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Definitions 
 
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics  
Auxiliary Officer Officer appointed under the Police Act to provide support to sworn 
police officers with custodial duties as well as a range of other 
support tasks using specific police powers and training 
BCA Building Code of Australia 
BMW Building Management and Works  
Bridewell The royal palace’s detention facility originally named after the 
nearby 16th century Well of St Bride. Bridewells came to be 
recognised as custodial facilities and similar subsequent facilities 
were referred to as Bridewells. The term ‘Bridewell’ is still used 
today in reference to some police station holding facilities 
throughout the United Kingdom.  
CCTV  Closed Circuit Television or recordable security vision 
CDG   Custodial Design Guidelines  
CJS    Criminal Justice System 
Cross-talk Ability to communicate via unconventional and unintended 
methods due to poor sound isolation, including physical separation, 
mechanical ducts, pipework etc.  
COPs Commissioner’s Orders and Procedures 
Custodial Officer A category of police employed under a civilian agreement attached 
to the Perth Watch House providing custodial support. WAP no 
longer recruits personnel to form part of this category. 
Dado Line A horizontal line created where two colours meet, usually 1200mm 
above a finished floor level creating a two-tone colour scheme 
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Direct supervision Constant surveillance applied in New Generation prisons achieving 
continual contact and interaction with all prisoners at all times 
DCS Department of Corrective Services 
Exercise yard A generally well-proportioned breakout area for detainees usually 
with access to natural light, ventilation and sometimes a view to 
the sky and outdoor sounds 
Houses of Correction (See Workhouses) 
HR Human Resources 
JPA  Joondalup Police Academy  
LMP London Metropolitan Police 
New Generation  (Design) A strategic and unique spatial layout associated with prison 
environments beginning in the 1980s. 
OIC  Officer In Charge of a facility, shift or station, usually a sergeant or 
above but on occasion or in specific locations an experienced senior 
constable. 
Panopticon  A panopticon is a type of building that allows a watchman to 
observe all inmates of an institution without them being able to tell 
if they are being watched. 
PCF/s   Police Custodial Facility[ies] 
Police ‘Gaols’  Historically refers to facilities used for holding criminals awaiting 
trial or those convicted of relatively minor crimes serving short 
sentences, similar to the American jails that serve a similar 
purpose. Confinement and isolation in such facilities are at best 
short-term security measures (United Nations Social Defence 
Research Institute 1975, 2).  
Police Lock-up  A generic term for a short-term police custodial facility used for 
temporary holding 
vi 
 
Regimental Numbers Unique official identification numbers (usually affixed to the breast 
or collar of military and police uniforms) which identify its 
individual members 
Poorhouses Publicly funded, privately administered institutions for living for the 
poor and destitute (who are typically) unable to work.  
PWH (existing)  Perth Watch House (WA Police Complex between Hay Street and 
Adelaide Terrace, East Perth) previously named East Perth Lock-up 
PWH (proposed new) Perth Watch House (Cnr Fitzgerald and Roe streets, Perth) 
RE Royal Engineer 
RCIADIC Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
Sally Port A secure vehicular annex and entry point associated with custodial 
facilities for secure transfer of people from a vehicle to the facility 
Silhouette Line  (See Dado line) 
SOP Standard Operating Procedures 
STCF/s Short-Term Custodial Facility[ies], a custodial facility specifically 
intended to temporarily hold people – PCFs, detention centres, 
remand centres or other similar facilities  
Trustee Prisoner or ‘Trusty’ prisoner – a low-risk and DCS/WA Police approved 
person who for the remainder of their short custodial sentence 
lives in a PCF instead of prison, with some autonomy in return for 
domestic labour  
Tun A facility for temporary overnight confinement of people arrested 
during the hours of darkness  
Workhouses Publicly funded, privately administered institutions where debtors 
would live and work with the intention of paying off debts and the 
indigent laboured for food  
WACJS    West Australian Criminal Justice System 
vii 
 
Timeline of penal events 
 
• 1704  Fraud’s Workhouse a basis model for RCC custodial facilities  
• 1764 Cesare Beccaria's Dei Delitti e Delle Pene published 
• 1791  Bentham’s Panopticon drawings completed by Willey Reveley 
• 1812-21  Millbank Prison construction period (part facility open in 1816) 
• 1826  WA first settled in King George Sound (near current Albany) 
• 1829  Swan River Colony (SRC) first settled  
• 1829  London Metropolitan Police established by Sir Robert Peel 
• 1829  Henry Willey Reveley first civil engineer to SRC (son of Willey Reveley) 
• 1830-31  Round House construction complete 
• 1830  Perth Waterside Lock-up completed (St Georges Terrace) 
• 1830-48  Public executions and chain gangs to be phased out 
• 1838-49  Rottnest Prison completed and functional 
• 1840-42  Pentonville Prison construction period (still in operation)  
• 1841  Guildford Lock-up/Gaol opened 
• 1842  Thomas Hill Dixon, member of London Metropolitan Police [LMP] (later 
Superintendent of Convicts - WA) 
• 1849-56  Rottnest Prison unused in this period  
• 1851-59  Fremantle Prison constructed under EYW Henderson 
• 1852  Richard Roach Jewell becomes the Director of Public Works 
• 1852  York Lock-up/Gaol constructed 
• 1853  WA Police considered as a structured organisation 
• 1854-66  Perth Gaol construction works 
• 1855  Perth Waterside Lock-up closed 
• 1856  Mt Eliza Lock-up/Gaol operational 
• 1863-69  EYW Henderson prisons Surveyor General & Military 
 Prisons Inspector General 
• 1864  Fremantle Asylum construction complete 
• 1869-86  EYW Henderson Commissioner of LMP 
• 1871  Quad Native Prison built Rottnest Island 
• 1874  Poor House proposed for Fremantle 
• 1888  Perth Gaol last prisoner transferred to Fremantle Prison 
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• 1890  Millbank Prison closed 
• 1897  Perth Lock-up construction complete Cnr Roe and Beaufort streets 
• 1898  Royal Commission Fremantle instigated by facility conditions 
• 1901  Federation 
• 1902  Rottnest no longer officially recognised as a prison island 
• 1903  Prisons Act 
• 1904-07  Circular panoptic exercise yard built at Fremantle Prison 
• 1909  Fremantle Asylum designated to be used as a Poor House  
• 1909  Last female executed in WA, Fremantle Prison 
• 1911  Royal Commission Fremantle  
• 1920s  Prison farm alternative gains popularity 
• 1925  Stateville Prison USA opened (still operational)  
• 1941  Fremantle Asylum no longer used as a poor house 
• 1942  Barton’s Mill classified as a prison (perimeter fence with tents) 
• 1960s  Reformatory prison philosophy generates momentum  
• 1961  Last execution at Pentonville Prison 
• 1964  Last execution in WA, Fremantle Prison 
• 1965  East Perth Lock-up construction complete 
• 1970  Women transferred from Fremantle Prison to Bandyup Prison 
• 1980s  Direct Supervision prison design a new direction in prison design 
• 1989  Barton’s Mill closed 
• 1991  Fremantle Prison closed – prisoners to Casuarina 
• 1994 Rangeview Juvenile Detention and Remand Centre opens 
• 1997 Banksia Hill Juvenile Detention and Remand Centre opens 
• 2000 Hakea Prison and Remand Centre opens 
• 2001 Acacia Prison, first privately run prison, opens 
• 2004  Boronia Pre-Release Centre for women open 
• 2005-14 Banksia Hill Detention Centre expansion 
 Acacia Prison expansion 
 Series of new prison work camps at Warburton and Wyndham  
 Expanded prison work camps at Walpole, Pardelup and Roebourne 
 West Kimberley Regional Prison – Aboriginal culture specific prison 
 Eastern Goldfields Regional Prison replacement 
 Wandoo Reintegration Facility (second privately run prison) 
 New Perth Police Complex completion anticipated  
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Abstract 
 
Evolving from Colonisation and the transfer of associated knowledge, attitudes and societal 
norms, early West Australian (WA) penal architecture and philosophy, and hence some 
aspects of the WA Criminal Justice System (CJS), has an English ancestry. As a consequence 
of this, and stagnancy in penal reform progress, severe deficiency in specialist literature, 
incompatible spatial strategies and insufficient relevant architectural research, 
contemporary carcerative facilities, including Police Custodial Facilities (PCFs), continue to 
reflect many outdated design principles and philosophies promoted by early prison ideas 
and reformers. PCFs perform the unique function of temporarily detaining suspects and 
provide an integral interface to other allied resources and sectors of the CJS. Paucity in PCF 
associated research suggests a lack of consideration and critical knowledge of the 
requirements for specialised spatial relationships and robust architectural theory relating 
specifically to PCFs and has rendered them an under-developed critical functional 
component in the WA CJS. This research is therefore concerned with developing a 
specialised body of knowledge and understanding of the requirements of PCF spaces that 
maintain and enhance the capacity for dignity where necessary, and serve the needs of the 
custodian and those held.  
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Introduction 
 
Police Custodial Facilities (PCFs) in the West Australian Criminal Justice System (WACJS) 
perform the unique and specialised function of temporarily detaining or holding suspects. 
However, due to a severe deficiency in specialist literature, incompatible spatial models and 
strategies and insufficient relevant architectural research and government funding, current 
PCFs continue to reflect prison philosophies and building designs that are in need of review 
and fresh resource investment. Further, the fundamental operational requirements of 
Short-Term Custodial Facilities (STCFs), are based on entirely different parameters and a 
separate and unique set of functions in the WACJS in comparison with prison institutions. 
As a consequence of focusing on prison models for STCFs, this suggests a misalignment of 
spatial provision and rationale when existing architectural outcomes are considered in 
conjunction with the distinct operational needs and specific procedures, policies and 
regulations governing contemporary police custody. This disparity implies a legacy gap in 
critical knowledge and consideration of the requirements for specialised spatial 
relationships and robust architectural theory relating specifically to PCFs, resulting in less 
than ideal architectural composition of the WACJS. This research is therefore concerned 
with advancing our understanding and developing specialist knowledge and architectural 
strategies to reduce the contemporary incompatibility between architectural brief-given 
functional requirements of PCF spaces and prescribed application of police policy and 
procedure.  
In respect to STCFs, this research seeks to bring the two seemingly unrelated disciplines of 
architecture and policing to the forefront of a specific analytical undertaking which aims to 
discover and understand custodial spatial requirements from a custodian’s tactical and 
operational perspective. This is achieved through analytical discourse and narratives as well 
as related analyses of physical sites, and historical, intermediate and contemporary theories 
and philosophies to make associations between organisational relationships, training, 
procedure and architecture. The scope of this thesis is to identify critical flaws within 
components of existing PCFs and suggest improved alternative design or operational 
solutions that could be developed to inform design of a successful local or state-level 
operational PCF environments which is humane for its detainees, staff and visitors and 
offers an environment which is conducive to a reduction in stress and anxiety. Therefore, 
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the aim of this research is twofold: first, to highlight some key issues that may help reduce 
assaults, self harm and violence in PCFs and help staff to carry out their duties while 
adhering to policy and procedures; second, to advance the understanding of carceral 
architecture, specifically PCFs and their associated operational requirements. In his book 
Buildings and power; freedom and control in the origin of modern building types Markus 
(1993, 25) notes that hierarchies of authority and control exist in all architecture (buildings) 
as the melange of different entities and their component relationships are defined and 
informed by carefully orchestrated spatial strategies. Therefore it is not a question of the 
existence of surveillance in this context, but by whom and for what purpose surveillance is 
undertaken. As such, strategically designed spatial programs that facilitate surveillance are 
not restricted to the confines of custodial facilities, but rather the need for observation 
exists in all buildings such as schools, hospitals, museums and libraries etc, but for different 
purposes. PCFs and other non-penal facilities stand to benefit from surveillance to ensure 
safety, whereas penal institutions might use surveillance as a rehabilitative instrument to 
help modify behaviour.  
Analytical research can be considered a critical link between theory and architectural 
practice, and is essential to derive informed conclusions and innovative (and sensible) new 
theories, and in the context of this research, the specific application of forms of surveillance 
that are beneficial to both the observer and the observed within PCFs. Additionally, re-
evaluation of practice or, in essence, performance must also be considered, for as Einstein 
aptly concluded, the definition of insanity would be “doing the same thing over and over 
again and expecting different results” (Calaprice 2011, 474). Considering this, Schön (2004, 
4) states that:  
“[P]rofessionally designed solutions to public problems have had unanticipated 
consequences, sometimes worse than the problems they were designed to solve. 
Newly invented technologies, professionally conceived and evaluated, have turned 
out to produce unintended side-effects unacceptable to large segments of our 
society.” 
Improvements in the design of PCFs should therefore aim at, but not be limited to, reducing 
risk for detainees and staff, while also maintaining security integrity, maximising efficiency, 
humanising the experiential quality of the space for all personnel (including detainees) in 
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the space, and assist officers to adhere to policies and procedures.1 This strategy, therefore, 
disassociates itself  from the conventional architectural understanding of panoptic 
environments that seek to achieve surveillance at all costs to an  administration that 
facilitate “surveillance, transparency, security, efficiency, and knowledge” (Foucault 1975, 
249), which in part form the backbone of short-term custodial function (for terms relating 
to panoptic see ‘Panopticon’ in definitions section). 
Panoptic principles in carcerative contexts essentially seek to produce a self-regulatory 
response in one’s conduct by means of misdirection and psychological conditioning. In such 
spaces the ‘observed’ must assume the existence of actual or perceived constant 
surveillance by a strategically positioned ‘observer’ in the prescribed space. This suitably 
modifies inmate behaviour to achieve conformity. Rigorous and long-standing application 
of panoptic principles is readily associated with prison design despite negative 
psychological implications in long-term custodial facilities. Yet a paucity in research aligned 
with implementing or considering panoptic spaces in PCFs suggests that despite the 
beneficial superior levels of surveillance able to be achieved with relatively benign 
psychological effects, such architectural expressions in contemporary carcerative 
institutions that challenge the wellbeing of detainees and staff. It could be argued that 
contemporary society’s perception of surveillance and understanding of the true 
implications of Big Brother can be directly apportioned to, and have been intensified 
through published literature. Reference made to the application of the omnipotent Big 
Brother is over-inflated and, moreover, is of fictional proportions more relevant to social 
and public contexts. Therefore, societal sentiment to surveillance is generalised and has 
been significantly influenced by myth resulting in a common belief that does not relate to a 
considered and research-led approach to its application in PCFs and forms no relationship 
to Orwell’s classic Nineteen Eighty-four: a novel, in which he writes: 
“He took a twenty-five cent piece out of his pocket. There, too, in tiny clear 
lettering, the same slogans were inscribed, and on the other face of the coin the 
head of Big Brother. Even from the coin the eyes pursued you. On coins, on stamps, 
on the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and on the wrappings of a cigarette 
packet – everywhere. Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. 
Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed – 
                                                          
1
 COPs Commissioners Orders and Procedures manual & SOPs Standard Operating Procedures 
manual for specific locations 
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no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your 
skull” (Orwell 1949, 72). 
This insight is indicative of a situation whereby having succumbed to Big Brother’s 
oppressive matrix, as a system of measures, Orwell describes a world of fear which is 
utterly devoid of individuality, privacy, opinion and where one could be made to 
“disappear” (Orwell 1949, 67). As this is a classic text that indiscriminately approaches the 
notion of surveillance as intrusive and inherently problematic, it is used here to illustrate 
that texts with such a perspective towards surveillance could have the capacity to form a 
generalised sentiment towards the term within society. It cannot be overstated that within 
the context of this research and where surveillance refers to that within PCFs, the term 
surveillance should not be equated with Orwellian or similar texts. This, fictional, broad-
brush, and exaggerated position on all-powerful and all-seeing surveillance does over time 
influence and perpetuate the sentiment of other authors and thus society who develop a 
position inspired by this nuance. Consequently, panoptic considerations, even in STCFs, a 
completely different typology with unique functions, appear to be abhorrent and 
incomprehensible. 
Nevertheless, as this thesis will demonstrate, there is potential merit in the retrofitting of 
some key component surveillance-based principles in carcerative institutions, specifically in 
STCFs and not in prisons as has historically been the case. It is also the case that law and 
order significantly benefits from CCTV surveillance in banks, trains and other public 
locations from a level of surveillance that provides an increase in public safety. This form of 
surveillance is not applied to reform or rehabilitate, but provides a necessary medium 
designed to protect all parties in public and private spaces in urban environments. The 
premise upon which surveillance is argued in this thesis is supported by Zimbardo and 
Leippe’s (1991, 132-133) observations that to minimise the risk of persecution and maintain 
their position on contentious matters, people seek the association and reassurance of like-
minded people. Similarly, Brown (1977, 8) summarises Nineteen Eighty-four by suggesting 
that Orwell believed that “public opinion can put a human being under continuous pressure 
to make him behave and think in exactly the same way as everybody else.” Set against 
different ideas and arguments, many people will formulate their own conclusions based on 
assessment of specific critical investigation and research of historical and contemporary 
discourse as “new information may prove old beliefs wrong” (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 
145). This being considered, institutions, architects and researchers must collaborate and 
6 
 
share knowledge to ensure a more comprehensive, integrated and holistic approach to 
facility design that is compliant with legislation and government standards.  
In every instance, proposed new short-term custodial facilities present momentous 
opportunities for the implementation of research, specialised architectural strategies and 
philosophical solutions inclusive of and beyond mere standards and legislative compliance. 
Consequently, Schön (2002, 77) states that evidence which suggests that there is an 
“increasing . . . tendency to think of policies, institutions, and behaviour in itself, as objects 
of design” already exists.  
For the purpose of this research, the lack of specialised STCFs in Perth has been highlighted 
by studying existing district level custodial facilities2 and the current designated police state 
lock-up facility, the Perth Watch House, in Adelaide Terrace, East Perth. It should, however, 
be noted that PWH is outdated due to its age (40 years) leading to the building of a 
replacement in Northbridge. What should be emphasised here is that architecture does not 
provide the whole solution, but is a critical component which must operate in conjunction 
with other factors to offer better functional solutions and create effective operational PCFs. 
Fundamentally, architectural briefs for custodial facilities (specifically PCFs), are a product 
of many divergent yet interrelated issues associated with societal attitudes towards law 
and order, philosophies on crime and punishment, government persuasion, research, and 
funding which directly impacts on the quality of PCF architecture in terms of physical size, 
finishes specification, and project delivery. Governments have failed to empower 
practitioners to resolve complex issues or find alternative means to adapt to rapid changes 
in societal attitudes, technology and policing through conventional means and thought. 
Increasingly there is a “tendency to think of policies, institutions, and behaviour as objects 
of design” (Schön 2004, 77). These determinants inform the essence of prescriptive 
specifications drafted vicariously by the specifier and through the pen of the architect. 
However, this process is without critical research, specialist contributions and reflective 
practice, or as for architecture, the process of stringent reflective evaluation which can be 
directly associated with improved knowledge (Schön 1983, 69). The apparent paucity in 
such assessment predicates the foundation of the (following) objectives and aims of this 
research. 
 
                                                          
2
 District-level Lock-up refer to PCFs that are contained within the largest police station building for 
that district, e.g. East Metropolitan District refers to Midland Police Station 
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Aims and purpose of the study 
Preamble - Preliminary Investigations (Masters Dissertation) 
The rationale of this research is derived from of findings of my undergraduate Architectural 
Masters Dissertation completed in 2008. This undertook limited comparative analysis and 
consideration of significant components of PCFs in contrast to historical advances in prison 
and other forms of custodial facility design to ascertain if PCF design shared similar 
architectural and philosophical roots with prisons, psychiatric facilities and hospitals. On 
completion, it was established that PCFs and prisons perform different functions in the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS) and people held in PCFs by definition are not similarly 
classified as those held in prison institutions or held for the same purpose. As a 
consequence, detainees held in PCFs require different accommodative structures, and to 
facilitate strategic police operational requirements, distinctive and specialised architectural 
forms. 3  
This research shares in WA Police’s acknowledgement that the existing Perth Watch House 
is outdated. It is also noted that design of a new Watch House had started during the 
course of the study. As a part of this, a theoretical comparative analysis was conducted by 
visiting and examining Brisbane’s Roma Street Watch House and Justice Complex, a PCF 
considered an exemplar for the new Perth Watch House and contemporary PCF design 
(R.21 2008). Staff in the Brisbane Watch House were also interviewed in relation to the 
operational, procedural and philosophical aspects of the facility as a way of determining if 
the architecture and its occupational use formed beneficial or counterproductive 
relationships. Additionally, a site visit and interviews were conducted at the Joondalup 
Police Academy’s custodial ‘simulation’ facility which was examined to also determine if 
there was a disparity or correspondence between training, the training environment and 
the reality of operational facilities experienced on a recruit’s graduation to operational 
policing.  
This research determined that existing Watch-house or lock-up facilities available to WA 
Police were not significantly dissimilar to functional philosophies reflective of a legacy of 
now outdated prison design. This reiterates the need for the new customised facility that 
has been commissioned for construction in Northbridge. Additionally, it was determined 
that further investigation is required to understand the causes of the similarities between 
                                                          
3
 This suggested further investigation assisted in developing the focus of this research. 
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PCFs and other custodial facilities and philosophical and historical discourse associated with 
crime, punishment, carcerative architecture and the inception of WA Police.4 It is the 
background of these findings that have formed the basis of my objectives and aims of this 
research which initially traces the history and defines the origins of WA Police and the role 
of police in the CJS.  
A historical contextual analysis was undertaken to distinguish significant chronological 
threads and the organisation’s historical relationships pre and post West Australian 
colonisation, from frontier to contemporary policing. Further, this research has analysed 
Perth Watch House, WA’s state PCF, discovering its fundamental responsibility as an 
integral platform and initial interface into the WACJS, and investigated existing examples of 
WA metropolitan district PCFs formulating a functional, organisational and architectural 
datum as a baseline for historical and contemporary comparison. Finally, this dissertation 
undertook critical analyses of typical WA PCF architecture and spatial strategies to 
determine the relevance of current PCF design, appropriateness of spatial form, and 
compatibility with critical functional and ethical requirements. These PCFs have been 
represented in a way that is intentionally diagrammatic in this thesis and are not intended 
to be read as building drawings but as spatial relationships and layout patterns, for obvious 
security reasons. 
Overview of the study  
(Chapters 1-3) Background  
Research of published works pertinent to the history and establishment of the WA Police, 
PCFs and prison facilities, as well the corresponding international architectural standards, 
was undertaken as well as research of literature relating to historical and contemporary 
philosophical discourse relating to incarcerative architecture, crime and punishment, 
psychology of space and the principles of control architecture relating to custodial facilities. 
Historical Beccarian and Benthamite texts and more contemporary Foucauldian literature 
on crime and punishment, prisons and the ideals of Jeremy Bentham on incarcerative 
philosophy are referenced as an instrumental component of early prison institutional 
architecture, judicial reform, retributive penalty and philosophical and physical control, 
which arguably continues to influence existing and enduring custodial facility design.  
                                                          
4
 While research undertaken within disciplines of architecture relating to carceral contexts exist and 
utilise similar research of methods, the methods adopted specifically for this research are adapted 
from diverse interdisciplinary frameworks and structured to a local WA and PCF specific setting.   
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Government and semi-government reports and publications such as royal commissions and 
inquests into specific incidents which offer findings and design, policy and procedural 
recommendations are used as a marker to ascertain disparities in recommendation and 
implementation or time-lag to its implementation.  
Police guidelines were analysed in relation to the comparative functional capacity of 
current PCFs and historical police custodial architecture. The Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
the census and archives also form a valuable resource of historical data for illustrating 
critical patterns and trends. The Heritage Council of Australia, State Records Library, 
Broome Museum, and WA Police Historical Society were also excellent sources of historical 
data and oral histories which have directly assisted in mounting a more expansive 
understanding of historical, hereditary and contemporary issues relative to this research 
and its objectives. 
These chapters therefore examine the philosophical history of punishment and its 
associated philosophical discourse and trends to develop an understanding of the 
relationships between societal attitudes and their embodiment in carceral perspectives and 
their subsequent manifestations in architecture. In particular, those drawing from English 
examples of legislation, government and attitudes towards crime, punishment and 
incarceration relate to and inform similar developments in many Australian contexts.  
Philosophical and architectural discourse is examined to determine their convergence into 
an association with the WA prison facilities platform. This is a localised contextual analysis 
of the unique developments on which prison system facilities were established and 
philosophies subsequently transformed. Colonial rule governing law and order and the 
development of an official WA Police organisation is similarly assessed adjacent to London 
police models, to determine if its foundation has been modelled on this Anglo example but 
consolidated in its current form due to unique local conditions.  
(Chapter 4) Case Study: Questionnaire, Site Analysis, and Fieldwork Methodology  
What chapter 4 demonstrates is that insufficient police training and the inability to update 
some police facilities to meet their needs as required have challenged the WA Police 
organisation from its inception. In examining existing facilities through observation and 
analysis of contemporary narratives of personnel associated with PCFs, policy and 
operational procedure, it would appear to a degree that it continues to do so, and although 
progress has been made, fiscal and strategic government inefficiencies and insufficiencies 
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promote a continuance in these inadequacies, and further, establishes that internationally 
a disparity in progress exists between prison and police facilities, particularly around the 
implementation of innovative architectural solutions and new conceptual notions.  
A more cohesive and effective custodial training matrix, requiring partnership with 
regulations and policy and associated operational PCF design, may be determined by 
developing an understanding of (existing) collective custodial attitudes and socio-
organisational constructs and relationships as a product of custodian training relevant to 
the requirements of operational PCF design.  
This research thus examines attitudes towards PCFs and short-term custodial duties as a 
way of understanding how sensitive contemporary conceptions could be translated into 
tangible architectural solutions. From this, assessment is made of existing custodial 
infrastructure in the context of future considerations that are based on international-styled 
strategies.  
These strategies are centred on privatisation of law and order, personnel, custodial 
transport, provisions and infrastructure developments and argue that any human resource 
and economic benefits achieved by outsourcing, restructuring or distancing the police 
organisation’s custodial systems and accountabilities may manifest as negative outcomes, 
particularly if tendered to private corporations, which as business enterprises operate 
under entirely different ideologies.  
To inform my objectives, which are based on architectural, sociological, historical and 
human relationships and multi-faceted architectural research, both qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies were deemed necessary. These methods were applied 
to three specific areas of concern: philosophy (of punishment – historical and present), 
architecture (response – historical and contemporary) and police (custodial training, 
policies and legal procedures – historical and contemporary).  
This research does not intend to consider the minutiae of every aspect of PCF design, 
custodial training, operational PCF policies and procedures, but rather undertake critical 
assessment of specific areas to develop a critical understanding and new knowledge 
relating to custodial spatial requirements and organisational relationships specific to 
existing operational WA PCFs. This can be interpreted and adapted to inform alternative 
future PCF architecture, design concepts, models and functional spatial components that 
are humane and provide safety for all occupants through adequate surveillance.  
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To achieve these aims this research is composed of three sub-categories, each with 
constituent parts: examination of literature, conducting interviews and undertaking site 
visits and mapping.  
The following illustration represents this process as a collection of key descriptor words 
that summarise the detailed explanation to follow.  
Diagrammatic outline of research  
 
An investigation of existing theories, narratives and experiential analyses was required to 
develop design and project specific knowledge relating to particular historical and 
contemporary police facilities and to increase knowledge in a related area to empower 
decision-making involving non-project specific design (Downton 2003, 18). Specific 
methodological application involved architectural analysis via site visits and mapping of 
existing district level PCFs and the existing PWH where facilities were examined to observe 
design changes through habitation, drawing, measuring, occupying and experience, and 
critical investigation of relevant theories and review of prison history and architectural 
custodial history.  
Furthermore, philosophy of crime and punishment, police history, police policy and 
procedure, training, architectural briefs, guidelines, statistics and facts and approved semi-
Texts 
•prison history 
•architectural history 
•philosophy of crime and 
punishment 
•police policy and procedure 
•police history 
•architectural briefs and 
guidelines 
•statistics + facts 
Interviews 
•police 
•trainers 
•custody officers 
•auxiliary officers 
•ancillary personnel 
Site visits 
+ 
mapping 
•drawings 
•observation 
•design changes through use 
•occupying +experiencing space 
Objectives 
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structured exclusive interviews of police, custody and auxiliary officers were also 
conducted.  
Architectural briefs, and thus strategic spatial decision-making, are not entirely subject to 
historical precedents, architectural pedagogy, cultural intuition or the free will of the 
architect, but rather clear instructions informed by clients, economic constraints and 
specific language guiding architectural decisions, of which the occupiers of space are 
generally not associated with the documentation and discourse before its construction. 
However, these dialogues or narratives are the basis on which architectural decisions 
materialise into design strategies which inherently determine functionality and experience 
(Markus and Cameron 2002, 16). This means that in most cases the occupiers will inhabit 
the building after the fact, so the pre-design, design and construction phases to which they 
had no input precedes them and, as a result, none of their concerns, knowledge or 
experience is considered relevant. 
In the context of this research, narrative analysis is the process by which professional 
experience and its essential relevance to the research is converted into meaningful 
material. Narrative analysis and its documentation has been defined as “systematic theory 
of narrative” by Genette (1980, 7) and by Markus and Cameron (2002, 12-13) as “the power 
to represent reality in a particular way and [have] it be accepted as ‘the truth’ . . .  a neutral 
version of reality . . . which seeks to discover specific patterns which contribute to a 
particular construction of reality being represented” associated with the pertinent 
research. Contributing to this, narrative or discourse analysis is used to not only analyse 
field research data, but also interpret the subtle human nuances of the content, such as 
grammar, carriage and formal and informal demeanour, tone and vocabulary of 
professionals, specialists and of the recorded text (Markus and Cameron 2002, 8). 
Therefore, theoretical discourse, perceptions and knowledge attributed to narratives, are 
significantly more rigorous and form a holistic approach to architectural resolution by 
incorporating “methodological discussion” with its past, present and future inhabitants 
(Genette 1980, 7: 28-29).  
Interviews - Group 1, Police, Custody and Auxiliary Officers 
This stage began through a series of semi-structured interviews that were undertaken with 
highly experienced police officers as well as retired police and people who had previously 
served as sworn police officers. Consent was sought from WA Police Academic Research 
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Administration Unit (ARAU) to allow this research to be conducted and to authorise 
interviews with serving police organisation personnel.  
This was not only necessary to facilitate interviews, but also to gain access to police 
buildings and sites to undertake site visits and analysis. These visits were to be coordinated 
with the interviewee at the time of visit such that they took place either before or after the 
interview had been completed. A meeting was held with staff at the ARAU to which a 
proposal was submitted outlining the investigative objectives associated with this research 
before the start of systematic exploration, evaluation and observation. Further to this, the 
questionnaire intended for use as a guide to my proposed semi-structured interviews was 
discussed with the unit staff that subsequently supported and approved the research 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was structured into six sub-components comprising a 
total of 38 questions (see Chapter 4). The six sub-components include: Experience, 
Organisational Relationships, Custodian Training, Facilities Considerations, PCF Violence and 
Risk Management, On Dignity, and HR and Facility Management. The Academic Research 
Administration Unit staff kindly offered to facilitate the process by obtaining authorisation 
from the Assistant Commissioner and organising district commissioned officer approvals to 
start facility site visits and interviews.  
Comprehensive contextual analysis was achieved through narratives drawn from the 
interview of a broad spectrum of serving officers. These involved sworn officers-in-charge 
(OIC) of police stations containing PCFs, sworn or unsworn officers-in-charge of ‘shifts’ of 
police stations containing PCFs or the PWH, and officers with significant current or  
previous experience in PCFs or the PWH. These represented an assortment of officers with 
varying backgrounds, cultural and social upbringings, training, life and policing experiences 
that as a collective forms a somewhat microcosmic representation of the organisation as a 
whole.  
From the outset, it was decided that officers with modest policing experience would not be 
interviewed as they would not have enough depth or consistent specialist knowledge. It 
must be noted it was not possible to interview equal proportions of male and female OICs 
as only four female officers were in or had previously acted in the position of OIC of a shift 
at the permitted research sites. Therefore, female officers were also included in this 
research where present. Although there appeared to be a distinct paucity of female OICs at 
district level police station lock-ups, which confirms the existence of an uneven distribution 
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or representation of female personnel at this level, within PWH there appears to be a more 
even representation of male and female shift OICs and personnel. 
The overall aim was to discover how individual attitudes towards pre-operational and 
operational training, situation specific experiences, and organisational relationships 
contribute to the understanding of the lock-up function, psychology of carcerative space, 
operational preparedness and sensitivity to social conduct and detainee dignity. Individuals 
were encouraged to talk about their own attitudes and perceptions towards policing, 
training, custodial care, hierarchy, facility issues, morale, organisational relationships, 
career stress and satisfaction or any other issues that arose from the interviews. Consent to 
participate in this research originally included the approval for tape recording of the 
interviews, but due to the topics discussed it was decided that hand written notes alone 
would be sufficient. The nature of the research was explained at considerable length by 
referring to the information provided in the participant information sheet before 
requesting their consent to participate in the voluntary interview which assured the 
participants of the research intent.5 
Twenty interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011, each taking an hour to 90 minutes, 
followed by a one-hour on-site analysis and a further one-hour (off-site) synopsis where 
supplementary explicative notes were made and then converted into summarised 
transcript. The transcript was later extrapolated into an interpretative matrix model 
providing a visual composition of representative consistencies and antithesis which 
required a degree of interpretive and subjective judgement to allow for an (empirical) 
numerical score ranging from one to nine (1-9) to be tendered for each question based on 
the preceding narrative discourse with critical narratives themselves serving as qualification 
for empirical data.  
The interviews produced invaluable critical knowledge and both empirical and non-
empirical data pertinent to complementing my understanding when considered in 
combination with other background research.6 This holistic mode of understanding is 
relevant to effect a reduction in the lack of adequate existing knowledge and research 
which would otherwise rely on the analysis of predominantly empirical data which is 
unlikely to adequately capture or significantly complement our understanding of the subtle 
organisational and spatial relationships that exist in PCF contexts. 
                                                          
5 
These records are stored in accordance guidelines set out in Ethics Approval.  
6
 The text contained in Chapter 4 is a summarised version of the interviews conducted. Actual 
interview answers are de-identified and can be found in the appendix section of this research. 
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Staff at each of the police custodial facilities graciously volunteered their time in relaying 
their unique experiences and knowledge, perceptiveness and professional sensibilities 
around the facilities’ ‘perceived’ operational inadequacies and distinctions, functionality, 
and ability to facilitate custodial care initiatives and adherence to official procedure from a 
police perspective. Out of this I gained an accumulation of experience in excess of 300 years 
of service. I should note that this research does not include or intend to seek or obtain 
responses or conduct interviews with any detainees. To have incorporated such parameters 
would require an entirely different study. 
Interview - Group 2 Non-Police (Ancillary personnel). 
An interview was conducted with an unsworn member of this group from the WA Police 
Land and Building Services. This was structured to gain insight into the proposed intent and 
limitations associated with the design briefs for building alterations and additions to 
existing PCFs and to proposed new facilities. This interview sought to determine which 
policies or what sociological, economic or external factors (including design related 
constraints) influence the overriding architectural language already adopted by WA PCFs. 
This interview further advanced my understanding of the requirements, impositions and 
legislatively enforced constraints. It also provided knowledge of the capacity and 
willingness of architects to undertake and incorporate sufficient pre-design research, and 
their intent on creating the most appropriate and specialised spaces beyond operational 
expectation based on existing knowledge or to determine if the objective appeared to 
simply meet the requirements of regulations, design brief, budget, timetable and current 
trends or standards.  
Site Analysis 
For the site analysis stage of my research, the WA Police Academic Research Administration 
Unit gave approval to visit seven PCFs for empirical and non-empirical architectural 
analysis. Such site visits were conducted (post-interview) with the permission and in 
coordination with the OIC of the authorised location, which comprised six district level 
police station PCFs and the Perth Watch House – WA’s state level PCF. 
Before undertaking this research it was decided that design of juvenile detention and 
facilities specifically intended for defined user groups such as those attributed to ethnicity 
and cultural difference, which offer specific additional challenges for architects such as 
indigenous-specific design, was outside the scope of this research. It became evident, 
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nonetheless, that existing facilities addressing accommodation requirements for these user 
groups are in much the same way worthy of further prospective research.  
Site visits were also conducted at other locations taking into account the diversity and 
dissimilarities of existing custodial facilities. Both contemporary and historical examples of 
custodial local, national and international facilities and typologies were researched to 
acquire an understanding of the array of physiological, psychological and organisational 
relationships associated with custodial architecture. The facilities visited included Broome 
Regional Prison, Fremantle Prison, Brisbane Watch House, Old York Gaol, Old Guildford 
Gaol , the Round House and Rottnest Island’s Quad Prison site. By investigating prison, gaol 
and PCF custodial typologies as well as facilities which have been used for both long-term 
and short-term and police and Prison Department purposes, I was able to develop an 
understanding the spatial relationships that are shared by different typologies and 
recognise similarities in design that permeate prisons and PCFs. 
The combination of literature-derived background knowledge with physical (architectural) 
site analysis provides an essential and comprehensive appreciation of the condition and 
advancement of PCF design in their current and historical contexts. This component of 
research became crucial in understanding the relationships between disparities in historical 
precedence, societal attitudes, literature, architectural spatial strategies, typology specific 
ideologies and guidelines. Site analyses will focus on gathering specific contextual 
information such as location, site constraints, architectural language, spatial strategy and 
spatial programs, capacity and surveillance capabilities such as direct, passive and 
electronic. Analyses of physical and experiential qualities were also conducted. This 
included materiality, security, spatial quality, lighting quality and source, acoustic control, 
and thermal comfort.  
Comparisons between design intent and actual performance were analysed in combination 
with the operational guidelines and the narratives of the custodial personnel associated 
with the analysed space. Physical and experiential analyses were compared with other 
custodial typologies to determine if similarities in design existed among institutions of 
dissimilar systems, function and philosophy. Methods of evaluating and documenting site 
analyses include photography, sketches, flow diagramming and measurements, situational 
perspectives and sensorial perception. To appreciate the sense of proportion of the 
different cells at the various locations visited, I inhabited them to measure them empirically 
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and to gain a sense of proportion of the volume of the space in relation to my physical 
presence in it. 
(Chapter 5) Survey and Site Visit Findings 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the organisational relationships and dynamics that 
develop specific to PCF environments and understand ways in which location-specific 
conventions and behaviours develop independently by the personnel who inhabit these 
insular policing locations. The intention of this chapter is to develop an understanding of 
WA Police’s organisational, social, cultural, procedural, philosophical and operational 
conditions specific to PCFs which directly inform the associated specific long-term spatial 
needs of the custodians who inhabit PCFs and facilitate custodial care. The chapter also 
establishes whether one ‘police personality’ exists or whether location specific legacies 
influence sentiment that affect police conduct, and further, whether custodian training is 
lock-up specific or what could be defined as ‘specialised’. This is discussed next to what can 
be defined as pre-existing location-specific organisational relationship legacies that define 
sentiment and operational approach separate to formal training, discussions that highlight 
issues of dignity and finally on amenity and specific components of PCFs. This is achieved 
through analysis of discussions with police interviewees and through the capturing of both 
empirical and non-empirical experiences through site visits to approved metropolitan PCFs. 
(Chapter 6) Surveillance Principles 
This chapter discusses the disparity between the perceived and the reality of surveillance in 
general and its application in highly specialised environments such as PCFs.7 To further 
highlight the significance of surveillance in such contexts, this discussion refers to select 
fundamental components of panoptic philosophy, which, if it weren’t for its namesake 
being problematic, could be considered in short-term custody such as PCFs. Therefore 
Jeremy Bentham’s philosophies on the panopticon and surveillance are discussed with 
reference to PCF perspectives and analysed on the basis of it being either a theoretical or 
effective model, in other words whether it could conceivably function as intended or not.  
In addition to this, further surveillance principles such as initiatives before entry and 
acceptance in to the PCF are discussed. These are referred to as Pre-Lock-up Screening 
areas that propose to act as a diversionary instrument that help minimise risk by 
                                                          
7
 It must be noted that in disciplines such as Critical Criminology surveillance is a highly contested 
terrain. 
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recognising detainees that should not be held in PCFs but ought to be assessed and cared 
for by other allied services.  
Limitations  
A research proposal was submitted to the Strategic Planning and Review Committee in the 
Department of Corrective Services as it was intended that empirical and non-empirical 
architectural analyses of contemporary prison facilities could be made to evaluate the 
evolutionary progression of long-term custodial facilities in contrast to short-term custodial 
facilities as existing literatures and historical discourse suggest that both typologies share a 
common ancestry.  
It was intended that site visits at prison facilities and interviews be conducted with prison 
personnel as it was envisaged that their operational experience, training and knowledge of 
prison facilities and professional opinions would contribute a more holistic context to this 
research. Associated data was proposed to help determine comparative contemporary 
disparities between police and prison facilities’ functionality, facilitating respective 
personnel compliance with operational guidelines, and further, to gauge the facilities’ 
adoption of ‘architectural surveillance’. It was intended that a comparative analysis of 
interviewee answers and reactions to the same or similar questions be made by evaluating 
answers given by respondents employed in differing custodial typologies. It was anticipated 
that this could establish whether organisational relationships and sentiment towards their 
institutional environment, occupation, and interpersonal relationships developed in a way 
that was similar or dissimilar when compared with employees from other custodial facility 
typologies.  
For the purposes of this research, it was not necessary to physically inspect prisons given 
sufficient existing examples, studies and historical and contemporary literature as well as 
empirical data exists in relation to both WA and international prison facilities. It is evident 
that sufficient prison-related research on architecture, sociology, psychology and various 
other humanities and social science disciplines has already been undertaken. For the 
purpose of this research, this was determined to be adequate in lieu of access to WA prison 
facilities by DCS. Though this situation is not of significant consequence, it does in part 
begin to substantiate my position that there is a need for a willingness to contribute to 
inter-organisational knowledge and cross-disciplinary understanding for the betterment of 
the entire system: a ‘system’ in which all departments are dependent on each other to 
succeed as a ‘justice system’.  
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Chapter 1 
Background/Literature review 
The Philosophical and Architectural History of Punishment  
Prisons 
Incarceration as we now know it was not inherently a common form of punishment and its 
conception cannot be outwardly attributed to any one country or individual. Rather, it has 
been described as a “primitive inclination” of authority where one and all generally 
remained unsegregated irrespective of age, record, offence or gender (Babington 1971, 3-
6). Webb and Webb (1922, 8), described the notion of basic early imprisonment as not a 
“punishment any more than chaining up a dog” and “simply a method of detention” to 
avoid escape and ensure the custodian could easily retrieve the offender and put him 
before a judge the following day or as required. Further, it would appear to be an 
impossible task to accurately date specific institutional penal markers, as trends associated 
with philosophical, architectural and legislative advancement and modernisation of 
countries did not occur simultaneously. Rather, a more linear country-specific tendency 
existed in isolation with some time lag in the advancement or adoption of the changing 
philosophies between countries.  
This is in keeping with the limited methods available for the transfer of information, 
technology and knowledge through earlier centuries in comparison with near instantaneous 
contemporary means. Acknowledging this, incarceration in itself was uncommon without 
direct association to other additional forms of retributive physical punishment. Punishment 
was defined as a “stimulus whose occurrence following a behaviour leads to a decrease in 
that behaviour” (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 49). Thus, early imprisonment is to be 
considered simply temporary detention before a trial, at which time the actual punishment 
would be handed down. Consequently, it is the concept of punishment and prison ideology 
which has evolved, not the institutions that facilitate temporary custody of untried people 
which essentially continue to serve the same function, albeit under slightly improved 
conditions and moreover specifically associated, for the purposed of this research, with 
police custody or Department of Corrective Services administered remand facilities.  
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In England, Henry II's sovereignty was associated with the development of effective 
enforcement of Royal Justice and of the King's Peace. His period in power coincided with 
legislation to provide detention facilities for pre-trial detainees. Further, Henry made 
significant inroads in developing an established trial by jury framework through the Assize 
of Clarendon in 1166, which also commanded counties to build gaols if suitable provisions 
for detention did not exist. Conditions in these provisional or new facilities were 
“indescribably squalid because few were built originally for the function . . . any building, 
whether suitable or not, was adapted for the purpose” (United Nations Social Defence 
Research Institute 1975, 14). Following this, the Mayor of London, Henry le Walleis, 1281-
83 (Lord Mayors of the city of London from 1354-2010, 1) caused a building to be known as 
the Tun-Upon-Cornhill due to its shape and location to be built in 1283 for the temporary 
overnight confinement of people arrested during the hours of darkness, which Babington 
(1971, 20) attests to being the basis on which Bridewells and houses of correction facilities 
would be later conceived. The Tun was used for this purpose until the royal castle was 
subsequently presented to the City of London as an alternative facility for the provision 
predominantly of short-term detention (Babington 1971, 20) largely for people accused of 
minor offences (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 14).  
Following this, reformative measures introduced by Henry VIII, which involved the closing 
of many monasteries once used as places of detention for religious offences, under Canon 
Law, led to an increased pressure to find alternative facilities to fulfil this initial function. 
According to United States Bureau of Prisons (1949, 18) being near the 16th century Well of 
St Bride, (now Bridewell Place, City of London) the palace’s detention facility itself was 
found to suit such a purpose and became recognised as an entity about 1557 and it is 
believed that because the Well was close to the detention place it came to be referred to as 
Bridewell. This pressure instigated a requirement of many more ‘Bridewells’ as a distinct 
custodial typology which was adopted as a designated custodial model to account for the 
reformative action, and for Crown and civil offences throughout Europe but especially in 
Holland and Germany (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949, 18). Webb and Webb (1922, 
2) attest to this and maintain that; 
“For the safe custody of a person apprehended, the constable . . . was he himself 
responsible, whether or not they would provide a Watch House or temporary Lock-
up. These lawful places of detention were, down to the 16th century, only the 
common [municipal and franchise] gaols. From 1557 and 1576 onwards there 
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existed also an increasing number of prisons bearing another name, and 
maintained under different statutes, known as Houses of Correction or Bridewells.” 
However, Bridewell facilities, were also adopted for similar and other purposes and all 
people – whether untried, sentenced, the poor for default or non-payment of fines, private 
debtors, people arrested on civil process and even entirely innocent witnesses held only to 
ensure their whereabouts when required for trial – were “exposed to practically identical 
treatment” (Webb and Webb 1922, 24: 77). Some 400 years before this, Justices of the 
Peace were charged with the power to be the overseers of what could be colloquially and 
loosely referred to as early ‘law and order’ and administers of punishment, and the 
“marshals of England [held] the traditional right of detaining in custody all prisoners who 
were awaiting trial” (Babington 1971, 20). They sentenced prisoners of the king's central 
courts inside Marshalsea Prison on the banks of the River Thames, Southwark. This period 
preceded the formation of an organised and funded police force in London by more than 
650 years. 
This is an early example of an attempt to specifically legislate certain practices relating to 
the provision of custody in non-specific facilities. Common gaols more closely resemble US 
jail models which temporarily hold people awaiting trial, as well as people sentenced to 
short-term imprisonment, usually less than 30 days (Carter, Glaser and Wilkins 1972, 71-
73). This was also similar to the function of ‘The Clinke’, accepted as having been a non-
police administered short-term “lock-up for minor offenders” (Babington 1971, 20). 
Nonetheless, the definition of ‘short-term’ is rather arbitrary when used in reference to 
early facilities, which also held debtors, instigating the inception of work houses (some time 
later) which were publicly funded institutions (Collins Australian Dictionary 2003, 1849) 
where debtors would live and work to pay off debts and the indigent would labour for food. 
These facilities were privately administered, and there was no incentive to intervene when 
it became apparent that some prisoners would never be able to leave based on the 
repayment structure set by their creditors. While facilities preceding work houses might not 
have been intended to operate as such, the prospect of extra financial remuneration by 
way of inducement for poorly paid administrators dictated otherwise (Morris and Rothman 
1998, 119).  
Destitute people deemed to be elderly, sick or insane or subject to any other consequence 
that rendered them unable to work “were frequently forced to seek poor relief or entry 
into a Poor House, a national system of poor relief introduced in England at the end of the 
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Sixteenth Century” (Hetherington 2009, 11). It should be noted that this system and new 
associated facilities were considered for WA during the initial colonisation, and although 
consideration was given to this issue of a severe lack of facilities which could be used to 
shelter the poor, little evidence of any concerted efforts made by the government to 
circumvent this problem exists and as a consequence of this, “the insane were also 
regularly sent either to gaols or to a hospital” (Hetherington 2009, 9-11). 
Against this background in WA, the (now defunct) Public Works Department (PWD) 
proposed a purpose-built Poor House be constructed in North Fremantle in 1874, for the 
poor and destitute and debilitated men (Le Page 1986, 114), which clearly adopted and 
resembled the spatial format and philosophy of countless existing examples of international 
work houses/Bridewells preceding its proposal (see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 Bridewell plans showing linearity of form, cell arrangement  
and terms of reference similar to other custodial typologies with  
different functions.  
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The need to separate ‘insane’ prisoners from the general prison population was also more 
readily appreciated and temporarily catered for during early colonisation by housing those 
with mental illness at Scott’s Warehouse (Ellis 1984, 15-18), which at the time was little 
more than a sparse and under-developed site owned by Captain Daniel Scott. This came 
before the completion of the Fremantle Asylum in 1865 (Ellis 1984, 15-18: Le Page 1986, 
87).  
Subsequent functional reassignment of Fremantle Asylum saw it reclassified as a facility for 
poor and elderly women in 1909 (Hutchison 1970, 12) after its occupants were transferred 
to the new Claremont Hospital for the Insane completed in 1903 (Register of heritage 
places - assessment documentation Graylands Hospital 2002, 2).  
  
Fig. 2 Poor House plan illustrating linearity of form and  
repetitive cell arrangement and philosophies similar to 
other historical and existing custodial typologies. 
24 
 
This might have temporarily alleviated and circumvented the government’s commitment to 
and expense of providing the proposed new Poor House and thus one was never built (see 
Fig. 2). Next to this, the Mount Eliza Depot buildings (see Fig. 3) “were transferred to the 
Colonial government” in 1868 for the purpose of functioning as an asylum for old and 
incapacitated paupers, in other words, a poorhouse (Matthews 2007, 9). 
  
Fig. 3 An example of early STCFs in WA featuring 3 cells 
arrangement in a linear formation serviced by a corridor.  
 
Clearly, there appeared to be a concerted endeavour to address the spatial requirements 
associated with contemporaneous social issues and with WA’s own Lunacy Act passed by 
Parliament in 1871. But the cost implications and expediency of new construction 
outweighed the straightforwardness of delegating functional reassignment of pre-existing 
infrastructure and in so doing disregarded the required distinction and specific 
requirements of the dissimilar categories of people held, inclusive of the poor, the young 
and those with mental disability. This situation appears to have been a recognised concern 
with The West Australian newspaper publishing; 
“The proposal to remove the 'Invalids' from the colonial depot under Mount Eliza, 
and from the convict depot at Fremantle and to unite them in one establishment at 
Freshwater Bay, is to be commended, although difficulty may be found in the 
classification of its in-mates when they are brought together.  
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“This must prove advantageous economically, because the cost of government and 
service will be lessened, and socially because the inhabitants of Perth will no longer 
be annoyed by those from Mount Eliza” (The West Australian, August 13, 1886). 
And further, in an excerpt of a report submitted by the Superintendent of Poor Houses, 
dated and titled Perth Poor House, March 31st, 1888; 
“I have the honour to submit the following remarks on the Poor Relief Department 
under my charge, for the year ending December 31st, 1887, and do append the 
Returns, showing comparison with the year 1886. These Returns show an increase 
over those in previous years, and as I have pointed out in former reports, will 
continue to do so for some years to come. The Royal Commission appointed by His 
Excellency the Governor, in December, 1887, for the purpose of making a full lot 
investigation into the administration of certain departments in the Public Service, 
reported on the Mount Eliza Poor House as follows: 
“A marked increase of late years has taken place in the admissions into the Invalid 
Depot . . . as previously stated, the number of inmates has been yearly growing 
greater . . . who, if kept in their respective districts, would entail a much greater 
expense to the Colony . . . these remarks are applicable now, and explain in a great 
measure the principal cause of the present great increase of paupers in that 
Institution” (The West Australian, April 16, 1888). 
And yet while Matthews (2007, 9) notes that “the poorhouse was to be perceived as an 
instrument for moral reformation”, this appears to be an unlikely objective, and would be 
more appropriately used to remove from sight what might be considered visual pollution to 
other members of society and social order. Nevertheless, the facilities were indiscriminate 
in their use for holding people afflicted with mental conditions due to an insufficiency of 
options. 
The distinction of suitable medical treatment for mentally ill people did not eventuate until 
the passing of the Lunacy Act 1903 and the later inception of mental health services in WA. 
At the same time, although the dire situation was apparent to the Government and prison 
officials, a lack of funding did not allow for a permanent purpose-built facility (Ellis 1984, 
12-25: 27-50). With this, mental illness would require specific medical assessment, 
treatment and facilities and not the former practice consisting essentially of providing a 
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place of detention. Significant advancement in mental health specialisation progressed over 
the next 60 years. Further advancement saw the Lunacy Act 1903 repealed in 1966 by the 
Mental Health Act 1962 (Ellis 1984, 129) leading to, and more closely resembling WA’s 
contemporary Department of Health, the Mental Health Commission.  
Nevertheless, improved screening and more effective alternatives are still required, as 
illustrated by a recent article Jail used to house disabled for years relating to “five 
intellectually disabled men [having] spent a total of 30 years in WA Prisons without having 
been convicted of crimes” (The West Australian, August 11, 2011). Furthermore, confusion 
arises with the interchangeable use of terms such as Bridewell and work house, or prison 
and gaol due to the disparity between their defined intended use and actual use being 
subjective and indistinct for a significant portion of early custodial history. The problem of 
transposable terminology used for specific functions and room types across all custodial 
typologies is still evident as it is still used today.  
This is due in part to only modest development in philosophical principles and none in 
architecture. These adaptive re-use exemplars and operational methods (in relation to later 
more purposeful proposed facilities) having few redeeming features worthy of inheritance 
(Johnston 1973, 11). Nevertheless, a measure of clarity was achieved nationally, though 
internationally significant confusion and interchangeable reference continued among 
dissimilar custodial models as it does to this day. And although repealed by the wording of 
the Prison Act 1865, the term Bridewell continues to be used in association with PCFs as in 
the case of Bristol and Leeds’ Bridewell Police Station. The name was also applied over 
centuries to countless similar facilities which accompanied judicial process (of temporarily 
detaining people) across England (Thomas 1972, 10).  
Notwithstanding this, Bridewells, within the meaning of the Prison Act 1865, were no 
longer recognised as an official form of custodial facility and (by repeal) it was demanded 
that prisoners held in such facilities be removed and held in ‘prisons’ as soon as they had 
become available. This suggests that this now defunct facility typology might have 
inadvertently and by default been to some degree an adjunct predecessor of more recent 
short-term custodial facilities for unsentenced people by having some aspects of a 
functional and associative pedigree still in keeping with current short-term PCFs, which 
serve a similar purpose. This suggests that legislative imposition dictated some order of 
separation and distinction among some custodial models. It also appears that this 
emphasised the development and advancement of prison facilities at the expense of the 
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Bridewell and to the detriment of the evolution of short-term PCFs. It is from this that it 
becomes evident that associated developments in relation to PCFs are a result of an 
imposition born out of the specialisation of prison systems and change in societal attitudes 
which serendipitously coincided with the period that saw the formalisation of the first 
police in England. Therefore, a once locally administered set of facilities which served all 
purposes and held all types of prisoners whether sentenced or unsentenced, mentally ill or 
awaiting trial, was now subject to classification of its subjects and specific function. Webb 
and Webb (1922, 126) state that police stations which now processed unconvicted 
prisoners, upon apprehension had “means of separation so defective, that he may be 
confined with the drunkards, burglars and pickpockets” with whom he had to be confined 
overnight or possibly for days where it had been known that prisoners were sometimes 
robbed by other prisoners in the lock-up. 
Nevertheless, Sir Robert Peel instigated the inauguration and formation of the first 
professional police force in England, the London Metropolitan Police, in 1829. Peel further 
proposed that for the sake of prison discipline and uniformity the centralisation of power 
and national dispersion of costs and authority associated with prison systems should occur. 
England was one of the last European countries to break away from local control over 
punishment, though unsentenced prisoners remained the responsibility of the localities 
(Morris and Rothman 1998, 125-126). “Almost the beginning of departmental supervision 
of prison administration” can be attributed to Peel (Webb and Webb 1922, 107), the 
argument being that; 
“it is inequitable that similar crimes should be punished in a dissimilar way. Why 
should a mere geography determine the amount and type of punishment? The 
Inspectorate of prisons and the proliferation of laws and national regulations on 
imprisonment had largely been born out of this concern, parity in sentencing and 
punishment had wide political appeal and no theoretical opposition” (Morris and 
Rothman 1998, 127). 
Short-term custody was locally financed and administered (about 1842) and long-term 
prison custody was now overseen by government which was made possible, moreover, by 
better rail transport and therefore the ability to better provide food for prisons which had 
always seen significant crises while locally administered with many prisoners succumbing to 
starvation if they did not have family members to provide for them (Morris and Rothman 
1998, 126-128).  
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Elsewhere, existing evidence suggests that the first purpose-built prisons, "the first true 
models of a new field of architecture,” were constructed in the early 17th century. Of 
particular interest are prisons in Rome and Milan built about 1628, of which comprehensive 
preservation and historical analysis suggest that the concept of the prison was more a 
design response to a general requirement for functional structures for industrial 
institutions. Although the process of industrialisation is manifest in prison architecture, 
sequential and methodical evolution is not typologically apparent before the 18th century 
(United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 8). Prison buildings in the 17th and 
18thcenturies were usually; 
“two or three-storey structures arranged in a rather haphazard way to enclose one 
or more courts, which were used for exercise. Often these erections were never 
designed to house prisoners in the first place and many unsuitable rooms and 
buildings quickly developed into fetid dens where men, women and children were 
confined together like wild beasts. Certainly none of the prisons had been built to 
take as many prisoners as were later forced into them. To these miseries must be 
added the corrupt practices of the jailers, who exacted fees from the prisoners for 
their food and keep, and made life insupportable for those who could not pay. So 
lucrative was the post of jailer that when one left the jail or died his job was given 
to the highest bidder” (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 15). 
At the turning point of the 18th century a limited yet influential number of enlightened 
reformers advocated a humanitarian and somewhat revolutionary position towards 
imprisonment and punishment. For countless years beforehand, and for several years 
during this period of reform, many prisoners endured hopelessness, torture, 
malnourishment and execution while held in contemptible conditions until the sentiments 
of society and that of law-makers adjusted. 
A testament to the ideology quoted above from Zimbardo and Leippe is the Catholic 
Church, which as early as 1704 augmented the idea of incarceration with contemplation 
and penitence, instigating a specialised architectural response influenced by philosophical 
operation and function requirements. Influenced by Fraud’s Workhouse in Florence, Pope 
Clement XI (1649-1721) commissioned architect Carlo Fontana to design a hospice/prison 
addition to St Michael’s Hospital in Rome. All individual cells “looked out onto a central 
corridor toward an altar with solitude allowing for reflection on misdeeds.” This 
architectural response was based on a design brief that inaugurated a cellular prison 
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blueprint which more specifically acknowledged the requirement to detain adults and 
juveniles separately,8 a design and philosophical ideology that influenced prison spatial 
programs and architecture for the next 200 years (United Nations Social Defence Research 
Institute 1975, 15). 
Following this, Pope Clement XII commissioned many facilities in Venice, Milan, Naples, 
Turin and Florence, which significantly contributed towards the evolution of an organised 
and distinguishable penal structure over 70 years. Following St Michael’s Prison, Rome 
(with the exception of Milan Prison), Ghent Prison in Belgium was regarded as the earliest 
large-scale penal institution that made a conscious attempt to use prison architecture and 
philosophy as a form of rehabilitative treatment (Johnston 1973, 13). This was arguably the 
most “significant penal building within the 70 year period with Milan being an intermediate 
configuration between St Michael and Ghent Prison” (United Nations Social Defence 
Research Institute 1975, 15-16). However, the philosophy associated with the central 
corridor in this facility appears to more closely resemble that which is aligned with panoptic 
surveillance ideals and not penitence. 
Further developments of the criminal justice system are attributable to Cesare Beccaria 
(1738-94), an Italian philosopher and avant-garde intellectual who argued against capital 
punishment and torture. Beccaria outlined his philosophies in Dei delitti e delle pene in 
1764. This was later translated and published as On Crimes and Punishments in 1880 and 
epitomised his fundamental ideologies and advocated utilitarian-imposed imprisonment as 
punishment and deterrence. Beccaria was ardently against capital punishment or torture as 
retribution for crime, but rather advocated that the severity of punishment should 
proportionately relate to the gravity of the crime. Further to this, societal inclinations 
relating to prisons as institutions, coincidentally associated them as “ . . . metaphors for 
constraints on freedom, both literal and symbolic” (Zimbardo 2007, 21).  
Beccarian philosophies and documented papers appear to have profoundly influenced 
Jeremy Bentham’s principles toward crime, punishment, discipline and imprisonment, 
which is evident from his published works. Philosophically aligned, Beccaria and Bentham 
argued against publicly exhibited and prolonged humiliation and merciless barbaric torture 
of “criminals.” Punishment in the form of lethal, pugnacious and torturous practice lasted 
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 This instigated further refinement to custodial institutions and associated legislation that ultimately 
led to separate facilities specifically for juveniles (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949, 134).  
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until the end of the 18th century. Due in part to their philosophies, though not 
geographically concurrent, revolutionary trends in international penal philosophy were 
initiated, inducing a paradigm shift in the philosophy of punishment and, in particular, the 
“theatrical representation of pain” with the disappearance of the “great spectacle of 
physical punishment” (Foucault 1975, 14).  
Public execution preceded by torture and public exhibition and ridicule of “chain-gang” 
labour were also phased out between 1830 and 1848. The early part of the 19th century saw 
public executions performed swiftly (by guillotine) with the offender being veiled as a way 
of implying that “crime is to be faceless” (Foucault 1975, 7-14). Guillotines and other 
methods of execution were, however, being moved behind prison walls in the 19th century 
in Europe and in France by the 1930s, which saw the beginning of the end of public 
executions in the West, with the last public execution by guillotine occurring in France in 
1939.9 
This consolidated philosophical manifestation was a concatenation of the preceding period 
of “enlightenment” which saw altered persuasions transposed into concomitant forms of 
punishment just before the turn of the 19th century, constructed on human perceptions of 
time, space and liberty. Thus, in discussing the disjointed demise of the guillotine it is 
evident that globally, physical, political, and philosophical progress does not occur 
concurrently. This is made further apparent by the 2011 figures that indicate that 58 
countries retain the death penalty, though fewer than this continue to execute prisoners. 
Of these, the United States is the only Western country that continues this ultimate form of 
punishment (Amnesty International 2011). Irrespective of these contemporary statistics, 
incarceration became recognised and adopted as the new standard form of punishment 
towards the end of the 18th century10 and was eagerly endorsed by many philosophers, 
including Beccaria, François-Marie Voltaire, Samuel Romilly, John Howard and Bentham. 
The emerging belief was that restricting a person's liberty would itself be significant 
retribution for crime, and that a measured amount of time served could be assigned in 
proportion to the severity of the crime (Beccaria 1764, 150).The trend became not to 
punish the body through pain and indignity, but rather the mind and soul through 
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 This method of execution continued within the confines of prisons until much more recently with 
Hamida Djandonbi being the last to be executed in Baumettes Prison, Marseilles on 10
th
 September 
1977. Francois Mitterrand abolished the death penalty in France in 1981, “relegating the guillotine to 
the museum” (Mercer 2008, 268-276: 283). 
10
 Incarceration as a punishment has remained virtually unchanged since this time and continues to 
be the existing preferred form of custodial punishment. 
31 
 
deprivation of liberty (Foucault 1975, 11). Justification for the duration of a penalty was not 
to be regarded as a proportionate retributive exchange of time for the crime committed, 
but rather a period adjusted to achieve the “useful transformation of the offender during 
his term of imprisonment” (Foucault 1975, 244). While imprisoned, inmates were expected 
to work to alleviate idleness of body and mind. Prison work associated with the separate, 
silent prisons (such as Fremantle and Pentonville) was never intended to be productive, 
“rather to expend energy at a disproportionate rate to the return” (Melossi and Pavarini 
1981, 156). 
Bentham was a 19th century British philosopher whose ideas on crime and punishment 
influenced and shaped both architectural and philosophical responses to jurisprudence. His 
scriptures on law, democracy, utilitarianism and government significantly influenced 
societies’ attitudes towards crime, criminals and punishment, and were underpinned by 
similar ideals of transformation and self-imposed behavioural regulation. Bentham 
documented his many theories in letters and books, and of particular relevance, drawings 
of the panopticon, an idea in architecture that was drawn on his behalf by English architect 
Willey Reveley in 1791.11 
Reveley did more than translate Bentham’s panopticon into drawings; the pair appeared to 
work together on translating philosophy into an architectural response. Bentham (1787b, 
97-114) referred to Reveley’s “ingenuity in his capacity as his professional adviser to whom 
he was indebted” for his input with reference to several key ideas that Reveley proposed to 
make plausible the workings of a panoptic architectural model. Of particular interest to WA 
penal history is that Henry Willey Reveley, Willey Reveley's son, became the first civil 
engineer at the Swan River settlement in 1829.  
He completed many structures, including the Round House in Fremantle (1830-31) and the 
Old Perth Courthouse in Perth and oversaw the construction of Fremantle Prison. When 
Reveley left this position it was renamed Superintendent of Public Works, later the Public 
Works Department. 
Ultimately, the Quad Native Prison was built in 1871 with Henry Vincent appointed in 1839 
as superintendent of the Native Establishment on Rottnest Island (Ferguson 1986, 13: 41). 
The Quad had a remarkable resemblance to many other prison structures influenced by 
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 Willey Reveley is father to Henry Willey Reveley, an English-Australian colonial engineer in Perth in 
the 1830s. Henry Reveley would go on to design a number of prominent buildings in Perth that have 
a clear spatial pattern and form that suggest a Bentham-like influence.  
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panoptic philosophy in architecture, both internationally and locally. About 19km away, 
Fremantle’s Round House, is one of countless examples of architecture and architectural 
theory significantly influenced by precedent – essentially a scaled sub-study of the 
octagonal (and cellular) prison in Ghent, Belgium 1773 (United States Bureau of Prisons 
1949, 22) which precedes Bentham’s Panopticon model consisting of an architectural 
spatial arrangement which appears to have manifest in more modern day direct supervision 
prison models. This particular historical (philosophical and architectural) thread suggests 
that Henry Willey Reveley had been influenced by his father, Willey Reveley, who in turn 
was influenced by people who associated, worked, and were influenced by Bentham, and 
so on. 
Bentham’s theories have been studied extensively by libertarians and philosophers, 
particularly French philosopher Michel Foucault, who can be credited with interpreting 
Bentham’s theories into contemporary cognoscence with reference to the function of 
modern society. Bentham’s panopticon was never realised, but as an operational concept in 
architecture it has had an overriding influence on early prison design. It is unmistakably 
manifest, for example, in Stateville Prison, Illinois built in 1925, essentially personifying 
Bentham’s contraption in architecture 134 years after Bentham’s papers were published.12 
Coinciding institutional trends and attitudes in the 1930s, deviated toward a preference for 
rural settings such as San Quentin State Prison, California, and Sing Sing Correctional 
Facility, New York State. It is assumed that through site, architecture and improved day-
lighting (as significant components) these facilities would improve prisoner rehabilitation 
and provide a less oppressive atmosphere compared with an asphyxiating sense of self-
containment in ‘round-house’ expressions of panoptic architecture. With this, rectangular 
and radial prison spatial arrangements complete the scope of existing archetype within 
which these custodial facilities were classified. 
The word panopticon comes from two Greek words meaning “everything” and “sight” and 
was originally a design initiative conceived by Bentham’s brother, Samuel, to increase 
worker productivity in a large workshop in Russia, by facilitating better management of the 
workers through observational transparency (Steintrager 1977, 79). The precise origins of 
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 Panopticon-inspired architectural variations include Arnhem, Breda and Haarlem Prison in Holland; 
Carabanchel Prison in Spain; Chi Hoa Prison in Vietnam; Caseros Prison in Argentina; Huron Historic 
Gaol in Canada; Millbank Prison, England; Mount Eden Prison in New Zealand; Old Provost Prison, 
South Africa; Palacio de Lecumberri in Mexico; Presidio Modelo, Cuba; Round House and The Quad, 
Australia; and the Twin Towers Correctional Facility in the US. 
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panoptic theory are uncertain, but it is accepted that its origins pre-date the philosophical 
conceptualisation articulated and expressed by Bentham.  
Its existence throughout society is evident in number and diversity that challenge our 
perception of it, notwithstanding this we are socially pre-conditioned to an extent that it’s 
imposed effects are sub-conscious. To this extent, it is plausible that the un-published 
theory may have been inadvertently yet strategically applied, as early as the 17th century to 
manage the spread of the plague, where urban panoptic surveillance was managed via 
quadrant division and segmentation. The applied means was achieved through distribution 
of distinct compartmentalised quarters to individual administrators where isolated streets 
were superintended and surveyed by individual syndics, onerously and exclusively securing 
each house, setting the street under his control into lock-down (Foucault 1975, 195).  
Implemented as a panoptic mechanism, efficient surveillance ensured differentiation and 
classification enough to ensure that unauthorised people did not enter quarantined areas. 
In this context the situational response was not contemporarily considered as such, though 
it bears a significant resemblance to operational control in prison institutions.  
Bentham, however, sought to introduce panoptic theory into a variety of building and 
institutional typologies such as hospitals, asylums, schools, production factories and other 
institutions (predominantly prisons) where control over surveillance was the prime 
objective. Bentham believed that the panopticon could be used to reform the morals and 
psychological state of the individual by way of behavioural self-modification, “efficient as 
prisoners would soon come to expect continuous surveillance” (Gandy 1993, 22). 
It is described as an architectural “apparatus” by Foucault (1975, 203), and not as 
something that was ever intended to be a beautiful piece of architecture used to establish 
co-lateral relationships of power, irrespective of the positions of people involved.13 
However, the success of panoptic theory is predominantly based on fiction and illusion. The 
relationship between the observer and the observed and the belief that on is always under 
observation is critical. The architectural response of the panopticon is initiated by specific 
light, space, proportion, and positioning to allow total surveillance of all the subjects by one 
centrally positioned inspector form the required components to achieve this principle. The 
back-lit subjects could not see into the inspector’s darkened central observation point, so 
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 Foucault describes the panopticon as a “utilitarian mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form” 
and as “being seen and never seeing or always seeing and never being seen” (Foucault 1975, 203-
205). 
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had to assume they were always under his gaze and would regulate their behaviour based 
on this assumption. It is in this context that the apparent presence or absence is translated 
into divine superintendence: he is nowhere and thus he is everywhere (Bozovic 1995, 9). 
Bentham saw significant potential in criminal “reform” attributed to self-modification of 
one’s behaviour should the panopticon be incorporated into prison design and operation 
(Atkinson 1969, 141). Foucault (1975) argued on this background that disciplinary systems 
and prisons in particular with the panopticon as the ideal were social failures. He 
considered that the way in which disciplinary systems crush individuality and individual 
freedom negates positive social endeavours such as rehabilitation and calm relations 
between individuals, describing it as a “machine to carry out experiments, alter behaviour 
and allow continuous examination” (Foucault 1975, 203). 
This notion has been further highlighted in the Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo 1971) 
and movies such as Das Experiment (2001), based on the Stanford experiment, directed by 
Oliver Hirschbiegel and starring Moritz Bleibtreu, Christian Berkel and Oliver Stokowski. This 
film, set in a German research centre, engages male participants for two weeks to adopt 
the role of prisoners or guards in a simulated prison, facilitated by cells and surveillance 
cameras for their randomly computer selected roles. The 'guards’ only instruction is to 
preserve order in the prison without use of violence, while the ‘prisoners’, being locked up, 
are only instructed to comply with orders. From the outset the disposition of the groups, 
while initially apprehensive, changes into a complete immersion into social and hierarchical 
behaviours similar to real prisons.  
Almost immediately the warders began to exhibit contempt and resentment towards the 
prisoners for what they, the guards, see as defiance and disrespect for their authority. 
Promptly adopting increasingly drastic measures of punishment, warders soon border on 
employing sadistic torment to assert their authority and maintain order. 
Bentham believed that the “punishment is less for the punished, but for the deterrence of 
society” and accordingly the punishment should produce what appears to be extensive 
suffering, with the least amount of actual physical pain (Bozovic 1995, 5).  
Bentham’s ideologies were so profoundly aligned with perception, illusion and behavioural 
self-regulation that his scheme, in relation to released and so called reformed prisoners was 
financially dependent on the indoctrinating and inculcating attributes of the panopticon 
having instilled a form of neurosis in released long-term custodial prisoners where the 
sense of being observed continued upon release from the institution. To this extent, 
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ongoing episodes of self-regulatory situational responses would be considered a ‘desirable’ 
disorder on release into society, a disorder that could be proclaimed as a rehabilitative 
response. Bentham was to pay a penalty for every instance in which a released person 
would reoffend (Semple 1993, 159).  
In light of this, while there are detrimental side-effects to an individual’s mental and 
physical wellbeing in long-term custodial prisoners, architectural panoptic ideologies 
appear better aligned to short-term custodial facilities – observation, self-regulation and a 
decreased likelihood of assaults and self harm in police Lock-ups. Short-term custodial 
facilities may provide a setting more appropriate and conducive to exploiting some of the 
observational benefits that panoptic architecture could provide, avoiding long-term 
psychological detriment pertinent to short-term custody. Bentham (1787a, 78), makes 
specific philosophical reference to appropriate operational and architectural application of 
a panopticon for use with unsentenced or uncharged people, but none of the theories 
appear have been implemented or critically analysed for congruity to the specialised 
functions of a police Lock-up, a facility which has a unique role in the criminal justice 
system: to temporarily accommodate “civilians” whose guilt has not yet been determined 
by a court and are to be presumed innocent.  
Both Director General Eriksson of the Swedish correctional system and Leroy’s article on 
the psychological impact of confinement purport that; 
“very little is known about the psychological impact of physical prison conditions. It 
is by now fairly clear that the main hypothesis proposed a century or so ago—
confinement and isolation invite reflection and amendment—has been disproved. 
Confinement and isolation are at best short-term security measures [and 
emphasises importance of a relevant study] which could and should be researched” 
(United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 2). 
Nevertheless, Bentham proposed his idea in architecture, keenly adopted by philosophers 
for speculation, ridicule and research, and used (in some form) in a misguided way. The 
accumulation of Benthamite literature is a testament to a consistent modus operandus 
which essentially seeks to discredit Bentham's theories while offering a general (author's 
perspective) overview of his life and works based on the overviews of others. It is 
astounding that the preponderance of existing works and research has been dedicated to 
the relevance of panoptic theory in prison architecture and institutions and not to short-
term custodial facilities, to which Bentham makes specific, albeit brief reference.  
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It is perhaps in consideration of the inadequate acknowledgement and brief nature of his 
almost fleeting suggestion relating to the implementation of panoptic architecture into 
other types of facilities, in particular short-term custodial facilities, that little, if any, existing 
published investigative works relate to the possibility that there may be considerable 
relevance to the use of an entirely architectural panoptic response in short-term custodial 
facilities, more so than the risk of ridicule for considering or proposing such a notion on 
seemingly antecedent philosophy. 
A panoptic architectural response, it would appear, could be of benefit to the spatial 
rationale associated with police Lock-up facilities, which only require exceptional levels of 
surveillance when used short-term. Although, prima facie, police Lock-ups or short-term 
custodial facilities appear to share a common historical thread, contemporary institutional 
requirements for short-term detention or for sentenced prisoners require significantly 
dissimilar architectural and philosophical typology and strategies.  
Therefore one key responsibility of an architect is to offer a humane environment that 
respects the dignity of those detained, staff and visitors, while also providing the 
exceptionally high level of tactical parameters required. Despite this, and in 
acknowledgement of infinite individual, cultural, societal and situational variables, 
architectural environments alone cannot guarantee that every philosophically motivated 
design manifestation explored will achieve the anticipated outcome, but should inherently 
facilitate the organisation’s function au minimum (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 48). 
Having a duty of care, innovative design considerations which ameliorate incidents of 
depression, isolation, stress, anxiety and violence are to be vigorously considered as 
beneficial strategies for complying with statutory requirements. The architect in Lock-up 
design should therefore not discount the concerns of human respect and dignity, but 
promote and conceptualise advanced organisation-specific strategies to deal with 
specialised requirements relative to a facility’s unique function. Ability to maintain constant 
control to ensure safe conditions for both prisoners and staff is paramount to both police 
Lock-ups and prisons, but it appears that from an architectural standpoint, social and 
functional relationships continue to be secondary considerations to security when this need 
not be. 
The external visual language of prison architecture – the extensive scale, mass, hardness 
and articulation was and is still used to convey a perception of overbearing and dominance 
of institution over the powerlessness, isolation and anonymity of the prisoner. In parallel 
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with the notion of using architectural expression as a means to produce a particular 
emotional and psychological response, in the case of the internal program and spatial 
layout, the penal system further evolved with the influence of a number of key intellectuals 
and reformers14 into a diverse arrangement of institutions with unique spatial 
characteristics. The architectural response articulated in these institutions were based upon 
a variety of emerging philosophies, societal attitudes, architectural knowledge and 
technologies that had predominantly developed from the 17th century onwards, although 
even these examples appear to have inherited preceding historical threads that are 
indicative of a particular intent or requirements deemed appropriate at that time.  
As a consequence of the unique architectural spatial layout and articulation characteristics 
and operational philosophies that have been introduced into penal systems, the human 
factor within institutional facilities such as prisons also develop definable institutional 
relationships and groupings. ‘Prison culture’15 is the product of the (non-voluntary) 
confinement of an assortment of populations with complex sub-groups and social 
structures that as a collective form an overriding insular society within specific long-term 
criminal (institutional) facilities within penal systems.  
The influences and ideals that contribute significantly to development of un-spoken rules 
and the values of prison cultures are predominantly counterproductive as they generally 
anti-establishment. Similarly, the warders are considered the ‘enemy’, being instruments of 
control of the establishment (Haney 2006, 289-293). This doctrine is indicative of an 
uncooperative position which facilitates violence, intimidation and gangs to proliferate and 
condemns any genuine positive associations with prison staff generally construed as the 
trait of an informant otherwise referred to in prison contexts as a ‘snitch’ or ‘dog’, making 
any attempt to rehabilitate virtually impossible (Haney 2006, 265-269: 273-274). For 
inmates that would consider ‘working with the system’ rather than against it, this culture 
creates a setting that further reinforces rejection; by other individual offenders, by specific 
groups, by the institution and general society. Small-scale prisons evoke a more 
advantageous environment and are easier to integrate into urban locations, where 
predominant community support resources are available. 
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 Further discussions relating to specific reformers are discussed elsewhere in this chapter and 
chapter 2. 
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 For the purpose of this research prison cultures are considered as groups of prisoners that have 
developed and adhere to a set of values shared in common with other prisoners but not with 
officials. These values tend to be concerned with being outside of the laws that intends to govern 
them.  
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Irrespective of the context, be they urban or regional, numbers totalling a maximum of 300 
inmates are more conducive to maintaining a safer, productive and positive environment, 
and further, it should be noted that if lower prisoner numbers were considered, this would 
present modern cities and urban environments with significant opportunities to 
incorporate high-rise prison structures which are cheaper to build, more conveniently 
located and have better access and proximity to other infrastructure. Considering this, it is 
imperative that this intensive style of facility be operated as intended – in keeping with its 
principal inherent design limitation which is more appropriately aligned with only remand 
and short-sentence prisoners as this style of facility is not suitable for housing prisoners 
serving long sentences (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 30: 211). By 
way of example, one of the tallest prisons, Western Correctional Centre in Burke County, 
North Carolina, proclaims many advantages associated specifically with high-rise prisons.16 
Some of these include security of building and site because of reduced perimeter lengths 
externally and the ability to integrate the prison’s footprint and architectural articulation 
within a city’s constrained urban geography and the ability to effect multiple level lock-
down. This is achieved by means of added consecutive levels of security internally, and an 
enhanced capacity to classify and segregate within limited spaces without compromising 
administration and supervision (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 30). 
Prisons form part of a broader set of disciplinary institutions that accommodate, and 
generally speaking, try to manage a diversity of people that as a collective forms a quasi-
society within society itself. Prisons and thus its inhabitants are governed by both official 
and unofficial codes of conduct, hierarchies, rules, regulations, guidelines, employment and 
currencies. In opposition to this, there are exponential differences in function, operation 
and circumstance between prison institutions and police facilities that exist with the intent 
to temporarily detain – not imprison.  
Through trial and error and extensive research, modern prisons have significantly evolved 
into a typology aligned with specific functional requirements, which is no longer to 
rehabilitate but to securely detain prisoners for the benefit of society’s safety. Subsequent 
architectural approaches much more closely achieve the goal of total surveillance by using 
cells around an open dayroom with a central observation point to achieve nearly total 
visibility. This style of prison is known as New Generation design,17 which implements a 
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 Also see works by Yvonne Jewkes and Helen Johnston 2007: Berit Johnsen, Per Kristian Granheim 
and Janne Helgesen 2011: Alison Liebling and David Price 2001. 
17
 New Generation prison design is further discussed in Chapter 2. 
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direct or indirect supervision philosophy of greater staff involvement with inmates. It is 
claimed that with this style of prison there have been significant reductions in violent 
conflicts among staff and prisoners and reduced isolation, as distinct to the inmate cultures 
and hierarchies constituted within radial, axial and linear plans due to the fact that “greater 
staff inmate contact leads to positive relations” and more effective surveillance 
(Fairweather and McConville 2000, 35). In short-term custodial facilities, this philosophy 
does not associate itself with issues of institutional cultures and hierarchies, but the 
reduction of assaults and violence against staff and other detainees. 
It appears that contemporary philosophies have had little influence on current WA Police 
Lock-up design as these parameters appear to be suitably aligned to significantly benefit 
the unique function and requirements of STCFs, namely PCFs. Further to this, the 
philosophical substance that informs New Generation design ought to be considered for 
implementation in PCFs in particular used in conjunction with Direct Supervision of staff 
over detainees. Certainly, minor interventions have, in the form of add-ons, been 
implemented due to coroners’ recommendations and due to advances in technology. But 
the overriding philosophy of intent, the core ideas and overriding principles of these 
institutions do not appear consistent with significant changes in policy, training, procedure 
and accountability of the custodians who work within them and the expectations and 
values of contemporary society, and could benefit from operational and architectural 
reconsideration and restructure. 
It may be a faux pas to mention the panopticon in association with contemporary 
architectural or theoretical consideration, seeing that at one point in time it was considered 
at the cutting edge of penal reform and a positive step away from torture and death as 
forms of punishment. The rehabilitative aspirations associated with Bentham’s Panopticon 
represented a paradigm shift in penal philosophy. Bentham believed that the panopticon 
could be used to reform the morals and psychological state of individuals by way of 
behavioural self-modification (Kerr 1989, 4) and so doing, promised to restore the 
deterioration of societal weakness. The concept of Panopticism and the way in which it was 
communicated as an idea, promised exponential potential in modifying behaviour, and 
through this, rehabilitation. Furthermore, it was suggested that the concept could be 
applied among a variety of different architectural typologies and urban environments, 
though for the purpose of this research, its intended application within long-term custody 
penal systems, it was believed, would crush the human spirit and create psychological 
distress if it were ever built (Atkinson 1969, 141). Therefore, even though a considerable 
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number of international examples already exist that clearly resemble the formal physical 
architecture, spatial pattern and operational components of Bentham’s Panoptic apparatus 
(discussed elsewhere in this chapter) an actual Panopticon that incorporated all of the 
components Bentham had envisaged was never built.  
In reality, panoptic spaces saturate our society, and the key principle, surveillance is 
criticised by contemporary societies and some intellectuals that apply sophisticated layers 
of artificially overly-libertarian ideals to something that is inherent in all living beings. To 
feel secure, fight or flight or to kill or be killed relies on hardwired instincts to observe 
subtleties ahead of one’s observer. In Exquisite corpse: writing on buildings, Sorkin offers an 
example that ridicules and belittles both the design of an affluent estate (Williams Island, 
Don Johnson City Miami), and regrettably, moreover, its residents stating that in their 
desire to “feel secure” they submit “to a Draconian, Sovietique, surveillance” (Sorkin 1991, 
200-01). 
It is regrettable that, irrespective of wealth, one should belittle the desire of others to keep 
themselves and their family safe in order to compose an overarching argument 
contemptuous of the Panopticon. Sorkin’s position on all things panoptic is not unique, 
however, this all-encompassing argument is limited in its failure to appreciate some of the 
positive functional and operational benefits of panoptic spaces within some specific 
contexts such as banks, malls, trains, streets and PCFs. Within this context, the temporary 
loss of privacy, not dignity, due to intensive levels of surveillance over short periods of time 
is easily rescinded by the ability to offer improved safety, and in relation to PCFs, custodial 
care and make every effort to ensure preservation of life. Social influence (of social norms) 
is extensive and indiscriminate, and opposing such norms and beliefs invites social 
castigation, so to maintain these norms and social acceptance, people will go against their 
own beliefs, attitudes and understanding of fact. For most people, “what others think of us 
and the way they act towards us are extremely potent sources of influence over behaviour” 
(Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 53-61). 
In thinking of an issue in a particular way, our attitudes can be described as in the sense of 
an “evaluative disposition”, that is, our attitudes are susceptible to the social influence of 
what others say or do (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 31-36), however, this research 
challenges the commonly held all-encompassing position that panoptic spaces are 
somewhat evil, perverse and draconian Rather, it evaluates panoptic ideals on its empirical 
qualities to argue that there exists a potential benefit in selective consideration of its 
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observational theory component. Of the many, and some inconceivable interrelated 
elements nominated by Bentham to complete the Panopticon model, intensive 
surveillance, is the singular constituent that has the potential for unique application in an 
intelligent and considered manner in areas of areas of PCFs that require exceptional 
observational capabilities.  
Of particular relevance, attitudes can be dramatically influenced through diversity of 
effective literary forms (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 22-30), suggesting that considerable 
academic and social rhetoric surrounding Bentham’s panopticon and ideals could be 
attributed to an accumulation of negatively under-toned literature, whereby to be anti-
conformist to contemporary attitudes would almost certainly preclude acceptance of one’s 
position on the matter. Zimbardo and Leippe (1991, 37) note that within social situations 
there exist the power and capacity to override ingrained differences of thought between 
people, uniting them so that they respond in the same way in a given situation, even if the 
situation appears to defy logical reasoning. Zimbardo and Leippe (1991, 18-21), cite the 
Jonestown mass suicides as an example of social conditioning over individual attitudes and 
beliefs. Additionally, Stanley Milgram’s fifty-year-old Obedience Experiment, is still adapted 
and refurbished to modern requirements and continues to exemplify how people are 
conditioned to observe blind obedience to people in positions of power and authority18 as a 
normal example of social influence (Milgram 1963, 371-378).  
However, as contemporarily objectionable as the panopticon’s association may be to 
architectural or theoretical discourse, such as Sorkin’s position in Exquisite corpse: writing 
on buildings (Sorkin 1991, 200-201) as previously discussed, and Oscar Gandy’s The 
panoptic sort: a political economy of personal information, Foucault accurately concludes 
our society already exists and ultimately functions as a panoptic machine (Foucault 1975, 
217). It is upon this notion that imperceivable panoptic spaces exists, surreptitiously yet 
methodically surveying habitual and perfunctory routines of society. ‘Active’ panoptic 
spaces instil within society a manner of conduct which conforms to an acceptable norm. 
This would include for example, libraries, public foyers and public squares where behaviour 
is modified and adapted to an appropriate standard due to situational and observational 
vulnerability or social gaze. Contemporary urban societies coordinate a hierarchy of 
sophisticated surveillance matrices including passive surveillance (physical human 
                                                          
18
 Also see Lord of the flies by William Golding. 
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observation and strategic urban design), monitored mechanical devices (CCTV, radar, laser 
and biometric systems), global positioning systems and satellite triangulation technologies 
(via cellular telephone signal, smartcards, software applications, and digital fingerprinting 
via one’s computer or Smartphone and any other electronic transactions).  
Correspondingly, “observation is no longer limited to line of sight or limited to a single open 
building” (Gandy 1993, 23), as evident in the way in which panoptic spaces facilitate 
accumulation of data collection. Our very preferences are defined from our observed and 
analysed responses to marketing, shopping and similar activities, with information in 
response to this behaviour used to inform specialised capitalist-driven architectural 
responses and strategic considerations directed at collective society (Lyon 1994, 4: 71-75). 
With this, it can be seen that panoptic ideals are already used with subterfuge, for capitalist 
ends, personal gain and other inappropriate ways which would be considered unwanted. 
Notwithstanding this, with ethical, considered and sensitive application as argued, panoptic 
spaces do have a legitimate place and can positively contribute in circumstances of specific 
contexts. Most critics, however, do not mention whether their overriding analysis of this 
idea in architecture has considered all of its potential applications and benefits within the 
relatively un-researched extent of PCF architecture. 
WA Police 
The historical discourse in this chapter is associated with relatively recent chronological 
threads relating to the formal inauguration of the WA Police in the early 1850s. For the 
purpose of qualitative and theoretical analysis of the WA Police’s adaptation to specific and 
unique Western Australian conditions, this research takes a specific and relevant period 
into account, that is, from the early 17th century to now. The following account is distilled of 
the unnecessary complexities that generally surround the convoluted reality of 
intercontinental and cross-cultural policing that has evolved due to different situational 
circumstances and operational requirements between English and WA policing. Further to 
this, “Australian police forces are today distinguishable by a particular relation to 
government which can be traced in its legal form to statutes of the mid-nineteenth 
century” (Finnane 1994, 14). 
Historically, policing and upholding a society's moral and social norms, generally speaking, 
were administered by a part-time quasi-police operation usually comprising designated 
constables and night-watchmen. Serving unpaid and untrained for a year and 
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predominantly concentrating on maintaining peace, these officers carried out routine 
surveillance over the small precinct in which they served using a variety of powers which 
derived from common law and a range of statutes, and their own discretion, however 
ambiguous its application (Beattie 2001, 120). A lack of clear written guidelines and 
operating procedures made it all the more difficult for those serving19 for fear of a lawsuit, 
creating an approach to policing that was flawed at best as those exercising power would 
return after their year’s service to the very community they had been policing, often 
meeting resistance and threats of recourse on completion of ‘official’ service (Beattie 2001, 
122). Until the more established and professional police forces of the 19th century, police 
were not expected to perform a significant role in gathering and evaluating evidence, 
investigating offences or prosecuting suspects. Prosecution, as well as the associated 
financial burden of it, ultimately rested upon the victim of the crime. Furthermore, the 
victim of crime is faced with the additional disincentive to prosecute should he be 
inadvertently found guilty of perjury which at the time was punishable by death. This 
festered within society, a reluctance to engage in such a speculative and portentous 
undertaking (Beattie 2001, 131: 226). One of the most significant transformations to come, 
however, relating to professionalization, was accountability to the state rather than the 
community and the creation of a more intimidating ‘force’ rather than a passive collective 
(Reiner 1996, 10: 11). 
Colonial 
WA Police history, as well as that of other early Australian police forces and 19th century 
police histories generally, is indicative of institutions whose organisational structure and 
machinations were consciously formulated and modelled on the fundamental principles of 
the inaugural London Metropolitan Police and, to a lesser degree, the Irish Constabulary, 
founded in 1829 and 1836 respectively (Finnane 1987, 16). Increases in population in 
London in the early 19th century resulted in the need to manage increases in crime, 
therefore, there was a specific need for a ‘metropolitan’ response. With this, it appears, 
that a conscious decision to distance itself from what could be construed as a paramilitary 
entity. Specifically, where uniform, appearance, rank and structure are concerned these 
                                                          
19
 ‘Officers’ were usually an elected householder with little more than local knowledge but were 
charged with powers of arrest and entering premises (Beattie 2001, 120). 
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police forces clearly identify themselves as a body of civilian extraction.20 This is particularly 
apparent in British colonies, but hardships attributed to the unique and harsh geographical 
conditions found in the early settlement period of WA, and a different demographic where 
cities were developed from the outset, have contributed to some significant differences. 
Consequently, colonial police forces such as that which first existed in WA and in turn 
formed part of the foundation of the WA Police as we would more readily recognise today 
can be described as “a compromise between military and civil authority models” (Finnane 
1987, 4-9), and further: 
“the nature of the frontier profoundly affected the pattern of law enforcement in 
Australia. Policing in Australia was also shaped largely by conditions on the frontier. 
Nevertheless, in most communities it was the city that seemed to harbour the most 
dangerous criminal. From the beginning of the century cities appeared increasingly 
unstable and socially fragmented” (Finnane 1987, 16). 
It is against this background, that police as an institution have been described as completely 
“dependent upon the values and social structure of a particular society” (Mosse 1975, 1). It 
is upon this notion that together with a gazetted code of conduct and formal command 
structure that the WA Police was officially established as an organisation in 1853. Therefore 
police organisations tend to be somewhat vernacular, differing from community to 
community according to their associated social norms and expectations.  
Frontier policing could thus be considered a symptom of necessity of which the primary 
cause – colonisation – was induced by British desire for urban development and need to 
increase demand in domestic industries. Bipartisan trade between England and Australia 
(WA) ensured the colonial demand was conveniently and directly provisioned by an obliging 
and enterprising British supply: an artificially implemented unilateral trade arrangement 
(Finnane 1994, 66). Colonial frontier-policing, though crude, harsh and indisputably physical 
and as a consequence psychologically challenging, was indeed straightforward and 
unsophisticated next to the multitude of functions and expectations placed on modern 
police by modern society. 
                                                          
20 WA Police continues to share similarities in rank, structure, appearance, terms of reference and 
function. The official newspaper of the WA Police Historical Society, for example is the ‘Peelers 
Gazette’. 
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John Augustus Conroy was the first WA Commissioner, with backgrounds in both army and 
aristocracy. Inevitably, previous service in the armed forces became a common thread 
among many who held commissioned officer positions; John Henry Porter was the last WA 
Commissioner to have served in the armed forces. Porter left the WA Police Force to serve 
in World War II with the RAAF, later returning to the Police Force and many years later 
taking up the Office of Commissioner from 1981 to 1985 (WA Police n.d.[a]).21  
An affinitive connection to the armed forces continued to exist throughout the 
organisation22 with many serving police being ex-servicemen and women and or reservists. 
With this, Regimental numbers still issued to police today are a direct legacy of military 
origin; however, it would take until 1898 before the first Police Regimental numbers were 
issued to identify individual police officers. Individual numbers promoted greater personal 
and professional pride and individual accountability, but, their use and a rigid rank structure 
were symbolic of an organisation that associated itself with the armed forces. Nonetheless, 
organisational dissatisfaction persisted because of unfavourable working conditions, which 
in turn created an atmosphere that was not conducive to attracting ‘quality’ recruits. Ever-
present organisational camaraderie and unity in expression of grievances to parliament 
resulted in the formation of the world’s first Police Association in 1912, which successfully 
campaigned on behalf of officers, achieving many positive changes (Lawrence 1979, 23). 
 Robert Connell was appointed Commissioner of Police in the same year and served in the 
role for 21 years, managing the organisation at a time when, as McArthur (1993, 483) 
states, “significant innovations were introduced that revolutionised local police practices, 
such as the introduction of fingerprinting and motorised transport.”  
Connell further developed the fundamental structure of the former WA ‘force’ into the 
organisational model we see today. These advances were made despite detrimental 
changes to fiscal policies and monetary cutbacks resulting from World War I until about 
1928, a difficult period when 70 per cent of WA jails were converted for use as ‘police jails’. 
This was motivated by the logic that significantly fewer resources were needed to operate a 
facility administered by police. Unfortunately, in addition to being ill equipped, unsuitably 
                                                          
21
 This link with the military is worthy of further interrogation in reference to the degree of 
paramilitary cultural transference that WA Police has incurred. 
22
 A considerable number of sworn WA Police with a military background continue to serve and the 
profession appears to continue to appeal to ex-military personnel (R.13, Personal Communication 
March 18, 2011). 
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trained and without appropriate facilities, police could do little more than detain prisoners 
(Thomas and Stewart 1978, 103).  
The military contributed significantly to the WA Police Force’s organisational attitudes in 
the inter-war period (c.1915-c.1940) when significant numbers of ex-servicemen were to be 
later instated into commanding, high-ranking positions in Australian police forces23; this 
disciplined mentality playing a significant and critical pre-policing preparatory function and 
rigid behavioural expectations (Finnane 1994, 135).24  
Ending in 1933, Commissioner Connell’s term in office coincided with the Great Depression, 
a period that brought severe reductions in government funding for the WA prison system 
and later, in 1939, considerable strain on the WA Police with widespread resignations due 
to a “common desire to enlist for overseas service in World War II” (Lawrence 1979, 34).  
                                                          
23
 It was relatively common for sworn officers to leave the police force to fight in the world wars; it is 
also still relatively common for police officers to be reservists in the armed forces (R.13, Personal 
Communication March 18, 2011). 
24
 Arguably, this discipline may be a critical factor in being able to carry out one’s duties without 
question and while not necessarily having access to optimal conditions or facilities in which to 
perform them.   
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Fig. 4 Early Lock-up facilities attached to courthouse in York, WA 
showing linear layout and cell arrangement. A number of early 
facilities also served as gaols for short sentences. 
 
Before 1942, York’s police custodial facility (see Fig. 4) had been assigned as a prison to 
hold Fremantle Prison’s female prisoners during the war, a decision that appears to have 
been made at short notice.  
Male prisoners about the same time were transferred to Barton’s Mill Prison, which was 
little more than a series of tents secured by a perimeter fence (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 
159). The post-war period did not bring with it any new police-specific premises intended to 
allow WA Police to grow, develop and modernise into specialised units or departments as 
was envisaged and desired, with many of the existing facilities being described by Lawrence 
(1979, 35) as “cramped and dilapidated”, causing extensive relocation and readjustment in 
and around the city into an assortment of different yet equally inappropriate sites (Heritage 
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Council of Western Australia 2002). However, the 1950s did herald significant advances in 
vehicular and telecommunications technology. 
The early 1960s brought a gradual decrease in the number of ‘police jails’ (police 
administered jails) in WA, reinstating a more desirable ratio between typical PCFs to Prison 
Department jails, although a surge in prisoner numbers in the late 1960s, saw the Kalgoorlie 
PCF proclaimed a Prison Department administered jail as late as 1967 (Thomas and Stewart 
1978, 159). In comparison to police facilities in existence, according to Thomas and Stewart 
(1978, 162), “the number of ‘common gaols’ in existence more than doubled” by 1971. This 
period coincided with the conversion of hospital facilities in Wooroloo into the current 
Wooroloo Prison and the proposal for a police facility ‘built by design’ near the Causeway in 
East Perth.  
The proposed ‘purpose-built’ police headquarters complex in East Perth was announced by 
the Minister of Police in 1960 (Heritage Council of Western Australia 2002), though cost 
would be cited as the reason for delaying its commencement almost immediately. The lack 
of adequate facilities over such an extended period, however, provided sufficient 
‘motivation’ to reapprove the project in 1962 for construction, which started in 1963. Perth 
Watch House,25 and adjoining police station were completed in 1965 and the Perth Police 
Headquarters building in 1975 by architects attached to the Public Works Department 
(P.W.D.) inclusive of Stanley Buckingham Cann – Principal Architect of the P.W.D. 1968 – 
1980 (Le Page 1986, 591) and was considered at the time to be the “most technologically 
advanced police building in Australia” (Lawrence 1979, 39). In what could be considered a 
more humorous sense, its form and many windows overlooking the Causeway has more 
recently been described as a panoptic instrument of surveillance; a gatekeeper for a ‘police 
city’ for all that approach to enter its realm, and its stature likened to that of “Ceausescu’s 
balcony” (J. Stratton, personal communication May 23, 2012). 
Such conceptions appear made in jest, as the reality of the typical office activities that occur 
behind this glazed facade26 quickly dispel any association with evil undertones that could be 
suggested. 
                                                          
25
 Perth Watch House was formerly named and is at times still referred to as the East Perth Lock-up 
26
 Observations made during authorised site visit to PWH, where interviews were conducted in the 
Headquarters building. 
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Fig. 5 Early Lock-ups in Perth showing similarities in layout, 
naming of functions and spatial relationships similar to those 
found in existing PCFs and other custodial typologies. 
 
The Perth Watch House component of the headquarters complex continues to be the 
principal holding and processing facility for police in WA. The facility receives – directly or 
via transfer from suburban police stations – people arrested in Perth metropolitan areas 
who are refused bail, unable to obtain bail, or arrested on a warrant. It also provides 
custodial facilities for terrorism suspects, temporary detention of transferred interstate 
prisoners, and a temporary holding facility for the Australian Federal Police.  
Incompatible conversion and poor coordination of facility and resource use between the 
WA Police and the prison system of the day, with countless other examples of ‘make do’ 
initiatives, such as Hillgrove ‘Lock-up’ – a Lock-up in a tree trunk, and insufficient funding 
both past and present, have clearly influenced and distorted the unique spatial 
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requirements of police Lock-ups, morphing them into a shape based on characteristics 
inherited from prison architecture (see Fig. 5). Contemporary codes and SOPs clearly guide 
police in their duties and define acceptable practices and principles of custodial care. These 
early conditions highlight early WA Police’s ability to continue to operate irrespective of a 
clear lack of any infrastructure. This make-do attitude that appears to be clearly evident    in 
early WA police that are of military extraction undoubtedly influences and lends itself to 
formulate the underpinnings of a unique, hardened organisational culture, and with similar 
approaches in resourcefulness where facilities are yet to attain a desired level of 
functionality and receive necessary upgrades, it appears that this adaptable approach is still 
in existence.  
Early Australian convict and colonial history is demonstrative of an era in which immediate 
and improvised solutions were of predominant importance to achieving authority and 
order; compromise, taking priority over discussion, analysis and design to achieve a 
straightforward solution, often in lieu of necessarily the most considered solution (Finnane 
1987, 4: 16). Similarly, early WA Police administrative and organisational patterns would 
have been largely guided by and based on the history, traditions and needs of early West 
Australian society.27 Likewise, current societal trends and attitudes towards policing, crime, 
and the facilities in which police custodial services are provided may also form a link to how 
the government that the society elects approaches the issue. While there are people that 
will still form a view that custodial facilities such as PCFs should be harsh, or rather, basic, a 
more informed view may influence the willingness of government to be proactive in its 
approach to offer sufficient funding to allow WA Police to undertake whatever 
refurbishments might be necessary to meet their needs and perform optimally. Next to 
this, if the government of the day is a representation of its society, it appears that it is not 
serving the needs of the society it governs and the needs of its police with insufficient 
funding where required. This attitude appears to be out of touch with society which in turn 
does not appear to bode favourably for modern WA Police (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 71).  
 
 
                                                          
27
 An example of this might be a number of specialised units and departments set up to perform 
specific functions required at point in time. These may or may not still resemble their original form 
or perform the same function; stock squad, gold stealing squad, mounted police, water police could 
be considered examples of these. 
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In the same way, it appears that coronial criticism aimed at the WA Police for some of its 
shortcomings could have equally been aimed at the WA Government, which by failing to 
offer sufficient funding for modern, purpose-built and state-of-the-art PCFs has resulted in 
facilities being ‘dilapidated, appalling’ and requiring replacement for decades (Dean 2004, 
5). 
Despite this, WA is the world's largest single policing jurisdiction, the state being about 10 
times the size of the United Kingdom, divided into two primary regions in the metropolitan 
area, the North and South Metropolitan Regions. These comprise six sub-districts and one 
division: the South-East, South, North-West, East, West and Central Metropolitan Districts. 
The Office of the Metropolitan Regional Coordinator is a division that also forms part of the 
conglomerate regional structure, having direct management and authority over the Perth 
Watch House and the WA state PCF (Cottman 2007). 
The following diagrammatic plans have been have been intentionally drawn in such a way 
that it constitutes a graphical representation of the actual PCF. These are operational 
facilities and thus the integrity of their security dictates that minimal annotation, 
orientation, and spatial relationships to the entire complex are paramount.  
For the purpose of this section, the following figures named as ‘Lock-ups within the Perth 
Metropolitan Area’ do not require specific identification as their intended purpose is to 
illustrate their general form, layout, spatial rationale, types of space and spatial 
relationships between various zones and functions (see Fig. 6 – Fig 10).  
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Fig. 6 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth 
which has a disjointed layout consisting of 2 wings is 
no longer used as designed with a number of compliant 
cells now consolidated to a single area, though still not 
in direct physical view from an observation point relying  
on electronic surveillance and regular cell checks to  
maintain sufficient observation. Narrow corridors 
lead to non-compliant and disused exercise yard an 
showering areas. 
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Fig. 7 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth 
which has a disjointed layout consisting different wings  
which are disused. As with other operational district level 
facilities Juveniles are processed but not held in PCFs.  
Should detention be required, juveniles are escorted  
to Juvenile detention facilities under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Corrective services. Narrow corridors 
link this excessively long facility with disused exercise 
yards and juvenile areas. 
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Fig. 8 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth 
which showing a narrow linear corridor and cell 
arrangement with a potential observation area at  
an axis point. This area however does not provide 
a vantage point from which to see detainees without 
physically walking along corridors or the use of  
electronic surveillance. 
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Fig. 9 An operational Lock-up located in Perth which  
has similar issues already discussed in figures 6-8  
in relation to facilitating sufficient physical observation. 
This location also has a vulnerable ‘passage-like’ control 
area that is poorly considered in terms of officer safety 
and narrow corridors. 
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Fig. 10 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth 
which has a number of compliant cells that are not  
allocated as being gender specific. Though this facility  
is relatively modern, spacious and clean, with wider  
corridors and better ambiance, there is no provision  
for a dedicated search room. As with the other Lock-up  
examples illustrated, direct physical view is not possible 
from the observation point. 
 
Nationally, Australian PCFs represent a small yet fundamental subdivision of the WACJS, yet 
their significance cannot be overstated. It appears that this critical portion of the WACJS 
has been marginalised, neglected and has not benefited from critical architectural 
investigation to such an extent that custodial facility architecture fails to perform some of 
the basic functions it was designed to achieve. As a result, the Perth Watch House has been 
described as ‘obsolete, inadequate and non-compliant’, which is due only in part to its age 
(Dean 2004). This has resulted in the detention of people in custodial facilities that do not 
meet the specific needs of police and highlights the need for new purpose built facilities 
based on a design intended for short-term police custody, rather than PWH which is more 
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suited to sentenced prisoners in long-term custody.28 It appears that WA is not unique in its 
‘make do with status quo’ mentality. Police organisations worldwide appear to suffer 
comparable insufficient funding, resources and research and lack the urgency required to 
tackle and ‘make good’ deficient existing custodial facilities.  
South American correctional facilities have been heavily and erroneously criticised over 
time in American literature – inaccurate to the extent that a great deal of this literature 
does not make the distinction between PCFs and prisons ‘even though the difference in the 
conditions between these two types of facilities is in South America immense’ (Tomlin 
1995, 135). In the United States, ‘jails’ are unequivocally the holding facility for “untried 
people” and for people serving short-terms of imprisonment. The significance of jails within 
the U.S CJS cannot be underestimated; being described as:  
“reception units for a greater variety and number of offenders then will be found in 
any other segment of the correctional process, and it is at this point that the 
greatest opportunity is offered to make sound decisions on the offenders next step 
in the correction process. Indeed, the availability of qualified services at this point 
could result in promptly removing many from the correctional process who have 
been swept in unnoticed and undetected and who are more in need of protective, 
medical, and mental care from welfare and health agencies then they are in need of 
custodial care” (Carter, Glaser and Wilkins 1972, 71-72). 
Although critical of others, these short-term custodial facilities in the U.S have also drawn 
criticism when comparative analysis is conducted across the U.S CJS where “the vast 
majority of city and county jails and local short-term institutions” have shown little or no 
improvement in “50 years” (Carter, Glaser & Wilkins 1972, 36: 71). Although the 
operational levels of humaneness and dignity might have improved ahead of architectural 
development in the U.S and other countries, the same cannot be said in relation to PCFs in 
some parts of South America which harbour deplorable living conditions in violation of 
basic human rights. Tomlin (1995, 133) describes Brazilian and Salvadorian PCFs29 as bleak, 
appalling and overcrowded due to indifference toward maintaining adequate facilities 
where the concrete floor forms the bed upon which the detainee will sit in a barely lit cell, 
                                                          
28
 It should be noted that the new PCF situated in Northbridge is designed to achieve the specific 
needs of police. 
29
 Here PCFs provide the role similar to that of Perth’s historical police gaols where offenders can be 
detained temporarily, remanded for trial or imprisoned for short sentences for up to 80 days. 
Existing correctional facility crowding, however, often makes it impossible for residents to be 
released within that time frame (Tomlin 1995, 134).  
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and where regularly, “seven men are housed in a cell designed for two.” In addition, Tomlin 
maintains that policy and procedure (relating to dignity) in such facilities are also in dire 
need of review. A clear example of this relates to the fact that the only allowable clothing 
for detainees in such places is underwear. Brazilian and Salvadorian PCF conditions, 
therefore, appear to be unpardonable. On the other hand, prisons across the world appear 
to be humane and organised; even those found in Brazil and El Salvador are generally 
sanitary with sufficient natural and artificial lighting and access to private showers and 
toilets (Tomlin 1995, 134). 
Brazilian and Salvadorian PCFs, like WA PCFs, also temporarily detain people while they 
await trial. However, the state of the criminal justice systems in these countries, Tomlin 
(1995, 133) explains, “has caused instances where police are unable to transfer sentenced 
prisoners to a prison facility, leading to cases where prisoners have been housed in PCFs for 
seven months.” The situation in which people are held for any length of time – particularly 
for ‘simple’ offences – poses significant increased risk, not only in South America, but other 
parts of the world, especially Australia with its distinct indigenous populations, and in WA, 
where indigenous people in police custody are significantly over-represented as a 
proportion of the total population. Aboriginal people are often less able to tolerate 
isolation in custody, so face greater risk of suicide or self-harm (Biles 1988, 17). 
Indigenous people in WA constitute 45.9 percent of people in police custody. The state is 
second in this respect to the Northern Territory (Australian Institute of Criminology 2002, 
12), despite the fact that 31.6 percent of the Northern Territory's population is indigenous 
compared with only 3.8 percent in WA. These statistics clearly indicate a disproportionate 
representation of indigenous people held in custody in comparison with other states 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006, 5). 
The precarious reality of this situation is that 63 percent of Aboriginal deaths in custody 
occur in PCFs. As well, 80 percent of non-Aboriginal deaths in custody occur in the first 24 
hours of detention, implying that the highest level of risk for self-harm and related causes 
of death in police custody occur within a short period after admission (Biles, McDonald and 
Fleming 1988, 129). Reser (1989, 161) referring to a national study by Hayes (1983), states 
that “the pattern of deaths in custody clearly indicates that police custody poses more risks 
than prison incarceration” and further, that there is a disparity in suicide rates between 
prison and police custody “with suicide rates in police custody being as much as five times 
greater than corresponding prison rates: this pattern being observed both in Australia and 
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overseas.” Next to this, other significant changes and concerns have also emerged within 
the US and the UK CJSs commencing in the 1970s. Predominantly associated with economy, 
efficiency and commercialisation of crime control, power and responsibility of certain 
aspects of law and order have been increasingly transferred to profit-driven commercial 
enterprises and private security firms with potentially unlimited vested commercial 
interests restricted only by adherence to contractual compliance (Garland 2001, 116).  
With this, ever-increasing fiscally motivated governments appear to over-rely on private 
sector custodial management companies and private security firms which suggest that as 
with any profit driven structure, inequalities of access to acceptable levels of services will 
inevitably occur (Garland 2001, 117).  
Although on a superficial level it might not be evident that the direction of privatising law 
and order should be a need for concern, it must be considered that the distinction between 
the function of policing, transportation, imprisonment, custodial services and security in 
certain circumstances are increasingly distorted. For example, a number of functions and 
responsibilities no-longer apply primarily to police and are now predominantly municipal 
bodies and private security functions, and as such, various communities and groups within 
society become subject to the risk of substandard access to equitable levels of service in 
comparison with those with higher levels of affluence. It is within this context, that it is 
evident that in-spite of initial humble beginnings and make-shift frontier-policing, through a 
period of 160 years of official history, WA Police have developed and achieved significant 
level of professionalism and excellence with many highly specialised sections; at times with 
a scarcity of funding and insufficient provision of appropriate facility and space or training.30 
Next to this, and following the lead of other societies a growing trend is emerging to 
deviate from some aspects of traditional policing practices to an increasingly blurred 
composite private and government system which clearly comprises of two opposing entity 
types with different underlying social and fiscal interests. In this instance, police should 
ensure that the potential for unjustified criticism by association with an underperforming 
allied service provider is mitigated wherever possible where transfer of authority and 
responsibility of some services to private industry have occurred on the basis of economic 
management and efficiency.  
                                                          
30
 Police Operations Centre, Traffic Enforcement Group (TEG) and Police Forensics Complex are all 
examples of specialised sections of police where it is evident that there has been a focus on 
providing state of the art facilities.  
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Furthermore, the WA Police organisation maintains a relatively unchanged component of 
sworn personnel irrespective of a WA which continues to rapidly expand in both population 
and physical development placing additional pressure on government to either invest in the 
WA Police to further develop and adequately manage future challenges. Based on 
international trends that sees capital cities growing and regional areas in decline, coupled 
with exponential increases set to occur in global population which relies so heavily on 
resources, it seems unlikely that any investment to increase the capacity of WA Police will 
be anything other than money well spent. Conversely, either an inevitable return to 
previously adopted make-do initiatives will eventuate or increasingly, additional 
responsibility and function will be transferred to private enterprise raising significant ethical 
concerns surrounding accountability, impartiality and accessibility to police services for all 
sectors within society.  
As an overview, the focus of this chapter has been to outline of some of the philosophical 
and architectural aspects that relate to the history of incarceration, punishment generally, 
and the transfer of these characteristics, knowledge, and ideals to the WA context.  
This chapter has established that penal history pre-dating some of the emerging prison and 
law reformers of the enlightenment period was based upon a subjective and sometimes 
agenda-based construct associated with the public theatre of barbaric and torturous 
punishments and death. From an architectural perspective a variety of spaces have been 
shown to be adapted, rather than specifically designed for imprisonment until philosophies 
toward punishment of crime by an apportioned sentence of incarceration and associated 
legislative frameworks developed. This framework led to architecture that began to 
distinguish specific institutional structures and relevant administrators such as Prison, 
Asylums (Psychiatric Institutions), Poor Houses, and Workhouses. Further legislative Acts as 
well as the inception of Police Forces restructured and rationalised crime and punishment 
into a considerably more specialised Criminal Justice System. 
Although this chapter has outlined some of the architectural and philosophical knowledge 
that has evolved with some adaptations into the WA context out of the English, some WA 
Prison Facilities continue to develop both architecturally and administratively from what 
this research has revealed to be a Benthamite inspired inception. As a result of WA being 
colonised, a direct lineage exists between early Australian architects, public works 
engineers, and Bentham and his ideals. This chapter outlines this association, and in turn, 
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the underlying influence of other noteworthy reformers such as Joshua Jebb, Carlo Fontana 
and Cesare Beccaria.  
Many developing townships throughout WA undertook construction of Police Gaols, Lock-
ups, and court facilities as priority infrastructure due to the frontier nature of early WA 
settlement. Later, post-war hardships saw some of these earliest examples of Police Gaol 
facilities used for purposes of both long and short-term detention and administered as 
required until sufficient prison-specific facilities were built. This adaptive use of facilities for 
whatever purpose required highlighted attitudes towards custodial facilities similar to those 
of earlier centuries where anything that could be used for the purpose would be sufficient. 
This chapter describes early Fremantle and Perth as being foremost considered as a prison 
and later a police town, inspired by the first significant building in this location being a 
prison and other key facilities for the purpose of detention, with clear physical and spatial 
similarities to English models. Some of these include Bridewells and Workhouses, which this 
chapter highlights as sharing spatial relationships similar to those found in current WA 
PCFs. In-so-doing, this chapter has shown that generally, WA Prison facilities continue to 
present an international perspective on carcerative architectural trends, however, PCFs 
have stopped far short adopting a position as a world leader as a custodial typology with 
others being significantly more progressive. The architectural outcomes that have resulted 
from these historical influences and trends are discussed further in chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
Architectural Response 
WA Prison Facilities 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate a direct transfer of institutional knowledge and attitudes 
towards crime and punishment in particular those between England and WA, by outlining 
the historical chronology associated with the inception of Prison Facilities in WA, focusing 
on the inherited international aspects of function, philosophy and architectural expression. 
This chapter establishes WA institutional pedagogy as a derivative of the social engineering 
and developments of some of the 18th century’s most prominent intellectuals and 
reformers such as John Howard, Cesare Beccaria, François-Marie (Arouet) Voltaire, Samuel 
Romilly and Jeremy Bentham. 
Bentham passionately opposed penal colonies, being in favour of imprisonment as the 
preferred form of punishment: prisoner transportation to penal colonies was contradictory 
to his ideals and push for penal reform. From its inauguration, Bentham, as well as other 
like-minded intellectuals opposed settlement on the basis that transportation was not only 
expensive and inefficient but an entirely inappropriate method for punishing convicts, 
primarily as this was inconsistent with his theory that the significance of punishment should 
be that it deter greater society from similar acts “by making an example of convicts in a 
strictly run penitentiary” and not by “shipping them off to the other side of the world” (Kerr 
1989, 5), which would not achieve the desired deterrence.31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Bentham’s views, however biased by personal and financial motives relating to his impending 
plans to construct and administer a panoptic penitentiary which he hoped would attest to the 
pertinence of his penal philosophies and authoritative power of his proposed panoptic prisons 
(Jackson 1998, 371) relate to colonies in general (including Australian colonies). 
 
63 
 
The way in which Australia was considered around this time, and for many years post 
colonisation, significantly impacted on Australia's own sense of self which was partly 
conditioned by the dialogue of such distant intellectuals who assumed the notion that 
Australia would not amount to anything other than an austere and atrocious prison island.  
Lord Bacon’s sentiments are clearly outlined in his remarks that: 
"It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked 
condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but 
it spoiled the plantation: for they will ever look like rogues, and not fall to 
work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary: 
and then certify over to their country, to the discredit of the plantation" 
(Thompson 1794, 38). 
This attitude was ever-present in Australia’s psyche significantly impacting the society’s 
sense of place, translating into Australia’s existing examples of imprisonment architecture 
(Kerr 1989, 8) within WA and in particular, Perth and Fremantle being some of the earliest 
original settlements with early infrastructure, planning and construction being overseen by 
English civil engineer, Henry Willey Reveley, the son of Willey Reveley, who arrived in 
Fremantle in 1829.  
Over a period of ten years to follow, Reveley, as the civil engineer to the Swan River 
settlement oversaw the implementation of buildings and structures inclusive of but not 
limited to the Round House in Fremantle and the Old Perth Courthouse in Perth among 
other less prominent projects such as roads, bridges, jetties and tunnels (Barker 2000, 10).  
The first Gaol in Perth was established in 1830 (see Fig. 11) and operated until 1855.32  
                                                          
32
 This facility was situated next to St Georges Cathedral and opposite to Government House. It is 
serviced by St Georges Terrace and is now site to the Deanery.  
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Fig. 11 An example of an early Perth Lock-up facility  
that also served as a gaol for short sentences. As per 
existing operational PCFs this facility also comprises  
different wings for males and females, along with 
exercise yards and linear corridors with no observation 
area for officers. 
 
In 1852 a recently completed gaol facility situated next to the Courthouse on Beaufort 
Street shared whole responsibility of holding detainees awaiting trial from the Roundhouse, 
which at the time primarily served as a short-term detention facility for “white prisoners 
under sentence, aboriginal prisoners awaiting transportation to Rottnest Island” (Barker 
2000, 10). 
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Grant (2008) states that the Rottnest Island Gaol was an early recognition of the: 
“difficulties of providing custodial environments for aboriginal prisoners [however], 
local initiatives arose across Australia. In Western Australia, the ill-fated Rottnest 
Island Gaol was established in 1838 as an alternative to incarcerating aboriginal 
prisoners in Fremantle Gaol. Exile was seen as a preferable method to facilitate 
greater personal freedom while reducing the risk of escape” Grant (2008, 66).  
However, it is not entirely a convincing argument that the decision to transport aboriginal 
prisoners to an Island-Prison (from 1838), proclaimed as such by enactment (and lasting) 
for a period of over sixty years (1841 to 1903), within a relatively convenient distance from 
main-land Fremantle, was entirely based upon what was perceived at the time to be best 
practice for aboriginal prisoners (O’Toole 2006, 187). Rather, what was best for the colony, 
the economy and the ‘visual and ethnic integrity of the mainland’ – a more socially 
acceptable form of ethnic cleansing.  
Rottnest Gaol was closed in 1849 and remained disused for a period during which all 
prisoners were returned to Fremantle, however, the Rottnest facility was brought back into 
operation in 1856 as it was determined the move to Fremantle was unviable as a 
permanent solution. Further to this, it was recommended that Rottnest no longer be 
deemed an Island-Prison in early 1902,33 however, it was still considered an integral out-
post of Fremantle Prison and although it was no-longer used to incarcerate aboriginal 
prisoners specifically, it continued to be used until 1932, concurrently as a gaol and also as 
a place for tourist recreation (Ferguson 1996, 77).  
Along with Rottnest’s increasing popularity as a health resort within reach of the mainland, 
subdivisions of land into residential allotments as well as into potential farming plots 
became a more economically attractive endeavour for the State, making the islands new 
direction incompatible with existing practice of on-site imprisonment. Therefore, if “exile to 
this island was seen as a preferable method to greater personal freedom while reducing the 
risk of escape” for aboriginal prisoners (Grant 2008, 66), why disband the entire enterprise 
and send the remaining aboriginal prisoners elsewhere to “northern gaols, climatically 
more suited to natives” (Ferguson 1996, 77) where neither the Rottnest nor the ‘northerly 
gaol’ solutions address significance placed upon aboriginal attachment to ‘country’.  
The design of the subsequent Quad Native Prison, built on Rottnest (1871) is similarly 
                                                          
33
 It took until 1904 for the recommendation to be ratified (O’Toole 2006, 187). 
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implausible in its design intent – that it be proposed to address requirements specific to 
aboriginal prisoners, as this is an architectural example whose form is clearly a slightly 
larger version of the design of the Roundhouse in Fremantle, which, as previously 
mentioned was primarily used to detain white prisoners on a short-term basis and 
temporarily hold aboriginal prisoners before transportation to Rottnest (Barker 2000, 10). 
Perth Gaol (see Fig. 13) operated under Convict Establishment authority from 1858-1888, 
with all prisoners being transferred to Fremantle Prison. It was designed by Comptroller 
General Edmund Yeamans Walcott Henderson with construction (1851-1859)34 overseen by 
Henry Wray (R.E.) (Morrison and White 1979, 94).  
The design of Fremantle Prison was significantly influenced by Henderson’s association with 
Joshua Jebb, who assisted Henderson with professional guidance35. Jebb’s own rationale for 
Pentonville’s design had in turn been influenced by William Williams’ Millbank Prison, 
London. Millbank was widely regarded as first modern prison36, though equally, it was 
considered indescribably unattractive and “one of the most costly of all the buildings the 
world had ever seen since the pyramids of Egypt” (Webb and Webb 1922, 49). This design 
implemented some of Jeremy Bentham’s principles outlined in Willey Reveley’s Panopticon 
drawings for Bentham – completed in 1791 (Tomlinson 1980, 99-101), but it was the 
philosophy that underpinned Millbank’s operational rationale that predominantly 
influenced the design of Fremantle Prison. 
Fremantle Prison was administered as a silent prison by Superintendent of Convicts, Thomas 
Hill Dixon for nine years (Stebbing 1999, 612–628), using a strategic separate system design. 
Previously, Hill had also served as a member of the London Metropolitan Police Force in 
1842, and also Deputy Governor at London’s Millbank Prison (Barker 2000, 53: Bosworth 
2004, 7). Henderson later returned to England and was awarded the role of Prisons 
Surveyor General and Military Prisons Inspector General in 1863 upon Jebb’s death till 1869, 
and later Chief Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police (1869 – 1886) “credited 
with establishing Scotland Yard” (Le Page 1986, 83). Circumstances related to the handling 
of the Trafalgar Square riots in 1886 saw Henderson tender his resignation.  
This lead to new direction in appointment of Commissioners for Police where having a 
military background was sought after as desirable attribute for any subsequent holders of 
                                                          
34
 Fremantle Prison was officially closed in 1991. 
35
 Jebb also involved with the design of Portland Prison in Dorset and accommodation for Parkhurst 
Prison on the Isle of Wight (www.fremantleprison.com.au). 
36
 Construction of Millbank Prison commenced in 1812 and was completed in 1821. 
67 
 
that office (Metropolitan Police 2010). Of particular interest, WA Police have seen no fewer 
than six previous commissioners of police serving in the armed forces, and significantly 
more commissioned officers sharing military backgrounds (WA Police 2010a) this suggests a 
clear top-down structure of ranking personnel might have been required where it was 
believed that the difficult decisions required of such an Office required the decisiveness and 
fortitude of ex-military servicemen.    
Settling in WA in 1852 after he was appointed as Director of Public Works, English born 
colonial architect Richard Roach Jewell designed many prominent buildings throughout 
Perth. However it is in relation to custodial facilities that Jewell significantly contributed to 
the WA CJS by designing many regional Police Gaols such as Guildford (see Fig. 12), Toodyay, 
Roebourne and Greenough (Oldham 1972, 481).  
  
Fig. 12 An example of an early Perth Lock-up facility  
that also served as a gaol for short sentences. This 
facility comprises exercise yards and very narrow  
linear corridors. Interestingly, this facility has a very 
generous outdoor area which is still secure. 
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Additional Police Gaols were also built in Northam, Albany, York, Busselton, and Port 
Gregory – all serving as police administered gaols for sentences of less than one week, with 
the exception of Albany and Port Gregory. Prisoners sentenced for a period of more than 
one week would be transferred to Perth Gaol (Barker 2000, 10) see Fig. 13. 
 
Fig. 13 An example of an early Perth gaol. This  
facility has a number of wings and dedicated 
exercise yards. Long, narrow, linear corridors  
connect all areas of this facility which is almost 
identically mirrored over 2 floors. This facility 
shares design layout and functional terminology 
that is still consistent with some existing Lock-ups  
and prisons.  
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Prison design appears to have been the dominant influence on all types of custodial 
architecture in WA, evident in the significance placed upon the completion of the 
Roundhouse as one of the first prominent public buildings constructed in Fremantle, along 
with a series of other temporary prisons and entire streets dedicated to warden 
accommodation. The completion of the Fremantle Prison which operated for almost 140 
years, as well as the water police and other special constables saw Fremantle labelled a 
“prison, police and military town” (Bosworth 2004, 69). Further to this Bosworth (2004, 40) 
describes Fremantle Prison as a facility designed to confine and control, intimidate, punish, 
redeem and improve the individual. It was also stipulated that it had to be plain, functional 
and not too expensive. This specification was not uncommon and apparently still in keeping 
with current construction prerequisites and practices, facilitating the construction of 
facilities with a unique ‘West Aussie’ flavour, where we strive for specific design intent and 
almost achieve it. 
The importance we place upon a public facility and its funding should be proportional to 
the importance of its function and obligations to the society in which it is built, such as 
providing custodial duty of care. In other words, if Fremantle Prison were to be considered 
without the aid of romanticised literature it would be apparent that the design brief was 
unequivocally and grotesquely inadequate. The overwhelmingly misjudged and 
miscalculated requirements saw a facility realised which would be utterly substandard and 
sub-humane almost immediately and would inexplicably be permitted to continue as an 
operational facility under such conditions for many years, suggesting incompetence though 
more likely, ignorance among administration. Deplorable living conditions deficient in 
“sanitation, undersized cells37 with little or no ventilation, poor food quality and extremely 
harsh punishments for prison offences” were eventually the catalyst leading to two Royal 
Commissions (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 50). The first Royal Commission conducted in 
1898 issued its recommendations which were predominantly architecture-related. 
Among other recommendations, the commission prescribed a series of alterations; 
including the construction of new walls in the main cell block facilitating the categorisation 
and separation of incompatible prisoners, and further, the demolishing of walls between 
every second cell to create improved and substantially larger standard cells with better 
                                                          
37
 The original design of Fremantle Prison provided only for single person cells in keeping with design 
following design which was required to achieve appropriate conditions for a separate silent system. 
Prisoners were expected to work and not inhabit their cells for anything other than to retire at night, 
thus it was deemed acceptable to provide such space.  
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ventilation. The second Royal Commission conducted in 1911 primarily concerned itself 
with the restructure of the administration and operation of the Fremantle Prison (Thomas 
and Stewart 1978, 50–54). 
The Royal Commissions instigated many changes both built and administrative, but the 
introduction of the Prisons Act 1903 was a critical milestone in WA prison history, which 
empowered both staff and prisoners to better understand their institutional position, 
duties and expectations; this act still forms the fundamental building blocks of current 
prison administration. The act which did not stipulate that there be a permanent official to 
head the WA prison service, did on the other hand, allow for a Comptroller General;38 an 
office which took charge over multiple sectors of the CJS (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 77). 
Nevertheless, the very next year (1904-1907) a circular panoptic inspired exercise 
compound was built within the walls of the Fremantle prison site (Australia. Department of 
Treasury and Finance 2010, 13) closely resembling a bicycle wheel complete with spokes 
radiating out from the central hub – each segment being surveilled by a guard located 
within the central hub. 
Prison facilities in the mid 1920s saw a trend towards a reformatory philosophy in design, 
with the emergence of Prison Farms such as Pardelup Prison Farm, and later, Barton’s Mill 
Prison, Karnet Prison Farm and Wooroloo Prison Farm and a host of other work camps 
associated with WA Regional Prisons. WA was deemed to be at the pinnacle of modern 
penology and criminology at an international level on the basis of this trend. Pardelup 
Prison Farm opened in 1927 and quickly developed into the exemplar of the prison system, 
being established ahead of similar initiatives in other countries and ten years earlier than 
England. These ‘open’ prisons were deemed to be a “turning point in prison history 
encouraged by the economic benefits resulting from work on the farm, though the 
economic benefits were always more easily measured than the reformatory performance 
of the facility” (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 110).  
A major consideration and anomaly with open prison systems is that they are intended for 
minimum security prisoners, which are least likely to require reformation, thus the 
recidivist prisoners who would most benefit from this initiative are the least likely to be 
sent to a prison farm to receive it. Thomas and Stewart (1978, 110) argued that prison farm 
economics appeared to be the only instigator which appeared to generate parliamentary 
                                                          
38
 It would appear that this role was implemented as a cost cutting exercise (Thomas and Stewart 
1978, 77). 
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discussion that encouraged or lead to any change and thus these early facilities operated 
(and continue to operate) as a quasi enterprise and appear to provide little reformatory 
benefit, rather, financial sustenance to the government and the greater CJS. Barton’s Mill 
was established as a prison in 1942–1989 (Heritage Council of Western Australia 1998), 
coinciding with the beginning of World War II, receiving all of the male prisoners from 
Fremantle Prison and Broome Regional Prison while they were under the control of military 
authorities. Thomas and Stewart (1978, 117) state that the post war period indicate an era 
of neglect from 1945–1951 with the Department of Prisons seldom submitting yearly 
reports to the government, and with no further changes of significance until the 
introduction of parole in the early 1960’s. 
Attitudes towards prisons and their role within society continued to change and adapt both 
locally and internationally in the early 1960s, reflecting a shift in societal and political 
perspectives on imprisonment centered upon rehabilitative aspirations. This rationale 
initiated the manifestation of reformatory style facilities in the United States (Wirkler 1995, 
86). Development in prison farms continued with Karnet Prison Farm which opened in 1963 
doubling as a specialist alcoholic’s facility, and Wooroloo Prison Farm established in 1970, 
which are both grounded on rehabilitative ideals in an open–style prison here in WA.  
Thomas and Stewart (1978, 112) affirm that the novelty of this type of facility was short-
lived for both prisoners and custodians. Consequently, an increase in the number of 
‘escapes’ from these open prisons resulted in subsequent fencing of these types of facilities 
(Department of Corrective services 2008). 
By the 1980s In the United States, and shortly thereafter in the United Kingdom, innovative 
and alternative style of prison facilities were being introduced and adopted. “Direct 
supervision” requires that constant control of all areas within the facility be attained 
through “direct and continual contact” with all detainees at all times, achieved through 
increased levels of interaction between staff and prisoners (Wirkler 1995, 86). Additional 
benefits of a direct supervision model include the significant consolidation of staff 
provisions associated with special needs prisoners that require intensive observation 
(Fairweather and McConville 2000, 31). This prison administration and supervision style 
does nonetheless, require a New Generation architectural program, instigating an entirely 
new classification of prison facilities in these countries and subsequently internationally, 
with claims of astonishing success (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 31).  
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As described by Thomas and Stewart (1978, 161) 19th century prisons were “built to last 
forever”, advancing little flexibility for future additions, alterations and changes in society 
or philosophy. Therefore, as a modern and educated society, equipped with the benefit of 
hindsight, we ought to be substantiating our contemporary institutional (architectural and 
philosophical) positions in their entirety. Yet, it appears that WA’s state funding for public 
facilities is reflective of a political culture where facilities continue to be built down to a 
cost and not up to a standard, a sentiment to which Knapel (1993, 4) also observed, stating 
that as a rule, decisions associated with issuing of construction contracts for correction 
facilities are determined and appointed according to lowest price.  
Contemporary developments continue to reflect an increasingly disturbing trend which had 
been commented upon by nonconformist reformer John Howard (1726 – 1790) over 200 
years ago, stating that in relation to custodial matters, he had seen “enough to determine 
him on reform. To his simple mind it seemed obvious that the root of all the evils of 
management was the fact that it was allowed to be a profit-making business” (Webb and 
Webb 1922, 34), the empowering of private companies to take control over what Garland 
(2001, 18) states would ideally be considered the role of the state; the establishment of 
increasing numbers of private prisons, an irrefutable indication that rehabilitative 
philosophy and endeavours of prisoner reform have been disbanded.  
With this, McDonald et al. (1998, 4-5) argue that although not a new concept, in the years 
leading up to the 1980s, sub-standard conditions found throughout the US government 
prison system, offered potential private contractors the political platform required to 
propose a (more cost efficient) private prison alternative to a system clearly in need of 
improvement while assuring adherence to obligatory statutory requirements. Over the ten 
year period following this (1988-1998), privately operated prisons have seldom been 
examined in the US to determine the overall success of their integration within the 
previously government-run system, and of those which have, to date, have not 
demonstrated significant advantages over government run facilities, with McDonald et al. 
stating that: 
“Perhaps the most striking aspect of this research literature is that it is so sparse 
and that so few government agencies have chosen to evaluate the performance of 
their contractors formally. Even though there exist over a hundred privately 
operated secure confinement facilities, there have been very few systematic 
attempts to compare their performance to that of public facilities. Most 
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government agencies have been satisfied with monitoring compliance with the 
terms of the contracts” (McDonald et al. 1998, 54-56). 
Rapid increases in prisoner volumes next to an existing system mired in futility compelled 
the US government to seek the unencumbered and efficient procedure with which private 
entities undertake the design and construction of their detention facilities (McDonald et al. 
1998, 7) especially as the excessive bureaucratic processes which underlie every minutia of 
government process can be excluded. This trend appears to be surreptitiously infiltrating 
the infrastructure and consciousness of WA society, with a measured and gradual 
conversion to privatised custodial services for the WA Police Department and courts as well 
as provision of food, hygiene among many other services found catering for needs within 
PWH such as custodial transportation services between Department of Corrective Services’ 
facilities and WA Police facilities. Further to this, the Department of Corrective Services 
(Acacia Prison) is the first privately administered prison by Serco. Though this research will 
not directly examine this shift in detainee processing in Australia, its operational benefits, 
and associated costs are not a trivial matter and is worthy of further research.  
Present-day prison management objectives envisage its primary role as a public protector 
“by holding offenders securely in custody39 and no longer pretend to be capable of bringing 
about rehabilitative effects,” and further, common forms of de-individualising and de-
humanising employed as a method for attaining and maintaining power in custodial 
facilities is contrary to the desired processes of rehabilitation anticipated to occur within 
prisons (Garland 2001, 18). De-humanised relationships are “objectifying, analytical and 
empty of emotional and empathetic content” (Zimbardo 2007, 222-223), and accordingly, it 
is noted that as early as 1726, a writer described prison as “a place fitter to make a rogue 
than reform him” (Web and Web 1922, 21). In-so-doing, this perspective suitably predicts 
the ensuing delusions of the next 280 years that rehabilitative outcomes could be achieved. 
This reformative objective has only recently been acknowledged as futile. 
As a result, it appears that imprisonment, the ineffective vehicle once used by reformers to 
persuade society in relation to the transformation and correction of those people that 
might contaminate societal morality and while ambitious in its progressive intentions, now 
requires an unqualified deviation in philosophy as do PCFs which as a custodial institution 
                                                          
39
 Within this context Garland refers to keeping offenders away from general society. 
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share historical parallels with prison institutions, though arguably, are indicative of less 
advancement than latter. 
Although this chapter has shown that architectural knowledge relating to custodial facilities 
was transferred from England to WA, the content outlines a timeline and discusses some of 
WAs early carcerative facilities and their functions. This includes Rottnest Island facilities, 
which, like the Roundhouse in Fremantle, convey an architectural language consistent with 
having panoptic influence. Further links to English penal architecture are demonstrated 
through those that designed and administration of Fremantle Prison, both of these people 
having an association with Bentham, Bentham’s ideologies, and the London Metropolitan 
Police Force. 
This chapter also illustrates some of the key spatial similarities that can be found in existing 
PCFs when compared with police gaols by means of diagrammatic architectural plans and 
discuses some of the more contemporary penal trends and attitudes to imprisonment, and 
the underwhelming level of government initiative shown relating to improvement of PCFs 
and associated knowledge. 
While this chapter has discussed many aspects relating to carcerative architecture and WA 
prisons facilities in general, the following chapter will further elaborate upon development, 
specifically, in relation to the evolution of PCFs, moving toward a WA context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Chapter 3 
Architectural Response 
Police Custodial Facilities (PCFs) 
This chapter’s interpretation of PCF development historically is indicative of a custodial 
typology that appears to have largely developed by default or indirectly as a consequence 
of advancement in prison philosophy and architecture. This establishes that dissimilar 
institutional typologies share similar historical, and to some degree, architectural threads 
based upon interrelated views of criminals and criminality.  
Whether tried by a court or traditionally by our peers, as a place of detention for the 
accused, Lock-up style holding facilities can be traced back to our earliest civilisations, 
however, few if any were originally built for this specific function. Any building whether 
suitable or not was adapted for the purpose. Early attitudes towards the criminal element 
was that of absolute rejection “to be got rid of at least cost, clarifying the fundamental 
motivation persuading authorities to make use of pre-existing structures; whether 
dilapidated or outmoded, they could serve no better use” (United Nations Social Defence 
Research Institute 1975, 8) in the hope that these detention places effected physical 
manifestations of psychological punishment (Foucault 1975, 239). This clearly illustrates the 
disdain once reserved for prisoners, clearly, this was also reflected in early places of 
detention.  
By this definition, very early detention-places served no other purpose than to hold people 
for indefinite periods of time and thus do not offer direct relevance to this research. 
However, a contemporary reference to the term imprisonment, which is for the purpose of 
punishment40 and thus the beginning of a conscious endeavour to develop specialised 
architectural forms and spatial solutions of the late 18th - 19th century needs to be 
considered.  
This does in some way require one to consider facilities which preceded this period such as 
the Bastille, built as a fortress predominantly between 1357 to 1370,41 whose primary initial 
function was to hold upper-class prisoners, and later as a general prison. Other, significantly 
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 Also see ‘holding for sentence versus holding as sentence’ later in this chapter. 
41
 The Bastille’s construction continued on beyond this date (United Nations Social Defence Research 
Institute 1975, 8-14). 
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older examples dating back to B.C.E also exist, though Johnston (1973) mentions that the 
Mamertine Prison, Rome, is one example of a detention place for which sufficient quality 
physical and literary documentation still exists and is thus able to be studied.42 Although 
this example will not be described in detail in this thesis, it serves as a well-documented 
example of a preserved and tangible ancient detention place that substantially precedes 
Common Era.  
Mamertine Prison, like other early examples of spaces built or adapted for the purpose of 
imprisonment required little if any other functional and operational capability other than 
secure detention, and as detention itself and its duration was not considered punishment, 
any attempt to make a categorical inference between the specific functions of ancient and 
contemporary facilities with any plausible or acceptable level of accuracy upon this basis 
would prove impossible, and thus does not form part of this research. Nevertheless, it 
would appear that detention facilities, irrespective of form and institutional identity, have 
one of the longest histories among all institutions – ironically dissimilar to the architectural 
advancement associated with prison institutions, where reform is well documented. It 
appears that detention facilities continue to be the institution about which the least is 
known, and consequently, this custodial typology has until recently continued to function in 
a relatively rudimentary way, ‘evolving largely by default’ (Mattick 1974, 782–785).  
Unlike Mamertine Prison, records do not always allow for dependable images of primitive 
detention-places, though research would suggest that so long as documentation exists (as 
ancient as it may be) reference can be directly associated to the detention of captive 
people, be it in caves, rickety timber cages or ‘gibbets’ cage, deep dug-out pits, strong 
poles, cellars, gate houses, castles, manors or convents, altered for the new function 
formed a small part of many crude and primitive detention edifices (United Nations Social 
Defence Research Institute 1975, 8-14 : Pashley 2000, 22).  
“Many city gates were used to house prisoners, some being enlarged or rebuilt to 
provide the necessary accommodation. During the next three or four centuries this 
rudimentary penal system showed no signs of developing into anything more 
progressive. Jails continued to be established in grim, forbidding rooms, cellars, 
gate houses and castles: all were used mostly for detention rather than 
punishment” (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 14). 
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 Johnston (1973, 5) mentions that sufficient substantiating literature suggests that completion of 
this structure dates back to approximately the 6
th
 century B.C.E. 
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All of the aforementioned examples are indicative of structures that have undergone or 
out-rightly involve some manner of human intervention that have resulted in built forms 
able to be adapted or used for the purpose of detention.  
WA Short-term Custodial Facilities (STCF) 
Documented examples of WAs inceptive; makeshift and primitive STCFs around the time of 
colonisation and for some time to follow, suggests that conditions under which detainees 
were held, and police were expected to function, were crude and extraordinarily difficult. 
WA has seen many police ‘Lock-ups’ come and go, predominantly borne out of exigent 
necessity. The majority of these were hastily built from whatever local materials could be 
sourced or specific to Perth, adaptive re-use by using the hull of moored ships upon the 
Swan River. While only the largest towns were afforded more resilient and sturdy materials 
such as brick, timber, steel and iron, small early 1800s country settlements usually relied on 
brushwood and canvas and while this only protected them from the sun and rain, those 
detained, were so by chain not the edifice itself. Though basic, inexpensive and 
inappropriate it was an improvement in comparison with existing practices, inclusive of 
chaining detainees to tree trunks, within tree trunks, to heavy logs or a spike in the ground 
without relief from the harsh Australian sun and rain (Pashley 2000, 27). 
Significant advancement in regulations and laws have since been enacted by government 
such as The Criminal Investigation Act 2006, Criminal Code, Police Act and scores of others 
that outline what Police can do in a particular situation, though, police do have 
discretionary powers. The ‘Commissioner’s Orders and Procedures’ (COPs) Manual, forms 
the foundation of best practice police procedures. In short, the COPs Manual outlines 
appropriate police procedure, taking into account the many acts, regulations and other 
guidelines against which police are bound. What is certain is that PCFs perform an integral 
contributory function within the Criminal Justice System. They are not intended nor 
designed to be an instrument of correction or punishment, simply, they serve to assist 
police to temporarily detain people for a variety of reasons. Police custodial facilities form a 
fundamental link to other divisions of the Western Australian Criminal Justice System 
(WACJS) acting as an associated interface within a matrix of divisions of the system. As a 
result of the pivotal function police facilities play within the WACJS, complex issues 
deserving of serious consideration and comprehension require critical analysis during pre-
design planning in order to propose a rigorous and specialised architectural response. 
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Nevertheless, one may question the likelihood of a future to help combat issues of 
overcrowding in prisons, similar to that of the United States where police operate hybrid 
detention facilities. These appear to have evolved from the need to have police Lock-up 
facilities and a place for detention, for questioning, and pre-trial detention purposes. These 
facilities perform a function akin to what was formerly referred to as Police Gaols; holding 
detainees and housing sentenced prisoners (Mattick 1974, 783-785). Arguably, within 
contemporary law, there exists a vast area of uncertainty and interpretation, and thus the 
amalgamation of the two custodial typologies could conceivably be achieved as it once did 
in WA, and as it continues to do so elsewhere in the world such as the US. Notwithstanding 
this, the existing Perth Watch House already errs on the side of an unwilling participant in 
the detention of people on return to prison warrants for longer than required. This occurs 
in order to conform to prison intake hours which more appropriately resemble business 
office hours. Although PWH has not held detainees for short sentence purposes for many 
years, it does however, reluctantly hold unsentenced drunken detainees as a last resort, 
predominantly due to a paucity of alternative options. This in no way suggests that 
functional generalisations associated with short-term custodial architecture are to be made 
in the belief that an all-encompassing solution is remotely plausible (Hall et al. 1985), 
rather, PCFs require the support of other divisions within the CJS and its partners. Critically, 
it appears that many of the support agencies such as those within the Department of 
Health are also underfunded (The ABC, April 18, 2012), as is the Salvation Army (The Age, 
September 11, 2012) who administers the Western Australian Network of Alcohol and 
other Drug Agencies (WANADA). This significantly impacts on the subsequent performance 
of the WA Police's PCFs and use of resources where short-comings and difficulties 
experienced in other sectors are directly transferred to police who are required to hold 
them for their own safety where alternative more suitable custodians are unavailable. To 
accommodate such people where appropriate care and observation can be made, police 
may place them in PCFs until they are deemed sober enough to be released or alternative 
accommodation can be sourced.  
This is a direct consequence of large numbers of people that come to the attention of 
police who could and should be relinquished to the care of other allied professionals that 
are for the most part better equipped and trained to assist in many instances.  
For example, drug and alcohol centres, psychiatric clinics, medical practitioners, guidance 
counsellors, guardians and parental care, and Department for Child Protection etc. At times 
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people who come into contact with police should not be in active custody in a PCF or more 
loosely in police 'custody' by association (R.13 2011).43  
Further to this, the apparent magnitude of societal unawareness to the diversity of 
functions performed by the various sectors of the WACJS is demonstrative of apathy and 
indifference. Similarly, the function of police custodial facilities, jails and prison are 
frequently misunderstood, and are regularly referred to interchangeably, which is 
comparative to a perceptible deficiency in research literature and procedures specific to 
police custodial facility architecture. It appears a preposterous and arrogant ambition when 
considering the infinite number of variables such as unique histories, languages and 
multiple cultures in existence within modern society, to aspire to remedy this undervalued 
and misinterpreted subsection of the criminal justice system with an all-encompassing 
architectural solution. Considering this, Klofas (1990, 71) notes that the application of 
specific, case-by-case research in every instance where PCFs are to be considered appears 
the most logical and effective process whereby specialised solutions can be established and 
implemented.  
Architecture  
From an architectural perspective, the WA PCFs visited were expected to account for 
compliant, non-compliant, non-compliant who are violent and combative, and suicidal or at 
risk of self-harm categories of detainee. To achieve this for all these different detainee 
types, WA PCFs provide three categories of cells, being, predominantly glazed (Perspex) 
temporary holding pods, standard finish holding cells and padded cells. Sub-categories of 
these cells do exist, however, in most circumstances they were found to be obsolete in 
terms of their design compliance, were not provided due to the size and location of the 
facility, or were inaccessible due to facility design when assessed alongside available human 
resources. Thus, police are restricted to detaining; male, female, transgendered, intoxicated 
(drugs or alcohol), serious to relatively more minor offenders, and culturally diverse groups 
of the abovementioned categories within a very limited set of accommodative provisions. 
Juvenile cells also present in most existing facilities, however, most, if not all, are now 
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 In this instance, custody is generally defined by most dictionaries as being in the presence of, being 
stopped by, or being spoken to by police and feeling that if one was to attempt to leave they would 
be prohibited from doing so. 
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disused as policies on detaining juveniles have changed over time favouring escort and 
accommodation at a juvenile detention facility, such as Rangeview, over police detention.  
It would be impossible to specifically cater for all groups at an individual level, hence what 
is provided, intends simply to address the minimum safe human requirement for relatively 
short periods of detention. However, different solutions can be considered in the sense 
that they address the specific requirements of regions, districts, countries or cultures, as in 
reality individual solutions are not only impractical but impossible.  
This research does not intend to suggest that a single all-encompassing design solution is 
even remotely possible for PCFs, in fact, this research suggests quite the opposite, that a 
specialised set of design considerations are required but they must respond and be relative 
to the situational context in which it is located. 
In the case of PWH this is achieved by providing minimal space, fixtures and stimulation. 
What is provided here, in a standard holding cell is a platform to take a single foldable 
mattress, a flush mounted emergency communications button, a flush mounted stainless 
steel toilet pan and flush mounted stainless steel drinking spout and drain combination. 
Some cells at some station level PCFs have access to a fixed window for natural lighting.44 
Some station PCFs do not provide a specific area for mattresses but have an oversized 
transition space that could accommodate this function and flush moulded formed seating 
which highlights the notion of 'temporary' detention. All cells have a transition space that 
allows for negotiating between sitting, sleeping, drinking and toileting activities, though 
when accounting for the proportions of the cell, this space,45 makes up a considerable 
proportion of the overall cell area. It must be remembered that at peak period times, this 
space is likely to be taken up by an additional mattress and a detainee, a circumstance that 
this specific space within cells was not intended nor designed for.46  
Primarily, PCF spaces aim to ensure as much as practicable that detainees cannot harm 
themselves or others. All items other than blankets and mattresses are provided as fixtures 
and other than these two items, nothing within the cells can be moved or modified. While 
this cannot be considered as of a concern in STCF due to the minimal length of stay, what 
                                                          
44
 This is not the case at PWH where natural light permeates into the exercise yard and some of the 
office areas only as all cells are contained in the core of the building. 
45
 A walkway that performs as a corridor would in a domestic context. 
46
 Also see Chapter 5 on overcrowding. 
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needs to be considered is that there were no pacifying or diversionary measures within any 
of the locations visited, particularly pertinent to PWH which holds detainees overnight and 
for slightly longer than station PCFs as they are not adequately equipped to do so. Other 
than a high level convex mirror, and more recently a camera to nullify any blind spots, 
padded cells have no fixtures whatsoever.47  
In general, PCFs provide a bland environment devoid of any visual or auditory stimulus. 
Granted, these facilities provide short-term custodial solutions, however, a myriad of 
architectural considerations as well as pacifying instruments could provide the necessary 
diversionary and pacifying stimulus required to alleviate boredom and potentially violence 
at little if any additional cost.  
Individual access to open air exercise yard, natural light, dimmable artificial lighting with 
override in case of misuse, use of colour, television, radio, magazines and reading material 
was not available. To some, this might appear as an undeserved and unnecessary luxury, 
however, irrespective of the fact that detainees have not yet been determined as guilty, 
what such considerations aim to achieve are more convivial PCF spaces that offer what 
could be considered environments that are less stressful and encourage behaviours that are 
more amenable.  
It is suggested that behavioural modifications that can be achieved by these means should 
be sought and not from high levels of surveillance. Consequently, any behaviour that can be 
improved (or good behaviours maintained) by good design might assist officers to carry out 
their duties more efficiently due to an increase in detainee compliance. This notion in 
effecting a change in behaviour seeks 'real' or 'sustainable' modification, whereas panoptic 
spaces as that which Bentham advocated required a belief that one was being constantly 
observed, therefore it could be said that behavioural self-modification hinged on this belief 
alone and without this conviction the theory no longer applies.  
Physical interventions and design strategies, however, it would seem, could encourage 
effective solutions that are inherent within the form and architectural articulation; it is real 
and exists in continuum irrespective of the existence of cameras or presence of custodial 
officers. 
                                                          
47
 This is to ensure that the potential for injury and self harm through fixtures and fittings is 
minimised.  
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What this offers to the profession of architecture is a more holistic and considered way of 
looking at some of the additional aspects other than merely the primary components of 
function and security, that could and should influence decision making for the purpose of 
design. Furthermore, it demonstrates that there is a significantly greater level of knowledge 
that is required to understand the critical existing spatial and behavioural relationships that 
that could empower architects to not only develop more holistic design briefs to the 
comprehensive level that this research will suggest, but highlights a gap and potentially, a 
unique opportunity for architects to undertake a more active and central role in delivering 
strategic education to end users, key stakeholders operational personnel. 
In terms of architectural briefs, what is required, it is suggested, is a brief based on a body 
of knowledge that that is reflective of interdisciplinary research. With this, one is more 
likely to achieve architecture that create spaces which promote suitable spatial 
relationships for all of the facilities occupants, best considers all of their specific needs, and 
meets the necessary functional and operational requirements.  
The profession of architecture and architectural research also stands to greatly benefit from 
additional collaborative discourse with WA Police to further develop an in-depth, quality 
body of knowledge that can be built upon and formulated into an-almanac of data. This 
knowledge could be used by architects to assist police with future facility design that is 
better considered and relates to real police needs rather than perceived requirements. In 
partnership with spatial, behavioural and environmental architectural knowledge that 
architects possess, this data represents additional layers of knowledge that architects can 
utilise in the development of deliverable instructional and educational précis to specific 
user groups. This new knowledge could offer WA Police an additional set of intellectual 
tools that facilitate more efficient use of custodial spaces, and equally, highlight concerns of 
effective use of space in providing custodial care, and maintaining a safe working 
environment through an enhanced understanding of it. This notion should not necessarily 
be limited to the confines of specific buildings in which specific police groups inhabit, but 
could equally be applied to urban environments and other spatial typologies.  
In this capacity, architects could offer a basic level of understanding of how space within 
different contexts can be interpreted to formulate a greater appreciation of behaviours that 
occur relative to the environment in which they occur, relative to anticipated societal 
behavioural norms. From this perspective, architects are able to offer a specialist form of 
spatial knowledge that is able to adapted and applied to assist police function and in-so-
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doing, promote new platforms for architectural research, education and knowledge, and 
potentially formulate a more specialised sub-component of the profession of architecture. 
Holding as a sentence and holding for sentence 
As the only western society that still retains and utilises the death penalty, the US presents 
what appears to be an anomaly in progression to our contemporary understanding of 
punishment, being, a prescribed period of incarceration determined by the severity and 
type of crime committed. Death row inmates are on average held for 10 years (Hudson 
2000, 834-835) before execution and are a particular deviation from conventional 
contemporary understanding of the definition of imprisonment and punishment. As the 
actual punishment in this instance is death, this raises the question; what then is the 
extensive period of imprisonment preceding the capital punishment? In this case it would 
appear that this is merely an extraordinarily excessive period of detention for the purpose 
of carrying out what is considered the actual punishment; the death penalty. Ethically, this 
raises many questions of what occurs should the 'accused' be found innocent and 
exonerated, for example, what should the term of imprisonment served be considered in 
this instance?  
In answering this question it must be considered that “over 100 people have been 
exonerated of charges for which they had been imprisoned awaiting execution and 
released from death row since 1973” and although a valuable tool, DNA testing is only 
partly responsible for “proving innocence” (American Civil Liberties Union 2003). 
The US criminal justice system has been described as;  
“[A] broken machine that wrongfully convicts innocent people, sentencing 
thousands of people to prison or to death for the crimes of others, as a new study 
reveals. The University of Michigan law school and Northwestern University have 
compiled a new National Registry of Exonerations – a database of over 2,000  
prisoners exonerated between 1989 and the present day, when DNA evidence has 
been widely used to clear the names of innocent people convicted of rape and 
murder” 
and further…  
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“Death row inmates were exonerated nine times more frequently than others 
convicted of murder. One-fourth of those exonerated of murder had received a 
death sentence, while half of those who had been wrongfully convicted of rape or 
murder faced death or a life behind bars. Ten of the inmates went to their grave 
before their names were cleared” (The Guardian 2012). 
“Many of the releases of innocent defendants from death row coming about as a result of 
factors outside of the justice system … such as students who had been assigned to 
investigate cases where people were to be executed, after the system of appeals had 
rejected legal claims,” thus, “people have been spared because of the informal efforts of 
concerned citizens, not because of the justice system” (Michigan State University 2004). 
Although prisoner types associated with US prisons differ, the Bastille was similarly used for 
holding prisoners for future execution during the French revolution and beyond. This 
suggests that in principle, the humanity of the US criminal justice model has not progressed 
to the same extent as it has politically and economically when compared with other 
countries. While this position does not form a significant component of this thesis, it does 
highlight that although as a contemporary society we have advanced in many ways, in other 
ways, such as our moral stance on punishment for redemption, punishment for 
rehabilitation, imprisonment for punishment or as the punishment and the way in which 
facilities are used remain rather rudimentary, ill-considered and primitive at best. 
Although this chapter has shown that custodial facilities share common ancestries well 
beyond the 18th - 19th centuries when one did not consider imprisonment as a form of 
punishment nor were any facilities built specifically for this purpose. Very early facilities 
were merely adapted for this purpose, therefore a ‘deviation period’ was sought to 
determine the point at which the attributes of either prisons of PCFs appeared to specialise. 
This established that the specialisation of prison institutions occurred more readily, with 
PCFs developing largely by default. Further to this, a more structured system of 
government institutional provision and various new Acts further contributed to a 
divergence of services performed by prison institutions into more specialised and function-
specific architectural and spatial responses. Consequently, the current WACJS is indicative 
of significant system-specific specialisation of operational function which has incrementally 
developed since colonisation. However, further PCF specific research is required to develop 
the architectural, spatial and strategic conditions appropriate to this under-appreciated and 
unique custodial typology. Therefore, a research questionnaire that intends to develop a 
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more in-depth understanding and knowledge of PCFs and the personnel that functions 
within them has been formulated and follows in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study: Questionnaire, Site Analysis and 
Fieldwork Methodology. 
Summary 
This chapter seeks to develop a better understanding of specific issues relating to PCF 
design and the processes and organisational relationships of the personnel attached to 
these locations. This chapter recognises that contemporary architectural research requires 
a better understanding of a number of design related issues and solutions require analysis 
which is not limited purely to built fabric, but subject to a complex matrix of philosophical, 
historical, cultural and socio-organisational interactions in addition to architectural 
reflective practice and critical analysis of space. 
Waid and Clements (2001, 1), in reference to architectural design of correctional facilities, 
state that “few criminal justice scholars have pursued this topic as a research interest.” It 
appears, however, that fewer still, do so specifically with respect to short-term PCFs, thus it 
is against this background that there currently appear to be clear disparities between 
custodial training and the requirements of the position before operational undertaking of 
service within PCFs, and between policies and procedures associated with PCFs and the 
functional ability of the PCF to facilitate them. In addition, inconsistencies exist between 
design intent and the operational utilisation of PCF space through make do ad-hoc 
initiatives forcing the facility be used in a way in which it was not intended – a way in which 
did not form part of the original design brief which initiated the existent design response.  
This research focuses on translation and inevitable and sometimes regrettable transfer of 
philosophical, cultural and historical custodial nuances into current PCFs. This research also 
aims to determine if PCF personnel consider current custodial training sufficient to achieve 
a sense of operational preparedness in PCF staff and discusses a potentially more effective 
training environment requiring full utilisation of the existing PWH or specific design 
rationale for future facilities in addition to a symbiotic correlation with regulations, policy 
and operational PCF procedure. 
Additionally, this chapter discusses the potential for developing functional specialised 
component architectural strategies that embody acceptable levels of dignity and security 
while addressing the physical and psychological welfare of all occupants for STC 
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environments. This requires a more comprehensive consideration of contextual analyses 
which contributes to an understanding of all of the spatial qualities and human sensibilities 
(specific custodial intra-organisational relationships) associated with PCFs to affect this 
objective through a carefully structured and approved face to face questionnaire.  
This questionnaire was divided into its six (6) essential sub-categories to aid presentation of 
narrative discourse associated with the empirical data collected from fieldwork conducted. 
This structure grouped related topics which allowed for a more fluid process of discussion 
with interviewees that had a logical sequence; this ensured that a consistent approach was 
able to be applied in each interview. The questionnaire used for this research is as follows: 
Approved Research Questions 
 
Experience: 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 
2. How long have you worked at a police Lock-up or other short-term custodial facility 
(please indicate type) and where? 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? 
 
Organisational Relationships: 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do 
you think this method works?  
5. Are organisational relationships different in the Lock-up compared to other areas 
such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? 
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working Lock-up environment and why do you 
think this is the case? 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward Lock-up/custodial duties and 
associated facilities has changed over time, and how? 
 
Custodian Training: 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/Lock-up training before 
working in a Lock-up facility/environment? 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to Lock-
up/custodial staff? Explain your answer 
10. Do you feel that the Lock-up should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. 
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Facilities Considerations: 
11. Do you think that the way in which the Lock-up is designed helps you to perform 
your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the 
outcome? If no why not? 
13. How could the Lock-up operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed 
differently? Explain your answer. 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the Lock-up design 
(perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. 
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you 
feel about this? 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain 
your answer. 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lock-ups, could they be made better, how? 
18. Is the Lock-up observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved?  
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the Lock-up?  
 
PCF Violence + Risk Management: 
21. What do you think about the violence in Lock-ups? 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were 
handling the situation? Explain your answer.  
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the Lock-up was designed 
or laid out differently, and if so how? 
 
On Dignity: 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a Lock-up), if so where is it usually found? 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the Lock-up?  
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? 
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31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that 
are sober? Explain your answer 
32. In your opinion, how does drugs and alcohol effected detainees determine the way 
the Lock-up facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if 
so how? Does the Lock-up easily allow for this? 
34. Does Lock-up design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with 
both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer.  
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and 
when?  
 
HR and Facility Management: 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? 
Explain your answer. 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your 
answer. 
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Questionnaire Interviews 
Although all interviews and questions were structured in the same way, the format of 
answers that were offered varied greatly, ranging from to-the-point to very forthcoming 
and engaging, and ranged from 60-90 minutes in duration. 
Before all interviews and obtaining Consent to Participate, all respondents were issued with 
a Participant Information Sheet which was read and discussed. This outlined their role in 
the research and how their information would be used and protected by way of privacy and 
confidentiality. To protect the identity of respondents that participated in the interviews, all 
have been de-identified and where reference to specific discussions are made, they are 
mentioned by a respondent code, a number and the year in which the interview was 
conducted, for example ‘R.17 2011’. It must be noted that none of the interviews were 
recorded in any way other than hand written notes. 
A scale method was developed by which to be able to allocate a numerical value to 
dialogue in a consistent way. This scale applied relationship values from 1 - 9, where ‘1’ was 
equivalent to ‘Disagree’ or ‘No’, with ‘5’ being equivalent to ‘Neutral’ or ‘Maybe’ and ‘9’ 
being ‘Strongly Agree’ or ‘Yes’. This made it possible to determine trends, averages, 
establish a graphical representation to verbal answers given by respondents. Numerical 
scores are presented as a factor out of nine (9) and thus an equivalent percentage. 
In the same way that the questionnaire has been structured into related groups, the 
Summary of Questionnaire Interviews are similarly structured into sections as follows: 
 
Experience – Questionnaire Component [sections 1 to 3] 
Organisational Relationships – Questionnaire Component [sections 4 to 7] 
Custodian Training – Questionnaire Component [sections 8 to 10] 
Facilities Considerations – Questionnaire Component [sections 11 to 20 & 35] 
PCF Violence + Risk Management – Questionnaire Component [sections 21 to 25] 
On Dignity – Questionnaire Component [sections 26 to 34] 
HR and Facility Management – Questionnaire Component [sections 36 to 38] 
Summary of Questionnaire Interviews 
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Experience [1-3] 
 
 Relating to length of service [average length of service 21 years] 
 
 PCF specific experience [average length of service in PCFs 3.5 years] 
 
 Level of stress requiring coping mechanisms [factor of 6.7/9 equivalent to 74%] 
 
All interviewees other than R.8 (2010) and R.13 (2011) stated that they felt 
stress at work however most stated that the stress related to hierarchically 
(instigated) pressures placed upon them which related to a seemingly ever-
increasing administrative workload rather than operational pressures. In all 
instances within PCFs associated with Police Station, varying levels of 
responsibility for observation of detainees rests with the Station OIC and 
shift OICs (in some instances full responsibility) which in-turn impacts on 
having appropriate level of custodial surveillance by virtue of the 
administrative expectations placed upon them which must be completed 
concurrently. This is entirely a HR issue as during the course of this research 
there were no dedicated Custody or Auxiliary Officers attached to the 
Station's PCF which could take 'ownership' of the station-level PCF and 
taking a more direct approach to custodial observation and care – in lieu of 
the current CCTV approach conducted from other parts of the building. 
Additionally OICs could not see an alternative as the working day was finite 
with not prospect for completing excessive workloads on overtime thus 
placing them in a difficult position of balancing work and life. 
Those attached to the PWH – as the state's operational PCF stated that 
stress was experienced in a number of ways hierarchical, direct – 
operational, working within a facility under permanent surveillance, and 
from a prevailing sense of being under constant scrutiny from investigative 
bodies whose deliberations promote uncertainty particularly among new 
custodial staff. As a result, staff become hesitant to respond as they should 
or seek to avoid any contentious, hostile and difficult situations which might 
instigate potential disciplinary or legal ramifications. This situation is 
amplified by a sense of training related un-preparedness (Note: see section 
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relating to training). All respondents indicated that they could not de-stress 
at work having to de-stress outside of work time as best they could using a 
variety of approaches as they felt there was no reprieve or appropriate 
provision for respite or retreat within the facility.  
 
Organisational Relationships [4-7] 
 
 Issues relating to ease of making and outcome of grievances process and the 
appropriateness of this method [factor of 6.4/9 equivalent to 71%] 
In general, most supervisors felt that existing grievance processes 
encourages staff to come forward and discuss specific or general issues 
which require a grievance process. It appeared that many of the supervisors 
took a proactive approach in monitoring shift issues, discussing these as a 
way of moving forward, with most of these OICs being visibly proud of being 
able to be a part of what might create favourable morale, and a strong 
unified team. Some of those interviewed, who alluded to having made a 
grievance themselves at some point in their career offered further comment 
in relation to the appropriateness of this method, stating that the process 
outcomes can be quite subjective and that sometimes the process did not 
appear to be unbiased with a conflict of interest when a complaint might be 
made against a high-ranking officer. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
general attitude of all people involved in the interviews was that the 
grievance process had improved over time to such a degree that officers no 
longer felt that the first recourse of making a grievance would be ridicule. 
Interestingly, (sworn police) respondents felt that many more grievances 
were being lodged by civilian personnel in the workplace, however, civilian 
supervisors did not make mention of this being an issue, rather, they felt 
that in general civilian personnel addressed grievance-worthy issues 
whereas when a complaint is made to sworn police the problem just tends 
to be shifted around. 
Undoubtedly, the vast majority of all respondents stated that new 
technologies such as social networking, namely Facebook posed serious 
concerns as a tool which has the potential to and is being used to extend 
intra-organisational issues beyond the confines of the workplace. In 
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particular this refers to ‘throw-away’ comments being posted in the virtual 
world regarding work related issues or about other staff having significant 
impact in fracturing real workplace relations. Social networking has been 
further described as a significant contributor to inter-shift fracturing 
allowing exclusive ’cliques’ to develop. 
 
 Confidence that PCF organisational relationships differ to those of other areas of 
WA Police [factor of 6.2/9 equivalent to 69%]  
 
The majority of people interviewed particularly those from PWH believed 
that location specific organisational relationships associated to PCFs did 
exist resulting from the unique working conditions and environment 
associated with this work. This appears to be more pertinent to the facility 
when staffed by sworn police.  
Civilian supervisors feel, however, that the culture within the PWH has 
changed now that it is predominantly staffed by civilians doing a police job. 
Further to this, there was an overt distinction made by one or two sworn 
officers interviewed who suggested that civilian supervisors are inferior to 
sworn police in PCF contexts – suggesting the existence of an ‘us-and-them’ 
attitude, however, this sentiment was not shared by the majority of 
interviewees. It was suggested that this manifested itself as sworn 
arresting, corroborating or transporting officers always seeking the advice 
of a sworn supervisor on contentious issues and in doing so circumventing 
civilian officers, leading towards a detrimental effect on staff dignity and 
morale. This is not the case between staff attached to the PCF, but sworn 
officers from outside of the facility bringing in detainees and who are 
challenged in regard to operational and custodial procedure. (Note: see 
following question of further discussion).  
 
 Perception of existing PCF morale and staff dignity [factor of 5.2/9 equivalent to 
57%]  
Generally, interviewees had different opinions on staff morale, which 
became evident among different shifts within the same facility. 
94 
 
Respondents indicated that staff morale was almost exclusively attributed 
to their direct supervisor. Shifts with ‘good’ supervisors had good morale 
and teamwork. However, custodial and auxiliary officers had added issues 
which require consideration.  
A small number of current custodial staff, predominantly civilian and 
auxiliary, suggested that sworn officers saw them as working for them, ‘The 
Police’ in police facilities, and as such imposed upon them at will to carry 
out functions on their behalf and where civilians staff did not agree with 
what sworn officers required of them, sworn officers would seek a sworn 
supervisor to confer with (R.18 2011, however, civilian staff were aware of 
grievance processes available to them should they feel aggrieved (Note: 
further reference to this discussion made in ‘Police Morale and Location 
Specific Cultural Legacies’ within the discussions chapter). 
  
 perceptions of an attitude shift toward custodial duties and PCFs over time [factor 
of 7.3/9 equivalent to 81%]  
 
It is apparent that PCF staff sentiment towards custodial obligations is now 
better than it had been previously when fully undertaken by sworn 
personnel only. At the time many members of staff were there by default 
fulfilling their country service obligations, as punishment or as part of 
probationary experience and in essence, did not wish to be there and did 
not see or appreciate the significance of this aspect of policing.  
Most of the sworn police interviewed believed that general professionalism 
and attitudes towards custody has improved since The Royal Commission 
Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody due to increased scrutiny by internal and 
external investigative bodies, and public and media attention. (Note: further 
discussion relating to current opportunities to further improve and 
professionalise not only PCFs but also attitudes towards the significance of 
their specialist function in discussions chapter). 
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Custodial Officer [Police / Auxiliary / Custody] Training [8-10] 
 
 Perception of operational preparedness upon deployment to PCFs [factor of 2.6/9 
equivalent to 28%]  
 
In general sworn police staff felt that custodial training currently received is 
greatly improved and considerably more specialised when compared to 20 
years ago. It was believed that back then little time was apportioned to 
custodial training considering importance and frequency of performing 
custodial duties, risk to self, detainee and the organisation’s reputation due 
to incompetence. This is in consideration of the portion of an officer’s career 
dedicated specifically to custodial duties which is disproportionate to the 
investment made in time, training and resources by the organisation, 
however, the training that is currently received throughout the recruit 
training process continues to stop well short of achieving a sense of 
operational preparedness upon graduation.  
Some respondents felt that although training felt specific and specialised for 
custodial environments it was insufficient and sometimes irrelevant with 
regard to some contemporary social, cultural, and psychological issues. 
Most feel that they receive a grounding or an introduction but competency 
will only come with on-the-job training (Note: for further discussion see 
‘Custodian Training’ in the discussions chapter).  
  
 On ongoing training specific to PCF and custodial duties [factor of 3.6/9 equivalent 
to 40%]  
 
Respondents attached to district station PCF's indicated that they received 
little if any ongoing custodial training however some OICs believe what 
recruits are taught these days far surpasses what they were taught when 
they were recruits or junior constables.  
OICs attached to Perth Watch House indicated that they had a dedicated 
custody Trainer attached to the section and that consistent training and 
instruction was given and is available to all staff attached to PWH. 
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The Trainer position is intended to address any specific and non-specific 
operational issues which may require further training or revision and 
facilitate critical areas training. However, some supervisors attached to the 
PWH indicated that they had hardly come into contact with the trainer for 
any specific issues which would normally be addressed during a short period 
of flexitime which could be used for training purposes.  
 
 Regarding specialisation of PCFs [factor of 8/9 equivalent to 88%]  
 
Many of the respondents did not appear to be fully conversant or 
appreciative of the significance of PCFs or the PWH as components within 
the WACJS and appeared to be initially uncertain as to how to respond to 
this question, however, upon discussion regarding the operational and 
functional responsibilities - once articulated, almost all of the respondents 
stated that they felt that PCFs should be classified as a specialist area. 
However, due to the potential long-term psychological implications of 
working within such a facility a qualification was made that the position of 
custodian within the PWH as a 24 hour facility ought to be subject to 
tenure.  
A small number of respondents stated that they believed that custodial 
responsibilities of WA Police has already seen a significant degree of 
specialisation through the implementation of custody officers initially and 
more recently auxiliary officers into PCFs. Many auxiliary officers, however 
were able to use Watch House training and experience to set up a platform 
to apply for entry into the WA Police Academy to become sworn police (R.14 
2011). 
 
Facilities Considerations: cells + spaces + surveillance [11 to 20 & 35] 
 
 Lock-up design assisting performance of duties [1.5/9 equivalent to 16%]  
 
The overwhelming majority of respondents stated that they felt that in 
general the overall design of each of the facilities visited were subject to 
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many flaws in either design, fittings or equipment or the way it was being 
used which impacted on their performance.  
The following range of issues, some serious, suggests that an audit or issues 
associated with the facilities visited ought to be conducted. The issues 
discussed with respondents include:  
 illogical or prison style layout 
 inappropriate spatial organisation 
 multiple stories 
 number of and cell sizes 
 insufficient number of approved cells 
 inability to see if detainees are asleep therefore cell doors must be 
opened and officers must enter to check which is not only dangerous 
but disturbs an otherwise quiet detainee 
 doorway and circulation space length that are too long 
 door and corridor widths to narrow 
 glass that can be reached (PWH) 
 floors finishes that are too slippery when urinated on and grip the 
skin too much when dry if dragged upon 
 the removal or decommissioning of showers (particularly since 
capsicum spray introduced unable to properly administer after-care) 
 some district Lock-ups have panic buttons that are in ill positioned 
 no pacifying instruments such as TV radio or reading material  
 protruding fixtures and outdated equipment 
 electronic door release issues in particular for outsider staff bringing 
detainees to some district level PCFs where it has been noted that 
there is a potential for an officer to lock themselves within in the 
Sally Port if the door should close intentionally or unintentionally 
between them and the detainee leaving the detainee within the 
reception area which could be unattended 
 areas where CCTV are overlooked 
 doors able to be used as weapons as cannot be anchored open 
 fixtures which allow officers to catch themselves 
  sharp angles causing injury during struggles 
98 
 
 no dedicated strip search room within one facility thus rooms able 
to be used are fitted with CCTV which is able to be viewed outside of 
the confines of the PCF (within the police station office area) causing 
issues of dignity (Note: for further discussion see ‘Lack of Amenity’ 
within the discussions chapter). This might not be in keeping with 
Section 72 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 – provision of reasonable 
privacy for strip searches. 
 
 on being forthcoming on new ideas relating to PCF design  
[5.2/9 equivalent to 57%]  
 
The overall outcome of the questionnaire conducted relating to this 
question suggested that many of the respondents were more than willing to 
make suggestions or report faults and issues that required repair or 
consideration. Initially, however, the vast majority stated that nowadays 
they would not bother as nothing ever appears to happen to rectify the 
situation, we just make do establishing a sense of complacency regarding 
the quality of the environment. Further to this, those respondents who 
elaborated further stated that one of the benefits of being a supervisor or 
having a higher rank was that they felt that they were better able to effect 
change and that a number of suggestions made while being in a position of 
a higher rank have been taken on board, subject to funding.  
This sentiment appeared to be consistent across the spectrum of 
respondents. Respondents also seemed rather sceptical and cynical in 
discussing budget related issues associated with suggestions and complaints 
regarding PCF design. Considering this, respondents were well aware of 
some of the constraints such as the expense of moving walls and structural 
members et cetera, however made mention that issues that they had 
brought to attention were simply cosmetic and superficial such as cleaning, 
painting and the like but would raise the standard of the space somewhat 
and indicate the detainees that the space was cared for and that it ought to 
be treated with respect. An issue that had been raised by a number of 
respondents was that design of some PCFs did not take into account future 
expansion. 
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 on promoting efficiency through design [5.8/9 equivalent to 64%]  
 
R.3 (2010) suggested that significantly more post-occupancy study was 
required in order to evaluate the success of the design of PCFs with data 
made available to subsequent architects so that they weren't always 
starting from scratch or looking at precedents unnecessarily.  
Comment has also been made that it would be impossible to design a Lock-
up for every conceivable scenario but a solution where detainees were more 
easily observed while still offering an acceptable level of dignity to 
detainees particularly females and showering and toileting facilities should 
be considered.  
Further comments have been made that at some district PCFs there is 
nowhere for officers doing custodial duties to sit where they could also be 
productive while occupying the PCF area, and further, from an operational 
standpoint some officers, in particular detectives who bring detainees into 
the PCF expect that they can leave them under the care and supervision of 
General Duties staff as they are the ones with the monitoring equipment 
and therefore should be responsible. Further comments made also include 
making the spatial layout more open plan and that there ought to be a 
more logical way of processing detainees that made it more efficient. 
 on specific negative issues associated with PCF design [7.1/9 equivalent to 78%]  
 On the dining area 
A location mentioned by all respondents attached to the PWH as being of 
particular concern was the potential (and at times actual) risk of violence 
within the meals area. This area is where pent-up anger and any 
antagonism experienced over-night could be acted out between detainees 
and formed an area of significant risk to staff as it an area which sees the 
largest gatherings of separated and unrestrained detainees and usually 
where the ratio of staff to detainees numbers are most imbalanced.  
  
 On corridors 
A major concern apparent to all respondents other than R.10 (2010), but in 
particular to those attached to the PWH relates to the width of corridors 
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and doorways which service detainee holding areas – one respondent from 
PWH attesting to existing corridors not allowing for standard sized medical 
stretchers to enter all the way into cells.  
In discussion, interviewees believed that a consideration was required – 
weighing up ‘sufficient space’ – increasing these movement spaces such that 
it accounts for a detainee’s ability of gain momentum if moving to strike, 
charge or attack with offering sufficient space for the required number of 
staff to manoeuvre around a detainee to appropriately restrain them 
without causing injury to either the detainee or staff involved. To achieve 
this most respondents suggested that a corridor should be wide enough for 
a minimum of three person (staff/detainee/staff) particularly as altercations 
frequently required three or four staff members to safely restrain some 
detainees – up to one for each limb.  
Doorway openings would also ideally accommodate three people shoulder 
to shoulder as many injuries occur when struggling in doorways. The current 
situation At the PWH sees three people shoulder to shoulder unable to fit in 
corridors or doorways, this is a particular problem with the padded cell 
whose doorway should obviously be wider as this is where those who are 
most non-compliant and requiring restraint are escorted.  
Note: for other general issues raised while discussing this question with 
respondents see points within this category (facilities Considerations: cells + 
spaces + surveillance) to follow. 
 
 on issues of excessive overreliance on CCTV surveillance [4.2/9 equivalent to 46%]  
 
This particular question divided the respondents clearly – dependent upon 
which type of PCF they were associated, with those respondents attached to 
district PCFs stating that CCTV was over-used to varying degrees and was 
due to operational and administrative productivity pressures placed upon 
them and that they had to multitask at all times due to a lack of human 
resources which would allow them to place staff within the PCF on a 
permanent basis while detainees were present.  
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Those respondents attached to the Perth Watch House all stated that they 
believed that CCTV was not over-used for surveillance purposes but rather 
was instrumental in maintaining an environment which was safe for both 
staff and detainees particularly should allegations be made. Nevertheless, 
staff from the PWH stated that electronic surveillance was dual edged. 
While protecting officers and detainees, it could be simultaneously used as 
an instrument to surreptitiously leave one's self (officers) open to 
disciplinary action particularly due to conduct within the facility during 
periods of down-time where officers might let their guard down and let off 
steam. Respondents attached to the PWH stated that letting off steam was 
critical to maintaining psychological health by opening up in discussing 
hardships and stressful circumstances with colleagues or a somewhat 
informal and impromptu debrief.  
One respondent strongly believed that working within a facility that was 
constantly under surveillance was not a healthy environment for anyone 
over extended periods of time. 
 On understanding the working environment and facility [4.2/9 equivalent to 46%]  
 
Respondents to this question were undecided as to whether the working 
environment of the facility was enjoyable. The general attitude from 
respondents suggested that a degree of indifference existed among 
custodial staff. It did not appear that this was due to satisfaction; rather due 
to a sense of inability to change the status quo (with reference to question 
No. 12 previously) and conforming to existing organisational attitudes.  
This was not always the case in relation to civilian officers who did speak 
out in relation to working conditions whereas it was mentioned that sworn 
staff did not. This particular attitude was expressed by a number of 
supervisors and conferred on behalf of their staff members stating that they 
believed staff in general were not happy and things could be better but you 
just get on with the job and make do with what you have. Similarly other 
respondents stated that although things could always be improved, it is 
better now than many years back when they themselves were in the 
position that their subordinates are in now. 
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One respondent stated they believed that although the built environment 
might not be in a position to be altered, their staff were pleased with the 
increased technology introduced in the workplace which is intended to make 
their work more streamlined and productive. New technologies must be 
thoroughly assessed to determine if the introduction of additional 
administrative requirements and training associated with implementing 
new technologies made it beneficial or counter-productive. Further to this 
discussion, R2 (2010) stated that while the working environment and facility 
in particular relating to the PWH was unsatisfactory, some incentives 
attracted a number of potentially unsuitable people to this location when it 
was difficult to attract people to the Watch House by temporarily classifying 
this location as a country posting. This offered officers who did not wish to 
fulfil their country service obligations in a country location, the opportunity 
to comply with this requirement while working at the PWH. Of the 
respondents interviewed, R1 (2010) had sought a term of employment at 
PWH to comply with country service obligations. Other staff that 
traditionally come directly from the Academy had no idea what the working 
environment and conditions would be like. 
 
 on Sally Ports [3.3/9 equivalent to 36%]  
 
Although in general respondents did not make sweeping suggestions on 
how best to address Sally Port design, certain issues were consistently 
mentioned. In particular these issues were concerned with proximity of the 
police vehicle to the area where police officers un-holstered their firearms 
and remove their Taser, pepper spray, and extendable baton and secure 
them. From this position detainees had a line of sight and in close range to 
observe methods for removal of weaponry.  
 
Respondents felt that this appeared to be unprofessional and was tactically 
inappropriate, particularly as people who were bought to PCFs on a regular 
basis (as a detainee) were able to study police protocols, method of 
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accoutrement removal and the location of weaponry storage.48 This, 
however appeared to be more an issue that resulted due to the design of 
the sally port that did not readily allow for discreetness and is not reflective 
of common practice but isolate incidents.  
Other issues surrounded the vehicular movement through the Sally Port and 
its general size with particular respect to the PWH facility which caused 
some significant issues in particular on busy evening periods where 
‘ramping’ occurs as there is only sufficient space for one vehicle. Arresting 
officers must park outside the Sally Port, but within the facility compound, 
and physically walk their detainee in to the PWH requiring coordination 
whereby entry of one set of arresting officers and detainees into the facility 
must be effected before opening the Sally Port roller door which is required 
to allow the next arresting officers and detainee to enter. Once inside, the 
roller door must be closed behind them before opening the electronic door 
accessing the reception area. One respondent stated that they knew of 
instances where the roller door was raised and detainees had been escorted 
through while the previous arresting officers within the Sally Port were in 
the process of locking weaponry away.49  
Another issue, understandably not able to be addressed due to its existing 
design, and that of all other Sally Ports observed, is that there is no 
provision for unidirectional vehicular travel of the arresting vehicle through 
the Sally port; rather the vehicle is required to reverse out of its location 
within the Sally Port to depart or to allow another vehicle to take its place, 
which is a particular hindrance at the PWH which regularly receives multiple 
detainees compounding the situation.  
Additionally, police vehicles have restricted vision creating difficulties in 
negotiating the PWH Sally Port area in its current state. Issues relating to 
                                                          
48
 Although this issue is covered in the PWH Standard Operating Procedures it only requires that 
officers remove firearms and secure them in the firearms cabinet in the sally port. There are clear 
protocols and training in the method of holstering and ‘clearing’ firearms, however it is up to the 
individual officer to use best judgment in terms of being discreet in doing so  
49
 This is a risk management issue reflective of isolated incidents only that may have established 
protocols to mitigate. 
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the width of the corridor and doorway leading to the PWH reception area 
and distance and number of corridors leading to the padded cells from this 
point have also been raised (see discussions regarding corridors and 
doorways in question No. 14) and some respondents have mentioned that 
the CCTV positioning within the this Sally Port is not appropriate in its 
current location. 
 
 Regarding benefits of exercise yards [7.2/9 equivalent to 80%]  
 
All respondents stated that exercise yards provided a valuable tool which 
benefited both the detainee and by default – staff members; unfortunately 
all exercise yards at the locations visited were deemed non-compliant with 
current standards and therefore with inadequate human resources to 
situate a staff member permanently outside an exercise yard to be able to 
offer this benefit to detainees, these facilities as described by respondents, 
and their associated benefits remain idle and unused and generally appear 
to be in a state of disrepair. Further to this some respondents stated that 
they believed that all exercise yards within the state with the exception of 
regional PCF exercise yards might be non-compliant. 
Exercise yards have a completely different feel to general cells, and have 
been described as extremely beneficial. Exercise yards were described as 
tending to have a pacifying effect for detainees as it offering them a sense 
of release and a degree of openness, being of particular benefit for those 
held for extended weekend periods particularly in instances where weekend 
court was unavailable.  
Exercise yards were also used as overflow during exceptionally busy periods 
within the PWH, however, it has been mentioned that it is critical to consider 
that numbers within them should be kept to a minimum so that the 
occupational, ratio the amount of detainees held within the yard in 
comparison to the number of officers overseeing it, and the potential of 
injury to staff should violence break out among a number of detainees is 
managed. Minimising the number of detainees held within exercise yards 
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also ensures that sufficient personal space is available and the ability to 
move around is not compromised. 
 
 On the observation cell [2.7/9 equivalent to 30%]  
 
The observation cell within PWH has been described by respondents 
attached to this facility as both appropriate and inappropriate in a number 
of ways. Issues relating to strategic location, spatial qualities, size and 
proximity to staff administrative area have been mentioned as areas of 
significant concern which required consideration. 
The current PWH observation cell is located to ensure some degree of 
visibility from the bail area. This area serves to process detainees to bail and 
return a detainees property, however, is also used by staff for administrative 
duties, however, staff are recurrently antagonised and provoked by 
detainees with distractive behaviour from this cell via an inadequately sized 
observation window which is intended to allow one-way observation, thus 
affecting their administrative duties and productivity with inadequate 
acoustic separation further compounding the problem (R.19 2011). See also 
question No. 20 ‘on lighting and acoustics’). 
Entry to this cell is off the corridor and directly opposite to it is a non-
compliant holding cell which is inappropriate due to the exchanges that can 
occur between occupants of the two opposing cells. In addition, this 
observation cell is the only one designated as such located in the male 
section of the facility, and should ideally cater for a specific maximum No of 
detainees.  
There appeared to be no specific number that respondents could nominate 
as the maximum that should be held within the observation cell as this was 
dependent upon operational requirements and discretion of the individual 
shift supervisors. Consequently R.2 (2010) made mention that it is 
imperative when sizing cells to consider the procedural aspects associated 
the organisation which suggest that it would be better to make observation 
cells of smaller proportions to better serve their purpose as this particular 
respondents felt that if cells were made larger shortcomings operational 
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resources would translate into cells being used to hold more people (with 
reference to the organisational make do mentality also found elsewhere in 
this section). R.1 (2010) stated that the observation cell was too small as a 
single open cell, however, in explanation stated that they had previously 
seen up to ten (10) detainees held within the observation cell at one time 
with over-flow being held in ‘H1’ (holding cell No.1 which at the time of 
interview was deemed non-compliant) – which appears to be consistent with 
views held by R.2 (2010) regarding occupancy versus cell size.  
Other respondents who participated in this research who were attached to 
district level police buildings containing a PCF indicated that they did not 
have what would be considered a dedicated observation cell but considered 
them to be a valuable asset and would welcome their inclusion within their 
PCF should they be made available and some indicated that they did have 
an observation cell. However, this was not the case as it was merely a 
custody pod. 
 
 On issues regarding the placement and design of the padded cell [3.4/9 equivalent 
to 37%]  
 
In general, most of the respondents stated that the design of padded cells 
and the way in which they are used is effective; however, a number of issues 
were raised at various locations specifically relating to ease of access. 
Concerns were raised by all respondents attached to the PWH regarding the 
location and access to the padded cells within this facility.  
Of particular concern was the distance from the reception area to the 
padded cell, a part height wall to the corridor leading to the padded cell 
posed an injury risk when struggling with detainees on the way to the 
corridor leading to the padded cell, the corridor width itself is too narrow (as 
previously mentioned in question No. 14) and the width of the doorway to 
the padded cell was also considered to be too narrow to allow enough 
officers to escort a combative detainee into the cell. The distance between 
the padded cell and the strip search room was also mentioned as being too 
excessive. 
107 
 
A variety of other concerns were mentioned at various locations, including 
mirrors installed within padded cells that could be reached, poor lighting, 
padded or all skin being too loose and subject to vandalism, and at one 
location – mechanical calling installed within the PCF causing sufficient air 
pressure to force the padded cell door to slam closed and thus an 
operational risk should staff be struggling with a combative detainee within 
the padded cell should this occur. The padded cell within this particular PCF 
had a ceiling height of 2400 mm which is easily reached and is of particular 
concern. 
A respondent attached to another district level PCF mention specific issues 
relating to their padded cell where the cell door swings freely and 
surrounding the entry, inappropriately located fixtures overhead gave 
detainees the opportunity to hang on with their hands – freeing their legs 
and thus presenting a capacity to kick out at officers who would then be 
forced to approach detainees while being kicked in order to pull them away 
from the fixture. This respondent felt that these fixtures were located in one 
of the most inappropriate locations available seeing that the most non-
compliant detainees were the ones escorted to this location. However, the 
respondent was pleased with a new flush mounted stainless steel water 
hose enclosure affixed within the wall immediately outside the padded cell 
door which was installed for ease of sanitation and cleaning of urine and 
excrement from the cell into a grate beneath the cell door threshold. 
Another non-directly related issue of concern to supervisory staff attached 
to the PWH which they felt the Police Department ought to consider related 
to the cleaning of cells (of a minor nature) should they be soiled with urine 
or faeces, which is currently undertaken by trustee prisoners who reside 
within the PWH facility (under the authority of the Prison Act 1981 and 
regulations in conjunction with the Police Lock-up Manual). PWH trustees 
are considered invaluable to PWH staff, forming a beneficial two-way 
relationship with the Police Department where among other menial tasks 
within the PWH, minor cleaning is exchanged for what is considered a much 
safer alternative to imprisonment for the trustee when compared to the 
sentence being carried out solely within a state prison. 
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PWH staff mentioned they could foresee something that would be of 
particular concern for the future Perth Police Precinct Watch House, a belief 
that a trustee program would no longer exist and thus trustees would no 
longer be accepted in the new state facility. With this, respondents stated 
that their understanding was that the cleaning of soiled cells at the future 
PWH facility (currently under construction) would be undertaken by external 
contractors. Respondents raised an example of such an incident taking place 
at 3 or 4 AM and therefore the resultant time and cost implications, 
mentioning that at present the clean-up would occur almost immediately, 
however, they felt that if a contractor had to be called out after hours the 
padded cell and other cells might be left usable for extended periods of time 
which would be unacceptable particularly during busy periods. Further to 
this, the respondents also mentioned that it would also be unacceptable and 
unreasonable to ask their staff members to clean something that they 
wouldn't want to clean themselves, especially bio hazardous material.50 
 On the qualities of facility lighting and acoustics [2.7/9 equivalent to 30%]  
  
Acoustics 
All respondents other than R.15 (2011) who saw some benefit to the 
custodian being able to hear everything that was occurring in the facility 
stated that PCF acoustics in general were unacceptable particularly with 
regard to acoustic separation between male and female, observation, 
segregation, and administrative areas within PCFs. At district PCFs 
detainees that shout, swear and are generally disruptive within the 
custodial area can be heard throughout the police station due to insufficient 
sound attenuation and proximity to office areas. 
PWH respondents mentioned that areas where mixing of detainees occurred 
such as bail and reception areas posed the undignified prospect of private 
details furnished by detainees to facility staff during questioning being 
overheard by other detainees. This highlights the need for design that 
                                                          
50
 SOPs allow for procedures in the event of both "significant" bio hazard and "minor" spills. In the 
absence of the PWH OIC, the Shift Supervisor must be advised of any biohazard spills. 
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addresses issues of confidentiality. Designated areas with a suitable level of 
acoustic attenuation or separation from ‘common’ areas might suit here.51   
Other points made related to acoustic quality of the PWH facility as 
unsuited to facilitating audio recordings of an acceptable quality which 
were necessary to protect the integrity of all occupants. The way in which 
one respondent described the PWH during busy periods as a consequence of 
poor acoustics suggested that the facility took on an asylum like quality with 
a number of respondents making reference to issues associated with 
acoustic separation when many family members or other large associated 
group were held at the facility, and separated, as this instigated screaming 
that could be heard throughout the facility causing unwanted disruption 
and anxiety among other detainees who are trying to sleep. This causes 
antagonism overnight which can sometimes lead to violence at breakfast 
time where all of the detainees are in one dining room at the same time 
(See dining room in question No. 14). 
 
Lighting 
Lighting was described by respondents as being sufficient, although some 
detainees could reach surface mounted lighting fixtures at some locations 
posing some concerns. Some respondents stated that although artificial 
lighting was sufficient natural lighting and direct natural lighting was 
insufficient. 
An issue mentioned by R.15 (2011) which relates to all PCFs visited, 
concerned the inability to dim any of the lights in cells which they believed 
could pose a negative situation psychologically for detainees, particularly as 
complaints had been made by detainees regarding excessively bright 
lighting within cells particularly during extended periods of detention when 
detainees were trying to sleep.  
 
 
 
                                                          
51
 See also Chapter 5 ‘Survey and site visit findings’ for further discussion 
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PCF violence + Risk Management [21 to 25] 
 violence in general [no score given] 
 
None of the respondents stated that they were happy with the level of 
violence in PCF. In fact the majority of respondents stated that violence is 
excessive, and unfortunately to be expected as part of the job. Some of 
those interviewed stated that the level of violence appears to be getting 
worse and that they believe the recent increase in the number of detainees 
bought into the Lock-up which are not only alcohol affected but also drug 
affected, and further, a high proportion of these are found to have 
underlying mental issues.  
Respondents did, however, appreciate that the point of being brought to 
and detained within PCFs was when detainees were at their worst and could 
exhibit some of the most awful traits of human behaviour, but were usually 
entirely different in the morning. With this, the behaviour of some detainees 
in the morning could be subject to what had occurred overnight (see 
question No. 14 ‘Dining room’ and No. 20 ‘Acoustics’ relating to detainee v 
detainee antagonism). It was felt that general violence was directed more 
so towards arresting officers bringing detainees into the facility rather than 
towards custody staff but this is not always the case. With this, a measure 
which appears to have some influence on violence towards officers within 
the PWH is bringing to the attention of the detainee that officers are not 
police they are ‘custody’ officers who are there to look after them – this 
distinction appears to hold some weight with a number of detainees. 
 Location of violence [no score given] 
 
Predominantly at rear of van while in the Sally Port – when detainees are 
asked to exit the rear of the vehicle, and in the area leading up to the entry 
door.  
Another location where a significant proportion of violence is acted out used 
in the reception area which has been described as inadequate as the 
benches where multiple detainees are made to wait for their turn to be 
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processed are to close in proximity to other detainees in the same position 
and the distance from this point to the reception counter where sensitive 
information is discussed with the receiving officers is also inadequate, with 
one respondent stating that the waiting area ought to be outside or 
separate and then each person is asked to come in one of the time (also see 
question No. 20 ‘Acoustics’ and discussions contained within ‘Dignity in the 
PCF’).  
Violence also occurs in the dining room sometimes (see question No. 14 
‘Dining room’), in the exercise yard when they were being used and 
sometimes within cells one respondent making reference to an incident 
where one detainee attacked another rather badly and refused to stop in 
the presence of staff outside the door, who had to wait for the door in the 
trial cell to be opened remotely due to the way it was configured, having to 
be physically removed from the other who was cowering on the floor. 
 
 Type of violence - methods used in acting out [no score given] 
 
The way in which violence could be and had previously been acted out 
according to respondents, involved physical, verbal, psychological, racial 
and sexual. 
 
 Risk minimisation through experience [6.6/9 equivalent to 73%]  
 
while most of the respondents believed that experienced officers could 
control certain situations with a more developed set of personal strategies 
to form a rapport with detainees and an ability to analyse and intervene in 
situations which had the potential to escalate into violence are the 
respondents stated that it came down to how well the individual officers 
communicated, and the interpersonal/social and life skills that they could 
draw upon which made them ‘good operators’. Further to this, the risk of 
being highly experienced comes with a reduced level of tolerance and 
cynicism toward detainees and thus in the way in which experienced officers 
relate to them.  
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The general feeling was that younger male officers and not necessarily a 
lack of experience was the cause of some circumstances escalating into 
violence whereas female officers and older or more experienced male and 
female officers had more patience and spoke to the detainees in such a way 
that it showed empathy and did not react in haste to non-compliance nor to 
the degree as others might. This did not appear to be in any way related to a 
predisposition to move towards violence, rather, perhaps more experienced 
officers had a more diverse set of life experiences and skills that could be 
drawn on in difficult situations. This was also the sentiment of R.10 (2010) 
who stated that these days officers do not talk to detainees as much as they 
should in order to resolve things verbally. However, some respondents made 
it clear that there are instances in which nothing could be said or done to 
placate certain detainees.  
R.14 (2011) mentioned that volatile situations could be defused with good 
communication and that the presence of female officers who could achieve 
compliance through the verbal negotiation, a tool developed according to 
some female respondents as necessary to compensate for a lesser physical 
presence was a valuable asset in PCF environments.  
Female respondents in general felt that irrespective of the length of time 
required; achieving compliance through verbal communication and showing 
some compassion was a more mature, consistent and effectively method 
that compensated for lower levels of physical strength, next to their male 
counterparts, and would be the preferred method on every occasion.  
R.19 (2011) eluded to a culture predominantly among young male officers 
for action – evident when the compliant behaviour of detainees normally 
renowned for being violent when bought to PCFs result in obvious 
disappointment and a sentiment toward a detainee that they are ‘pussy’. 
With these types of detainees the arresting or escorting officers will pre-
notify PCF staff that a detainee likely to be violent at the point of exiting the 
vehicle and during processing will be transported to the facility and as a 
consequence up to six officers might come together and wait for the 
detainee who may turn out to be completely compliant by the time they 
arrive. 
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 violence and design [5.5/9 equivalent to 61%]  
 
Most of the respondents stated that they did not believe that violence could 
be avoided or excluded through design especially with drug and alcohol 
affected detainees, but rather could have the effects of risk of injury 
minimised by design and avoided through training. The only way 
respondents could see the risk of physical violence being removed from PCF 
environments was if there was no contact required.  
It has also been mentioned that it was not only up to design but many other 
factors including procedure such as occupancy levels and length of stay 
which in turn is of particular concern at the PWH which is left with detainees 
on occasion, who are on a ‘Return to Prison Warrant’. The cause of this 
appears to be related to prison protocol where detainees who would be 
escorted back to prison after hours are not accepted, leaving PWH staff to 
hold them longer than they should and increasing risk to the police 
Department. This is also the case when there is no weekend court sitting. 
Respondents generally made reference to resolving all of the issues 
mentioned in the answers they previously furnished in questions No. 13-20.  
R.14 (2011) mentioned that selecting the appropriate candidates to work 
within these facilities was an important consideration to avoiding violence.  
R.15 (2011) felt that the PWH ought to be used in the way in which it was 
designed with a separate high, medium and low risk sections as some 
detainees should never be placed next to some high risk detainees or with 
extensive records and previous prison experience.  
It was also stated that particular attention had to be paid to general areas 
where there was a potential for large gatherings of detainees to occur such 
as the dining room where as many as 20 detainees could be locked in the 
one room at the same time with access to utensils. Once everyone was 
sitting and eating the door to this room is locked and staff return 
downstairs. When issues arise, staff are required to run back upstairs and 
unlock the door which takes time and prolongs the potential length of 
violence.  
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On Dignity [26 to 34] 
 On single person cells [7.5/9 equivalent to 83%]  
All of the respondents could see (to varying degrees) operational as well as 
functional benefits associated with the inclusion of single person cells in 
conjunction with a mix of other cell options. They were, nevertheless 
sceptical that the many benefits these cells could offer a PCF would ever 
persuade government in respect to substantive costs.  
Most respondents stated that a number of single person cells would provide 
more options to better segregate sensitive people and also for isolating 
detainees with contagious medical conditions increasing overall prisoner 
safety. Respondents attached to the PWH having had access to peruse over 
plans of the proposed new Perth Police Precinct Watch House made 
reference to custody pod cells as single person cells, however, these are not 
intended to be used for anything other than immediate supervised control 
and only for very short periods of time. R.19 (2011) said that detainees were 
not held within this type of cell for any longer than necessary. Although 
there is no specific limit set on the amount of time a detainee can be held in 
what has been referred to as the ‘fishbowl’ holding cell. Again, this too is 
subject to operational requirements and individual supervisor discretion 
under any given set of circumstances.  
(See question No. 18 ‘Observation Cells’ in relation to a misunderstanding of 
the definition of single person cells). R.18 (2011) stated that the key issue 
already mentioned was the non-existence of any pacifying strategies such 
as TV or radio to alleviate boredom especially for those held for extended 
periods with literally nothing to do other than sit, wait and conjure up an 
ailment that might get them taken out of the cell and to a hospital. 
 
 On issues relating to secretion of contraband [2.2/9 equivalent to 24%]  
 
Respondents stated that contraband was very difficult to get into PCFs and 
further that there wouldn’t be much chance of it as most detainees were 
brought in straight off the street and thus do not have a chance to prepare. 
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If contraband did happen to make it into the PCF (PWH) it would most likely 
be found at the time of strip search, in the rear of the police vehicle, the 
exercise yard or in a mattress. It would be more likely that this occur in 
prison within facilities where there could be a level of preparedness, 
anticipation and purpose for the contraband.  
Thorough searches are conducted of people lodged at PCFs, a cursory pat 
search before being placed into the police vehicle and again by PCF staff. 
This is followed by a more thorough search before being placed into a cell. 
Searches are also conducted each time a detainee re-enters the PCF 
following return from having been ‘outside’ (hospital, court or visits). 
R.1 (2010) stated that it would be impossible to completely rule out 
contraband being present within the body without biometric scanning. 
 
 On other external agencies assisting PCFs  
 
All respondents were familiar with external agencies working in partnership 
with PCFs such as Department of Corrective Services (DCS) including Special 
Operations Group (SOG), G4S for secure transport between police and 
prison, Cultural Diversity Unit, Aboriginal Visitors Scheme (AVS), Mental 
Health Emergency Response Line (MHERL), Choice One nursing staff, 
Salvation Army, Bridge House, Drug Use Monitoring in Australia (DUMA) 
through National Drug Research Institute, Mental Health Emergency 
Response Line, although still referred to by Respondents as Psychiatric 
Emergency Team Service (PETS), Bail Co-ordinator, Mental Health Nurse, 
Justices’ of the Peace (J.P’s), St. John Ambulance (SJA), and Sanitary 
contractors. 
 
 on a forwarding appropriate medical attention  
 
All respondents were well versed with the requirements of giving medical 
care, be it a band aid to St. Johns Ambulance (SJA) or the associated local 
hospital within the district. Specifically relating to the PWH, nurses were 
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rostered on duty to work within this PCF six days a week from 8 PM to 4 AM 
and Sundays from 10 PM to 4 AM.  
 
 on maintaining detainees dignity (also see training)  
 
Most respondents did not appear to fully understand nor appreciate issues 
relating to detainee dignity and how this could be afforded to them nor the 
significance of its potential influence on detainee behaviour.  
Collectively, respondent answers amounted to and were in keeping with the 
general outlines of ‘Rules for Searching’ (Criminal Investigation Act 2006) 
sections 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, and 13. These include reference to searches 
being conducted by same sex (unless a nurse or doctor), as quickly as 
reasonably practicable, with the least required amount of intrusiveness and 
visual inspection, and with the minimum number of people required present 
as safety permitted. 
It should be noted that none of the respondents interviewed made reference 
to the prohibition of questioning of people being searched (during the 
course of the search) pertaining to offences the detainee might be 
suspected of having committed Section 70 (Criminal Investigation Act 2006).  
R.13 (2011) stated that there was no defined way of offering dignity just 
one’s own perceived understanding of it, therefore the range of responses 
ranged considerably from not being able to identify how dignity could be 
afforded without compromise in safety and security to a reasonable set of 
personally imposed strategies. Strategies ranged from the environmental 
qualities themselves such as the condition of the PCF being clean fresh and 
well lit with natural lighting (R.10 2010) and more aligned to procedural 
measures. 
R.19 (2011) mentioned that tactical communications were taught though 
not specifically in relation to affording dignity, this respondent further 
appeared to have reasonable comprehension regarding a specific group 
which might need to be considered if subjected to strip searches (victims of 
sexual abuse) as they would be particularly self-conscious and thus this type 
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of search would be more difficult for them and possibly misconstrued as 
non-compliance or hindering officers instructions if not promptly followed.  
R.19 (2011) stated that understanding would be required, allowing sufficient 
time or allowing them to turn around to remove clothing and then turn 
briefly to follow any instructions required. 
R.18‘s (2011) philosophical view was that dignity must always be present 
from the outset and then a portion of the onus rested with the detainee to 
retain it through compliance. R.18 (2011) communicated this principle to 
other staff (inclusive of other respondents), however, conceded that dignity 
is soon lost during strip searches. Further to this all detainees are treated 
the same irrespective of any socio-economic or cultural background and 
every effort is made to maintain dignity by communicating the processes 
that must occur and the consequences of not complying with the detainee. 
R.15 (2011) mentioned that PCF staff should treat all detainees as if they 
were someone they knew while R.2’s (2010) understanding was 
predominantly connected to strip searches – believing that assessments 
ought to be made on an individual basis in relation to the requirement for 
strip searches which was referred to as something that should not be 
mandatory seeing the wording in the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 uses 
the wording ‘may’ be strip searched, particularly for minor offences where 
risk is not posed to any party. However, as this decision is up to the 
discretion of the OIC the decision was not always up to the individual 
officers conducting the search. Further to this, professionalism and 
politeness during strip searches was described as imperative particularly 
without making derogatory comments. Further reference relating to 
professionalism while conducting strip searches was made by R.1, R.5, R.8 
(2010) stating that dignity was partially maintained by not having cameras 
in strip search rooms.  
Other than this, R.5 and R.7 (2010) believed that dignity was being afforded 
and no other feasible measures could be decided upon during the interview 
that did not compromise safety. R.9 (2010) similarly believed that a 
temporary loss in dignity was a small price to pay in order to decrease the 
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risk of death in custody and a simple consideration might be making every 
effort to place detainees with appropriate other detainees.  
R.1 (2010) and R.15 (2011) added that female sanitary pads were offered as 
required and clothing was supplied to detainees who came in partly/un-
clothed while Respondent No.9 indicated that female toileting was an issue 
where some modesty was required but little or no mention was ever made 
in relation to male toileting or showering.  
R.14 (2011) mentioned the need for contemporary policies for transgender 
people and gay and lesbian people to reflect contemporary life due to 
contradictions between the different policies, procedures and statutes And 
other initiatives include buying temporary hairnets for those who wear 
turbans, and prayer mats for Muslims (other respondents mentioned 
cultural initiatives such as prayer mats which were not brought up during 
this question see question No.33) 
  
 On specific requirements for intoxicated detainees [7.5/9 equivalent to 83%]  
 
Intoxicated people were generally described by all respondents as being 
more labour-intensive requiring greater supervision and in particular those 
that appear to be severely inebriated were best examined by medical 
practitioner in order to be given clearance for ‘fit for custody’ but this also 
took up a valuable time when considering the minimal resources sometimes 
available.  
R.1 (2010) estimated that no less than 50 to 60% of all detainees brought 
into the PWH were either alcohol or drug affected or both especially in 
relation to late night or early morning arrests.  
Intoxicated people are separated from other detainees whenever possible as 
they are extremely disruptive and combative – waking up other detainees 
causing fighting and violence with what would otherwise be quiet and 
compliant detainees.  
R.18 (2011) mentioned that sober detainees are different from those that 
are intoxicated by generally being cooperative and quiet. This point of view 
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is corroborated by other respondents such as R.8 (2010) who described 
intoxicated and drug affected detainees as unhelpful and belligerent 
particularly during questioning and as being non-compliant, difficult, loud 
and aggressive by R.11 (2011). 
R.13 (2011) referred to intoxicated detainees as obnoxious, however, R.15 
(2011) although sharing the same opinion, reiterated that detainees should 
not be judged based on the state that are brought in (see question No. 30). 
It is noted from discussions with all respondents that heavily intoxicated 
people pose a particular policy and procedural issues for PCFs. Simply being 
drunk in public is no longer an offence in WA. On the other hand, such 
people may be a danger to themselves and (once upon a time) these people 
were taken to a PCF and lodged as a drunken detainee and held within the 
PCF for a period of time sufficient to satisfy the Lock-up keeper that they 
would be safe to release (these are not charged people). This type of 
detainee poses a significant increase in risk to deaths in custody within PCFs 
and use up valuable human resources and facility space. For this reason 
drunken detainees are reluctantly and rarely accepted at PCFs.  
This is a ‘Catch-22’ situation where police have a duty of care to people that 
are intoxicated to a point where they cannot care for themselves. Hospitals 
and other facilities might not take them due to insufficient resources leaving 
police personnel with a difficult situation where that had to live by the 
decisions they made increasing associated risks within the PCF or risk of 
injury or death to the intoxicated person should they not be accepted (R.7 
2010). 
 
 On design and intoxication [6.3/9 equivalent to 70%]  
 
A number of respondents made particular mention of design related issues 
which are impacted directly by the way in which intoxicated detainees 
behave within PCFs. In particular, comments made relate to the existing 
PWH as the behaviour of these detainees affects a much larger population 
of other detainees and staff, however, these comments are also relevant to 
district PCFs which follow a similar design ethos.  
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Most of the respondents attached to the PWH cited significant problems in 
design related to acoustic separation when combined with intoxicated 
detainees (see previous discussion regarding ‘Acoustics’, ‘Specific 
Requirements for Intoxicated Detainees’ and ‘Violence in General’ and 
‘Location of Violence’) where screaming and swearing could be heard 
throughout the entire facility and as previously mentioned causing serious 
irritation to other detainees. Most of the respondents directed reference 
back to previous questions in order to answer this question (see questions 
No. 13 to 25).  
R.15 (2011) stated that the design of the PWH did not appear to be of 
assistance with intoxicated detainees but rather, appeared to be designed 
to cater for sober detainees, and further, R.20 (2011) stated that PCF design 
should reflect the worst possible detainees and the worst conceivable 
circumstances in terms of acoustics and non-compliance and therefore by 
default would also suit compliant and quiet detainees. 
 
 Design for detainees within specific categories [3.3/9 equivalent to 36%]  
 
While R.4 (2010) stated that police had a tendency to be very dismissive of 
any requests even if easily addressed, respondents felt that generic design 
of PCF's ought to reflect the overall majority of people held within PCF 
within that region and not be expected to cater for and operate on a 
minority basis. R.6 (2010) felt that this would not be much of a short-term 
issue but rather something that might come up in prison in PCFs 
occasionally detainees might not eat something - usually preferring to go 
without if we cannot offer an alternative.  
Certain procedural initiatives had been implemented in most of the 
locations visited in order to cater for Muslim prayer and the PWH accounted 
for not only this but hairnets for Sheikh males also some specific dietary 
requirements. R.10 (2010) referred to institutional racism where no 
provision is made to address specific requirements where it clearly ought to 
be, stating that clearly some level of flexibility to provide for some of these 
requirements must be offered to staff attached to both district PCFs and the 
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PWH. This might include a variety of food options to better cater for the 
diversity of people held in PCFs.  
 R.18 (2011) referred not to the physical provision of initiatives to cater for 
race, religion or specific groups but to a lack of training that addresses 
contemporary society stating that training which specifically considers 
current issues such as an increase in the African component bought into 
PCFs; stating that a key concern currently within PCFs was how to best deal 
with African detainees as they are so combative and believes that due to the 
background where human life and dignity appeared to be irrelevant, there 
was little incentive within PCFs to behave otherwise, as their attitude 
reflected a position where it did not matter what they did and how they 
behaved. This attitude was described as one where the African detainees 
felt that Australian authorities could not physically harm them. Respondents 
felt that the nonchalant attitude taken by this group towards requiring any 
form adherence to authority was exploitatively measured by the non-violent 
nature of policing compared to the brutality that they would normally 
experience in the country from which they came.  
R.18 (2011) felt that a lot of training which related to aboriginal people was 
also somewhat irrelevant as it generally applied to traditional aboriginals 
from other parts of Western Australia and not the ones from the 
metropolitan area. It seems apparent that PWH staff is seeking some form 
of concrete guidance – procedurally legally and politically on dealing with 
Muslim people within WA PCFs. R.15 (2011) stated that regularly, male 
Muslims would not comply or take orders from female officers and on 
another occasion a Muslim woman who was repeatedly asked to leave the 
backdoor of the outside of facility and given many warnings was about to 
be arrested. Here, the respondent's greatest concern was what to do in 
regards to the head wear should this woman be arrested. It is inexcusable of 
the Department not to provide direction or amnesty in its absence where it 
is clearly required on such a politically and religiously sensitive issue. 
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 Appropriateness of procedure and spatial arrangement relating to genders in PCFs 
[2.5/9 equivalent to 27%]  
 
Significant issues mentioned by all respondents attached to the PWH are 
concerned with the spatial arrangement’s inability to adequately 
acoustically separate different components of the facility and further, due to 
its linear nature sensitive people are required to be walked past general 
cells or general detainees must be walked past areas where sensitive people 
are held, as there is no separate wing: being incorporated within the 
existing linear corridor spatial arrangement. This was also the case at PCFs 
mentioned by R.6 & R.10 (2010) stating that within these PCFs there were 
no separate sections for male, female or juvenile cells and therefore could 
not be adequately separated requiring these different groups to traverse 
past each other’s cells while being escorted to their respective holding cell.  
Further to this, R.10 (2010) mentioned that in the case of the PCF under 
their authority, there was no designated search room, therefore searches 
had to be carried out in rooms and cells that were all fitted with CCTV which 
the respondent referred to as unfortunate due to the footage being linked to 
the monitors within the main station, which was a serious concern for the 
detainees dignity. This respondent further commented within the facility 
there was no provision for specific high risk or low-risk cells which would be 
beneficial.  
Dignity was also an issue mentioned by R.2 (2010) who discussed their 
concerns regarding the use of cameras in the shower area (of the PWH) 
which both male and female staff are expected to supervise, creating issues 
of dignity. 
R.8 (2010) mentioned that issues of gender and dignity and risk begin in the 
reception area through the physical occupation and mixing of different 
groups of people in the one space. This also occurs in the cells areas due to 
insufficient provision of compliant cells and the distance between them 
which is amplified by inappropriate acoustic separation in most station level 
PCFs. This respondent also mentioned potential issues should a male, 
female, juvenile and transgendered person be in the Lock-up area at the 
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same time, and while this might appear unlikely there is every possibility 
that it could and does. 
Another specific issue raised by R.1 (2010) relates to the searching of 
transgender people. Although procedurally it appears to be straightforward 
and most respondents that had stated that they had not yet experienced 
issues with transgendered people believed that the policy in relation to 
searching was clear. In reality it is not so. R.1 (2010) stated that male 
officers are required to search the male portion of the person, and female 
officers search female portion – requiring the male officer to step out of 
room thus leaving the female officer vulnerable while conducting her part of 
the search. However, issues arise where transgendered people might be 
‘pre-op’ or ‘post-op’ and although some might be pre-op, perhaps through 
hormone therapy, are clearly extremely feminine (R.14 2011). Furthermore 
there are differences between the policies of WA Police and that of the 
Department of Corrective Services which directs the administration of 
transgendered people. These relate to procedures on how searches are to 
be carried out, and appropriate placement in the facility.  
R.1 (2010) mentioned that transgendered people who are pre-op but clearly 
feminine as previously mentioned have served prison sentences in Bandyup 
Women's Prison and during the sentence have been searched by female 
staff. These same people since their release and reintroduction into the 
police system, are expected to be searched subject to police policies and 
procedures.  
R.7 (2010) raised concerns regarding the placement of detainees with the 
minimal provision of compliant cells, only 2, as there are no provisions for 
single person cells. As a result, officers must make a decision on the most 
appropriate cell to hold multiple detainees, where on occasion a cell to one 
person is required. This leaves no further flexibility should the other cell be 
occupied and either a juvenile or another male be brought in during the 
same period. A juvenile male and a female will go into the two different 
cells, if we get an adult male at the same time or someone who might be 
classified as a sensitive person we will have a problem, it does happen and 
ideally 3-4 cells would be better.  
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HR and Facility Management [36 to 38] 
 Issues associated with detainee volume [5.3/9 equivalent to 59%]  
 
Most of the issues associated with overcrowding were addressed by staff 
attached to the PWH. The supervisors interviewed mentioned that there 
were times when overcrowding was an issue particularly on Sundays, long 
weekends and during periods where festivities such as New Year's Eve and 
Australia Day causes a significant increase in the number of detainees held. 
Generally standard cells are intended to hold three to a maximum of four 
detainees.  
In relation to the PWH a number of respondents make specific suggestions 
relating to how overcrowding could be managed. The exercise yard, which is 
now no longer deemed compliant, can be used to hold a significant number 
of people so long as custodial staff are positioned outside and as previously 
mentioned up to 10 detainees can be held in the observation cell and if 
more is required detainees could be held in cell ‘H1’.  
Next to this, R.20 (2011) stated that there was also the option of initially 
placing the most compliant detainees five to a cell. The next measure would 
entail taking the most compliant detainees upstairs to the non-compliant 
cells on the floor above, with officers positioned there permanently. R.18 
(2011) corroborated all of these points but added that five detainees per cell 
would feel rather overcrowded, however, would rather this temporary 
discomfort for detainees rather than the operational risks associated with 
splitting the shift among different levels of the PWH and losing staff 
permanently to those levels.  
R.15 (2011) made similar comments in relation to the division of staff which 
usually occurred if any more than twenty three (23) lodged males were 
being held, stating that it was the preference on the balance of risk to place 
more detainees in the exercise yard on individual mattresses rather than 
splitting the shift over two floors of the facility. R.14 (2011) mentioned that 
if the Watch House was crowded to a point where it was deemed that it 
ought to be considered a “full house” occurring at around “fifty 
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overnighters” (R.13 2011), there was the provision to take detainees or 
overflow from the watch house to district PCFs which R.13 (2011) stated 
was to Fremantle Police Station PCF in the first instance, however, this has 
not yet occurred during the Respondent’s posting at the PWH.  
R.13 (2011) also mentioned that capacity had to be considered in relation to 
“drop and goes”, detainees that are processed and are considered lodged 
but go directly to bail and do not take up cell space. The limit was also 
defined by R.13 (2011) as circumstances that would cause for more than 4 
people to be held a standard cell once any overflow measures had been 
exhausted. These responses suggest that in actual fact issues of 
overcrowding have the potential to present themselves on a weekly 
occasion or at least on regular occasions and are generally managed in a 
haphazard way making do with the existing facilities. Next to this, there is a 
provision to place excess detainees within district PCFs however this comes 
with a significant impact on resources required to transport (escort) 
detainees to these other sites or causes difficulties for arresting officers who 
are required to divert to other sites particularly as in the case of some 
arrests where the paperwork required to accompany the detainee, such as 
warrants, are located in the Police Headquarters Building situated next to 
the PWH.  
Overcrowding could also occur by another definition whereby specific 
groups such as juveniles might reach the maximum supportable number – in 
the case of PWH SOP (2011) dictate that a number not greater than six 
juveniles are to be held at any one time pending no available vacancies at 
Banksia Hill or Rangeview. 
 
 Perceptions of shift experience and capabilities [5.7/9 equivalent to 63%]  
 
While there was a discrepancy in what each shift supervisor deemed as 
sufficient numbers of staff, the general response from those interviewed 
attached to the PWH was that they felt that there were sufficient numbers 
of staff on each shift with sufficient experience. This was not always the 
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case when custody or staff were required to perform other tasks such as 
‘pickups’ (R.19 2011).  
On Friday and Saturday nights two shifts were rostered on at the same time 
– the second shift starting at 9:00 PM (R.20 2011). R.18 (2011) stated that 
while there were sufficient numbers of staff at the moment attached to the 
PWH, this came at a cost of bringing all Auxiliary officers back from district 
PCFs to PWH to make up for a shortfall due to a large number of 
resignations, and further, that the problem might actually be within the 
different districts and not at the PWH. This position was corroborated by 
district PCF OICs during interviews, stating that the Auxiliary officers from 
the particular PCFs had been recalled back to PWH and as a consequence 
they and other district PCF OICs felt that they did not have sufficient staffing 
specifically for PCF duties. They had been promised that the Auxiliary 
officers would be returned to the PCF sometime later, though a specific date 
was never mentioned. 
 
 PCF specific rules or ethos for detainees to follow [2.3/9 equivalent to 25%]  
 
The ‘your rights in custody’ notices found adhered to many surfaces and 
locations throughout the different PCFs visited were also referred to by most 
of the Respondents when this question was posed. These notices did not 
met the criteria of the question posed which more specifically sought to 
determine if there were any published notifications anywhere in PCFs that 
specifically related to what polices’ expectations would be required of the 
detainee in regards to behaviour.  
All of the respondents mentioned that there were no defined and published 
‘rules’ positioned anywhere within PWH or district PCFs for detainees that 
defined or outlined what conduct was expected of them while in custody. 
PWH did have some instruction regarding what procedures were required to 
be carried out and what processes were required to be carried out by police 
and consequently the detainees would be going through.  
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This chapter did not intend to undertake a study of every aspect concerned with PCF 
design, custodial training, operational PCF policies and procedures. What this chapter has 
highlighted, however, are critical issues that relate to PCF design, police processes, and 
organisational relationships that impact on custodial care through a series of interviews 
that took place between January 2010 and May 2011. 
This has been a starting point in a quest to develop an understanding and critical new 
knowledge of what is required of architecture in order to better facilitate PCF custodial 
function, and also, promote better sentiment towards custodial duties, professionalism and 
organisational relationships. This chapter has been presented as series of summarised 
accounts, leading to insightful details not only worthy considering for design but ongoing 
procedural improvement. 
The following Chapter (5) develops further upon a number of key issues that have arisen 
from the case studies and interviews.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
Chapter 5 
Survey and Site Visit Findings 
Police morale, location specific cultural legacies and the Lock-up 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether general organisation-wide police culture 
and attitudes exist or whether PCF location-specific cultures develop independently by the 
personnel who inhabit these policing locations. Note, while not architectural, the following 
analysis is necessary to understand and bridge the nexus between WA Police’s 
(organisational) social, cultural, procedural, philosophical and operational conditions which 
directly inform associated specific spatial requirements PCFs. Further to this, it is necessary 
to discover if location-specific relationships form a component of an overriding 
homogenous organisation-wide culture or if they develop as fragmented sub-groups. This 
will make it possible to determine whether similarities or differences in organisational 
relationships exist between various policing locations, districts and regions. Next to this, the 
chapter also establishes pre-existing location-specific organisational relationships which 
may preclude prospective personnel from appropriately engaging with Watch House or 
Lock-up environments. Here, duties and situations require acceptable operational conduct 
to be performed in a manner which may or may not be fully informed by policy and 
procedure alone but subject to local and individual practice.  
To achieve this, this chapter seeks to define what organisational culture is and via 
discussions with police interviewees, attempts to establish individual perspectives on 
existing organisational relationships both at their current policing location (PCFs), and at 
their previous policing location other than PCFs. For the purpose of this and all other 
chapters, it was important that interviewees be sufficiently experienced by having served in 
a variety of policing roles and locations, having a considerable length of service, or by 
existing or previous exclusive assignment to a PCF. The premise of either extensive or 
intensive practice under PCF circumstances is that experience attained under such 
conditions would be conducive to an adherence to existing organisational relationships 
(cultures) or the formation of new sub-cultures. 
Schein (1985, 17) defines ‘organisational culture’ as a set of beliefs and values that are 
shared in common by members of an organisation. This being the case, Watson (1998, 2) 
describes the value system of the WA Police as “multi-tiered and hierarchical” consisting of 
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a number of key features, including; “risk avoidance, comradeship, masculinity, 
professionalism, opportunism and community standing.” Consequently, and irrespective of 
their combination, these values are considered to form the consistent overarching  
structure of organisational relationships within the WA Police. These attributes could also 
create negative conditions such as codes of silence, misconduct, and risk avoidance 
including disciplinary and legal consequences associated with being caught engaging in 
misconduct (Watson 1998, 145). Undoubtedly, to have the capacity to observe the 
functionality of police personnel devoid of the existing hierarchal environment and without 
existing obstructive intra-organisational encumbrances and agendas would be useful albeit 
seemingly impossible. A comparative analysis of the aforementioned illusory condition 
would prove impossible in reality as the two conditions do not occur concurrently.  
The WA Police organisation exists upon the basis of its progressive historical thread that has 
developed incrementally since formation that separated it from colonial administration. It 
should not be considered an experimental entity for the benefit of comparative 
retrospection, but one that ensures a measured approach to reform. Based upon 
preliminary fieldwork conducted at the early stages of this research, it became evident that 
morale and its impacts on specific attitudes toward and within PCFs and Watch House 
facilities would be required as a result of discussions with retired police which suggested 
that some existing individual and group dynamics had the potential to negatively influence 
organisational relationships at specific locations.52 This existing dynamic may be a 
consequence of a recent circumstantial inclusion of incompatible personalities, opinions or 
work ethics, or the un-biased attitudes of new personnel, impaired by existing cultural 
legacies to which they felt an underlying requirement to adopt. Overall, staff morale and 
contentment was shown to be directly influenced by the existing location-specific 
sentiment, and consequently, in relation to PCFs, generally manifested itself as apathy 
towards Lock-up functions, facilities and conduct.  
Existing organisational relationships found within WA PCFs, in particular the Perth Watch 
House are specific and sophisticated, and the subtle nuances are not easily appreciated nor 
understood by those with without specialist knowledge of or previous operational service 
in PCFs (Markus and Cameron 2002, 68-69). Interestingly, as a result of discussion with a 
broad spectrum of senior police members, it appears that WA Police as an organisation do 
                                                          
52
 Morale can have a significant impact on the way in which police view people in general, criminals 
and also affects the way in which they view police training, education and performance. It could also 
negatively impact on the operational sentiment of the policing location. 
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not have one distinct organisational culture, rather a multitude of evolving complex 
organisational relationship layers attributable to the many departments that developed 
over time almost independently of other locations and their individual issues, an 
assortment of situational, social, cultural, personal, experiential, scholastic, hierarchical and 
training derivatives. This creates different attitudes towards specific circumstances.53  
Therefore the notion of an all-encompassing ‘Police Culture’ appears to be little more than 
an over-simplified preconceived lay-interpretation predominantly exacerbated by ‘popular 
culture’ within many societies.  
Police officers tend to combine their individual identities with the views and the generic 
location specific “working personality” and attitudes of the organisation’s many sections, 
stations and departments (Chan 1997, 61). Staff morale has been shown to comprise of 
unspoken legacies which directly affect the productive capacity of a collective group of 
officers, which in itself is a significant consideration. Staff morale therefore, becomes a 
significant component that directly influences the way in which officers portray themselves, 
behave within PCFs and also in the way in which detainees are treated. A socio-
organisational construct based upon a collective philosophy and more cohesive custodial 
training structure in partnership with regulations and policy could identify key 
requirements associated with operational PCF design.  
Both at a station PCF and Perth Watch House level – staff moral appears to be directly 
related to the way in which shift supervisors both run their shift and treat staff (R.1, R.2, 
R.14, R.15 2011). Moreover, the morale of the Officer in Charge (OIC) is not directly related 
to that of his or her staff, rather, district level administrative and operational pressures 
attributable to a perceived excess in accountability, insufficient levels of human resources 
and legitimate work-hours available (R.2 - R.11 2010-2011). For officers of all ranks, it 
appears that occupational pressures are internally generated, rather than the function of 
policing itself. This pressure and frustration directly relates to policing location or specific 
departments, not to the architectural spatial qualities of police facilities. Upon investigation 
into the motivational factors driving resignation, the majority of respondents indicated that 
fiscal remuneration is seldom the singular catalyst for resignation. Rather, significant job 
dissatisfaction was due to paucity in appropriate reward and recognition at all levels and a 
                                                          
53
 An example of this might be where specialist sections are involved in specific type of work, i.e. 
Tactical Response Group’s work, specialised, training, or detectives investigating complex cases 
compared to what might be considered more general policing which is the type of policing most of 
the public can relate to.   
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sense of excessive and obstructive micro-management derived from an overly hierarchical 
management structure.  
Inadequate administrative support further contributes to discontentment considering the 
contemporary climate of constant “community, media, Corruption and Crime Commission, 
Ombudsman and internal” scrutiny (McNamara 2006, 9). 
Factors specifically affecting morale in PCFs, suggests a similar correlation to that of any 
other policing department and locations where the proportion of all personnel is comprised 
of a majority of subordinate officers. For a considerable numbers of officers, this type of 
socio-organisational construct and environment will be experienced at their first ‘posting’ 
(R.3 2010). These officers require varying degrees of guidance and further on-the-job 
training and find that morale among different shifts varies and is not only significantly 
dependent upon their direct supervisor and the way in which they are guided in their early 
career, but also that they will also be absorbed into the existing morale structure and 
specific culture of the location (R.15 2011). This is of particular concern as a disregard of 
one’s environment developed through the influence of others has the potential to promote 
a continuation of apathy towards facility maintenance, speaking out about ideas and 
concerns, and the significance of the very function PCFs, and in turn, they as officers 
perform within the CJS. 
Interestingly sworn police do not appear to or choose not to understand some of the issues 
experienced by non-sworn supervisors within PCFs or the Perth Watch House, believing 
that entire teams that have low morale within these facilities are associated with 
inappropriate leadership, namely, management by non-sworn OICs (R.15, 2011). Although 
custodial and auxiliary officers are trained to work within PCFs a small number of non-
sworn respondents felt that they have had their authority undermined by sworn arresting 
officers who at times have disregarded their direction (R.18 2011). Notwithstanding this, 
non-sworn officers appeared to be aware of procedures that exist to address these isolated 
occurrences. Arresting officers, it would appear, intentionally seek instruction from senior 
sworn officers while in the presence of custody and auxiliary officers who are of an 
equivalent rank to sworn officers being sought. This suggests a lack of understanding, 
sensitivity or disinterest in how this might affect the dignity and morale of the custodial and 
auxiliary officers involved directly and indirectly in custodial processes causing negative 
sentiments that permeates throughout the shift. 
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Some supervisors have been described as very dismissive, and disinterested towards 
probationers (R.1 2010: R.15 2011), while others may be very approachable to all staff 
irrespective of whom their actual supervisor is. Some OIC’s and shift supervisors employ a 
militant approach towards Lock-up management with some describing working conditions 
and atmosphere as being ‘barracks-like’ (R.2, R.15 2010). On the other hand, detective and 
specialist areas appear to have a casual hierarchy promoting a sense of equality and more 
relaxed working environment where staff feel more valued, their opinions listened to or at 
least debated (R.3, R.4 2010). This appears to be to the contrary to what occurs at a 
suburban station level which contain PCFs and locations comprising significant levels of 
subordinate staff and the Perth Watch House, where conduct appears to be intrinsically 
hierarchical (R.3 2010). Further to this, one person having command over all police, has 
been described by Finnane (1994, 15) as a means to a “hierarchical and increasingly 
bureaucratic organisation.”  
In this setting, politics intrudes into every aspect of policing, creating a less autonomous 
operational environment (Milte and Weber 1977, 202: R.6 2010: R.15 2011). The structure 
of the WA Police organisation is one that is multi-directorate which suggests that a 
spectrum of organisational relationships exists within an analogous framework where 
disparate “systems create hierarchies of dominance with influence and communication 
going down, rarely up-the line” (Zimbardo 2007, 10). Large organisations are in themselves 
a relatively homogeneous and insular fragment of society, comprising of conglomerated, 
separate yet interconnected sub-sections whose anomalous culture is undoubtedly 
attributed to specific institutional situational stimulus, suggesting that; 
“at some point, the System may become an autonomous entity, independent of 
those who originally started it or even of those in apparent authority within its 
power structure [as] Systems provide the institutional support, authority, and 
resources that allow situations to operate as they do; each system comes to 
develop a culture of its own, as many Systems collectively come to contribute to 
the culture of a society” (Zimbardo 2007, 179: 227).  
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Traditionally, locations such as Perth Watch House would not have been generally 
considered prestigious54 and on the priority list for officers looking to establish themselves. 
Likewise, this perception also applies to established officers or police in specialised sections 
where cultural legacies continue to formulate conceptions that supervisors attached to 
these ‘less desirable’ locations are so by default or due to reprimand. As such, PWH is one 
location that is regarded as performing a subordinate policing function (R.1, R.2 2020: R.15 
2011). This finding is consistent with Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman’s 
Review of ACT’s Policing Watch House Operations’ Report (2007, 79) where the review 
team, in discussion with Watch House staff established that “working in the Watch House 
was perceived to be among the least important jobs in Policing” with almost all people 
interviewed regarding deployment to the Watch House as a “form of punishment for poor 
performance” and did not want the be there. This mentality in conjunction with little 
preparatory or ongoing training and negative disinterested supervisory exchanges appear 
to be significant factors contributing to staff resentment and apathy toward proactively 
offering suggestions for improving facility conditions or operational processes.  
As previously mentioned this perceived indifference to what might be of critical operational 
significance become motivational factors driving resignation among custody and auxiliary 
officers who might not have the opportunity to transfer.  
Before this, custody and auxiliary officers in operational control of Perth Watch House 
adopted the classification required to be defined as a ‘country posting’ and became a 
catalyst for sworn officers’ obligatory compliance with ‘country service’ during times of 
insufficient human resources and when it proved difficult to attract sworn personnel. Under 
these circumstances, sworn officers who had not previously completed any other country 
service and transferred to PWH would be deemed to have met this requirement. However, 
this appears to have attracted some personnel who ought to be considered inappropriate 
based upon their motivations, which appears to have further compounded upon existing 
problematic moral and location-specific relationships leading to discontentment and a 
desire for transfer (R.2 2010: R.13, R.14 2011). 
It became apparent that the point of view of inappropriate motivations for transfer to PWH 
was not held by officers with any form of conviction before being interviewed and the 
                                                          
54
 Over the years PWH was also a ‘learning’ location with many graduating recruits sent to the 
location as a first posting where experience is gained away from the general public and work is 
conducted in teams rather than individually or with a partner. Other such locations include the 
Breath Section’s ‘Booze Bus’ and Perth Central Law Courts. 
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essential role that PCFs played in the CJS had not been given much consideration. A more 
specific position on the matter was, however, derived as interviewees articulated their 
thoughts during discussions regarding PWH and other PCFs’ functional and associated 
operational requirements, with all officers surveyed unanimously taking the position that 
PCFs performed a critical role in policing and agreeing that PCFs should legitimately be 
considered as a specialist section. Respondents suggested that for the psychological 
wellbeing of officers, if PWH was to be officially deemed as a specialist section, it should be 
provisional to tenure, particularly in light of the psychologically relentless nature of 
custodial environments which do not easily accommodate for staff respite as would general 
un-confined 55 policing (R.8, R.10 2010: R.14, R.15 2011).  
Respondents R.13, R.14, R.15, R.19 (2011) raised concerns on the psychological implications 
of PCF design which does not appropriately address access to appropriate breakout spaces 
for personnel. This was said in respect to the psychological impact associated with 
operational custodial duties (in large Watch Houses) being relentlessly noisy, violent, 
antagonistic and stressful. All respondents generally adopted this position while discussing 
the operational complexities, function and responsibilities of PCFs as an integral component 
of the entire criminal justice system. Simply, the respondents appeared to have had a 
revelation during the interview process, where for the first time, it appears, the PCF was 
being considered as an important entity performing a function worthy of special 
consideration and not a policing location of lesser status. During the interview the 
respondents’ point of view appeared to shift from one that more aligned with the collective 
location-specific cultural legacies and wider negative organisational attitudes towards 
custodial training to a more considered position.  
Reiner (1996, 178) similarly asserts that “too many policemen are contemptuous towards 
the people with whom they deal and oblivious to the seriousness of their tasks" and 
further, that when police perform tasks which they feel they ought not be doing, they have 
a tendency to take exception to what they do “day-in-day-out with the necessity of doing 
it" (Reiner 1996, 178) and thus lose sight of the significance of the holistic office of policing 
(R.10 2010). Regardless of the location, police work in general is stressful by nature and 
officers commonly claim that they receive little if any recognition of this. It has been widely 
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 This refers to policing locations that are not restricted to one location to carry out its primary 
function, e.g. general duties, traffic, detectives and mounted section. It is rare to have policing 
locations that come into physical contact with the public but all functions are confined to one 
building.  
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asserted that officers find the ever increasing number of ‘watch dogs’, or investigative 
bodies, appointed to scrutinise critical split second decisions frequently made under 
extreme duress, from the comfort and serenity of an office environment, equally, if not 
more stressful than policing itself (R.2 2010). Furthermore, these bodies have an 
abundance of time to contemplate every minutia of detail pertinent to the decision while 
many of the situations in which police are placed derive as a result of “the policies, 
operating practices, and inadequacies of other public agencies” (Reiner 1996, 199). 
Consequently, this appears to have created an atmosphere of negativity and resentment 
among personnel that feel that they work with the best intentions but are constantly pored 
over (R.2 2010).  
Affirmation of this internal pressure is found in both PCF and external environments by 
virtue of the way in which staff are increasingly hesitant to engage in frequently precarious 
situations due to potential implication of self in the event of a possible investigation,56 
especially in relation to matters involving use of force (R.2 2010). Some officers cite 
‘political correctness’ as another trend which has transformed the organisation’s 
operational ‘front-line’ practices. An increasingly hesitant approach is being adopted by 
officers that are hesitant to take decisive action (R.5 2010: R.15 2011). This is further 
asserted by Bryett and Lewis (1994, 100) who state that as a result of an increased number 
of civilian review bodies, some police are reluctant to perform in an operational capacity for 
fear of complaint or allegation, which however frivolous, must be investigated and leads to 
unnecessary additional stress for the officer involved.  
Lock-up specific training 
Additionally, it is widely accepted that this sensibility is further exacerbated by the fact that 
officers feel, in hindsight, they had not received sufficient situation-specific training before 
working within PCFs and due to enduring police legacies, feel that grievance-making does 
not come without some form of consequence or dishonour (R.3 2010: R.14 2011) 
particularly by confrontational supervisors who command their environment – in a quasi-
barracks-style. Furthermore, Loveday (2007, 364) argues that there is great difficulty in 
achieving reform within policing institutions, attributed to their internalised operational 
cultures and wider political factors, with Barton (2003, 346-58) indicating that police 
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 This finding is corroborated by ACT’s Policing Watch House Operations’ report which found that 
poor morale was further negatively impacted by internal investigations into the activities of Watch 
House staff with officers in this jurisdiction similarly citing role-uncertainty and anxiety relating to a 
seemingly constant scrutiny as considerable constituents directly related to poor morale among 
Watch House personnel (Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman’s 2007, 80). 
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possess inward-facing occupational cultures due to factors such as “wide discretion in 
interpreting the law, and robust mutual collective solidarity occasioned by the dangers of 
police work.” Solidarity of the institution against the dangers of policing and occupational 
norms, could instigate circumstances where police, guardians or custodian who are 
entrusted to care for detainees or arrestees surrender to ignorance, arrogance and 
adherence to specific situational cultures and exploit this localised divisional morale to 
create an indifference to, and a psychological barrier between themselves and detainees 
who are frequently viewed as belligerent and antagonistic (R.4, R.8 2010: R14, R.18, R.19, 
R20 2011). These psychological barriers are therefore used as a buffer between what the 
physical barrier (attributed to the built environment) can control, and detainee behaviour 
the aspect of custody the custodian isn’t able to control.  
This type of camaraderie appears to be emulated and perpetrated by those less 
experienced or conformist to divisional cultures or by officers trying to establish a 
reputation as ‘hard-nosed’ at the expense of the detainee, effectively discrediting police 
integrity as a respectable custodian. Furthermore, this mind-set precludes custodial staff 
from admitting, believing or even considering that significant deficiencies in custodial 
training, function and organisational relationships exist at an elementary level. Moreover, 
the status quo, operationally, has generally not been questioned by police PCF staff until 
more recently with the introduction of custodial and auxiliary officers. Before the 
introduction of these new types of custodial personnel, no significant changes had occurred 
to give rise to challenge latent mores which suggest that questioning convention or raising 
issues will be met with apathy and indifference and furthermore subjects the individual to 
future reprisal or being stereotyped as flaccid and a complainer. Wilson (1968, 271-298) 
mentions that police behaviour is not attributed to pre-existing personality traits but rather 
to the culture found within the organisation and therefore “individual differences” were of 
no consequence as the specific departmental cultures would in a relatively short period of 
time, determine officers overriding policing style and attitudes.  
Bartol (1996, 86) found that it is common for individuals to be “regarded as a failure in one 
but a success in another” department. It would also appear to be the case that although 
rare, certain individuals have traits that do not ‘click’ well within any cohort or policing 
(group) or team structures. Officers with such personalities, it appears, are considered in 
much the same way as a minority of officers with tarnished reputations which are not 
tolerated within the WA Police organisation. The tarnished reputation of these few has the 
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ability to burden them in future appointments (R.1 2010). Interestingly, it appears that 
through attaining a critical mass, different personnel types comprising of younger 
generation police officers and the introduction of auxiliary officers have contributed to a 
paradigm shift in a sense of entitlement to express personal opinion, and in more recent 
years have come to question the status quo and direction, in particular to this research, the 
policies, processes and qualities of existing PCF working environments (R.13, R.14, R.15 
2011). Achieving this shift in perception was also achieved through the considerable 
number of officers employed under the Direct Entry Accelerated Training (DEAT) program, 
similar to a method of recruitment used in the 1930s by both WA Police and Prisons 
Department. This program implemented by WA Police sought to recruit and infuse 
internationally experienced and trained officers into its ranks to bolster a deficiency in 
staffing strength or insufficiencies in knowledge and expertise within specific departments, 
which has also contributed to this rapid and progressive cultural shift.  
 
Direct Entry Accelerated Training 
The influx of internationally recruited officers into WA Police, under DEAT has influenced 
the local culture of policing, it would generally appear, in a positive way (R.2 2010). DEAT 
officers having diverse organisational and cultural backgrounds albeit still in policing, and 
with this, as important as it is to introduce fresh ideas, initiatives and relationships, it is 
crucial that these policing cultures be cohesive with that of the WA Police which is 
essentially reflective of insular evolution,57 specific to local conditions. In more recent years, 
the WA Police organisation has become increasingly focused upon professional 
accountability and community partnerships (Jonescu 2008, 34). Recently, WA Police have 
looked to increase the level and diversity of skill of its organisation by importing this 
proficiency from overseas. Indeed, Officers from abroad were tempted by a number of 
incentives during WA Police’s international recruitment-drives (R.1, R.2, R.4 2010), one such 
incentive being evident encapsulated within the program’s namesake ‘Direct Entry 
Accelerated Training’ (DEAT).  
Until more recently, WA Police as a collective have had rather an inward-looking disposition 
with some members exhibiting what might resemble a more military-like attitude. This 
mind-set is better suited the organisation’s earlier history, and less appropriate and 
representative of contemporary attitudes. Historically, length of service almost 
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 Within this context insular refers to evolution by means of recruitment of new police primarily 
from within W.A. regardless that this form of recruitment still captures a diversity of ethnicities and 
cultural backgrounds.  
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unquestionably equated to promotion, and with this length-of-service based promotion, 
offering an assortment of sought after positions. Conversely what has challenged a small 
number of respondents (R.1 – R.4 2010) is a sense of a lack of opportunities forthcoming to 
them while in parallel, DEAT officers appear to have their rank validated and skills 
recognised con brio, and presented with “plum” opportunities (R.1 2010) and attaining 
positions within highly sought after locations and access to desirable courses (R.1 – R.4, R.7 
2010). Given the relatively little reasoning given by these officers who have expressed this 
sentiment, it would appear that they are isolated and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the majority of police. This shift in recognition, which was once predominantly length-of-
service based to a more skills and performance based platform, places significant value on 
university qualifications and is considered a genuine means to Fast-Tracking one’s career 
and promotion. Unequivocally, officers with the right skill-set and experience regardless of 
where (in the world) it is gained could and should do the job, however, McNamara (2006) 
expands on this, stating that; 
“[sic.] the State Government appears clueless when it comes to attraction and 
retention of public sector employees. The situation with police is well known – 
conditions and pay for some time have not been sufficiently attractive to fill 
recruits schools so WA Police has had to go overseas to find new officers. 
Organisations need such attributes as performance-based rewards and recognition 
system, acknowledge employees for their contributions, have open lines of 
communication, high levels of employee engagement, competitive remuneration 
and strive for a work/live balance, unfortunately, it appears that WA Police does 
not have these attributes” (McNamara 2006, 8). 
DEAT as a strategy has changed local WA Police culture, which although not homogenous is 
distinctive, demonstrating that the transposing of one country’s police culture into that of 
another in anticipation that they be cohesive is an unrealistic expectation in the short-term. 
A proportion of local officers find fault in DEAT officers for their tendency to make continual 
comparison with the operational methods and facilities associated with policing in their 
native country, finding that this constant comparison is indicative of an attitude which is 
less than accommodating of local methods and therefore undermining beliefs and common 
practices held by the local majority (R.1, R4. 2010). While this is not exclusively pertinent to 
PCFs and attitudes toward custodial responsibility, it is significant to intra-organisational 
relationships and sentiment as a whole.  
139 
 
Further differences in culture stem from a historical perspective; the organisation’s roots 
and inception. Consequently, a police organisation of military extraction and conditioned 
through the adversities of frontier policing will bear dissimilar cultural traits from those that 
arise from civilian origins. These characteristics may also be found in the mentality, 
approach, skill-set and training of internationally acquired personnel who may be totally 
different and not necessarily cohesive with some of the local issues encountered in WA 
(R.1, R.4 2010). The (generally) impenetrable and insular nature of police organisations, and 
it has been suggested, a seeming reluctance among experienced international participants 
to fully assimilate to existing local policing cultures is further compounded by the creation 
of Custody Officers, via a now obsolete program and more recently, auxiliary officers. 
Psychological and behavioural pre-employment profiling for appropriate candidates and 
employee selection processes for some specific operational locations, has permitted further 
hybrid cultures to develop, formulating sub-groups of an overall ‘culture’ which is forever 
evolving. 
Police personality 
Next to this, Ho (2001, 318) mentions that modern day police organisations (world-wide) 
adopt the services of psychologists to administer their pre-employment, candidate 
psychological screening, where intensive psychological examinations are required to 
eliminate police applicants who are psychologically unfit to serve, due to incompatible 
personality traits. Psychoanalysis aims to select candidates most likely to maintain a 
consistent psychological profile into the future (McQuilkin et al. 1990, 293). Balch (1972, 
106-119) notes that among research into the ‘police personality’, there exists a common 
understanding that characteristics usually associated with police personalities include 
machismo, authoritarianism, cynicism, aggression, suspiciousness and pro-camaraderie. 
Unusually high levels of occupational solidarity and inward facing organisational cultures 
develop with little or no conscious effort on the part of individual officers, a situation 
intensified by the perilous nature of police work which serves to unite police as a faction 
yet concurrently divide them from the society (Skolnick 1977, 53). It has been argued, 
moreover, that cynicism is a distinct characteristic of the ‘police personality’ developing as 
a result of burnout and stress principally caused by the excessive demands and nature of 
police work and furthermore, has been distinguished as a precursor to misconduct, 
unnecessary mistreatment, torment and corruptive behaviour (Twersky-Glasner 2005, 62). 
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Authoritarianism by its very nature further separates and isolates police from society. 
Consequently, this initiates and establishes an ‘us and them’ attitude further underpinning 
the emotion of solidarity between police colleagues. This situation is exponentially 
amplified in precarious situations and instances where police officers as a group, 
experience “hostility from the public” (Skolnick 1977, 44-51). Circumstances such as these 
lay the foundation for differentiation between honour and trust, internal police and 
external society perspectives, and as a consequence, police officers enshroud themselves in 
what Kureczka (2002, 20) refers to as "image armour", police using this vicariously as a 
‘martyr’s’ shield to stave off expression of emotion, a common attitude among police 
where showing vulnerability and emotion is deemed equivalent to what has been described 
as being a “soft-cock” (R.1 2010). Officers that are considered “slackers” (R.1, 2010) or 
those that consistently complain are also regarded with contempt.  
With a blatant emphasis on the danger and unpredictability of police work as a precursor, a 
quasi-generic organisational culture can be associated with most policing organisations 
which is attributable to officers’ predominant overreliance on collegial loyalty and support. 
This is also due in part to the guarded and, in some circumstances well-regarded suspicious 
nature of the police personality. As such, officers are reluctant to entrust confidence in 
non-police others including auxiliary personnel, and therefore have a tendency to isolate 
their feelings (Miller 2004, 37). In addition to this, uniformed staff appear to exude an 
inherent attitude which is manifest in a form of aversion of non-uniformed police, 
commissioned officers and external professionals with Thomas and Stewart (1978, 179) 
explaining that uniformed officers see the non-uniformed staff as “just like the critics in 
society who are against them and that their dull and pedestrian routine is viewed by them 
with disdain.” At the same time, the presence of non-uniformed police and non-police 
professionals equate to un-warranted and un-wanted modifications in outcomes expected 
of the uniformed and thus a change in procedure which therefore inevitably impacts 
directly on them (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 180).  
Appropriate custodial care in PCFs requires adequate numbers of qualified and appropriate 
staff subject to a considered selection process of candidates cognisant of the importance of 
PCF function and value associated with human dignity, whereas errors in the selection 
process and applications of convenience, which directly impact on productivity should be 
regard as unacceptable, circumventing desired performance standards. 
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It is evident that the WA Police is undergoing a significant organisational metamorphosis 
which is not limited by location, rather, austerity measures and the need to keep in step 
with a new technologies and new issues and types of crimes or social implications they 
bring with them.  The organisation has been addressing this in a number of ways, 
specifically professionalization of the organisation, through progressively more specialised 
training, supervision and the introduction of various programs such as DEAT, custody 
officers and more recently auxiliary officers. This strategic intent is in contrast to the 
organisations corresponding modest historical derivation. It is apparent that a singular 
overriding police personality and attitude does not exist, rather, a general pre-selection 
matrix is employed to screen prospective officers for employment with WA Police and in 
some instances for transition to specific policing locations based upon particular suitability 
and predispositions which ought to preclude others in light of the operational requirements 
and function of the exacting policing location. Training and instruction as well as 
psychological requirements or assessments should therefore be sufficiently specific to 
specialised environments, policing locations, and functional and procedural requirements. 
This might also water down the notion of a general ‘police personality’ that exists upon the 
basis that the majority of the organisation adhere to quasi-collective attitudes created out 
of imposed selective processes and a ‘one-size-fits-all’ training regime. 
Based upon interviews conducted within this research, findings suggest a consistency in 
understanding among personnel relating to specific determining factors that might impact 
on a shift or location’s morale. Existing morale was found to vary significantly subject to the 
various locations visited with a range of despondent perceptions among PCF and Watch 
House facility groups, which predominantly cited morale to be inherently a direct reflection 
of supervisor-specific issues, attitudes and approach to the management of the shift. 
Incompatible personalities and neo-inter-organisational attitudes also resulted in various 
detrimental location-specific organisational relationships, further influenced by existing 
location-specific cultural legacies which manifest as an indifference towards individual 
obligation and conduct and an appreciation of the significance of their role within PCF 
functions. These findings are specific to PCFs and initiate what could be described as a non-
defined inherent identity; a cohort of individual and collective personnel qualities, 
attitudes, and personalities forming a constituent extract of any one of many WA Police 
location-specific organisational relationships and associated morale.58 
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 Morale here infers neither poor nor good morale, rather, is used to indicate that morale’s exist in 
all locations and is a product of the particular relationships and circumstances at each location.   
142 
 
Custodian Training 
The custodial training received as perceived by officers and the way in which it is applied in 
the varied number of circumstances officers encounter it, may be directly related to either 
individual situational or collective attitudes. In order to determine what microcosmic socio-
organisational construct exist relevant to the requirements of operational PCF design 
through police custodial training, this chapter seeks to determine the sense of operational 
preparedness experienced by members of the WA Police. This is discussed on the basis of 
training received immediately preceding appointment to a Watch House or being assigned 
to Lock-up duties within station PCFs, and whether this sentiment differs subject to PCF 
type, Watch House or Lock-up, and between custody, auxiliary and sworn police officers 
through specific PCF organisational relationships.  
This distinction is clearly required since it has been the intention of most police forces to 
eliminate functions that “do not directly contribute to public safety such as prisoner 
transport, guarding duties, court duties and Lock-up duties” with government-vested-
interest in a police commitment to “doing worthwhile things at least cost” (Bryett and 
Lewis 1994, 134). In line with this; modernisation of the WA Police and to make significant 
budgetary reductions the role of Custodian of the existing Perth Watch House and any 
subsequent WA State facility has seen the implementation of custody and auxiliary officers 
who’s primary role is to deliver custodial care and comply with policy and Lock-up or Watch 
House procedures as well as a number of other relevant functions in order to manage 
people in custody and external visitors to the PCFs.  
This initiative is now singularly aligned with the recruitment of auxiliary officers as their 
appointment allows for greater human resource flexibility authorised under the Police Act 
to undertake considerably diverse responsibilities. Thus their employment locations are not 
solely limited to the confines of PCFs as would a custody officer. Responsibilities of both 
designations within PCFs include administrative and operational requirements relating to 
detainee admission, during custody and release and administrative functions such as 
obtaining accurate data for detainee record files and documenting property. It is a 
fundamental role which must adhere to official custodial processes in the same manner as 
if the function were to be conducted by general sworn police, requiring at times what might 
appear to be an overly invasive if unavoidable measure of physical contact with detainees. 
This includes general and strip searches that occur with, or without compliance when 
required. 
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According to Bertoldo (2012, 10) auxiliary officers, which now consist of over one hundred 
and fifty officers59 are generally charged with performing many of what was once 
considered police specific administrative tasks relevant to particular areas of employment. 
For the purpose of this research, is considered in relation to the context of custodial care 
and within the confines of police district-level Lock-ups or the PWH. In these contexts, it is a 
requirement that auxiliary officers assist police officers by carrying out functions that “do 
not require full police powers” (Bertoldo 2012, 11) but could be considered as more of a 
specialised support task. This includes location specific functions such as identification of 
detainees during admission; involving the obtaining of DNA samples, fingerprints, and 
photographs. At times these functions must be carried out with coercion should detainees 
be non-compliant.  
Nevertheless, officers must be cognisant that all detainees within PCFs are ‘people’ (and it 
could be said, forms the core business) and therefore thorough and competent officers are 
required who present an unbiased attitude and a sensitivity towards cultural and socio-
economic diversity. Further to this, officers are required to monitor detainee health, safety, 
security and well-being by conducting regular cell checks while continuously screening with 
a focus on establishing an individual detainee’s level of risk with dignity and comfort always 
being mentioned as having to be balanced against safety and security (SOP 2011). 
The Commissioner’s Orders and Procedures (1995) otherwise referred to as the COPs 
manual is intended to provide police guidance and a set of instructions for effective 
management of police functions and maintain quality assurance of procedural performance 
and accountability. This also defines all pertinent aspects relating to the duties of a member 
in charge or Lock-up keeper (LP – 1.1 Responsibilities). Welfare Screening LP – 4.11, directs 
that “all prisoners admitted into custody [be] adequately screened to assess their needs” 
and further, Management of Self Harm – Detainees (LP – 3.6) refers to a requirement to 
perform regular cell checks of detainees who are determined to be at risk of self harm 
during the admission process into the Lock-up or Watch House facility as well as to re-
evaluate the risk and likelihood of “self harm.” LP – 3.4 Surveillance Until Release or 
Discharge states that the custodian is to ensure continuous surveillance is effected of 
detainees who have attempted self harm in police Lock-up and that Records of Checks and 
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 Officers, however, feel that this is insufficient at best considering the number of policing locations 
in WA. This does not even represent one officer per location policing location (R.1, Personal 
Communications January 5, 2013). 
144 
 
Observations (LP – 10.3) made by Members60 are to be appropriately recorded, inclusive of 
the time and the specific type of cell check conducted on each detainee including “physical 
arousal of . . . apparently unconscious detainee prisoner[s] if it is necessary to ensure health 
and safety” as this is Welfare Screening and Management of Self Harm dependant.  
The primary management strategy of risk reduction requires consistent assessment of 
detainee behaviour inclusive of their physical and psychological condition. Therefore a 
spatial program which facilitates a reduction in risk by offering the potential of applying 
constant physical surveillance ought to be considered. And in light of the volatility and risk 
of self harm in PCFs, if such a spatial program is implemented it should be used accordingly 
as a fundamental requirement. Detainees who verbally disclose or exhibit suicidal 
behaviour, appear volatile, are violent, or suffering medical conditions or are possibly the 
carriers of contagious disease can be competently assessed. Appropriate spatial program 
and suitable policy and procedure would facilitate better classification and segregation 
where necessary to reduce risks to all occupants within the PCF. This fundamental 
requirement is complicated by existing inadequacies in PCF design which do not allow for 
constant physical surveillance of detainees within in the existing Perth Watch House due to 
the layout of a disjointed linear system of critical spaces. This facility also comprises a 
number of disused areas and floors which are unable to be used due to having not been 
upgraded to current compliance standards and insufficient staffing levels to adequately 
manage the facility if it had been made fully compliant (see example Fig. 14).  
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 Refers to police personnel recording of information on a form ‘P 10A’ 
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Fig. 14 An example of an operational Perth PCF.  
This facility has a number of wings and is designed  
to operate over a number of floors. It has dedicated 
exercise yards. Long, narrow, linear corridors  
that connect all areas of this facility. There are 
a number of areas that are redundant and disused 
due to changes in policy and insufficient HR. This facility 
shares design layout and functional terminology 
that is consistent with some existing prisons and  
historical gaols and Lock-ups. 
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Station level PCFs are similarly designed and reflect comparable concerns in relation to the 
inability for this linear layout to achieve adequate physical surveillance without CCTV 
assistance or increase in dedicated human resources. This suggests that current PCF design 
is not appropriate and compatible with the critical functional requirements unless it is 
augmented with significant CCTV capabilities. This is also the case with District level Police 
Station PCFs to varying degrees, and while electronic surveillance is beneficial for safety and 
welfare purposes, it ought not to be a substitute or compensate for incompatible spatial 
architectural strategies, which would otherwise afford custodial officers the enhanced 
ability to comply with custodial procedure and ethical requirements.  
Most of the respondents interviewed mentioned that the main benefit of CCTV was not for 
observing detainees but to provide evidence of actual events should complaints be made 
against police. CCTV therefore protects all parties concerned in relation to allegations made 
within PCFs, and as such, have been retrospectively fitted within all PCFs visited.  
Initiatives to comply with statutory requirements have also been undertaken to a degree, in 
order to make the minimum number of cells compliant within each district and the PWH 
with outcomes that amount to little more than for cosmetic interventions. Nevertheless, 
from a historical perspective significant changes to organisational practices have occurred. 
“Custody Officers have their own trainer and participate in considerably more specialised 
job specific training than general police, such as cell extraction studies and close-quarters 
‘empty hand’ technique training” (R.13 - R.15 2011). Sworn police officers, however, believe 
the recruitment processes for Custody Officers did not procure suitable personnel, rather, 
civilian-minded people returning to the workforce or seeking a career change who may not 
have the right disposition for Watch House or Lock-up environments. Respondents 
describing the recruitment of people that do not have a ‘police mindset’, understanding 
and accepting of some of the behaviours of offenders and detainees who are non-
compliant or drug and alcohol affected (R.13 - R.15 2011). Comments have been made that 
“some of the Custodial Officer recruits have been grossly obese and unable to complete 
some of the most basic components of physical training required (R.4 2010). This was also a 
particular concern during the ‘500 Plan’ which commenced in the mid 1990s61 where were 
the government declared that WA Police would add 500 new police officers to the force.62  
                                                          
61
 Under the command of Robert Falconer, Commissioner for Police 1994 - 1999. 
62
 Interestingly this same election promise has been recycled and presented as an initiative more 
recently in the State election in 2013. 
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What eventuated as a result of this plan was little if any more police, merely new police.63 
In fact what transpired amounts to a proportionate replacement of experience with 
naïveté. This initiative in recruitment procured significant numbers of inappropriate 
personality types due to a softening in what would normally be a more rigorous 
recruitment process particularly in the psychological evaluation (R.22 2012). Perhaps what 
is required are psychiatric examinations conducted by (experienced) professionals with 
both a relevant degree and a policing background rather than recent university graduates 
with little general let alone policing experience (R.22, 2012).  
Additionally, the once stringent nature of police training appears to have gradually eased, 
with little opportunity for expulsion of recruits particularly at times when the organisation 
requires significant rapid increases in HR (R.22, 2012).  
In some cases where physical requirements were not met by a majority of the recruits, the 
Police Department’s demand for recruitment were such that the physical requirements 
were removed to expedite the process rather than fail the group or prolong their training 
till the required standard could be met” (R.4 2010). A contributing factor to this issue might 
be at the point of recruiting where “they are advised that they are suitable but shortly-
thereafter cannot even pass basic physical requirements, inciting recruits to complain that 
they had been deemed suitable but the training required once recruited was beyond their 
capabilities” (R.4 2010). 
Desired qualities sought-after when recruiting prospective Police and Auxiliary Police 
applicants, and an expectation among existing sworn police, include resilience and 
tolerance to stress – police are expected to possess an extensive array of redeeming 
qualities and a particular disposition considered commensurate with policing. An excerpt of 
WA Police Recruiting Section’s publication entitled The Constable: a profile outlines 
specifically that prospective Police applicants must; 
“Handle disappointment, frustration and/or dejection while maintaining effective 
performance whilst providing high standard working conditions and benefits for 
employees, the WA Police Service does not profess to provide a Utopian 
employment situation. Some constables may experience disappointment, 
frustration or dejection caused by perceived imperfect working conditions or 
                                                          
63
 Due to the number of ongoing resignations that took place during the same period as the plan. 
Large numbers of resignations have since occurred at various times within the last 10 years. 
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equipment; a large quantity of paperwork needing to be completed; or shift work 
interfering with personal life. Despite this constables should overcome these 
feelings and not allow them to affect their job performance” (WA Police. n.d., 3). 
It is also anticipated that potential officers should be able to; 
“Maintain composure and effective performance while under stress. Studies have 
shown that police officers suffer from job-related stress more than most other 
occupations. A frequent situation which causes stress to constables is attendance at 
violent or potentially violent domestic arguments. They may also suffer stress when 
faced with a heavy workload or a large volume of paperwork; attending a situation 
involving risk or physical injury; searching a building for a suspect; or attending a 
death scene.  
This dimension emphasises the need for constables to handle the stress which they 
may experience and not allow it to affect their performance” (WA Police. n.d., 3). 
The aforementioned behavioural and psychological expectations which are not too 
dissimilar to the expectations expressed in WA Police Recruiting Section’s publication 
entitled ‘The Police Auxiliary Officer: a Profile’ clearly suggests that WA Police seek to 
recruit prospective officers from specific groupings. Applicants with particular capabilities, 
discipline and dispositions are highly regarded. This desired disposition (It must be 
assumed), however, is equally relevant to the preponderance of policing locations, as 
additional – more refined psychological assessments and occupation specific profiling for 
approval to undertake occupation within a number of other departmental locations are not 
undertaken. 
All of the respondents interviewed stated that they had not received any additional specific 
and specialised psychological analysis before working within station-level Lock-ups or Perth 
Watch House. What could be regard as utopian policing – a scenario consisting of general 
autonomous freedom with unrestricted movement to undertake operational duties with 
full hierarchical support, appropriate praise, noticeable community respect and minimal 
paper-work does not exist within PCFs. What exists here, is a unique environment and 
operational requirements of a habitable ‘vault-like’ secured enclosure without respite, 
escape, freedom of movement or recourse; with endless, seemingly mundane processes 
while constantly under surveillance and scrutiny and frequently subject to investigation. 
Considering this, re-evaluation of psychological assessments and occupation specific 
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profiling for Watch House and Lock-up specific appointment should be considered 
essential.  
Technology appears to significantly contribute to a shift in policing methodologies and to 
individual and collective ideologies within the organisation. It appears that technology has 
promoted a cyclical effect on police where a lack of technology once provided police with 
significant capacity for self-directed autonomy, exponential advancement in technology, 
social networking and a more business-like approach to policing appears to be perpetuating 
apprehension among some police personnel and inducing an increasingly closed and 
objectionable mentality or antagonistic disposition based upon the organisations intent and 
objectives (R.3 2010).  
This position and sentiment is consistent with other police, apprehensive of the 
surreptitious nature in which technology could be manipulated by the organisation or 
investigative bodies to facilitate gathering of incriminating evidence against officers by 
using contemporary technology’s recording capabilities. Against this, technology is 
considered by WA Police personnel to be a periculous yet necessary factor which 
concurrently facilitates primary police functions and potentially, gathers evidence which 
might implicate and substantiate allegations made against them. Officers are appreciative 
of technological benefits while being reluctant to accept technologies which compromise 
discretion and autonomy – surveillance technology within PCFs are similarly regarded. It 
has been made clear that even with the advent of new technologies, which is intended to 
make work more efficient, in actuality more work is created through increased paperwork 
requirements associated with that technology. 
As a consequence of the changing staffing matrix, observational capabilities and 
recruitment processes undertaken by WA Police to undertake the organisational and 
functional responsibilities within WA Police Lock-ups and Watch House, participants were 
asked if they felt that they had received sufficient specific physical, psychological and 
practical training to work in these facilities. All police respondents who work or had 
previously worked in PCFs strenuously indicated that to varying degrees, this was not the 
case and that all that was offered to them was a grounding or a “foundation” (R.4 – R.9 
2010: R.13 – R.15, R.17, R.19 2011). Education and training of an appropriate method and 
type appears to be severely deficient, for sworn police Lock-up staff. O’Callaghan (1997, 
300) further refers to police education and training as an issue which “continues to be an 
ongoing concern with officers frequently feeling under-prepared for their role due to a 
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considerable disparity between societal and philosophical advancements to how and what 
police officers are taught in preparation for their role.” However, in addition it appears that, 
although important, disproportionate distinction is apportioned to criminal law education 
and other forms of training (R1. 2010) which could be considered to be a compulsory 
ongoing extracurricular activity in light of the significant proportion of additional functions 
police perform and thus training would better serve. A condensed recruit training period 
sees a curriculum where social, inter-cultural and community relations, custodial functions 
and the multi-faceted disciplines of psychology, to name but a few, are allocated secondary 
acknowledgement at best.  
In addition to this, a disparity exists between recruitment for the purpose of adequate 
human resources while at the same time aspiring for an organisation which continually 
seeks improvement in competency, specialisation and professionalism around what 
appears to be an enduring contempt for academic constituents over applied practical 
training among a multitude of senior ranking officers. Notwithstanding this, it is imperative 
that the instructors are themselves sufficiently versed in their field of expertise to train and 
suitably prepare officers for operational policing. The position of educator and trainer 
should not be undertaken by employees who are predominantly attracted to the idea of a 
non-operational non-shift-worker ‘nine to five’ lifestyle (R.4 2010). WA Police Academy’s 
state-of-the-art new training facilities, location and ambiance is more than ever aligned 
with that of a university campus being situated within the Joondalup Edith Cowan 
University precinct. The consolidation of an educational culture and training received at the 
Joondalup Police Academy (JPA) being a paradigm shift from the various locations and 
training previously provided since the organisation’s foundation, including Joondalup’s 
predecessor, the Maylands Police Academy.64 
Before the inception of the JPA, Maylands Police Academy was a relatively separatist and 
insular facility, which until recently, offered a rather more rudimentary and militarised 
setting with a more disciplinary approach to training. G.M. O’Brien, a former Public 
Relations Police Officer with the Victoria Police Force and author of The Australian Police 
Forces states that significant emphasis in Human Relations training was being developed in 
police forces in all states of Australia around the 1960s (O’Brien 1960, 10). Perhaps this was 
                                                          
64
 Maylands Police Academy site once functioned as “Perth's main airport until after World War II, 
and remained the centre for general aviation operators until June 1963 (Royal Australian Air Force 
Association, 2013). The Maylands site has more recently attracted controversy over asbestos 
contained within the aircraft hangars though other buildings are still used today for ancillary police 
functions. 
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the case, or rather, a distorted partisan perception as ironically in the following fifty year 
period this training appears to be non-existent let-alone improved upon. Further to this, the 
overwhelming majority of police respondents indicated that this aspect of educational 
instruction continues to be inadequate. Coincidently, Commissioner of Police Karl 
O’Callaghan (1997, 300: 270) refers to many facets of police training as “being out of step 
with changing social trends over the last few decades”, and further, exhibit a “stagnancy in 
response to implementing change” for which they are criticised. Nevertheless, 
unquestionable progress has occurred as evident in the divisions of rank which are largely 
dissolved and ‘given-orders’ now questioned, whereas previously this would be 
unconscionable and considered insubordination, carrying with it, considerable and 
sometimes physically stringent consequences particularly at and academy level (R.4 2010). 
To establish these claims, one need not look any further than the current police 
commissioner who is against ‘standing fast’. This typically refers to standing up, if seated 
when a commissioned officer enters a room or ‘bracing up’, a formal postural gesture while 
in stride as a sign of respect for the rank of the person passing within close proximity to 
one’s presence. Nevertheless, other individuals and sections might still enforce this 
conduct, yet this level of veneration is now only an explicit requirement at a police 
academy level (R.3, R.4 2010). 
Training 
Acknowledging the insufficient practical experience officers might have upon leaving the 
police Academy, directives dictate that when working in teams of two, probationary officers 
should not work with other probationary officers in isolation ensuring junior officers are 
able to be guided by more experienced officers as they attain practical experience. A 
number of respondents recall doing just that, some recalling having done this even on the 
first day on the job (R.4 2010), this, however is isolated and due to a lack of resources which 
may be experienced at some locations due to aforementioned austerity measures. 
Therefore, it is apparent that at times skills-sets are not evenly dispersed among the 
organisation, for example ‘General Duties’65 sections normally comprise of a large pool of 
inexperienced officers with a lesser number of slightly more senior officers and an even 
smaller number of experienced officers one or two per shift. This is a scenario being no 
different to that of PCFs where respondents stated that occasionally, both the operational 
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 General Duties police attend all tasks and are commonly the first in attendance. From here 
specialist assistance can be requested but sufficient experience is required to manage a variety of 
situations in the first instance. 
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staff and the shift sergeant are inexperienced in their role. Findings within ACT’s police 
Lock-ups subject to a Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman investigation 
similarly attest to a serious deficiency in relevant experience among officers commencing 
custodial duties within PCFs, stating that “relatively new members had ‘no idea’ when it 
came to entering a cell with a detainee” (Commonwealth and Law Enforcement 
Ombudsman 2007, 20). This report distinguishes that duty of care is; 
“integral to all police training and should be understood by all members. However, 
the review found many Watch House staff had a limited understanding of duty of 
care in a custodial environment [with] staff focused primarily on the secure custody 
of detainees, and gave little attention to maintaining detainee well-being 
(Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman 2007, 21). 
One of the most dangerous situations that could occur within PCFs is for there to be a lack 
of clear guidelines, rules or procedures in place, for deficiencies in competent 
understanding or insufficient training; in addition to ambiguous and or inappropriate 
direction presented as on-the-job training to carry out custodial responsibilities. Without a 
specialised training program for PCFs, alternative modus operandus emerge propagated 
among new officers through on-the-job training, posing significant risk of recourse should 
this instruction be inconsistent with policy and official procedure. The Stanford Prison 
Experiment (SPE), a study conducted in 1971 by professor Zimbardo and a team of other 
psychologists at Stanford University clearly demonstrates what can occur under such 
conditions. For the purpose of the SPE, a group of volunteers were enlisted and randomly 
assigned the role of either prisoner or guard within a controlled environment; a make shift 
prison which incorporates cells and surveillance cameras within a purpose-modified 
building on the university campus.  
The SPE controllers intentionally did not offer any decisive instruction, direction or formal 
training relating to how either control group should behave in either role. Guards (and 
prisoners) almost immediately made up their own ersatz rules and standard procedures 
with alarming and regrettable consequences. Both control groups adapted to their roles 
with such conviction that the experiment had to be ceased prematurely due to 
psychological distress among the participants (Zimbardo 1971). Based upon the SPE, Das 
Experiment,66 similarly stages a simulated prison within a research centre for a period of 
two weeks. Male participants adopt the role of prisoners or guards, their roles allocated 
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 Das Experiment, 2001. A movie Directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel. 
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randomly by computer. The 'guards' are told simply to retain order without violence and 
the 'prisoners' are locked-up and have to comply with the guards instructions which initially 
appear to be a set of blasé rules. From the outset both groups exhibit an apprehensive 
disposition toward the other, sentiments which quickly transformed into a power-struggle 
for dominance. The guards quickly devise increasingly drastic and de-humanising 
punishments bordering on sadistic torment to affirm their authority and maintain 
‘perceived’ order.  
While these are fictional accounts, de-humanising by means of humiliation as a method for 
attaining and maintaining power in custodial facilities is contrary to the desired process of 
rehabilitation ambitiously anticipated to occur in prisons, cooperation, and reduction in PCF 
violence. This is due to dehumanised relationships that are “objectifying, analytical and 
empty of emotional and empathetic content” (Zimbardo 2007, 222-223). Hooding, masking, 
numbering, and head-shaving of prisoners are examples of other forms of de-individualising 
and de-humanising measures employed by other agencies.  
Similarly Zimbardo (2007, 324-379) notes that situational parallels can be inferred to the 
devastating humanitarian crimes perpetrated at Abu Ghraib detention facility where 
officials operated under secrecy and anonymity seemingly without guidelines and pertinent 
formal training (Zimbardo 2007, 346). Further to this, professional identity under such 
circumstances is paramount, as “any situation that make people feel anonymous as though 
no one knows who they are or cares to know reduces their sense of personal 
accountability,” this is further intensified if a supplementary component is added, or the 
circumstances are such that organisations are permitted to engage others with force 
(Zimbardo 2007, 301). Oscar Wilde appropriately observed, that “man is least himself when 
he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth” (Ellmann 1982, 
185). Therefore while significant attention is accredited to strategic design considerations 
and planning considerations of site and internal and external spaces, (including site 
selection, site context, vehicular parking and egress, security, link to external services and 
proximity to public transport and the community, external envelope, internal 
environmental quality, strategic placement of rooms and adherence with all relevant codes 
as required), it is of concern that the qualitative component of ‘dignity’ are less 
prescriptive. Furthermore, WA Police custodial training content, it appears, is remiss in its 
capacity to equip the custodian with the capacity to appreciate its bearing or recognition of 
the value of the provision of individual care addressing specific individual requirements 
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which ensure greater detainee compliance and a thus safer working and custodial 
environment. 
Custodial training is perceived by both Police and Auxiliary officers in two different ways. 
Police officers feel that current custodial training practices given to Auxiliary officers are far 
more specialised and comprehensive in comparison to what is or had previously been 
offered to general police officers, however, what is currently offered to general sworn 
police is a significant improvement on previous practices preceding the late 1980s before 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC). However, as a 
collective, Auxiliary Officers feel that the training they receive is still insufficient. Perhaps 
the sense of operational preparedness experienced by members of the WA Police 
organisation both police and auxiliary, with respect to training received, cannot be placated 
due to an infinite number variables and circumstances officers encounter. The fear of the 
unknown or if one will be suitably prepared with the skill-set they possess before working 
within a Watch House or PCF is a common concern (R.13, 2011). This suggests that 
confidence in one’s own abilities and sense of purpose is predominantly developed on-the-
job which is at times optimistic and subject to the guidance, influence and sometimes 
improper practices of other more experienced staff who themselves have been subjected 
to informal training and streamlined practices. This perpetuates location-specific collective 
cultural legacies associated with operational practice. 
Police training currently relies on simulated operational training known as Patrol and 
Investigation (P & I) which was implemented as a pilot program in the 1990s. For the most 
part, it has been suggested that a recruit’s performance while in the line of duty could be 
better determined during P & I as It is during this simulated operational policing 
environment that ‘cracks’ in personalities appear (R.22 2012). This suggests that there are 
inconsistencies between the actual and the recruitment-process-derived psychological 
examination’s determination of a person’s character that do not appear until recruits are 
faced with real-life scenarios. This component of recruit training is insufficient and occurs 
towards the end of the recruit training process; furthermore, specific to this research, it 
would be difficult to assess how prospective recruit’s will engage with detainees within a 
PCF based on in-class textbook learning with one or two hours of simulated real-life training 
(P & I). On-the-job experience is certainly of significant benefit, however, the circumstances 
have to be carefully considered in light of potential litigation should somebody sue the 
organisation or the officer. Therefore it becomes imperative that near-graduated recruits 
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are not to be used during some of the busiest days for police, such as Christmas, New Year 
and Australia Day as the demands on police HR during these circumstances inevitably leads 
to anyone in police uniform being used irrespective of ability and thus exposing their 
naïveté to potential litigation (R.22, 2012).  
Specific to this research, WA Police ought to reconsider custodial (P & I) training limitations 
(R.4 2010) in favour of a more comprehensive ‘live’ training component which would be 
permissible if detainee categorisation allowed for more predictable, lower risk detainees to 
be presented to officers for pre-graduation training. This could be achieved if future Watch 
House facilities, as is current in PWH, incorporate and in particular, utilise a segregating 
spatial program for detainees of differing level of risk (see Chapter 6). Segregation by this 
means is additional to the directives outlined within the Commissioner’s Orders and 
Procedures (1995) LP – 12.1 Categories of Prisoners, which directs segregation of prisoners 
to be predicated upon adult males, adult females, juvenile males and juvenile females67 and 
LP – 12.2 Aboriginal Prisoners, which allows for segregation of aboriginal prisoners in the 
event of tribal conflicts whereas “otherwise they should if possible be encouraged to share 
a cell with other aboriginal prisoners.” Though not specifically mentioned within Categories 
of Prisoners COPs does account for other sensitive groups which will require segregation 
and or careful placement within PCFs such as homosexual and transsexuals as well as public 
figures and people charged with specific offences, however, within the typical cross-section 
of detainees exists further and more specific classifiable categories. 
The existing PWH spatial strategy although “outdated and in need of being replaced” (Dean 
2004, 5), would accommodate the above-mentioned live-training regimen, however, due to 
current policy and procedure the facility is not used as was intended by the architects 
employed within the former Public Works Department (PWD),68 the state government 
department responsible for the design of the facility.  
To this end, Conway (1974) mentions that when architects design buildings; 
 “we want people to use them, hopefully, properly. The more they use it in the way 
that it is intended, or manipulate it, it becomes good, it becomes meaningful and 
useful and something for people to benefit by” . . . “It seems to me a building can 
be judged on how well it serves the people. If the building doesn’t do that, we have 
failed somewhere” (Conway 1974, 7). 
                                                          
67
 Note that juveniles are arrested and processed but are no longer held in PCFs. 
68
 PWD has undergone many name changes but is currently Building Management and Works. 
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The original PWH architectural design brief accounted for more specific classifiable 
categories based upon risk minimisation of different detainees by physically separating 
them among different levels of the PWH building. This initiative might present concomitant 
benefits of a reduction in anxiety experienced by recent graduates who are normally thrust 
into the 'system' and from the outset, subject to detainees of all types, some of whom will 
be intimidating and be more familiar with the system’s parameters than the graduates 
themselves who coordinate and work within it. This “entry shock” coined by Gibbs (1982, 
99) refers to the experience of entering a custodial area from the perspective of the 
prisoner, however, this experience could be equally comparable to graduates with respect 
to the level of abusive and intimidating language, violence and threatening behaviour 
experienced by entering PCFs for the first time. Accordingly, this experience could be 
significantly reduced if new officers were incrementally acclimatised into their new roles, 
being a party to all types of situations. This includes high risk detainees, not in direct 
contact, but rather on the periphery, observing, experiencing and assisting rather than 
necessarily controlling and being reluctant to act or respond appropriately. In this way, 
officers might be more readily desensitised and better equipped to circumvent inherent 
abusive and intimidating conduct found within PCFs. This benefits both the individual 
officer to acclimatise to PCF environments and the organisation in retaining the very human 
resources it invests time and money into recruiting and training. 
Before the introduction of Auxiliary Officers into the WA Police organisation, the issue of 
desensitisation was a lesser concern with sworn police, having experienced this form of 
behaviour in the course of their duty and therefore it is unsurprising to them that the same 
behaviours, if not worse, are encountered in PCFs, and having already developed a “thick 
skin” (R.15, 2011), are reasonably unmoved by such conduct. All participants involved in a 
questionnaire indicated that the Lock-up should be a specialist area, however those who 
elaborated on this during the interviews, indicated that due to the persistent and relentless 
abusive and violent behaviour custodial staff are subjected to within PCFs, associated 
psychological issues may be experienced and work-related stresses would become 
unavoidable to some members of staff. These stresses are associated to specific 
operational factors that occur within PCFs that are impossible to anticipate or simulate until 
one commences work within a PCF. Such working environments can only be appreciated 
once experienced in the first person.  
The inability to moderate operational stress for officers that work in Watch House 
environments can be attributed to inadequate access to separate staff-only zones, whereas 
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station level PCFs are contained within a greater context. The current PWH design does not 
adequately address staff-only ‘break-out’ space for temporary respite for its staff away 
from the hostilities and stress of the custodial environment. Consequently, sworn police 
officers feel that they themselves are better equipped to accept operational PCF 
environments in comparison to auxiliary and custodial officers.  
Custodial officers, a position recently outmoded in favour of Auxiliary officers, do not have 
the option of working outside of the confines of a PCF, whereas Auxiliary officers are 
subject to tenure, and are able to work in other locations (R.14, R.15 2011). The ability to 
maintain psychological health, should Custodial and Auxiliary officers feel overwhelmed by 
the working conditions at the PCF, addresses the very core of respondents’ proviso in 
stating that PCFs ought to be a specialist location, in other words, the prospect of transfer 
should be fundamental requirement associated with the Custodial officers position 
description, which currently do not have. Nevertheless, many of the existing issues 
attributed to the disassociation between training and custodial environment could be 
overcome should police consider modifying their existing training philosophies. This 
requires specialised training be conducted in a ‘live’ environment rather than in isolation 
using substitute propositions. This approach to training could be easily afforded to officers 
in the current PWH as the design strategy embedded into the facility would allow for 
further and more specific separation of different categories of detainees. The capacity to do 
so, while currently not making the most of this, however, sees the facility being under-used.  
Furthermore, if the police organisation is reliant upon on-the-job training to complete 
officer training to a point of competency – why not commence this component of training 
at a much earlier stage in conjunction with Academy training personnel. Impressionable 
recruits could be more appropriately navigated around some of the more abrasive and 
problematic organisational legacies while concurrently being eased into their respective 
operational custodial function. This would be in opposition to the surrogate approach 
where once graduation has occurred recruit training becomes the undertaking of others 
who are not trained nor necessarily equipped to carry out this ongoing training and support 
without the presence of biases infused with issues of situational morale, legacy and 
substitute practices. 
Lack of amenity 
This section seeks to understand the complexities surrounding the provision of adequate 
facilities not only for custodial personnel but for detainees and other sectors which 
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contribute to an operational PCF and also for recruit training purposes. Undoubtedly, over a 
period of operational service as lengthy as that of the existing Perth Watch House, 
alternative or additional provisions will be required in-keeping with changes in policy and 
procedures which are subject to revision for the purpose of improved practice or other 
pressures such as internal or external political issues. This is a critical issue from which 
critical lessons can be learnt from the existing situation, where the current PWH continues 
to be operational irrespective of extensive criticism and acknowledgement as being 
“outdated and in need of replacement” (Dean 2004, 5). This chapter will look at some of 
the make-do initiatives which have, and in some instances continue to contribute to a lack 
of sufficient and at times inappropriate amenity. 
Indeed, regardless of the location or the age of the facility, it appears that police amenity is 
consistently compromised by funding, ultimately translating into inappropriately designed 
or provisioned spaces and once occupied, personnel are forced to utilise spaces in ways 
contrary to those initially intended. For example, space allocation is generally provisioned 
to accommodate for a set of requirements which can often be rendered as operationally 
insufficient before building occupation. This is in keeping with Conway’s position relating to 
ensuring that design facilitates the occupant as much as possible to utilise given spaces, as 
it was intended to be according to the design brief (discussed earlier in this chapter). In 
these circumstances, however, it is not necessarily the design itself that falls short of 
providing adequate facilities, but the funding allocated for the provision of the facilities. 
In certain circumstances, due to the time-lag between proposal, approval, and works being 
undertaken to a stage of completion; upon building occupation, there is already a need to 
increase human resources. At times, this occurs as a necessity to meet operational 
requirements particularly in locations experiencing rapid growth or development and had 
been deprived of any previous police facilities such as suburban police stations in the 
Perth’s Northern Corridor (R.3 2010). To date, planning provision for expansion in design, 
and modification to facilities based upon requirements both operational and architectural, 
have generally occurred at what appears a disproportionate rate to that of actual revision 
and conversion. As a consequence, to accommodate additional resources, officers are 
frequently required to restructure spatial resources in order to accommodate transiency. A 
common form of this is evident at policing locations which predominantly provides for shift-
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work and multi-disciplinary policing.69 In such locations, the functional capacity of spatial 
arrangements is particularly demanding around shift change-over when the volume of staff 
within the office is at its highest (R.3 2010).70 Generally, these facilities are rarely designed 
with a capacity to provide individual workstations for all staff. Though it is reasonable to 
accept that to do so would be impractical, this situation does, however, de-value the 
fundamentals of a working environment and is demonstrative of a method by which the 
importance apportioned to officer comfort, is translated to them through a spatial program 
built upon a deficient ill-considered and underfunded system, one lacking a determined 
effort to by government to sufficiently fund and future-proof facilities for an acceptable 
period of time (R.3 2010).  
Similarly, all respondents were asked should the need arise, if they were willing to make or 
had made suggestions or reported any perceived shortcomings in design or facility 
provision. It became clear that in general, the more subordinate the officer the less likely 
they would be to bring issues to the attention of a supervisor. However, in explanation it 
appears that it is not due to an unwillingness to make suggestions or report, it is due to the 
way in which their suggestions are either out-rightly disregarded by a supervisor or 
inaction, formulating individual opinions aligned with an already existing legacy where 
‘nothing ever gets done so why bother’ (R1. 2010). In contrast to this, a number of senior 
respondents mentioned that they much preferred being in a higher ranking position as they 
felt that with this they had have a lot more authority to effect change (R.13, R.14, R.15 
2011). 
To foster strong and healthy working organisational relationships, policing environments 
should ideally adopt approaches which promote working environments which are easily 
identified by its occupants as convivial spaces which encourage some personalisation and 
flexibility where appropriate. Existing police attitudes toward their immediate facilities 
were found to differ from indifference to contempt, but, it was considered as government 
property devoid of any capacity for personalisation and therefore not appropriately 
respected (R.4 2010). Consequently, some officers cited having observed conscious 
destructive behaviour toward their work environment and police property, supporting the 
                                                          
69
 For example, such locations allocate ‘hot desk’ workstations are used particularly by staff 
completing paper-work, administrative staff and officers assigned to office duties at any particular 
time. These workstations are altogether, no-one’s and every-one’s workstations negating any 
opportunity for personalisation and sense of belonging and permanency. 
70
 This is due to staggered start and finish times at shift change-over to provide sufficient operational 
cover.  
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notion that architectural worth (as is interpreted by the architect) is devalued, upon 
occupation by the user (Hill 1998, 3). 
Similarly, compromised vehicular structural integrity arising out of mistreatment or minor 
undocumented incidents that are not outwardly apparent to subsequent users due to the 
rotational nature of vehicular use, was described as being of particular concern. Some 
incidents of vehicle damage, it was suggested, remained unreported due to potential 
disciplinary action, thus posing significantly higher risk for other officers unsuspectingly 
using the vehicle (R.4, 2010). In addition to officers, members of the public who might be in 
the vicinity of an incident relating to a subsequent malfunction of a police vehicle due to 
unreported mechanical or structural faults are also inadvertently subjected to these risks. 
This WA Police example closely resembles that of some international organisational 
examples where Klofas (1990, 88) states that American facilities owe their unique 
organisational characteristics, inadequate budgets and facilities to government “which has 
neither the interest nor resources to fundamentally alter its purpose, organisation, 
management, or operation.” 
Until recently, support of this argument was evidenced by the condition of a number of 
current purpose-built police stations and many examples of adaptively re-used facilities.71 
In addition to this, alternative premises types have also been used offering little flexibility, 
such as shopping centre units being used for the purpose of providing a police presence.72  
Irrespective of these examples, it appears that new police stations and other specialist 
facilities, for example, Police Operations Centre, Forensics Division, and State Traffic 
Operations in Midland, are increasingly purposeful. Their design is contemporary, 
sophisticated, and informed by operational requirement and compliance with the Building 
Code of Australia (BCA) and appears to be aligned with best practice as opposed to minimal 
cost. 
New police stations and custodial facilities are also required to comply with the BCA and 
Annexure 1 of the Code, ‘Building Code Alternative Solution for Custodial Accommodation 
Police Stations Condensed Report’.73 Irrespective of building type, compliance with the BCA 
                                                          
71
 Some of these examples include outdated buildings such as the former Lockridge Police Station, 
North Perth Police Station and countless others still in operation. 
72
 The former Ballajura Police Station is an example of a shop-front police station. 
73
 The BCA differentiates PCFs into two categories; Class 3, Cell areas and Class 5, Office components, 
an office building used for associated professional or commercial purposes. 
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can be achieved in either of two ways, by meeting established performance requirements 
or by a Deem to Satisfy provision. As a consequence the quantity, type, configuration and 
qualities of police stations, cells and cell areas differ in orders of magnitude from location 
to location, however it is accepted that particular operational assessment criterion must be 
considered to determine specific strategic relationships between facility requirements and 
site suitability. Although compliance with specific codes is a requirement, as previously 
discussed with respect to time-lag from planning to procurement and occupation, it is 
unclear in certain circumstances, if this statutory compliance also translates to operational 
and occupational safety and health regulations compliance.  
Procurement of appropriate sites for future police facilities appears to be an overly 
convoluted, arduous and protracted process normally involving what appears to be an 
excessive complement of stakeholders including Police Land & Building Management 
Branch, District Office and a multitude of state government departments, Control Groups, 
Project Leaders, committees and user-groups. Preceding formal acquisition, comprehensive 
analysis is undertaken by Building Management and Works (BMW) to establish and address 
an extensive number of critical issues associated with the proposed site including but not 
limited to site appropriateness, capabilities, capacity, convenience, link to other services 
and communities, ability to integrate, and aspect visibility. Additionally, it is evident that 
Police facilities and their site are subject to not only strategic decisions but also sensitive 
political, environmental and social issues irrespective of the project being categorised as a 
small, medium, large, district, or state level complex.74  
The PCF component within WA Police complexes are categorised dependent upon locality 
being either; remote, country or city facilities, overnight or non-overnight, irrespective of 
location, must adhere to the essence of established current design standards contained 
within the BCA and WA Police Building Code’s; Custodial Design Guidelines (CDG).  
The standards found within this guideline are directly attributable to recommendations of 
the RCIADIC conducted in late 1980s and in combination with the Lock-up Management 
Manual. This facilitates implementation of specialised technical requirements for the design 
of PCFs, for which the Project Brief Development process appears to be an undertaking 
equally as onerous as that for site procurement. This process is inclusive of many similar 
stakeholders, and in addition, architects, Project Control Groups, commissioned 
consultants, Client Mangers, Cost Managers, and Specialist Police Groups – to name just a 
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 A comprehensive list of criterion is outlined in the WA Police Building Code ‘Planning Guidelines’ 
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few. With respect to PCFs, it is essential that the critical functional pre-design requirements 
for a custodial facility’s articulation be understood and be appraised as an immediate 
extension of the site planning and procurement stage of any new or proposed alteration 
and additions police facility works, and as such mitigate potential site imposed restrictions 
which may influence or inhibit desired future outcomes. 
Lighting  
This section discusses the importance of light in PCFs and the significant role it plays which 
is sometimes underappreciated. To do this, the following example is discusses the critical 
function specifically relating to natural PCF lighting, with solar orientation being a 
fundamental factor in allowing for the capture of ‘best light’ for a PCF component within a 
police complex. Moreover, as natural lighting induces a reduction in stress, vandalism, and 
likelihood of assaults, particularly in custodial facilities which Kessler (2000, 89-98) states 
that light “is the lifeblood of prison architecture, and it should be a primary consideration,” 
yet this notion can equally be applied to all custodial typologies not just prisons. It is further 
imperative to consider that PCF staff will spend significantly lengthier periods within the 
confines of a Lock-up facility. Therefore, both detainees and staff within these facilities, 
(particularly Watch Houses), stand to benefit from the advantages of natural light within 
PCF environments.  
Correspondingly, dignity should be designated as the fundamental human component 
crucial to Lock-up functional philosophy which although complimented by architecture is 
initiated and sustained by the custodian as are initiatives concerning the educational and 
instructive process of the rules and behavioural expectations acceptable within PCFs. 
Brisbane’s Roma Street Watch House has incorporated comparable initiatives in the form of 
‘house rules’ as a way of promoting a standard or level of acceptable detainee behaviour.75 
This arises as it is recognised that a vast proportion of understanding and learning is not 
due to action but learnt behavioural rules via verbal or written instructions, such rules 
being a set of behavioural guidelines in relation to an expected standard of behaviour for a 
certain set of circumstances (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 45). Coincidently, social 
conditioning further influences human response to immediate environment, evident within 
a Lock-up setting where detainees in-general, better respect the facility when the 
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 This affords the custodian tangible bilateral lay-guidelines by which to professionally negotiate and 
ameliorate conduct through cause and effect. Detainees also feel a sense of obligation to not impact 
on other detainees’ privileges that might be withdrawn due to their own behaviour.  
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architecture communicates to them that they in-turn will be treated with respect 
(Fairweather and McConville 2000, 39). Research by Fairweather and McConville (2000, 39) 
indicates that there have been positive outcomes where carcerative environments have 
presented a more “standardised setting”, over that which resembles a ‘human cage’. 
Inevitably, this would also be true for staff undertaking lengthy employment within PCFs 
where consideration ought to be given to design for the intrinsic purpose of dignity for all 
occupants. This becomes more critical in PCFs where the relative opposite of what occurs in 
prisons takes place. In prisons, prisoners are incarcerated long-term while in comparison, 
staff work relatively short periods, whereas in PCFs, detainees are held for relatively short 
periods of time and staff have long-term tenures of employment. 
Dignity  
Dignity by design is therefore coined as a term associated with conceptual design strategies 
constituted upon concepts proposed for dignity embedded into architecture, examples of 
which include (but are not limited to) affording genuine adequate physical circulation, 
acoustic and physical separation of incompatible groups (R.15 2011) such as sex offenders, 
males and females, juveniles and sensitive people, in order to minimise harassment and 
intimidation and as a simple gesture of an environment which is humane. Furthermore, it is 
important to present a clean freshly painted setting devoid of foul odours with adequate 
thermal comfort and good lighting that is able to be dimmed offering some semblance of 
perceived self-control, a set of parameters which detainees can control (R.15 2011). While 
the separation of male and female detainees is required, visually and acoustically this does 
not occur at most facilities and of primary concern in most WA PCF reception areas. 
Additionally, facilities where searches are conducted for both general and strip and the 
procedures for searching could be reviewed.  
For example, is it necessary that all detainees be subjected to searches that require undress 
or physical contact in instances where ‘mum and dad’ types are processed for non-violent, 
drug or weapon offences? Categorically and unanimously all police personnel involved in 
discussions indicated that under these circumstances it would not be appreciated by any 
respondents if it were their parents involved. Further to this, privacy while being admitted 
in the reception area is not guaranteed and standard admission questioning is less than 
confidential, intrusive and debatably undignified. These relate to medical and psychiatric 
history, alcohol and drug use, medication, transmissible diseases, and next of kin among 
many others questions. At this time, detainees are also required to relinquish all property 
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including jewellery and potentially sensitive property to police who ledger the items and 
return or transfer the property as required.  
Medical facilities within a Watch House, while making allowance for security and safety, 
should offer some level of privacy which also respects the dignity of the nurse, doctor and 
patient confidentiality. Notwithstanding this, the overriding design standards ethos is 
conditioned by recognition of detainee’s fundamental entitlements of being secured in a 
safe environment, supportive and respectful of human dignity. However, Architecture is 
greater than itself, in that it is not just a metaphor of physical construction, but rather, the 
essential, distinctive and experiential relationship between the user and the material reality 
of the building. Without the critical relationships that are promoted between inhabitant 
and space, architecture would equate to an artistic interpretation of brief without soul (Hill 
1998, 5-6). Therefore, competent understanding of architectural discourse requires 
acknowledgement of the social and psychological relationships between the user and the 
inhabited space which architecture provides. Moreover, Carter, Glaser & Wilkins state that; 
“Planners who have little or no experience working with an architect should 
recognise that he is a planning specialist. It should be expected that, whether he 
may not be experienced in designing correctional facilities, he will apply his 
knowledge and skills to the problems and needs at hand rather than rely on 
stereotypes of other structures. Since program planners and managers are not 
always as certain as they should be of the program desired and the specific 
functions involved, the architect may find himself confronted with an information 
vacuum; to fill this vacuum, consciously or not, he may resort to stereotype design” 
(Carter, Glaser & Wilkins 1972, 395). 
PCFs are required to accommodate the majority of detainees accounting for diversities in 
cultural backgrounds inherent in Australian society where possible, and further, incorporate 
distinct location-specific characteristics. As a consequence, it is imperative to understand a 
facility’s operational success through increased post occupancy research and evaluation. 
W.A Police must be the custodian of the data and findings that arise from these evaluations 
so that for future projects, they are able to present this information to whichever 
architectural practice may be involved. Accordingly, subsequent design briefs are able to be 
informed by the successes and failures of previous projects. In consideration of this, it is 
disappointing that propositions for considerable shifts in architectural norms (relating to 
police buildings) be openly considered akin to non-conformist trends in architecture by 
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those specifying police facilities who require rather, architecture that is “timeless and well 
mannered” (Western Australia 1995b, 1). This architectural expression is arguably a 
somewhat subjective and moderately pedestrian architectural panacea reliant upon 
predictability and conformity. 
Clearly, an imposition of architectural expressions of power creating an authoritarian 
impression is not socially accepted in contemporary societies. Local evidence supporting 
this is substantiated by considerable public opposition to the proposed site for the new 
Perth City Police and Watch House facility, expressing concern that this type of facility will 
transform this particular location in Northbridge into an authoritarian ‘gateway to the city’. 
It is for the prevention of these types of circumstances, that current guidelines stipulated 
within the WA Police Building Code insist on design that is compatible with the sensibilities 
of the immediate urban fabric yet still uniquely distinguishable. Internationally, 
contemporary architectural examples associated with police and Lock-up facility 
appearance have taken its urban context into account and do conform and complement 
existing urban fabric, scale, materiality, colours and perceived finishes. The building 
envelope although sensitive to context is also the first line of security for a police facility 
and the Lock-up and therefore must also be sufficiently robust to fulfil this requirement. For 
the greater part of society, the exterior of police buildings and indeed PCFs will be the only 
aspect by which to formulate an opinion. Therefore, it is incumbent that it make an 
impression representative of an organisations ethos and standards and not appear 
institutional as might be expected. 
Design Guidelines 
An admirable contemporary example which attempts to address Police, Court and Watch 
House contextual design sensitivities is evident in Brisbane’s Roma Street Justice Complex. 
This comprises of a Police Station, Watch House and Court House. The Court foyer is 
administered by both civilian and private security staff creating a more liberal ambiance 
and while the level of passive, electronic and observational surveillance in combination 
with perceivable security personnel is high it does not feel overbearing. However, there 
appears to be little impetus for aspiring progressive architectural proposals which conflict 
with status quo, as current planning doctrines are axioms of existing attitudes of 
conformism. 
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In its exhaustive comprehensiveness, that sets out many prescriptive design requirements 
for PCFs in specific detail the WA Police Building Code is to a point, regrettably inhibiting of 
implementing new cutting-edge theories and critical knowledge, in particular, as this all-
encompassing dossier – which incorporates Custodial Design Guidelines risks authoritative 
contemporary architectural attitudes being transposed into reluctance to adopt initiatives 
other than sheltered and antiquated prescriptive recommendations. In such cases where 
alternative solutions or new theories and technologies are available it becomes more 
difficult to have these implemented where it is not specifically mentioned in a prescriptive 
specification. Non-project-specific briefs are sometimes written in the form of a 
prescriptive design guideline by architects who may be experienced in the field of 
architectural practice in the relevant field, but may not necessarily apply any significant 
researched knowledge. In relation to custodial facilities, design guidelines are written by 
architects for architects, at times forming the basis upon which associated enacted 
legislation is drawn (Markus and Cameron 2002, 36). Markus and Cameron (2002, 36) 
describe official design guidelines as an initiative with “ideological assumptions” of the 
associated discipline, function, utilisation and occupants which has “continued almost to 
the present day”, yet it has continued to the present day and will continue to do so into the 
future not in the least with the advent of the Police Building Code, Custodial Design 
Guidelines and other legally imposed regulations. It is not entirely subject to the rigidity of 
the finishes and the fixings, but rather the physical and psychological ambience and thus 
the quality of the spatial experience which is in question. This is a condition which must be 
addressed, but one which fall outside of the empirical scope of architectural requirements. 
In addition to the corresponding policy and procedures, this condition supports the police 
including custodial officers and detainees, to the two main constituents of PCFs. 
Functions 
Ideally, a genuine means for testing and implementing innovative proposals should be 
encouraged as equally as the research preceding its inception. For example, although it has 
been established that the place and point where the highest risks of detainee versus 
detainee violence occurs with the greatest risk to incompatible staff to detainee ratio to 
control such violence is at meal time – in the Watch House dining room, little appears to 
have been done to address this. In accordance with the published data available (United 
Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975: United States Bureau of Prisons 1949) 
communal meals, dining, and mess areas have much the same spatial arrangement, finish 
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and philosophy across many examples of dissimilar custodial types.76 This suggests that this 
spatial one-size-fits-all solution to communal dining was more of an indiscriminate solution 
to the requirements of the various different custodial typologies which had dissimilar 
functions and operational requirements. Similarly it appears that an average single person 
cell size of five square meters is shared in common among many examples of custodial 
facility types. International contemporary and historical (Watch House, Jails and prison) 
examples studied, such as those found in the U.S. and Europe, tabled in the United Nations 
Social Defence Research Institute (1975) and the United States Bureau of Prisons (1949) 
publications indicate that there provision for single person cells have been made. Although 
there are some potential benefits in using single person cells in the short-term, Altman 
(1975, 23), stresses that “forced separation, such as solitary confinement in prison, that is 
likely to be harmful to people in the long run” is very serious when used as a punishment 
and is something that should be considered before it is put into practice. 
It must be noted that forced separation for the purpose of solitary confinement and 
punishment is not the same as single person cells in the general population of prison 
environments. What this analysis has determined, is that single cell examples for general 
population environments within prison are on average, similarly proportioned to those 
found within the existing PWH. However, within PCFs, the short-term context associated 
with single cells does not convey the same sentiment of being detained within them as a 
form of punishment. This situation appears to arise out of social structures and spatial 
relationships found within long-term carcerative environments which are diametrically 
opposed to PCFs. This suggests that a pre-determined acceptable minimum single person 
cells size may exist irrespective of custodial typology which may be based upon the 
proportions of the human body and perception of personal space. 
One of the substantial differences between two different typology environments exists in 
the social interactions that develop into acquaintances, friendships, alliances and other 
forms of social relationships. Many social relationships that exist within prison 
environments have prescribed spatial relationships such as territories whereby ownership 
of certain spaces can be asserted by different groups or alliances via occupation. Markers or 
physical inhabitation by these groups suggest “the environment becomes an extension” of 
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 Several examples are offered within the Handbook of correctional institutional design and 
correction (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949) exemplifying many prison facilities predating 1949 
with comparable functional strategies for communal dining. These share a similar spatial rational as 
that observed at PWH. 
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the collective groups ability to exhibit power and control of specific spaces through 
“territorial behaviours” (Altman 1975, 107: 206). Within this context it is understandable 
that to be removed from such a social and spatial set of connections is tantamount to 
further imprisonment within the prison itself. This implies, however, a degree of disregard 
of the significance of the functional distinction between prison and police, temporary short-
term, remand, medium-term and long-term custody. This is in addition to the relative levels 
of risk and different categories of people detained such as sentenced prisoners and charged 
detainees.  
Although a considered spatial provision and shift in operational philosophy would be 
required, communal meals area, it appears in PCFs, where concerns of psychological 
detriment attributed to non-socialising,77 would be better suited if subdivided into smaller 
specific clusters such as on the basis of risk classification. Perhaps if the original operational 
concept of the PWH was reintroduced, given appropriate human resources, low medium 
and high risk detainee holding areas and associated meals area could be provided for as 
separate clusters. This would effect a reduction in significant risk at meal times due to 
incompatible detainees being in the same area while unrestrained. In addition, it would 
also create a safer operational matrix for staff that would be more readily able to manage 
reduced numbers and more specific types of detainees and assign a more appropriate staff 
to detainee ratio.  
Undoubtedly, however, negotiating an effective balance between security, non-institutional 
articulation and convivial atmosphere with the practicalities of operational requirements 
specific to PCFs is critical. Further to this, it is also more-than-ever achievable with access to 
data, knowledge, historical precedents and other first-rate examples. These sources can 
also be complimented by dedicated research which suggest that particular spatial 
strategies, although cost effective have traditionally been and continue to be operationally 
problematic with increased inherent risk of violence irrespective of custodial typology. 
Changes in operational philosophy and thus spatial requirements are more easily achieved 
and sustained through contemporary architecture, technology, finishes and structural 
options limited only by innovation, imposed specification or policy and procedure. Consoli 
(2005, 223) validates this proposition, stating that non-prescriptive design briefs allow for 
more innovation in design and construction stages of a project with non-prescriptive briefs 
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 Compared with prisoners serving long-term sentences in other types of institutions where 
socialising is a necessity, in PCFs the need to socialise is not as critical a requirement which ought to 
offer some flexibility in the practice and management of meal time. 
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further urging architects to better understand strategic and operational requirements 
specific to the organisation, operator or manager of the facilities in order to transpose 
them into architectural responses.  
What is required to formulate further specialised strategies and decisions relating to PCFs 
are a two-fold robust mechanism for obtaining spatial and architecture related post-
occupancy data and narratives of both detainees and staff.  
This information serves to facilitate non-project specific tactical architectural advancement 
and related operational strategies by means of interpretation by both architects and a 
delegated research contingent. It is suggested that both disciplines should be required and 
incorporated in a constructive and collaborative environment to share in a common 
objective of innovation and progress. The inclusion of this non-project specific cohort of 
police, architects and architectural researchers could offer the added incentive of 
formulating non-partisan related decisions and judgement which allows for less biased and 
more comprehensive analysis. This arises out of insufficient partnerships that currently 
exist between architectural practice and academia where significant opportunities to 
develop more specialised and considered architectural and operational models for PCFs 
which better reflect organisational policies, operational mandates and the organisations 
specific cultural matrix exist. 
The detainee receivals custodial component 
The arrangements of the arrivals area for all facilities visited were similar including PWH. In 
considering this, it is more pertinent to state-level facilities that unidirectional Sally Port 
design be incorporated to streamline and make safe the process of lodging detainees to the 
Watch House. Further to this, contained within the Sally Port, the location of disarming 
needs to be revised so that method and action of disarming is not visible to detainees 
secured within the police vehicle contained within the same space. The current practice is 
rather rudimentary and presents itself to be un-professional and further, offers detainees 
the opportunity to study the movements and protocols relating to disarming and the 
removal of police accoutrements.  
Respondents generally felt that the spatial layout of the custodial environment should be 
more open-plan rather than as compartmented as they are (R.13, R.14 2011). In particular, 
the existing PWH and state-level facilities which process large numbers of detainees have 
been described as being in need of a more logical program for processing of detainees. This 
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may conceivably suggest a number of processing areas that form different parts of the 
receivals process be situated along the way to the cells area, rather than one receivals area 
that is restricted to one room where all detainees and arresting officers must congregate.78 
Multiple processing areas would allow for better separation of detainees along a 
sequentially distributed processing framework through PCFs. However, this will require a 
major shift in operational procedure and organisational commitment in the provision of 
adequate human resources to service such an arrangement which would account for the 
entire custodial process from receivals area to the bail area. 
Bail area 
Areas used by staff for administrative duties must also be reconsidered as staff 
administrative duties and productivity is directly affected by provocative detainee 
behaviour towards staff due to the location of the observation cell, which is directly 
opposite the bail area separated only by a narrow corridor (R.19 2011). It would, therefore, 
be imperative to maintain visual connection and acoustic separation of observation areas 
while minimising potential distractions. It would be highly desirable to have more 
observation cells and better account for cross-talk.79 Constant effective observation of 
detainees must be ensured by staff or a designated observer from tactically vantaged 
positions to assure detainees within cells know they were constantly being supervised as 
the entire premise for having been placed in such cells in the first place is on the basis that 
they will require maximum supervision due to their risk and therefore enhanced ability to 
conduct supervision is essential. With this, respondents mentioned that larger and more 
appropriately positioned viewing aperture panels of appropriate transparent glazing should 
be considered where current PWH observation cells do not facilitate adequate surveillance 
capabilities due to inadequate viewing aperture panels. In addition, this would also be 
beneficial in standard and padded cells, limiting the necessity to enter cells to check on 
detainee that might be sleeping in a position where they cannot be sufficiently observed 
through current viewing apertures.  
 
                                                          
78
 The current PWH receivals area was described as a space that is too confined and often congested, 
allowing for incompatible groups of detainees to be in contact with each other particularly during 
busy periods, or when multiple arrests of people related to the same offence are made and brought 
to Watch House at the same time (R.2, R.8, R.9 2010). 
79
 In custodial contexts, cross-talk refers to the ability to communicate via unconventional and 
unintended methods due to poor sound isolation, including; physical separation, mechanical ducts, 
pipe work etc between segregation cells, male and female areas and the observation cells. 
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Padded Cell 
Further to this, it was felt that padded cells must be positioned in much closer proximity to 
the reception area to minimise the need to negotiate already narrow doorways and 
corridors in order to escort detainees to the padded cell (R.1, R.8-R.9 2010: R.13-R.15 2011: 
R.18-20 2011). Furthermore, egress from either side of the padded cell could be provided, 
and with this, servicing both the reception area and internalised areas. The approach to the 
padded cell and doorway servicing it was described as a particular hindrance as this 
location is where detainees who are most non-compliant and in need of restraint are 
escorted (R.10 2010).  
Corridors and doorways 
Another similar and equally problematic concern expressed by all of the Respondents 
attached to the PWH relates to the width of corridors and doorways that service all other 
areas of the facility, which suggests that staff consider all other corridors and doorways as 
inadequate, both, being described as too narrow, and further, corridors too long. Sufficient 
space is required to achieve adequate manoeuvrability around a combative detainee and 
reduce the likelihood of impact injury into walls and doorway openings.  
Respondents suggest that a corridor (and ideally doorways) sufficiently sized for a minimum 
of three people shoulder-to-shoulder, i.e. two staff and detainee. On the other hand, an 
increase in space has to be counterbalanced by a potential increase in a detainee’s ability of 
strike, charge or attack as a consequence of increased space. This ratio is not only 
considered to be the appropriate number of personnel required to gain sufficient control of 
a combative detainee, but is equal to the minimum required staff to detainee ratio by PWH 
and Lock-up standard operating procedures to escort one person. In reality, to successfully 
gain compliance without the risk of injury to either detainee or staff requires greater 
numbers of staff to restrain and escort non-compliant detainees. Some exchanges 
frequently require three, four or more staff members to safely, manually restrain some 
detainees. 
Notwithstanding this, each of the facilities visited had some noticeable fault in either 
design, or the way in which personnel were able to interpret the design intent. This is 
further compounded by procedure or policy which might not be supported by the existing 
spatial configuration of the space. This is inclusive of but is not limited to fittings or 
equipment impacting on performance and causing potential risks. The following issues 
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were both observed and noted during the course of the site visit or were communicated by 
respondents and while they do not alter the position of this research in terms of the overall 
philosophy for PCFs, they are indicative of the existence of a number of key issues which 
continue to exist throughout metropolitan PCFs. In addition to the following, for further 
specific details (also see Chapter 4). At some stages of the research between 2010 - 2011, 
some PCFs had an inappropriate number of and sizes of approved cells and no approved 
exercise yards. Some progress in the number of cells is noted at one facility which was re-
visited upon invitation, it is unclear, however, if similar improvements have occurred 
elsewhere. At the time of conducting site visits, all locations had showers removed from 
their facilities. No sites had any form of pacifying instruments such as TV, radio or reading 
material which was more of a concern for PWH where detainees are detained for longer 
periods when compared with district Lock-ups.  
West Metropolitan District, was observed to have unsuitably positioned firearm cabinets 
and panic buttons throughout, protruding fixtures in corridors outside cells, obsolete 
equipment, proximity door release issues whereby non-district staff without proximity 
access could inadvertently be locked within the Sally Port should the door close 
intentionally or unintentionally between them and the detainee with the potential for the 
detainee to be separated from the arresting officers between the Sally Port and the 
reception area during a struggle. There were also blind-spots without CCTV coverage, doors 
that were able to be used as impact weapons as they could not be anchored open when 
required, fixtures which allow officers to catch themselves, and sharp angles causing risk of 
injury. The West Metropolitan District also did not have a separate male and female holding 
area or a dedicated strip search room. The rooms used instead are fitted with CCTV which is 
able to be viewed outside of the confines of the PCF causing issues of dignity whereas COPs 
manual LP – 4.5 Strip Searches specifically states that;  
“A duty of care prevails and as such, strip searches are to be conducted in privacy 
and in a humane manner with due regard for the prisoners human dignity. If the 
location chosen the strip search is capable of being monitored by cameras those 
cameras should not be monitoring that location while the strip search is being 
conducted” (WA Police 1995a). 
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Safety 
Tactical safety concerns were also observed at a number of locations in relation to the 
proximity of pins, sharp instruments and other items that could be used as impact weapons 
within confined areas such as fingerprint rooms, and behind poorly positioned and 
designed reception counters as found in the East Metropolitan District. Ceiling heights at 
various district facilities were also either too low or excessively high.  
It is evident from the abovementioned summary of some of the issues observed that a 
disjunction exists between model and actual operational PCF environments in WA where 
adequate facilities are not provided for custodial personnel or detainees. Basic working 
environments and amenity are non-verbal cues relating to employee worth and 
organisational commitment to provide comfort and a sense of belonging and permanency 
for personnel, and it is without doubt that regardless of the location or the age of the 
facility, amenity appears to be repeatedly compromised by funding and changes in policy 
that can’t keep up and be properly implemented. This, in due course delivers 
inappropriately designed or provisioned spaces. Consequently, upon tenancy it becomes 
necessary that these spaces be used by alternative means to those initially intended by the 
architect. It is also apparent that key opportunities for realistic recruit training are lost as a 
result of the current training matrix in combination with the underutilisation of the existing 
PWH facility leading, potentially, to recruit entry shock that could impact on career 
longevity and employee retention.  
As with many large organisations that face on-going issues of staff retention, WA Police 
undoubtedly identify and allocate resources in an effort to retain the expertise, experience 
and resources to which a significant portion of police funding is allocated. Accordingly, 
retaining the organisations most valuable assets through a more considered transition 
methodology from recruit to operational officer by using suitably designed operational PCFs 
in a way that apportions risk with experience has the potential to form the basis for future 
research. 
This chapter sought to define the organisational relationships and dynamics that develop 
specific to PCF environments to develop an understanding of behaviours and organisational 
relationships within PCFs and if they developed independently by the personnel who 
inhabit these insular policing locations. In doing so, this chapter has identified paucity in 
some specific aspects that relate to Watch House operations and understanding of duty of 
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care in relation to the provision of dignity. This was achieved through analysis of interviews 
conducted with WA Police and through the recording of information during site visits to 
approved metropolitan PCFs. 
Due to the unique nature of PCFs which provide physically and psychologically challenging 
environments, this chapter has highlighted a number of key issues of concern for officers as 
well as for the organisation to consider, in particular, relating to surveillance, the number of 
state-level Watch Houses, and considering the implementation of a pre-Lock-up screening 
and assessment section comprising specialist professionals which is discussed further in 
chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6  
Surveillance Principles 
Effective and Theoretical Surveillance  
Having observed the historical and contemporary aspects of policing and PCFs and 
conducting architectural analysis of such facilities, this chapter discusses the disparity that 
exists between a potentially more specialised PCF model and actual PCF environments 
where suitable operational facilities are not provided for custodial personnel or detainees 
as a consequence of out-dated design philosophies, ill-informed decisions made subject to 
legacies of long-standing beliefs. Furthermore this chapter proposes that select 
fundamental components of panoptic philosophy ought to be considered in short-term 
custodial models such as PCFs. For this research, one critical and pertinent element 
contained within Bentham’s philosophies on the panopticon, surveillance, is discussed with 
relevance to observation in PCF contexts. Irrespective of setting or the age of the facility, 
the problem that continues to confront PCF design is that it is based upon linear prison 
design and little if any research appears to have been undertaken to determine ways to 
deviate away from this design principle or formulate more specialised facilities and 
functional parameters. 
Consequently, effective surveillance settings such as observation areas, have some 
semblance of a PCF philosophy based upon perpetual supervision without the need for 
digital apparatus. This type of model could provide operational as well as other, more far-
reaching and less perceptible and specialised benefits for the organisation. Consideration of 
the spatial arrangement which is required to facilitate this ‘model’s’ function is able to be 
substantiated upon analysis of inherent benefits. If indeed, as some respondents have 
suggested staff do not excessively rely on CCTV to provide adequate surveillance and only 
value CCTV as they provide valuable evidentiary material, how is continuous observation in 
real-terms able to be achieved in linear or spine designed facilities with limited human 
resources.  
To achieve complete human-level observation in existing WA PCF environments would 
require officers be permanently positioned outside each cell which is unproductive if it 
were possible, but in reality it is unlikely due to insufficient HR to do so. Thus, acceptable 
observation may be achievable, but continuous surveillance is not, as direct human 
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surveillance currently entails walking along lengthy corridors and turning at a perpendicular 
angle to look into cells that adjoin it. What must be taken into account, however, is the 
fallibility of the human factor associated with PCF administration. Engagement of 
unsuitable and insufficiently trained officers who are deficient in social and operational skill 
can contribute to custodial associated risks within PCFs (R.1, R.2, R.3, R.4 2010).80  
From discussions with operational respondents which comprise a total of 400 years of 
combined service experience It has become apparent that some key issues exist in relation 
to the layout of the existing PWH and the basic smaller-scaled district PCFs which are 
designed around similar principles (R.14 2011) having been described as illogical with an 
inappropriate spatial organisation and “prison-layout” (R.15 2011). Long spinal corridors 
with a string of cells branching off to either side forms the basis of existing PCF spatial 
programs where, as Respondents have commented, the layout should be more open-plan 
(R.13, R.14 2011) as detainees cannot be observed sufficiently without the use of CCTV or 
physical inspection. 
Superior observational capacity within carcerative spaces, and in particular, PCFs where 
considerable risks of self harm exists, is necessary to ensure the safety of both detainees 
and staff can be adequately managed. Within the PCF context, however, as opposed to 
Bentham’s notion for the need for surveillance, is to ensure the safety of detainees and 
staff, not to change behaviour. Similar observational strategies already exist in the facilities 
of other institutions such as schools, hospitals, production factories, laboratories and urban 
spaces. Yet within these examples the thought of observation, it appears, is perceived to be 
less perverse than when considered within custodial contexts. 
A select fundamental component of panoptic philosophy and its benefits, could be 
considered in short-term custodial models such as PCFs, but not as Bentham would have 
anticipated. Bentham (1787a, 78), makes specific reference to the application of panoptic 
philosophy for use with unsentenced or uncharged people in short-term custodial facilities. 
Accordingly, within the scope of this research, this consideration is suggested with 
complete assurance that many other ancillary and sometimes absurd inclusions81 
                                                          
80
 Also see Chapter 4. 
81
 These include things such as skeletons along passages leading to cells, and sombre music being 
played while in procession to one’s cell for the first time and screams of apparent pain and torture 
being heard. Bentham’s concept and the way in which it was proposed in terms of the observational 
capacity of panoptic spaces is sophisticated, however, these superfluous items render it difficult to 
attain credibility when the unnecessary inclusions constitute a charade.  
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prescribed as necessary by Bentham for the purpose of intensifying the detained people 
experience within the Panopticon are discounted from this proposal. The preoccupation 
with the inclusion of a circular spatial form is also not included here.  
The concluding philosophical position itself relating to the potential advantage of constant 
surveillance is sound, but must be tempered by an appropriate operational and 
architectural application for use in short-term facilities: a setting more appropriate and 
conducive to the advantages of some of the observational benefits of panoptic architecture 
where superior levels of surveillance are essential. Panoptic ideologies of an architectural 
nature appear better suited to short-term facilities requiring exceptional levels of 
observation and a decreased likelihood of assaults and self harm in the short-term (PCFs) 
without the associated detrimental side-effects to an individual’s mental and physical 
wellbeing in long-term facilities. 
This chapter suggests that there is marked dissimilarity between Bentham’s panoptic 
philosophies and of what could be considered an effective panoptic ideal which seeks to 
utilise and exploit the surveillance capabilities alone of such a model without what could be 
considered the adjunct superfluous and illusionary make-believe Bentham also considered 
necessary. It is noted however as Schön (2004) cautions; 
 “Professionally designed solutions to public problems have had unanticipated 
consequences, sometimes worse than the problems they were designed to solve. 
Newly invented technologies, professionally conceived and evaluated, have turned 
out to produce unintended side-effects unacceptable to large segments of our 
society” (Schön 2004, 4). 
Bentham’s panopticon is a theoretical model based upon the principle of the all-seeing eye. 
In architecture, however, his theory is based entirely upon assumption, for in reality, it is 
impossible for a single centrally positioned guard to see all who are detained at any one 
time, even if, as Bentham stipulated, his architectural model was to be articulated as a 
circular space of 360°.  
Humans possess visual capabilities that diminish as objects move further to the back of us 
beyond our peripheral vision. In other words, for the purpose of executing directional 
surveillance, human sight, has a limited range in which it is most effective. Anything 
situated beyond such field of vision remains temporarily imperceptible. Consequently, as an 
architectural construct Bentham’s proposition is not plausible in reality but credible only in 
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theory, to the extent that a guard cannot occupy the central observation point indefinitely, 
but by the prisoner’s belief that they were. In opposition to this, I will refer to an alternative 
proposition, being, an ‘effective’82 panoptic model which would base its principles upon the 
human-biological limitations of sight; a quantifiable measure which directly informs the 
level of theoretical relevance. Panoptic theory continues to form a relevant component of 
the functional requirement of surveillance within observation spaces, though unlike 
Bentham’s Panoptic Model, it is not the exclusive architectural principle, or else the model 
would otherwise be severely compromised working in theory and only to a degree, in 
practice. For a theoretical model to address the functional requirements in actuality, 
require that it function both in theory and practice, particularly in short-term custodial 
facilities where facilitation of superior levels of observation is desirable. Competent 
articulation of an Effective Panoptic Model in short-term custodial architecture could 
translate into facilities that are beneficial to all occupants in respectively appropriate ways 
minimising the prospect of creating uncontrollable environments where the weak or 
different can be victimised: PCFs are not places for serendipitous punishment (by other 
detainees).  
The articulation of effective observation spaces should not surpass the observers expected 
ability to utilise its architectural intent in facilitating observation. When the architectural 
ability to facilitate observation greatly exceeds physical human limitation and capacity to 
harness and utilise architectural intent based upon surveillance, the integral framework 
diminishes in reality, to a mere and mainly ineffective theory. In contemporary PCFs, any 
human limitations are compensated for through the implementation of technology. At 
times, and overreliance on surveillance technologies exist mostly within station-level PCFs 
(R.7, R.8, R.10 2010: R.11 2011) and less likely at PWH. This is indicative of an architectural 
rationale that is deficient in its ability to facilitate basic observation and minimise risk. This 
situation is compounded by what appears to be an unworkable number of responsibilities 
placed upon OICs during the course of a normal shift (R.6 2010). This expectation of OICs is 
still relevant in addition to caring for any detainees that are being held. This is irrespective 
of, at times, being the only officer within the station (R.8, R.10 2010). In this context, CCTV 
surveillance is equivalent only to pseudo-control, a stop-gap measure that allows for 
additional concurrent administrative tasks to occur for officers to comply with their 
required duties.  
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 This is a term I have conceptualised predicated upon the more realistic set of parameters when 
compared with Bentham’s theoretical method of application.  
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Additionally, it has been argued that superficiality, indifference and paucity in 
contemporary culture stems from technology's “dominance over humanity” (Hill 1998, 2). 
In order to compliment observational capacity, the WA Police (1995b, 25) ‘Custodial Design 
Guidelines’ component of the WA Police Building Code, similar to the premise associated 
with Bentham’s Panopticon, require specific illumination within WA PCFs. The premise for 
implementing specific lighting rationale, however, is entirely different. Adequate 
surveillance of detainees within PCFs calls for lesser levels of tertiary illumination at the 
observer’s position. Secondary illumination of corridors leading to cells are required to be 
brighter than that of the observer’s position and cells are in-turn required to have either 
equal to but ideally a higher level of primary illumination than that of the corridors. 
Furthermore, cells are finished with a bi-coloured paint, contrasting wall scheme with the 
convergence point of the two colours at a height of 1200mm creating a horizontal dado-
line, providing a fixed visual reference point for intoxicated detainees. The WA Police 
Building Code requires that colour schemes be ‘psychologically neutral’ which are believed 
to have neither positive nor negative psychological significance. However, more focus could 
be apportioned to the specifics of the converging colours that create the dado-line which 
could be further researched and be valuable to the extent that it further supplements 
observational capacity. In relation to this, an experiment could be conducted to gather a 
greater appreciation and understanding of decisions associated with tactical use of colour, 
and sightlines in combination with illumination in PCFs rather than it simply being described 
as beneficial for the purpose of orientating intoxicated detainees and requiring 
psychological neutrality (WA Police 1995b, 22). It is acknowledged that an entire existing 
component of research and body of knowledge is devoted to colour theory relating to the 
understanding of the psychological impact of colour on human emotion and behaviour 
though this does not form part of this study.  
While the psychological implications that relate to strategic application of colours for 
psychological neutrality are noted, the resultant discourse contained within this research 
simply intends to emphasise the possibility of a more strategic and tactical application of 
colour related to enhancing peripheral and observational perception in PCFs which appears 
to be mostly under-used. Furthermore, it is suggested that certain colours should not be 
considered for this purpose as back-drops in PCFs, particularly in high observation areas 
where they will compete with the observer’s eye should they be used. Within the context 
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of this, a competitive colour is considered as one which adds yet another distinguishable 
element to the internal fabric.  
Thus colours which least compete with the observers attention should be favoured as a 
back-drop upon which to observe the subject with sufficient luminance to increase surface 
light reflectance thus creating an enhanced silhouette line. As a tactical strategy, a dado 
line comprising of three prescribed colours could further minimise the probability of 
detainee clothing creating analogous colour relationships within the observation back-drop 
area and appearing to the observer as somewhat camouflaged. Using three strategically 
positioned colours applied in a horizontal plane to a height of approximately 1.83 metres 
(6’0”) aims to eliminate any possibility of concealment, obscurity and subterfuge through 
inadvertent camouflage. Additionally, a set-height tricoloured contrast scheme could again 
have a more advantageous intent. This would provide both a reference point for inebriated 
detainees, or a tactical back-drop to enhance observation, and to further enhance the 
observers perceptual capacity by providing a series of datum points to appreciate position, 
posture and carriage and therefore offering a more comprehensive rationale for arriving at 
the most beneficial and suitable ‘canvass’ upon which to observe a subject within PCFs. 
The only District’s PCF visited which attempts or at one point in its history attempted to 
address a higher level of observational capacity through an architectural program that had 
adopted, whether intentionally or unintentionally, a quasi-panoptic spatial arrangement is 
the North Metropolitan District (Joondalup). However, it is unfortunate that the only 
segment of the PCF with exhibits a panoptic disposition, labelled the ‘Observation Post’, is 
non-compliant and due to the facility layout, is situated on either side of two corridor 
spines and is disjointed from the observational capacity of the rest of the facility.  
This section of the PCF is surrounded by what appears to be other examples of long-disused 
components of the facility. This seems evident from the adaptive reuse of a significant 
proportion of the custodial constituent of the facility for storage. Consequently, the 
architectural panoptic principle associated with this specific model is compromised, 
although theoretically conceivable in principle but unrealistic in practice. This model would 
be considerably more feasible if the ‘observation post’ facilitated administrative efficiency, 
for example, if the position comprised of some form of workstation such as bail, property, 
reserve or Lock-up-keeper, rather than merely a point of observation situated among the 
male and female cells area. Rather, it is situated some distance away to a separate 
perpendicularly orientated admission and Lock-up keeper’s area with many interceding 
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doorways separating the two areas. The observer’s room is flanked by two corridors to 
either side and by the observation cells to the front and rear. Therefore, with this spatial 
arrangement both the architectural and philosophical intent cannot be considered an 
effective panoptic strategy. It is, nevertheless, indicative of some significant and insightful 
consideration of the importance and necessity of adequate surveillance of detainees 
especially for those deemed at risk and requiring placement within observation cells (see 
Fig. 15). 
  
Fig. 15 An example of an operational Perth PCF.  
This facility has a undergone a number of changes 
to bring about a better level of compliance.  
It was designed with 2 dedicated exercise yards 
but is services by long, narrow, linear corridors. 
There are many disused areas that are used for  
other purposes. 
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Subject to adequate allocation of resources and irrespective of design and layout, based 
upon provision of space and allocation of required functional ancillary rooms alone, the 
Joondalup PCF is in all probability, sufficiently sized that it would be plausible to consider 
the prospect of it being part of a linked state-level PCF system. In consideration of the 
physical distances associated with WA Policing and thus accumulated time and resources 
used to access a single state-level Watch House, a more practical and strategic approach 
might be to consider a system of satellite Watch Houses which operate independently yet 
as interconnected subcomponents of one entity. With competent management of facilities 
and human resources, any circumstances where disproportionate levels of either personnel 
or detainees present among multiple facilities could be resolved through considered 
redeployment of resources as required to increase efficiency and maintain a balanced and 
more safe environment for all occupants. With this, it is suggested that police custodial 
facility function and efficiency within the CJS could be improved if capacity and operational 
responsibility could be distributed over more than one state level Lock-up.  
Conceivably, state-level PCFs could be situated in the north, south and central metropolitan 
regions. This format (of satellite facilities) could ease processing and custodial congestion, 
would reduce travelling time and do away with smaller suburban facilities in lieu of more 
fiscally and logistically favourable hubs. However, paradigm transformations such as this 
would dictate significant operational and procedural implications which would require a 
shift from procedures formulated upon the status quo, a culmination of many years of 
unchanged practices and mind-set. This notion was supported by R.3 (2010) due to the cost 
implications associated with providing Lock-up facilities within smaller stations such as 
Clarkson Police Station which was described as unnecessary and costly and remained 
mostly idle. A system which comprises a North, South and Central state PCF might offer an 
expanded service platform particularly in consideration of the next fifty years as the 
population of Perth “is projected to experience the highest percentage growth (116%) of 
Australia's capital cities, increasing from 1.6 million people at 30 June 2007 to 3.4 million in 
2056” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011), and the north-south corridor continues to 
expand to accommodate.  
For such an arrangement, a night-shift scenario, depending upon the specific offence, 
regularly sees the arresting officer and the corroborating officer not only attend and 
conduct preliminary investigation but also detain, search, transport, process and lodge the 
arrestee at a police out-station. Once held within the PCF (in the absence of other staff) the 
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arresting officer completes all paper-work required and conducts further investigations 
before any potential video record of interviews and subsequent formal charging. Further 
custodial paper-work is completed upon which the detainee is finally escorted to the Perth 
Watch House if bail has been refused where they will be re-processed and re-searched 
upon arrival. This is essentially a duplication of a component of process already undertaken 
by the arresting and corroborating officers which has the potential to cultivate an 
antagonistic disposition among some detainees as a consequence of what appear to be 
unnecessarily repetitive inquiries and physical processes. One need look no further than a 
recent incident involving preventable death ‘Mr Ward’ (The ABC, May 6, 2011) and other 
incidents of injury that arise during transport between different custodial facilities and 
between custodial facilities and court. Mr Ward’s first name is not used for cultural reasons, 
but his death after having been transported in the rear of a prison transit vehicle highlights 
the very real risks involved in negotiating prisoner transport. Furthermore, circumstances 
where detainees are removed from the relative safety of a fully surveilled facility for 
transfer to another location or to seek medical care, in itself, greatly increases the risk of 
unnecessary allegations to be made against police personnel. This safety, provided by 
surveillance within PCFs protects both detainees and staff, therefore, minimising the need 
to transport detainees between facilities has the potential to reduce operational risk. 
Acknowledgement of this situation is further highlighted by medical services being provided 
within PWH, and in so doing, reducing the increased level of risk of mobilising detainees 
outside of the Watch House for medical treatment where there are increased risks of 
escape and assault (R.13-R.15 2011: R.17-R.20 2011) which is uncorroborated by 
surveillance. 
Clearly this would require a comprehensive shift in mind-set and procedure since the status 
quo has operated as such for an exceedingly long period and as such procedure has been 
formulated around these practices. Nevertheless, with contemporary digital information, 
data and court brief systems much of the existing procedural requirements concerning 
lodging of paper-work, warrants, and court briefs and actual court of appearance are out-
dated and in need of re-evaluation. This requires a progressive approach and cooperation 
between a number of components within the CJS, in particular, relevant departments 
within WA Police.83 
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Provided that sufficient HR are assigned to appropriately designed multiple Watch Houses, 
the need to transport between out-stations and district stations to these strategically 
located state-level facilities should be considered, as so long as PCFs are designed to 
securely detain and surveil, the detained will devise ways in which to try to escape. 
Detainees merely require the “IAMO, the Intent, Ability, Means and Opportunity” (P. 
Zieger, Personal Communication 1996) to attempt to escape police custody, cause harm to 
police or self harm. Although these situations are not devoid from PCFs, they can be 
recorded on facility surveillance and generally, sufficient staff is within a reasonable 
proximity to manage such incidents, whereas in transit this is not the case. 
Implementing sentiment-modifying strategies 
Although custodian sentiments toward custodial care within PCFs appears to have 
encountered significant change over recent years; notably with the introduction of Auxiliary 
and Custody Officers into PCFs, the greatest existing opportunity for implementing change 
to existing location-specific PCF cultural legacies and organisational relationships with a 
minimised risk of resistance towards it, would be via saturation or en masse introduction of 
Auxiliary and Custodial Officers into that location. Further to this, WA Police have an even 
more potent opportunity to create a productive, desirable and cohesive environment which 
awaits them upon the completion of the new Perth City Police Station and Watch House 
currently under construction.  
This, as a strategic manoeuvre and opportunity, in combination with new specialist 
facilities, revised operational use and other initiatives such as “new social relations” 
(Markus and Cameron 2002, 47) might be further augmented through the implementation 
of strategic police-relevant spatial terminology which could create subliminal purposeful 
and positive new relationships between the main constituent occupiers of the space; the 
custodian and detainee, in keeping with an alternative inference towards organisational 
attitudes specific to PCFs. Notionally, this could be achieved by referring to particular 
spaces in police-relevant terms rather than what has been traditionally used. In other 
words, re-assigning traditional terms of reference used for some PCF areas may promote a 
more favourable rhetoric, perhaps one that more readily reflects the temporary and 
presumed-innocent nature of PCF custody.  
Existing terms used for many PCF spaces are the same terms used to define spaces found 
within prison contexts. Existing terminology is passé, and to date, reflects little intention to 
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consider an alternative naming convention that starts to become reflective of a more 
specialised custodial typology and of the police organisation. This communicative layer of 
dialogue could be considered as just one of many interpretative layers forming a contextual 
shift from a WA PCF legacy defined upon the underpinnings of a carcerative history from 
which it has not substantially deviated. This simple notion suggests a more considered 
police-specific approach to specialised PCF functions, for example; Alcoves, Units, Areas, 
Bays, Walks, and Zones that are named in lieu of generic terms such as Cells, Padded Cells, 
Sally-Ports, Crib Rooms, Lock-ups, Exercise Yards, Infirmaries, Corridors and Observation 
Cells.  
Contemporary PCF design is more-than-ever intent on providing facilities that are more 
refined and comprise of many layers of physical safety for detainees, yet countless detained 
will continue to seek means by which to harm and selfharm and passive will encounter the 
aggressive. Re-considering PCF naming strategies and terminology aims to eliminate the 
some of the negative undertones that exist in a subliminal capacity in common with prisons 
and jails by introducing a more intellectual layer that can be readily achieved at no 
additional cost. There truly are no ‘reasonable’ design strategies to stop an exceptionally 
determined, able bodied person from committing suicide or at the very least, self harm, 
only ways to minimise the potential risk and gravity of injury. This is achieved by 
reconsidering what measures already exist, why it was created and implemented in the first 
place, what purpose does it serve, is it still relevant and can it be augmented to achieve a 
purpose greater than itself. The psychologically and professionally unfamiliar will look at a 
particular situation and deem that it must be safe, it has to be, it’s just a box, while the 
learned and scholarly will undoubtedly look to solve the problem by ‘looking outside of the 
box’. Experience and expertise would dictate, however, that the ‘box’, in all probability, 
should not have been initially created as such. 
These are but fragmentary examples of inevitable dichotomies that produce a unique 
environment specific to PCFs to which policy and procedure must be engineered and to 
which training and personnel as well as the system itself must adapt to best address 
existing as well as potential future expansion, improvement and innovation. This research 
does not intend to anticipate the adequacy of the proposed new Perth Watch House to 
address the abovementioned increase in Perth’s population. Historically, however, trends 
associated with the existing Perth Watch House suggest that a building life expectancy of a 
similar period, greater than forty years, would reasonably be expected from the future 
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Perth facility. Consequently, this comprehensively coincides with the abovementioned 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) predictions which are indicative of a potentially 
significant concurrent increase in PCF spatial requirements or a re-examination of 
prospective human resources and infrastructure distribution matrix. 
Pre-Lock-up screening section 
This section discusses the potential for a shift in custodial process and operational 
alternatives which intend to address existing quality of custodial service, effect a reduction 
in risk, and potentially increase productivity through streamlining of infrastructure and 
facility specialisation.  
In terms of architectural advancement, particularly due to the frugality of government 
around the inter and post-war periods (as previous discussed), WA Police, it appears, had 
been subjected to a paucity in investment to development new specialised police facilities 
resulting an approach to accommodation that was not ideal but make-do.. Historically, 
adaptive-reuse of existing buildings not designed or intended for police, have been 
occupied and used for police business with what appears to be little regard for whether the 
premises will facilitate police adherence with their policies and procedures. Although it is 
acknowledged that a lack of funding available for this purpose, steady increases in police 
personnel, and an expanding city has dictated many decisions relating to accommodation 
with little appropriate infrastructure to choose from, this has resulted in missed 
opportunities to trial and consider more unconventional and progressive variations in 
accommodative structures, process and operational procedures. This would have provided 
a broader set of spatial circumstances that could have been analysed in terms of their post 
occupancy and operational success to better substantiate future propositions. While the 
previous chapter discussed a system of state-level WA Police Watch Houses that follows the 
north-south development corridor, this chapter proposes a specialist adjunct to state-level 
PCFs as an integrated component which undertakes Pre-Lock-up Screening.  
The undemanding notion of ‘inching’ forward, making inroads and changes to a basic 
template in custodial architecture and its related operating procedures in a linear and at 
times a rather lethargic rate is undesirable. Equally so is the idea that archaic practices and 
procedures should find themselves adapted into new versions of facilities or systems and 
be expected to be cohesive or become the basis upon which the new facility becomes 
inefficient and underused. This circumstance would resemble the suggestion of using a 
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gramophone operating brochure as a comprehensive manual for the functionality of an 
iPod and subsequently contemplate why the instructions seem irrelevant and ambiguous.  
Likewise, what is required in order to achieve significant advancements in PCF architecture 
is a deviation from existing conventional examples and archetypal solutions found in what 
has been a slow progression of successive PCF initiative in architecture. Alternative new 
ideas and innovative proposals are required to develop a progressively more specialised 
and professional WA Police PCF matrix. The implementation of an integrated pre-Lock-up 
screening component within a state-level PCF system is anticipated to facilitate a singular; 
safer, streamlined, rigorous and potentially perform as a triage-style buffer allowing for 
sequential multi-station detainee receivals at state level Watch Houses. This simple 
endeavour has also been serendipitously linked to a significant reduction in the number of 
incidents which require coercive force due to a more organised processes and improved 
staff efficiency in some facilities (Cox, Glewwe and Dunning 2010, 49). Furthermore, this 
could conceivably alleviate many situations of violence resulting from incompatible 
placement of detainee types and proficient determination of detainees’ psychological and 
medical requirements. This proposed system could also minimise the negative experiences 
associated with being subjected to several sessions of un-dignified strip searches and 
sensitive questioning resulting from multiple processes for lodgement currently required 
when transferring detainees across a number of facilities. 
Interviews conducted specific to PCF process and detainee dignity, suggest that currently, 
sworn police officers are not in a conducive position to appropriately appreciate the 
implication of the Lock-up environment to a person’s sense of vulnerability and absolute 
powerlessness which permeates throughout every aspect of essential police Lock-up 
procedures and for the duration of intake process. This is a process to which police must 
adhere, and to do so, requires detainee compliance. It appears that the term dignity itself 
and strategies relating to associated means in which detainees could be afforded ‘dignity 
retention’ are not clearly understood, appreciated and applied. In essence, a contemptuous 
and a deliberately inefficiency approach to addressing detainee requests (R.4 2010), 
reduces one’s dignity and perpetuates a sense of irrelevance to one’s sincere concerns or 
requests unnecessarily promoting further denigration in what is an already police-dominant 
environment causing resentment. Arguably, resentment experienced by those powerless 
within volatile systems or environments such as PCFs might be enacted as violence towards 
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self, or those in dominant positions, where it appears that although discretionary capacity 
exists to minimise perceived oppression, it is not exercised. 
A comparable example of such disregard to the existence of a sense of powerless exists in 
the patient-doctor relationship throughout the medical profession. This is attributable to 
stereotypically perceived and inherent existing lack of understanding and compassion by 
doctors toward patients in hospes environments.84 Interestingly, role-reversal training has 
been designed to emphasise and mitigate this situational issue in medicine, yet to date it 
has not been undertaken by WA PCF for training and education purposes, and it is unclear if 
a similar regimen has been conducted within other police organisations elsewhere. Clearly 
to the participants such initiatives are merely representative of situational protocols and 
mores. If the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) was to be considered a similar schema, the 
desired comprehension of a detainee’s powerlessness would arise almost immediately, 
particularly if experimental parameters of a similar nature were employed. This 
powerlessness is transferable, to such an extent that people who fail to obtain bail from a 
PCF or a police Watch House are inevitably transferred to remand where a gamut of 
dissimilar yet interconnected issues ensue. This is true not only of PCFs but also relates to 
issues associated with remand custody: another short-term custody program directly 
associated with PCFs.  
According to the Auditor General Performance Examination (1997, 3), in the first 5 year 
period of the early nineties, the number of people being held on remand had increased by 
200 per cent, most of whom were held in maximum security prisons or remand centres 
such as the male Campbell Remand Centre and Bandyup women’s prison. It has been 
pointed out during discussions with senior personnel working within PCFs that the 
psychological impact to some people held for the first time within PCFs is so severe that it 
changes them, their view of things, of the police, and their perspective in general (R.13 
2011). In every instance where discretion exists where the defendant does not pose a risk to 
self, others or the associated investigation the defendant should be allowed to retain his or 
her liberty. Police have significant discretionary powers to grant bail85 for minor offences or 
arrest in the first instance in favour of proceeding by summons. The arrestee can be 
released from police custody via three forms of bail: first, a Personal Undertaking to attend 
court with no monetary bail; second, Personal Bail as with personal undertaking, however, 
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set time and date, in return for release from custody. 
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the alleged agrees to forfeit a prescribed monetary penalty if the bail undertaking is 
breached; and three, Personal Bail with Surety where both the alleged and another person 
as surety are required to forfeit a prescribed monetary penalty if the bail undertaking is 
breached.  
Failure to obtain or meet the requirements for conditions of bail previously mentioned, 
result in the alleged being held in custody in either a PCF or at a remand centre or prison 
until such time as their court appearance. Typically this is the day of the court’s next sitting, 
at which time the court can over-ride police imposed bail refusal and grant bail or remand 
the alleged in further custody. 
The standard guidelines for corrections in Australia requires that prisoners be classified 
such that they are held at the lowest security level for which they qualify, however, the 
Director General Prison Rules requires that Remand prisoners be classified as maximum 
security prisoners and be held in maximum security prisons (Auditor General Performance 
Examination 1997, 26). Reassessment of remand prisoners can be made in order to re-
classify their security rating based upon a number of factors as set out in the Director 
General Prison Rules including whether bail was set or granted and if so the amount, the 
nature of the alleged offence, prior escape history, prisoner welfare, prison accommodative 
inadequacies, and prisoner ‘attitude’. It is clear that a number of the categories used for 
prisoner assessment are rather subjective, and as a result of re-assessments conducted, 
less than one per cent of remand prisoners are held in minimum security prisons (Auditor 
General Performance Examination 1997, 26). As a consequence, many undergo ‘induction’ 
which involves being strip searched (yet again, if arriving from a PCF), deloused and 
interviewed by prison officers and medical staff simply as a consequence of their inability to 
promptly arrange bail. A number of these people will have only committed relatively minor, 
non-violent offences and a further portion will not receive a custodial sentence, suggesting 
that out of process-generated indignity, the possibility for resentment against authority 
may be justified, even in non-obstinately recalcitrant people (Auditor General Performance 
Examination 1997, 29).  
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has introduced a bail coordinators position to assist in 
obtaining, organising and facilitating bail. This position appears to be successful at assisting 
the provision of bail within Remand institutions rather than in PCFs, which suggests that 
this initiative does little to circumvent unnecessary inter-organisational transfer of 
detainees and subjection to repetitive undignified processes. Such is the risk and burden of 
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duty of care in both PCFs and remand centres, that it would seem unconscionable that 
additional measures have not been implemented to expedite this process.  
While the concept of a pre-Lock-up screening section does not intend to make the intake 
process more expedient for detainees being processed, it also does not intend to elongate 
or prolong the process unnecessarily. However, over time efficiencies will develop by 
default as pre-Lock-up screening seeks to address inherent flaws within a system that 
currently accepts detainees that ought not to be. A number of detainees who should not be 
in custody or incorporated within the system such as people with mental health issues, and 
inebriated and drug affected detainees form a large component of people brought to PCFs 
(R.1 2010) and could be more readily identified and excluded from PCFs favouring other 
more appropriate care, and in so doing, effect a reduction the volume of detainee intake 
and in turn demands on limited resources. This suggests that the preponderance of 
prospective PCF detainees are therefore better administered by assessment under the 
management and placement of appropriate health care and other service providers with 
specialised training, appropriate facilities to manage what appears to be an unnecessarily 
excessive level of risk. 
It should be kept in mind that police are a unique organisation with year-round availability 
and they are predominantly the first and generally the only emergency service to respond 
and attend a scene where someone is “acting irrationally or likely to present a danger to 
themselves or others” (Burgess 2007, 1). Intervening between the prevalence of societies’ 
mental health issues and a seeming inability or unwillingness of the wider social system to 
cope or proactively intercede. The police are the primary emergency response organisation 
to which members of the public turn in time of crisis with front line policing of people with 
severe mental illness being empowered by legislation – the Mental health Act 1996 (section 
195). This Act provides for the apprehension of a person for the purpose of being examined 
by a medical or authorised mental health practitioner if an officer suspects that the person 
has a mental illness and requires apprehension to protect the health or safety of that 
person or any other person or prevent serious damage to property. The officer is 
authorised to use sufficient force and enter upon premises for the purposes of 
apprehending a person under this Act, and further, are required to expediently facilitate 
examination of detained people, who may be referred for further examination by a 
psychiatrist and possibly committed or charged or both.86 Nevertheless, police appear to 
                                                          
86
 The provisions for people already in police custody are also contained within the act. 
191 
 
have insufficient mental health training to manage and accommodate such people which 
inadvertently constitutes a major component of people brought into police custody (R.1 
2010) and it is, therefore, more appropriate that it be managed by pre-Lock-up screening 
professionals. 
Furthermore, Cox, Landsberg & Pavarati (1989, 111) argue that short-term custodial 
facilities do not offer sufficient mental health observation, screening or treatment in 
comparison to that of prison facilities. Legislative influence does not deter from the fact 
that detainees with mental health concerns pose a significant risk of suicide or self harm in 
PCFs, thus a quintessential PCF model proposes to expeditiously prioritise professional 
preliminary detainee assessment with detainees determined to be incompatible with 
custodial environments (police) relinquished from police custody as soon as practicable if 
not formally charged and expediently transported to a suitable management facility. 
Interestingly, having received no formal psycho-analytical instruction in order to 
substantiate the determination of a person’s mental wellbeing other than a lay-people 
diagnostic interpretation, experienced police personnel are reasonably accurate in relation 
to the vast majority of detainees they present before appropriate health professionals for 
assessment (Bean 1996, 59). This is perhaps attributable to occupationally acquired 
experience and understanding of behavioural norms. Cursory police determination of 
existing mental health issues is often sufficient to require further professional investigative 
analysis as required by the Mental Health Act 1996.  
A professionally administered pre-Lock-up screening integrated component, as a concept, is 
directly related to findings into police aptitudes and resources in confronting issues relating 
to intoxication without charge and mental health, which as separate issues or in 
combination present the greatest indirect and direct risk of “irrational and self-destructive 
behaviour” (Giles and Sandrin 1992, 671).  
Serious concern of unnecessary increased risk of suicide or self harm in police custody PCF 
can be directly attributed to the large component of highly intoxicated (drug and alcohol) 
people brought to, accepted and lodged in PCFs by police personnel, notwithstanding the 
considerable increase in risk attributed to mental health. 
The physical design and layout of PCFs as a strategic spatial program, forms the 
fundamental basis on which supplementary architectural, spatial and material 
requirements are incorporated. Consequently, the architectural rationale and functional 
and procedural matrix of an operational PCF are co-dependent to the degree that 
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operational and requirements must inform the architectural brief, in order to develop a 
cohesive and symbiotically relationship of form and function. The combination of 
architectural, operational, procedural and human relationships correspondingly determine 
PCF performance, and as previously discussed, facilitates superior levels of observation and 
surveillance which are the most critical means by which to minimise risk of self-harm and 
suicide in PCFs. However, it has long been established that the majority of successful 
suicide attempts within PCFs occur within a relatively shortly period of time (48 hours) after 
detainee intake. Biles, McDonald and Flemming (1989b, 217) found that half of the deaths 
occurred “within 5 hours” in a study conducted as a result of the RCIADIC commencing in 
1988.  
This research further noted that at the time, aboriginal detainees were “approximately 20 
times more likely than non-aboriginal people” to be held in police custody (Biles, McDonald 
and Flemming 1989a, 120), and that at the time “aboriginal people who die in custody are 
more likely to die in [PCFs] than in prisons” (Biles, McDonald and Flemming 1989a, 120).87 
Before and following the RCIADIC, the percentage of aboriginal people within the total 
Australian population has remained constant, approximately three per cent, while 
aboriginal people continue to be “over-represented in all areas of the criminal justice 
system” currently comprising 33 per cent (Australian Institute of Criminology 2011, 24).  
Following the RCIADIC the Australian Institute of Criminology set up the National Deaths in 
Custody Program (NDICP) an initiative which oversees the gathering of data associated with 
all deaths in custody in Australia and since its inception, deaths in police custody have been 
sub-categorised into category 1a and 1b and category 2 situations allowing for a more 
comprehensive understanding of circumstances surrounding deaths in custody. For the 
purpose of this research category 1a refers to PCFs such as police stations Lock-ups, Watch 
Houses as well as “police vehicles, during transfer to or from such an institution, or in 
hospitals, following transfer from an institution” (Australian Institute of Criminology 2006, 
4). The institute’s ‘Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice: Deaths in custody in 
Australia 1990–2004’ report concludes that; 
“Although the majority of Australian deaths in custody occurred in police custody 
between 1980 and 1989, the trend in the 15 years since the RCIADIC reveals a 
different picture. Prison custody deaths account for the majority of deaths in 
custody since 1990 and have exceeded all other deaths each year. Furthermore, 
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while deaths in police custody have decreased since 1990 [36 per cent to 2004], 
deaths in police operations have been increasing. This decline in police custody 
deaths may be due in part to the redesign of police cells to reduce points from 
which detainees can hang or harm themselves. Being able to identify such a decline 
in police custody deaths is one of the clear benefits of the NDICP and this finding 
shows that progress has been made since the RCIADIC relating to deaths specifically 
occurring in police custody” (Australian Institute of Criminology 2006, 5). 
This suggests that on-going further specialisation and consideration of design, training and 
operational parameters might further reduce the risk of self harm and deaths in PCF as the 
above findings conclude. This research, however, seeks to also promote a more realistic, 
live training program subject to operational facility capacity and increase efficiency through 
a reduction in incompatible placement through an integrated professional pre-entry 
screening process in order to provide a more comprehensive custodial service. Where 
appropriate, prevention, divergence and a considered approach at the point of and 
immediately following intake through professionally administered screening intends to 
accommodate or channel detainees to appropriate holding areas, alternative Lock-ups, 
departments, clinics, hospitals or institutions. 
A proposed pre-Lock-up section of police custodial facilities, aspires to identify those 
arrested individuals who are either suitable for immediate release, those not fit to be held 
in police custody, those requiring further assessment or to be immediately transferred 
before admission. An early and more robust assessment protocol could facilitate staff in 
better determining problematic behaviour and in-turn segregate incompatible people 
within the Lock-up, and thus offer and maintain the most appropriate service at an 
individual level as de-individualisation and “de-humanisation typically facilitates abusive 
and destructive actions towards those objectified” (Zimbardo 2007, 223).  
A person held in Police custody as a detainee as specified within the COPs manual should 
not be detained in a Lock-up facility unless absolutely necessary especially as some PCFs are 
modelled upon design specifically intended for sentenced prisoners in long-term custody. It 
is imperative that cognoscence of each detainee’s individuality is sustained throughout the 
custodial term, and via this, structure a management strategy centred upon early, 
customised, thorough and competent screening program focusing upon establishing each 
individual detainee’s level of risk. In addition, risk reduction management requires 
consistent re-evaluation of individual detainee behaviour as well as their physical and 
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psychological condition. Constant surveillance during each period of detention is a 
fundamental requirement taking into account what police would colloquially refer to as 
‘time, place and circumstance’ evaluation.  
At a preliminary level, individual detainees’ infinite spectrum of plausible circumstances 
varies as significantly as the reason for being detained. In state Watch House facilities 
where greater volumes of detainees are held, these individuals are accommodated 
together. Moreover, this results in detainees who are ultimately determined to be guilty 
and those that are innocent (Klofas 1990, 69) being collectively detained. It would appear 
inappropriate, therefore, to support circumstances where the detention of innocent 
people, in residence with seasoned criminals knowingly occurs, albeit a placement strategy 
that is considered and calculated. Moreover, the initiative of professional individual 
assessment of prospective detainees before entering the Lock-up proper, ought to be of 
fundamental importance as a ‘civilian’, by W.A Police definition who has not yet been put 
before a court to have their guilt determined, should not be held within the confines of a 
PCF, unless in not doing so, causes a genuine risk to self, public, police or property. A 
further overall reduction in risk to both staff and detainees could be achieved before 
prospective detention within PCFs, and in turn mitigating many other associated 
consequential risks that emerge through the entire custodial process such as induction, 
overcrowding, potential violence, etc. 
The police custodial setting can be perceived as extremely traumatic and stressful which is 
experienced particularly at the time of admission and initial detention. Coincidently, this is 
also the time when detainees are most violent as a result of feeling threatened and anxious 
(Fairweather and McConville 2000, 38-45). Gibbs (1982, 99) defines this stage as “entry 
shock” with resultant symptoms of suicidal and self-injurious tendencies and “serious 
psychological disturbances” in some detainees as a result of an abrupt and un-controllable 
change in a person’s circumstances. To this end, Reser (1989, 167)88 defines two critically 
disparate control mechanisms found within custodial environments; “institutional control”, 
and “personal control.” Recognition of the existence of (the two) forms of control are 
required in order to appreciate how their potential application can be used to promote 
beneficial incidence within PCFs.  
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Personal control relates to the intentional provision of a semblance of one’s own perceived 
control over his or her own environment or actions, and to this end, Resser attests that 
even minimal (apparent) control over ones immediate environment is particularly critical in 
appeasing a sense of despair and stress in custodial facilities (Resser 1989, 168).  
Conversely, formal charges, a distortion in one’s perspective of time, orientation within the 
facility, temperature, lighting, placement (with others) are among countless examples of 
pernicious institutional controls which are subject to design, procedure and operation; with 
some examples considered beyond both institutional and personal control as neither has 
the ability to circumvent rigidity beyond control and form the basis upon which anxiety 
experienced within PCFs are articulated. Resser (1989, 168) suggests that “research into the 
importance of perceived control in custodial settings indicates that perceived control is 
significantly related to the level of stress and physical symptoms experienced and violence.” 
Further to this, Hayes (1989, 7) concluded that PCFs have higher mortality rates than other 
custodial settings, such as prisons due to the “unique characteristics of the Lock-up 
environment which enhances suicidal impulses.” 
Indeed for specific groups there is an increased risk of suicide or self harm, such as drug and 
or alcohol affected people and according to Giles & Sandrin (1992, 670-672), people who 
have previous suicidal tendencies and those with mental health issues. Ironically, people 
representative of these groups comprise the majority of all people held within PCFs. PCFs 
reflect a significantly more perilous and volatile environment than other custodial 
institutions. Subject to the findings of the RCIADIC indicating that the highest level of risk of 
self harm and death in custody Reser’s findings support the notion that it is within the first 
few hours of detention, that the loss of perceived personal control over self and 
environment, which directly contributes to feelings of despair and stress in PCFs, 
particularly when imminent charges, court appearances and uncertainty are considered 
(Reser 1989, 13). Additionally, custodial environments in which the custodians distance 
themselves from detainees contribute to a response aligned with that of alienation where 
one will be required to fend for themselves, therefore, detainees that feel relatively safe 
due to actual or perceived appropriate levels of staffing, interaction and inclusion will 
generally experience reduced anxieties and uncertainty at the time of admission and initial 
detention, the same period associated with increased aggression and violence (Fairweather 
and McConville 2000, 38-45).  
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In spite of this, larger PCFs have been determined to have the capacity to provide better 
quality of care albeit de-individualised, detached and dispassionate (Blaauw, Kerhof & 
Vermunt 1996, 66-68). The majority of WA Police district level PCFs predominantly 
comprise of only 2-3 compliant multiple occupancy cells, at most, and while preferred from 
an economic standpoint, are not always appropriate particularly in the larger Watch House 
PCFs where considerable admission related risks exist around insufficient knowledge of a 
detainee’s character, general demeanour, predisposition to violence, weapon and drug 
history, mental health, contagious diseases or special skills for example. Moreover these 
are risks particularly inherent to short-term custody as prison institutions are generally 
better equipped to have a more comprehensive knowledge and understanding of prisoner 
dispositions through long-term observation and prisoner-guard rapport. The gathering of 
intelligence relating to inmate attributes within prison facilities is partly facilitated by the 
observations, notes and oral recordings made by WA Police personnel during the induction 
process and detention period within the PCFs before prison transfer. 
Prison contexts have the added benefit of being in a position to make observation of a 
subject over an extended period of time, subsequent to initial incarcerative shock and the 
dissipation of the physiological and psychological effects caused by the substances the 
prisoner might have been under. Further to this, large prisons provide facilities and 
professional personnel for specifically for initial medical and psychological assessment in 
addition to prison-exclusive ongoing care, which, other than a duty nurse, PCFs do not 
currently provide such comprehensive services, without the need for transfer to external 
facilities.  
In order to manage critical personnel safety and that of other detainees both with or 
without a pre-Lock-up screening, the provision and use of single occupancy cells should be 
a consideration for short-term custody where significant operational and strategic funding 
attributable to a blend of more diverse cell types including single occupancy cells can 
compensate for higher initial costs. The existing Perth Watch House does not utilise the 
opportunity provided by the blend of cells contained within it due to operational and 
resource determined factors. Yet, their very existence suggests that the importance and the 
implication of a diversity of cell types was once appreciated. Unfortunately, the overall 
design layout as a system does not adequately address surveillance and other operational 
requirements associated with PCFs, nor function as intended without adequate human 
resources and appropriate policy and procedure in place. Single occupancy cells are not cell 
docks similar to the Perspex interventions located near the admissions and reception areas 
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of most PCFs visited. Rather, what is essential is an appropriately sized and provisioned cell 
for one which could offer an increased ability to prevent physical assaults and maintain 
acceptable contact ratios; allow for medical and psychological isolation; reduce risk of 
litigation due to inability to provide an environment safe from other detainees; and allow 
for protective custody for ‘at risk’ or ‘sensitive’ people.  
Having discussed the potential implications of considering or actually implementing single 
occupancy cells with all respondents, only one respondent indicated that the existing Perth 
Watch House did in fact already have provision for such facilities in existence on a disused 
upper floor (R.15 2011). A subsequent visit to the PWH confirmed this to be the case. It was 
also evident that this portion of the Watch House facility which in addition to single cells 
comprised of two-person cells and semi-self-contained cells. This was described by R. 15 
(2011) as a provision originally intended for holding detainees under a Warrant of 
Commitment or for sensitive people, but had been disused for many years. This perceptible 
arrangement suggests design intent based upon an operational and procedural 
requirement that detainees of dissimilar classification such as low risk, first offence, 
sensitive people or warrant of commitment detainees were to be detained separately to 
high risk, violent and recidivist offenders. Unfortunately, it appears that long-term 
abandonment of not only valuable real estate but an operational rationale which intended 
to afford a level of dignity and safety compatible with functional and ethical requirements 
among entire categories of detainees has been justified by infrastructure related fiscal 
considerations and insufficient human resources to safely and adequately operate the 
Watch House as intended.  
Interestingly, the majority of officers interviewed either alluded to or directly suggested 
that PCF staff made every effort to categorise, effectively separate and accordingly place 
detainees, though it would appear that the outcome of this situation culminates in an 
inability to use the facility as proposed. Instead custodial staff are required to manage the 
situation which is circumstantially and inherently disadvantaged through post-occupancy 
re-interpretation of space. It is suggested here, that in order to allow for improved 
operational management and to facilitate safety and psychological well being of both 
detainees and staff and reduce risk of violence toward staff and between detainees, more 
distinction and classification of dissimilar constituent detainees is required which must be 
supported by a spatial program and associated policies, operational procedure and training 
program. This spatial program has the capacity to better address safety for detainees from 
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other more violent detainees with greater certainty, minimise entry-shock for first-time 
detainees and equally for inexperienced police personnel. 
This chapter sought to address the notion of surveillance and its application in highly 
specialised environments such as PCFs. This chapter is significant in drawing attention to 
the fact that surveillance is not in itself malicious, and in certain contexts high levels of 
surveillance provides all occupants with a capacity for safety with acceptable loss of privacy 
for short periods of time. This chapter challenges the idea that panoptic spaces seek 
absolute control and behavioural self-modification to further highlight the significance of 
surveillance in such PCFs. This refers to the essential component of panoptic philosophy 
which is generally referenced in disdain – surveillance. 
This chapter considers higher levels of surveillance in short-term custody such as PCFs as a 
necessity, and with this, Bentham’s philosophies on the panopticon and surveillance are 
discussed as an important philosophy that could have benefited STCFs, rather than in 
prisons as Bentham intended.  
Significantly, this chapter suggests consideration of Pre-Lock-up screening areas that could 
provide a diversionary function that could assist in reducing custodial risk by detecting 
detainees that should not be held in PCFs and require further assessment and care by other 
linked services. In concluding this chapter, this pre-Lock-up component, it is suggested, 
would also perform a secondary function of providing additional passive surveillance and 
data gathering capabilities through a professional level examination of mannerisms, 
conduct, speech and so forth, and line of inquiry. 
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Conclusion  
The aim of this research was to develop a critical understanding and new knowledge 
relating to custodial spatial requirements and organisational relationships specific to 
existing operational WA PCFs that has the capacity to be interpreted and adapted to inform 
alternative future PCF architecture, design concepts, models and functional spatial 
components that are humane and provide safety for all occupants through adequate 
surveillance.  
A thorough contextual analysis of architecture cannot be undertaken without analysis of 
the spatial relationships and site to which it relates. Equally, so too are analyses of specific 
groups without seeking candid responses to questions that relate to real-life human 
interpersonal relationships within them. This research, therefore, sought to investigate 
fundamental aspects specific to PCFs such as WA Police custodial attitudes, morale, 
custodial training relevant to the requirements of operational PCF design, and operational 
preparedness to work in PCFs. These were considered as some of the key attributes that 
could be considered in conjunction with design to achieve a reduction in risk of assaults, 
self harm and violence by detainees and to facilitate a more cohesive and effective 
custodial training matrix that supported adherence to policy and procedures for the 
custodian from a tactical and operational perspective. 
A historical contextual analysis of the WA Police’s history was conducted to distinguish 
between significant chronological threads and the organisations historical and functional 
relationships compared with developments that have occurred within other carcerative 
typologies. In addition, to determine the contemporary functional, organisational and 
architectural context required an in-depth analysis of Perth Watch House the current WA 
state PCF. This was fundamental in highlighting the unique function the PWH plays as an 
integral interface between different components of the WA CJS and other existing WA 
metropolitan district PCFs. This led me to investigate the architectural design approach of a 
number of approved WA PCFs and offer a critical analysis of the spatial strategies to 
determine if current PCF design was compatible with critical operational procedure and 
policy requirements based upon PCFs within the CJS. 
Carcerative architecture shares a common historical thread to a point in history where 
imprisonment was not considered a punishment but for the purpose of holding for other 
more physical punishment, and thus there was no need for a specialised architectural 
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response until the concept of imprisonment was considered a form of punishment in its 
own right. With it came many theories of how best to use architecture applied to physical 
body as well as to facilitate specific forms of administration to achieve rehabilitation, such 
as panoptic design, Pennsylvania System, Prison Farms, Psychiatric Prisons, New Generation 
Design, to name a few. The significance of considering architectural and spatial rationale to 
support rehabilitation by modifying behaviour while imprisoned within early prisons 
brought with it a sense of excitement and a source of inspiration for a dedicated line of 
investigation among many early intellectuals and reformers. Though contemporary societal 
attitudes find offence toward some institutions and perceived over-surveillance in modern 
life, most modern societies already exists within built environments where such conditions 
already exist. Equally we as consumers are also surveilled in our every-day lives through 
other less obvious electronic means by corporations such as Google, Facebook, transport 
systems, mobile phones and other networks. Although the term ‘surveillance’ once 
suggested physical observation or cameras it now defines parameters that are more diverse 
in the digital age, the notion that surveillance means the use of cameras has become less 
relevant. The fictional and perverse aspect of Bentham’s panopticon made the concept 
repugnant, and since, has led to similar all-encompassing attitudes that the application of 
omnipotent surveillance is pernicious. This may well be the case if such an all-encompassing 
system were to be introduced. However, this research finds that in specialised 
circumstances surveillance as means of deterrence in various situations is neither intrusive 
nor damaging. Surveillance, for the purpose of facilitating observation in PCFs, is not only 
beneficial but necessary to provide safety and reduce risk to all occupants and is a worthy 
subject for future investigation.  
From an architectural perspective, PCFs have not been greatly researched. Historically, 
having evolved out of a once all-encompassing typology, police facilities have seen little 
significant advancement. Distinction in PCF architecture, as a typology, occurred more by 
default, a remnant among other institutions that have since specialised physically and 
philosophically in comparison to PCFs due to advancements in law, specialisation and 
societal attitudes. Due to insufficient government funding at certain points in history, WA 
Police have at time had to make to with adaptive reuse of facilities that did not always fit 
the purpose and was not desirable from a police perspective. Without significant 
modification to suit and with staff expressing a sense of futility in voicing concerns, relating 
to unsuitable and outdated building like the PWH, frustrations have recently culminated in 
the establishment of the new state-of-the-art facility in Northbridge. 
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PWH, designed as a state-of-the-art purpose built facility for its time, was found not to be 
used as originally intended due to changes in policy, procedure, and a lack of funding to 
meet compliance standards or adequate human resources. WA Police acknowledge that 
current Perth Watch House facilities are unacceptable and are in the process of being 
replaced with new facilities (Dean 2004, 5) elsewhere in Perth, however, what is of concern 
is the disproportionately prolonged period between acknowledgment, funding, and action. 
PWH does, however, have the capacity to be used in a way that more closely resembles 
intent while also, due to its spatial program, and in a non-operational and disuses (vacated) 
capacity it could still provide an ideal real-life training platform and a place in which new 
ideas and technologies could be safely tested before being considered for use in an 
operational location. A facility that has the capacity to provide such a setting is of significant 
benefit to the WA Police organisation if it could be retained for such purposes as in this 
capacity it has the capability to be used to provide a specialised training environment. This 
consideration could complement existing training where serious concerns existed among 
police personnel who felt inadequately prepared for custody-specific and operational 
duties. Even though it had been suggested that training had improved over time, training 
lacks specificity to realistic PCF environments. In particular, some of the areas that require 
further improvement relate to aspects considered critical to PCF settings. This includes the 
prevalence of mental illness among detainees held within PCFs, and a better police 
understanding of the significance of preserving detainee dignity in PCF settings. 
Superseded design and incompatible spatial relationships do not assist officers with 
carrying out their duties efficiently and provide custodial care. The greater proportion of 
existing metropolitan PCF cells and exercise yards being non-compliant further exacerbates 
this concern. Moreover, all existing WA Police facilities visited had varying issues of concern 
and suffered from an inability to sufficiently observe detainees without electronic 
surveillance due to linear layout and inappropriate spatial relationships. Observation is 
paramount for the safety of all people in PCFs due to inherent risk of self harm violence 
towards police. However, even PCFs that had the potential for improved observation were 
circumvented by unrealistic administrative pressures and other tasks that are required of 
insufficient staff. At times, these expectations require un-related administrative tasks to be 
undertaken concurrent with custodial duties such as observation of detainees being held. 
On the other hand, what does appear to have improved as a result of RCIADIC and due to 
change of PCF administration from sworn police to custody and auxiliary officers, are 
attitudes and professionalization towards custodial care.  
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Irrespective of PCF administrations, however, a shift’s morale which is entirely connected to 
job satisfaction and a significant factor that can influence the way in which detainees are 
treated, was, and continues to be largely left to the supervisor and the level of support they 
provide their staff. This suggests that there are many HR issues and interpersonal 
relationship layers that must be considered in appraising staff satisfaction, morale, and 
potential for resignation. A superior’s indifference to individual officer’s abilities, 
requirements, training, validation of ideas as well as self-confidence in the capacity to 
perform in an already hostile environment are all additional, and moreover, pertinent to a 
more holistic analysis and understanding of the somewhat undocumented intricacies that 
are embodied within the organisational relationships of the ‘custodian’ element within PCF 
environments.  
This tells us that PCF architecture and spatial requirements for this specific typology are 
informed by a multitude of complex behavioural and organisational relationships, and 
operational and procedural considerations that are unique to police contexts. Accordingly, 
this custodial typology cannot be designed in isolation of the needs of all human occupants 
and functional aspects which is integral to the strategic planning processes and 
implementation of PCF architecture and specialised spatial program. With this, a singular 
all-encompassing design solution for ideal components within PCFs are not feasible, rather, 
existing standard PCF components that are required (as well as new components suggested 
in this research) require individual consideration. 
Rather than an architecture that is restrictive by way of indiscriminate forms of control over 
its occupants and the manner in which space is ultimately used, it is the flesh and blood 
constituents within these unique institutional mechanisms that must have their 
requirements fulfilled, and with this, inform the design rationale of PCF architecture.  
Although research-based representations make significant contributions to the field of 
architecture, and strategic planning, these disciplines cannot be understood in abstract 
terms alone. To suitably understand the implications of architecture, design and spatial 
relationships require critical analyses of Post Occupancy Evaluations. Post Occupancy 
Evaluation research is required to understand the practical application and consequence of 
PCF architecture and spatial strategies within operational contexts.  
The means by which this data could be collected and implemented to further develop 
spatial-behavioural considerations and PCF specific expertise in architecture and diversify 
the specialised knowledge base of a strategic category of architecture and planning could 
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be the basis for future research. This knowledge has the potential to be of real value to the 
decision making processes of various stakeholders, organisations, the professions of 
architecture and planning, and vicariously, the WA Police by means of increasingly more 
progressive, refined and specialised facilities. 
A number of additional matters worthy of future research also arise from a state-level 
Watch House facility that has the capacity to accommodate for detainees of varying risk 
and pre and post-graduation staff of varying skill levels, and subject to optimal operational 
requirements being met, is able to be used as intended. Controlled, real-life training 
environments that promote a measured release into custodial policing could reduce the 
sense of having a lack of proficiency by minimising unexpected disparity between simulated 
training and reality. This could offer an alternative training context that could translate into 
strategies for WA Police to assist with staff retention by allowing for the ‘easing in’ of police 
into challenging environments such as PCFs rather than graduate from the Academy on 
Friday and commence duty in such environments on Monday where the full extent of the 
realities within PCFs will be captured in a single first real-life experience which may be 
overwhelming. Knowing the full extents of what the job entails delivered in a measured 
approach, in a more realistic once-operational facility could potentially be more beneficial 
than the graduation approach where significant funding is committed to prospective 
employees that might quickly decide that working in PCFs was not what they had 
envisioned.  
The future Watch House currently under construction has potential to contribute to 
significant change in PCF attitudes that influence organisational relationships and also assist 
with staff retention. Upon completion, Auxiliary personnel will be the primary occupiers 
and administrators of the new state-level PCF. This removes the latent historical legacies 
that exists at PWH which associates the facility as being a police building in which Auxiliary 
staff work for and are subservient to sworn police who originally occupied and 
administered it. As the primary occupiers of a new facility, future research that explores the 
performance outcomes, attitudes towards custodial duties, specialisation, and morale of 
personnel within the facility is imperative to form a comparative context. It is anticipated 
that much of the existing sentiment will be neutralised due to this new direction in PCF 
administration, however, from this study, one is better positioned to determine whether 
the position description of ‘Auxiliary’ or ‘Custody’ officer continues to be considered as 
subservient as implied by the demeanour and conduct of sworn officers that exudes a sense 
of entitlement over auxiliary officers in PCF environments (particularly PWH). 
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Understanding the changes may provide additional layers of background knowledge that 
could inform more appropriate group-specific strategies in architecture. 
Consideration of design longevity not only in terms of individual building performance but 
also its operational capacity and relevance within the WA Police organisation also requires 
further analytical studies. This would be worthy of future research by means of quantitative 
and qualitative post occupational analysis. This could be approached from an observational 
perspective observing staff using the space, forming a ‘snag list’ of critical obvious issues 
such as looking at areas where the building deteriorates more than others as a marker of 
performance or future design consideration or to develop a maintenance plan. As with this 
research, staff could be also be interviewed to obtain a variety of qualitative perspectives 
and other more statistical research could also be considered. These are but a few 
suggestions that are aimed at developing a whole-of-life analysis of PCF spaces that could 
assist make better design decisions and predict future changes in operational requirements, 
developments and demographics. A study that investigates the feasibility of multiple, 
perhaps north, south and central state-level Watch Houses instead of small PCFs attached 
to many individual police stations that for the majority of the time remain vacant ought to 
be considered. This could assist in considerations of planning and architecture that extend 
the operational life and functional performance of PCFs, and make more efficient use of 
custody related funding. 
Additionally, further research that examines the implications a new spatial intervention and 
potential for pre-admission screening conducted within a new sub-component 
incorporated within PCFs could be considered. This could have far-reaching implications in 
significantly reducing custodial risk to WA Police by considering in-house specialist’s 
recommendations for the most appropriate course of action for each individual detainee 
case. This study could be undertaken in conjunction with the concept of forming multiple 
intake areas that requires a sequential administrative process of each detainee. This has the 
potential to reduce the concentration of detainees that are at times found within the 
existing PWH reception area in which a multitude of processes are undertaken and further 
minimise operational risk. 
It has been established that to ensure the safety of all occupants in PCFs, and in particular, 
Watch House environments, the significance of surveillance cannot be overstated as 
observation within such facilities is essential. Spatial strategies that enable direct lines of 
human-level observation that are less reliant on electronic mechanisms between the 
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custodian and detainees require further consideration for research. The observer’s role 
should not be undermined by excessive additional tasks that are required to be performed 
concurrently and it should be noted that within this context the observer should be 
situated such that the position becomes function-specific and the role itself be considered 
as the primary purpose. 
Finally more work that relates to the distinct nature of PCFs as a design typology among 
other institutional settings would advance further our understanding of this type of 
architecture and formulate a nexus between human behaviour and built space that will 
achieve a more rigorous knowledge of architecture and how it performs and impacts on 
individuals. Further interviews with WA Police will be required to develop a substantial 
body of knowledge of attitudes, organizational and spatial relationships and data that will 
assist in developing our understanding for design of PCFs. The abovementioned further 
future research seeks to develop a specialised form of strategic planning and a tactical 
category of architecture specific to PCFs and in so doing, improve our understanding of 
architecture in particular and in general.  
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Interviews 
 
Interview 1 (11.01.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 14 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 2.5 years while at central and 2.5 
years full time lockup tenure. 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? You can get stressed 
without even knowing it, it’s good to get out of the building and go for walks near work 
(Queens Gdns) or talk to others. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? It depends a lot on the supervisor, some do nothing and are very 
dismissive and disinterested towards probationers but others may be keen to help. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? I think the relationships are the same in that 
everyone gives everyone shit just like out on the road; it’s just the atmosphere and 
environment which makes is different in the lockup 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again it depends a lot on 
the supervisor, my team were very good, no slackers or soft cocks or chucking sickies all the 
time, the supervisor and level of staffing can make or break the whole experience is what I 
have come to learn. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? DEAT officers can be slack and always have to 
make comparisons to home, there is some resentment towards them due to plum spots 
they are given and then they disappear. It appears that they get preferential treatment 
which can be seen by the postings they get. 
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? Nil 
Received. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. ½ hour fingerprint machine course at academy and cell extraction course after 
1 year at the lockup. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes definitely 
due to the unique environment and function. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? No it’s a shocking building – corridors are too 
narrow, doors don’t allow passage, too many sharp angles, bars on doors and glass can be 
reached through bars, slippery floor when urinated on and too sticky if skin is dragged upon. 
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12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes I mentioned glass windows on WACA side can be smashed or seen through as 
it is unprotected. 2 years later they put a roller blind on the inside which still doesn’t fix the 
problem, I don’t bother anymore. 
 
13. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently? 
Explain your answer. You would need to start over.  
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design? Explain 
your answer. Lack of observation cell space, sometimes up to 10 detainees in obs cell at a 
time then overflow to cell H1 which is then used for same purpose but has bars and no 
acoustic separation. 
 
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? No cell checks are done every 20 minutes; they are used to supplement physical 
checks. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I don’t think they know any better. 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? The 
PWH one is terrible; entry should be taller and wider as trucks don’t fit. Need more room on 
sides of vehicles. Tactile or painted markers on walls or ground as police vehicles have 
restricted vision. Separate areas for multiple arrests especially while unloading firearms etc. 
It happens that sometimes other arrestees are brought through while officers are unloading 
weapons.  
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? Too small, bad location, 
window too small detainees disruptive to staff doing paperwork or similar, needs full length 
glass at some point. Females do not have an obs cell 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s effective, how could they be improved? Either the cell itself or their 
location. Should be able to be accessed from strip search room and cells area possibly 2 
doors and the doors should be wider as pack of officers carrying or dragging detainee can’t 
fit through door way. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Terrible acoustics. Nil 
between male /female and sensitive people must be walked past everyone to get to cell SC5 
(which also has no acoustic separation). Private details in mixing areas (bail and reception 
area) 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Unavoidable and just a part of the job 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how? Detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? detainee v police at reception and when removed from van and strip search 
room. detainee v detainee in cells but staff have problems in exercise yard due to large 
number of detainees to staff ratio. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of 
the above. 
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24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, especially as some young staff can incite ‘egg on’ 
violent behaviour, but experienced officers have a different way of speaking with detainees 
and ‘clients’ in general and are able to build a rapport with those who come into contact 
with police. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed 
differently, and if so how? Maybe not avoided but minimise the risk of injury. 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Not all of them should be but 
there definitely should be some. Some (a large portion) of detainees say please don’t put 
me by myself and prefer to be co-habitate. 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden, if so where it is usually found? It can be hidden but usually 
found during strip search, sometimes left (rarer now due to van design) in the rear of the 
van, but it’s almost impossible to stop all contraband without biometric scanning. 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Bail Co-
ordinator, Nurses, Mental Health Nurse, J.P, G4S (security), PETS, SJA, SOGS, Sanitary 
contractors. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Thurs/Fri/Sat – 20:00 onwards 
nurse on site makes assessment, at any other time supervisor can make assessment wether 
to take to RPH for clearance for ‘fit to stay in custody’. This is a problem in itself as these are 
the busiest for emergency staff at RPH also. 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Detainees 
are supplied with clothing if come in part or unclothed, females are given sanitary 
provisions, and strip searches are a no ‘stare’ affair. 
  
31. Are drug and alcohol affected detainees treated any differently? Explain your answer. I’d 
say 50-60% of all detainees come in either alcohol or drug affected – especially late at night 
or early hours, we try to separate them as much as possible from other detainees as they 
are usually much louder and sometimes screaming, swearing and carrying on at the top of 
their voice. This can wake up sleeping detainees and start fights with otherwise quiet 
detainees. 
 
32. In your opinion, how much does drugs and alcohol affect the way the lockup either works or 
does not work compared to a sober detainee? Completely affects it because in PWH you 
can’t block out noise from different areas and all other issues already mentioned in Q.15 & 
21. 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Yes, Muslims want to know which way Mecca is, they 
want single cells and won’t eat any of the food prepared for them. 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender 
people? Explain your answer. No, as searching can be an issue and sensitive people must be 
either walked past general detainees and can’t separate acoustically male to female areas. 
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Male search male part female search female part – male must step out of room leaving 
female officer vulnerable. 
 
35. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? They 
are beneficial to detainees as it allows them fresh air and a release, but can be dangerous 
for staff when numbers of detainees are high to low ratio of officers. All in fights have 
occurred and can become dangerous for officers to become involved. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Managed by staff usually 3-4 
in a cell overflow into H1 or exercise yard (where blankets and mattresses aren’t usually 
allowed (but is in this circumstance) sometimes up to 10 in obs cell, so yeah there can be 
problems with overcrowding especially NYE, Australia Day and long weekends. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Staffing levels are generally adequate, but can get caught out sometimes. Can 
be team dependant, some take sickies due to moral and supervisor on their individual 
teams. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. I 
think they are only made aware of their rights and that’s about it, sometimes it’s like a free 
for all like a zoo. I don’t think there is anything written anywhere outlining how they should 
conduct themselves. 
 
 
Interview 2 (14.01.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 30 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 15 years full time  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Never really with 
detainees or trustees, actually its mainly internal pressure its only stressful if you have to 
keep work related secrets from peers such as if there are UCO’s in or high profile detainees. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? Never saw or heard of grievances – probably due to the way the culture 
is and some supervisors are ex-army and run the lockup in the same way. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? It is different probably due to the type of work and 
the type of people who works in there. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again it depends a lot on 
the OIC it come in phases where it can be great or terrible depending if they try to operate 
it like an army barracks. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes – too many watch dogs and rules and 
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regulations, it honestly makes young guys not know what the hell to get involved in or not 
in case it turns to shit and they are implicated. 
 
8. What is your opinion about DEAT (Direct Entry Accelerated Training) and overseas officers - 
has this changed W.A Police culture and how? Yes DEAT has changed culture, due to their 
preferential treatment but some do have good work experience. Within the lockup they 
have generally been o.k. 
 
9. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? We 
never had any, you just learnt on the job. Sometimes there may be inappropriate use of 
force due to lack of training and sometimes officers are scared to do anything due to the 
watch dogs. 
 
10. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. Cell extraction, lifesaving refresher and fire emergency. 
 
11. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes probably 
should be. Detainees in lockup can be completely different to what they were like as 
offenders out on the street. Assessments need to be made and there is a different 
psychology in a state lockup over suburban station lockups due to the unique environment 
and function. 
 
12. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? No the current lockup looks like its designed to 
be a prison, lockup should be maximum 3 night (currently there is no set length of time 
depends on discretion of supervisors). 
 
13. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? No – nothing would change anyway  
 
14. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently? 
Explain your answer. Yes it could work better and a step in the right direction would be to 
speak with people who have worked there for many years.  
 
15. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design? Explain 
your answer. Reception area and bail area allows mixing of male/female and incompatible 
groups which causes problems which is not right. Also not being able to control noise and 
due to this, segregating of sensitive people can is virtually impossible.  
 
16. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? They probably do these days; it needs to be more hands on. 
 
17. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. Some do not because of the environment but the ‘sweeteners’ used to entice (not 
always the right types of) officers such as country service at lockup. 
 
18. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? 
Weapons area should be separate from car area.  
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19. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? It should be a little more 
restrictive so that there is less room to lash out and swing. The bigger they make it the more 
people they will put in there. 
 
20. Is the padded cell/s effective, how could they be improved? Either the cell itself or their 
location. I think officers tend to strip search too much. Camera, mirror and ledge can be 
reached (in the past) even though situated very high. 
 
21. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Terrible acoustics. 
Lighting is not too bad, but detainees can get to them as they are surface mounted. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Detainee V Detainee mainly in exercise. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of 
the above. 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, some officers ‘arc them up’ while experienced 
officer generally build a rapport with detainees and get them to comply that way, much less 
stressful method. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed 
differently, and if so how? Only if there was no contact. 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? They may be good but costly. 
No single officer should have keys so ambush for keys is not an option. 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden, if so where it is usually found? Generally on the person or 
exercise yard. Safe cells are best as there are no mattresses – mattresses can be used to 
hide contraband.  
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Salvo’s, FESA, 
AV Scheme, DUMAR, Prisons Dept., Court Staff, J.P’s and medical staff. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Weekend nurses and PETS for 
psych assessments. Minor issues at any other times are at police discretion.  
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? 
Assessments should be made on individual basis for strip search, should not be mandatory 
especially for minor offences where they do not pose a risk to anyone. 
  
31. Are drug and alcohol affected detainees treated any differently? Explain your answer. Need 
to be watched more intently. Manual states they should be assessed for fitness to stay in 
police custody 
 
32. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Yes, Muslims with headwear and meals and do-
gooders are right outside the door waiting to criticise if everyone is treated the same and 
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equally on one hand they should and on the other they shouldn’t you can never please 
everyone. 
 
33. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender 
people? Explain your answer. No acoustic separation, cameras in the showers creates issues 
of dignity with male and female staff able and expected to view. 
 
34. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? They 
are beneficial but could be better designed. Generally it’s good that it is long as detainees 
can move around and have own space unless overcrowded. 
 
35. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Overcrowding is difficult and 
risky – mainly placed in exercise yards NYE, Aust Day and long weekends can be a real 
problem. 
 
36. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Staffing used to be o.k with WAPS, now with ‘special constables’ we will see, 
as senior is still a police supervisor. 
 
37. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
There may be something on the wall, I am not sure, but if there isn’t there should be. 
 
 
Interview 3 (15.01.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 25 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 6 months full time and several 
years as a supervisor in a suburban police station containing a small lockup.  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? May not notice stress 
at work but may notice it at leave time and when they return to work. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? There is but it’s not used well as it could and there is a reluctance and 
unwillingness to speak out due to a lack of confidence in managers to treat confidentially or 
fairly. They tend to bottle it up. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? A culture in police is interesting, eg. Detectives have 
a broken-down hierarchy so everyone is more on the same level, more relaxed and staff are 
more valued, their opinions are listened to and debated (at least have a say). I could only 
assume that the lockup would be the total opposite as it is at a lot of suburban stations or 
locations where there is a lot of junior staff where they are treated like children. Uniformed 
areas tend to be hierarchical.  
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again moral can be 
influenced by the type of work, amount of ownership/autonomy in investigations, the 
workload for detectives for e.g. and other areas can be high but receive little recognition. 
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Also the amenity is always compromised by funding say office space for e.g. the space 
would be at the minimum requirement for let’s say 4 officers, and once occupied there may 
need to fit another 3 officers in so they squeeze them in, just a small way of devaluing the 
working environment and translates to value of officers comfort. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes, DEAT has changed culture, but there still is a 
paramilitary attitude in the police dept. You can see the change even in the new 
commissioner who is against standing fast . . . but individual sections might still enforce it. 
Technology is also changing culture. It seems to have gone through a cycle where there was 
a lot of control and tight reigns then there was a more businesslike teamwork approach and 
now due to rapid increase and change in technology creating a fear so it’s sort of going back 
to a more closed mentality. Any officer with the skill doesn’t matter where in the world it is 
gained, could and should do the job. The problem is the culture was always so insular where 
if you did your time you would get made up and get good postings, where DEAT are coming 
in and being made up rapidly and getting the good spots putting local police off side as feel 
as the dept. is not showing loyalty to them (but it is skills based and police may not be 
comparing apples with apples) 
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? 
Definitely not, even as an OIC I still didn’t know all the rules and procedures were and you 
could really get caught out. Liberty is a very precarious thing and young officers/people may 
not really appreciate fully the terms of bail etc. (esp. at suburban lockups) when they may 
be sending to or refusing bail. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. Generally we do the essentials and that’s it, you are new and you are expected 
to know everything. Example: brand new – just graduated police placed on night shift 
security at Head Quarters, with no training on what to look out for how to carry out security 
checks, who to check (do we check even detectives in plain clothes?) you used to get your 
months of training then your uniform and then expected to get out there and work.  
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes I definitely 
think it should be. I think that having ‘special constables’ is a move in the right direction. I 
think it’s important that they get the ‘levels’ v rank right depending on their experience. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? If someone wanted to hang themselves in any 
cell where they are able to (even with 20 minute checks) it would be all over. Makes 
mention of hospital ER where central point for staff and obs cubicles around this core. One 
thing that I find annoying is as a culture police take great pride in being able to tarnish/not 
look after the property without real repercussions . . . e.g. sloshing coffee into carpet when 
walking, or black marks on wall from boots, or sticky-taping to walls removing paint. But it’s 
like graffiti it needs to be removed or cleaned otherwise it breeds a similar attitude to the 
property. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? - 
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13. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently and 
do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I remember many instances where an old house was converted into a station and 
one of the bedrooms was converted into a cell (old Lockridge, North Perth & Bayswater). So 
it seems new stations are becoming more purposeful but we need to do more studies and 
write down the evaluation post occupancy, we always get a new architect in who wasn’t on 
the original design so are not privy to the information; bits are missed out as no one writes 
it down (it was designed this way because . . . ). Info should be owned by or held by police 
as it can be provided to subsequent architects as a brief. 
Lockups could be improved if there wasn’t just one lockup maybe there was a north south 
and central lockup. It could ease congestion (satellite lockups). Would reduce travelling 
time, costs involved, officer off road times. Should do away with suburban lockups like 
Clarkson, Midland etc. and have a hub (North South etc.). 
There could be directions to get out of van move here or there – do this do that rather than 
the officer needing to physically remove them from the van which can be a problem. There 
should be a vestibule system where they are directed all the way to vestibule door system 
from the van. 
 
14. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, experienced officer generally build a rapport with 
people. 
 
15. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Sometimes there are problems with an officer who has been to a station for 
one year being the most experience officer on the shift due to how much movement there 
is due to tenure. 
 
16. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
There should definitely be a list of rules to know that there may be consequences for my 
actions. I think this is really good a good idea especially if there are things in place which can 
be used as leverage i.e. TV, radio etc. 
 
 
Interview 4 (26.01.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 9 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? Only in a suburban police station 
containing a lockup – involved in officer physical training  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes definitely – I 
usually speak with colleagues and do a lot of exercise which is a personal decision but also 
helps cope with stress 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? Yes there is but no one or very few make a proactive effort to make a 
complaint. 
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5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Yes there are definite differences in police cultures – 
detectives are more career-focused and may feel like they come under more scrutiny and 
do more to protect themselves and colleagues from investigative bodies. Seems areas 
which invest more time and money and equipment in staff generally feel more appreciated 
and culture is better. Training now is more like university culture than military culture 
therefore divisions of rank are dissolved and orders are now questioned. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again. This is position 
specific and very much OIC related or whether you fit into the team. Pressures and 
workloads and nature of work at location all make a difference. The time of the year e.g. 
near Christmas time and NYE you are reminded of just how much you miss out on. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes the organisation has changed, and it has 
caused some problems, for example with overseas police, you can’t take one police culture 
and drop it in another culture/country and expect it to be cohesive. DE officers continue to 
compare everything to home and seem resistant to change from their country’s way of 
doing things (MO) or outlook on issues (their mentality, skill set and training is totally 
different and not necessarily appropriate). It is true that they receive preferential treatment 
and that would be that during the recruitment drive carried out in their country by WAP 
they were promised the world and told how easy training is and that it would be easy to be 
accelerated in rank – so when some require extra training to bring up to local speed they 
are resistant and protestant. They also seem to get on all of the ‘plum’ courses which locals 
find very difficult to get onto like TRG, Water, Police, K-9, etc.  
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? 
Absolutely not: but custody officers have their own trainer - they do cell extraction and 
empty hand but the bigger problem is that the people in this position (level 2) are not 
necessarily suitable – mums who have returned to workforce etc. may not have the right 
mindset for this (lockup) environment – they don’t have a police mindset which is 
understanding and accepting of some of the behaviours of offenders and detainees who are 
non-compliant or drug and alcohol affected. Some that have come through have been 
grossly obese and unable to even complete the first 5 mins of training required. In certain 
groups that went through the physical requirements were not met by a lot of the recruits, 
however, the Police Department’s demand for staff numbers were such that the physical 
requirements were removed to allow the group to pass rather than fail the group or prolong 
their training till they could meet the standard. This is similar to what happened with the 
500 plan where the process was eased up to let more recruits through. Integrity and psych 
tests may also be an issue but the main issue is at recruiting they are being told they are 
suitable but then cannot even pass the physical requirement. The recruits then complain as 
‘we were told we were suitable . . . and the training you make us do is beyond what we are 
capable of’. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. Email respondent re this question for further information. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes it should 
be – it could be run by the prisons service or similar but it comes down to money and this 
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reflects on the applicants (it is a level 2 so an ‘unskilled’ people without tertiary 
qualifications). 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? I actually think the introduction of CCTV is a good 
thing as it makes officers more accountable – now actually do their 20 min checks as it is 
filmed . . . not just write it down as done on running sheet. Poor design can be that you 
can’t see in if they are asleep or hiding – need to open door and go in so it’s a bit risky. 
 
12. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently and 
do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I have made comments but nothing ever gets done. Police mentality is its govt 
property and there is little personalisation so not respected. Bravado causes issues with 
being destructive of property – I have observed a game of who could shred the biggest 
thing, and if it isn’t bolted down or new and shiny its fair game. Cars can be thrashed quite a 
bit as well and as long as damage isn’t visible it just goes unnoticed but dangerous for 
subsequent used of vehicle. 
 
13. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? At the 
moment its only 1 car at a time with cars waiting outside possibly non secure detective 
vehicle and weapons removal should be in a lockable area out of view. 
 
14. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? When removing offenders from the back of the van but I always thought the 
worst place of all was the tunnel leading to court from lockup its long narrow and as soon as 
around corner no one can see you it’s like running the gauntlet. People have been called off 
patrol to escort in this tunnel and the ratio is not necessarily correct. 
 
15. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, but depending on individual as some can be 
antagonistic. 
 
16. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees. Might be good for prisoner 
safety but if lockups were used as just for holding then they shouldn’t need too many of 
them. 
 
17. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Same sex 
searches. 
 
18. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? No, but police can become very dismissive for requests 
that are out of the ordinary even if the request could easily be met. It is easier for a person 
in a position of authority to always say no. But in certain circumstances e.g. if you are trying 
to get information out of people, if you help of get chatting you can get so much more than 
if you always play the ‘no..no’ game. Just going into the exercise yard and having a smoke 
with an offender can build a very strong rapport very quickly.  
 
19. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Sometimes there is enough, but I can remember when I first came out there 
was a direction that no ‘probie’ was to work with another ‘probie’ but on my first day out 
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that is exactly what happened and it still happens. Sometimes skills are not evenly dispersed 
for example GD’s is usually a pool of very new officers and some more senior officers who 
are disgruntled or haven’t put in any effort to progress into a more specialised area, but 
these and traffic police are the police most people will ever see . . . and they speak and deal 
with people quite differently than detectives. Some of the teachers are not qualified enough 
to teach what they are teaching, they are just officer who want the 8-4 lifestyle and not to 
be operational. 
 
20. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
It’s a good idea; it’s just part of the education process which puts the detainee into the 
process not just a part of a process conducted on them. It’s like the breath test instruction 
you tell them what the process is and what the consequence is for failure to comply. It gives 
police more options for non-compliance and offenders will know where they stand. 
 
 
Interview 5 (02.03.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 36 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 2 years  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Unwind with family. 
Look forward to coming home. Used to have a beer at the police canteen. Medication. 
Political reasons do not allow for police canteen. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? Never made a grievance doesn’t really have an issue. Gets dealt with 
confrontationally. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? No not the culture but the work is different.  
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again. Gets down to the 
team and the individuals. Describes his team as high but some have very low. Happy to 
work there because of the moral. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes, it is to do with political correctness. Some 
say its due to DE officers but there’s nothing new about DEAT’s, my grandfather was Irish 
cop and came here. Lockup has hopeless DEATS and hopeless locals. Some of them are 
given too much rank without having local knowledge. Local knowledge is underrated. 
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? No, but it 
not rocket science but he is unsure if it is necessary. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. Some - Cell extraction training which is routine. Respondent states he has not 
done it though.  
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10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Some do not 
join the police force to be in this area but there is no harm in making it a specialised area. Is 
it a fair pay compared to other officers?? 
  
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? It’s an out of date design that is very basic. Been 
in the lockup at Detroit – good setup. EPLU is wrong no single cells, multistorey. Take them 
up to feed them, should be single story. Not safe cells upstairs and it gets used for overflow. 
Expressed concerns to DO but was advised to continue.  
 
12. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? No they don’t rely too much they are a useful tool, you can see more though 
them then in direct observation. 
 
13. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? Works reasonably well. 
Entry to it was no good because it was directly opposite the holding cell. Could sort of see it 
from the reception. Had wooden benches. 
 
14. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? No good in terms of 
recordings. Need egg carton stuff. Cleaning would be an issue though. Good recording is 
important for our own protection. Ideally when you shut a cell door it should be sound 
proof. It’s like a mad house. 
 
15. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Wrestle in a skinny corridor. Reception bench not adequate, crims sitting next to 
each other. Pluck one at a time from outside and process individually. No privacy for 
personal questions like psych issues and others listening. Hard to get a perfect design 
wrestle in and out of a cell. 
 
16. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. No doubt at all, some juniors are surprisingly good. 
More mature generally better. Able to talk people into what they want as he has been 
around “the old bloke”. 
 
17. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse Thurs, Fri, Sat from 1900-
0400. At any other time it is the discretion of the OIC of who we take and don’t take. 
Arresting officer to sort it out. Obvious benefit for a nurse to be there24hrs/7days. Sun is a 
definite day; some prisoners have been there since Fri. Maybe even every night Mon to 
Wed. 
 
18. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Nothing 
that he is aware of and can imagine anything feasible. Dangerous things can be hidden on 
the body. Strip searching sometimes has to be done and done properly. No cameras in the 
strip search room. 
 
19. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees. Might be good for prisoner 
safety but if lockups were used as just for holding then they shouldn’t need too many of 
them. 
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20. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Nothing comes to mind and no facilities are provided. 
Aware of stories from England. We get by, don’t keep the detainees that long.  
 
21. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? Does 
not work for smoko, there is no smoking. They work, they keep them happy as there is more 
room. The cells are small. Problem is you don’t want too many in the yard at one time 
(However sometimes used as overflow). 
 
22. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender 
people? Explain your answer. No provisions for single cells officers have to make a call where 
is most appropriate. On occasions have given them a cell to themselves. 
 
23. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Extra mattresses on the 
floor, used upstairs to overflow. Depending on the prisoner and the weather we use the 
exercise yard. 
 
24. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. We never had too many issues. Main issue of our leadership people. Should 
have had minimum numbers but requests went unheard. While we were there we down to 
9 minimum and do at least one escort. Not good enough for busy times. 2 or 3 ‘probies’, 
once I was there by myself! Experience is helpful but numbers are still numbers as long as 
you stuck to the 9 minimum. Admin had to recall. 3 out of 9 is only 33%. 
 
25. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? A locking 
arrangement should be in the car, you shouldn’t have to get out of the car with it. The Sally 
port works. Everything in EPLU is an afterthought. The glass holding box is tacked on. The 
glass box is more useful as an overflow if it is busy inside they leave them longer in the glass 
box. 
 
26. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? They might work but there are other factors. It depends how 
they manage the numbers. Depends how long you keep them for. Return to prison warrant 
if after hours prisons won’t take them (nurse isn’t there) no nurse in lockup either. We are a 
lockup not a prison. Would apply more to the long-term people. But why are we keeping 
them so long, there is a Sat court so why isn’t there a Sun court. EPLU isn’t accredited to 
hold overflow from prison. 
 
27. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
It’s a good idea; it’s just part of the education process which puts the detainee into the 
process not just a part of a process conducted on them. It’s like the breath test instruction 
you tell them what the process is and what the consequence is for failure to comply. It gives 
police more options for non-compliance and offenders will know where they stand. 
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Interview 6 (05.11.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 30 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? Never attached to permanent 
lockup  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes, you just adjust 
and cope with it as it becomes the assumed norm. It’s the administrative and accountability 
pressures that cause stress I find not the job itself. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? Yes but not many have been made in the last few years. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? -  
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? I think its ok here; less 
people seem to come through the lockup these days due to the summons in first instance 
stance.  
 
7. Do you think organisational attitudes towards lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time and how? No one really likes to do lockup duties, but they 
still do a good job of it, they like it for other reasons though, in that they can catch up on 
their outstanding admin duties.  
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? 
 They seem to be trained to a degree, but most of the knowledge required to perform well in 
a lockup it is on- the- job training and a lot is common sense 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. It is pretty rare, it might be offered once a year but with limited numbers in 
the end you just have to make do with what you have at your disposal with the minimal risk 
possible  
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes definitely, 
the function should specialise more towards mental health assessments experience in 
assessing demeanour. 
  
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? We make do with what we have, I think it’s  ok, 
maybe that they are taking away the showers in the lockups we need showers esp. if 
pepper spray is involved or they have shat themselves etc. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed concerns regarding this, if yes what was the outcome, if no why 
not? Not as such, but it seems when they design things or refurbish things they never get it 
right it ends up being a rabbit warren and they don’t end the design such that it can easily 
be extended or added to in the future. 
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13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way? Not sure for existing but design such 
that it can easily be extended or added to in the future. 
 
14. Can you think of any aspect of the lockup which hinders your duties? No they are pretty 
good here I think, just the air con makes doors slam shut on their own. 
 
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? – needed more so for evidence and to keep an eye on all cells at the same time 
and everyone’s safety  
 
16. Do you think that staff enjoy their work environment? So so, we had recent refurbishments 
but space is always an issue especially if we had to change the roster system at the moment 
with a 5 panel roster we are just o.k. 
 
17.  Do Sally port entries work well in Police Lockups, could they be improved and how? 
 
18. Are Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? We don’t have an 
observation cell as such we have a dock cell that’s quite good its small and easy to get 
people out of it, it’s good for controlling or separating until you are ready for them 
 
19. Is the lockup padded cell and its location effective, how could they be improved? This one 
here the door slams shut when you don’t want it to because of the air pressure from the air 
conditioning  
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Lighting is o.k but the 
sound travels out into the office. 
 
21. What do you think about violence in lockups? 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Receival area always we try to make use of the dock and not have more than 2 
detainees out in the area at a time  
 
23. - 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes definitely we do a lot of pacifying before even 
arriving to the lockup these days and also received fewer complaints. One problem is that 
some of the experience squads like DIV 79 and MIG no longer exist and day to day it’s a 
really young force. 
 
25. – 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Could be a good option. 
 
27.  – 
 
28. – 
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29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? If they sneeze they get taken to 
hospital. If they complain of injury, if we suspect injury straight to hospital. 
 
30. – 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees determine the way in which the lockup works? No 
they are treated in the same way  
 
32. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Generally not as it is short-term you might get the odd 
one that won’t eat something but if we can offer anything other, usually they are happy to 
go without 
 
33. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender 
people? Explain your answer. No there isn’t a separate section of cells for different sexes any 
and one or either have to pass cells of either or.  
 
34. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? - 
 
35. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Yes just enough at the moment with this unforgiving roster would be better 
when we eventually have some auxiliary officers come our way 
 
36. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
Yes minimal (was taken over to cell and shown ‘do not graffiti sign’ in cells). 
 
 
Interview 7 (19.11.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 29 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 2 years  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Get headaches I 
usually eat something and have some tea, I find I don’t identify well with when I am 
stressed or what pushes my buttons. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? Yes there is and it’s usually the more confident ones that come forward 
the timid ones usually keep quiet, but problems fester, personal relationships and how 
comfortable they are with the OIC. 
 
5. Is ‘police culture’ different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or 
traffic and if so, how? I think they are but they shouldn’t be as it is a very critical part of our 
work (custodial care) and they should be mindful of what can happen when not enough 
emphasis is placed upon lockup work (deaths in custody).  
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again. Very low here and its 
due to the lack of staff numbers making operational policing difficult. 
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7. Do you think organisational attitudes towards lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time and how? Yes especially due to deaths in custody I did 
lockup in 1981 when many of these issues were current. Detainees were treated very 
differently and the way in which custodial care was viewed was quite different, though 
some attitudes have remained the same that you’re stuck inside the office and it’s a second 
class task. 
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? No, new 
recruits maybe otherwise on the job or through policy and procedure. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. None apart from on the job, but custodial care should be on the critical list, it 
could be on blackboard and examined every 6 months (theory exam) 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes and they 
should specialise with psych training and testing, ordinary officers can get too blaze with 
lockup duties. 
  
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? It would be impossible without the cameras we 
now have here, you would need someone in there permanently watching the detainees if it 
were to be done properly. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed concerns regarding this, if yes what was the outcome, if no why 
not? Yes but it’s a HR issue not enough sergeants on shift to take on the amount of 
responsibility given to just one sergeants, it’s hard to get good sergeants into the station 
scenario as they know what that there are so many facets of responsibility upon their 
shoulders all at the same time as well as keep an eye on the lockup screen. It only becomes 
an issue when something happens but by then it’s too late. In the UK they have a shift 
sergeant, a radio sergeant, an operations sergeant and a beat sergeant. 
 
13. - 
 
14. Can you think of any aspect of the lockup which hinders your duties? Yes the cells are too 
far from the Sally-port door you have to go through 2 corridors and we only have 2 safe 
compliant cells out of such a large lockup area. 
 
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? Yes it’s all good until something happens it would be better to have someone 
there to observe but again limited resources don’t allow for adequate performance 
especially if you have a high demand detainee constantly ringing the bell and you have so 
many other administrative and operational duties to do in a limited amount of time.  
 
16. Do you think that staff enjoy their working environment? They should because if they don’t 
they won’t get much better but they still hate doing office and lockup duties. 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? All 
stations should have a Sally-port Warwick doesn’t and people have jumped on top of the 
cars and over the fence, what the cost of a lockable cage over re-capture? 
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18. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? Don’t have one but if we 
did you would need someone to watch it to be effective again a HR issue. 
 
19. Is the padded cell and its location effective, how could they be improved? They are OK here 
they should be a standard item. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? No good shouting 
goes right through the station. 
 
21. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Reception and admission area  
 
22. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes 
 
23. Do you think violence could be avoided if the lockup was designed differently? Yes if we 
didn’t have to walk them so far to get to the cells 
 
24. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? A mix would be better multi 
cells would be better for suicidal people not to feel so isolated, however, I think it would be 
ideal to have no more than 2 detainees in one cell at a time. 
 
25. Is contraband easily hidden (within the lockup) and if so where? It’s not too bad possibly 
more so on their person and it is up to the officers’ experience to find that. 
 
26. What are some of the other agencies that work with your lockup? None any more we used 
to work with court custody transport but now they take morning prisoners from prison 
directly to court holding and not via the lockup, should have happened a long time ago. 
 
27. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Joondalup hospital of ambulance 
 
28. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? No cameras 
in the strip search room. 
 
29. Do drug or alcohol affected detainees require dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? 
It’s a judgement call may need medical attention or ok in a cell, we rarely take a drunk 
detainee but there are no sober centres up this way so not many options and you have to 
live by the decisions you make sometimes under difficult circumstances. 
 
30. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not that I am aware of. 
 
31. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender 
people? Explain your answer. No we only have 2 safe cells (in such a large lockup) to use if 
we have a juvenile male and a female they will go into different cells, if we get an adult male 
at the same time we will have a problem, it can happen and ideally 3-4 cells would be better. 
 
32. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? We 
have 2 of them but cannot use them as they are not rated as safe, I can’t think of any in the 
state that might be compliant, but in the bush they may still be held for 2-3 days in them. 
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33. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? It’s not really an issue here 
especially since they finally directed prison transfers straight to court holding and not via the 
lockup in the mornings. 
 
34. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. No especially not custody management staff and if we used Joondalup as an 
indicator it would suggest that there are too many junior officers in the metro area, I don’t 
know where all the coppers go they just vanish here and there like bush and never come 
back. New high level positions are also created, filled by experienced sworn officers, and 
placed behind a desk 
 
35. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
No. 
 
 
Interview 8 (26.11.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a police officer? 23 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? Never attached to permanent 
lockup  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? No I don’t think I feel 
stressed because of work 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think 
this method works? Yes this method works well depending on the type of complaint. If it is 
significant then it will go to D.O but if it is minor it can be dealt with at station level and the 
outcome may be adequate and not resolved properly.  
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Yes they would be they are different in all locations 
as it is environment dependant they breed different camaraderie’s and work ethics. Staff at 
a watch house have to put up with the same constant barrage from detainees day in and 
day out in a confined building whereas at least we get some variety and get to go out on the 
road etc.-  
 
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? It’s low here and that’s due 
to a lack of staff and support.  
 
7. Do you think organisational attitudes towards lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time and how? Yes it has especially towards duty of care and 
responsibilities within the lockup; however, it has also changed due to policy where arrest 
rates have been impacted upon due to preference to summons CIA 2006 and also due to 
deaths in custody.  
 
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? 
 Not really most of it seems to be learnt on the job. 
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9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain 
your answer. We recently did course on removing detainees from a cell ranging from 
compliant (verbal instruction) to non-compliant detainees (shield and baton extraction) at 
the academy. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes definitely, 
but considering what has to be put up with every day perhaps tenure should be in place as 
listening to detainees every day would wear you down mentally. 
  
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? No it’s a hindrance, it has been improved a little 
with some technology but even that is now out-dated and more of a hindrance (changing 
recoding tapes). Call buttons and alarms and a safe cell (cube) has been installed but we 
only have 2 approved cells to use the rest are non-compliant. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed concerns regarding this, if yes what was the outcome, if no why 
not? The money is there but nothing gets done so I don’t waste my breath more than likely 
it may get done but I won’t be around to see it I don’t think. 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way? It could be more like the cells at the 
courthouse. Our cells are too far from the receival area and too many corridors to walk 
down to get to them. 
 
14. Can you think of any aspect of the lockup which hinders your duties? The counter layout 
and receival area is very small and the benches have no provision for restraints like Perth 
Watch House does. 
 
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? Yes and I am guilty of it too. It’s very difficult with lack of staff especially when 
you consider on night shift there might be only the SGT in here who is supposed to do 
everything in the station, his duties and keep an eye on the surveillance monitor. It 
shouldn’t replace physical checks.  
 
16. Do you think that staff enjoy their work environment? Overall they do but there are areas 
that need work and are quite poor, I think some is supposed to be happening in the main 
floor area of the station. 
 
17.  Do Sally port entries work well in Police Lockups, could they be improved and how? I think 
it works well but I don’t think it’s a good idea to let detainees see you loading and unloading 
firearms etc., even if they are locked in the back of the vehicle, this just shouldn’t happen in 
the same area. 
 
18. Are Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? We don’t have an 
observation cell.  
 
19. Is the lockup padded cell and its location effective, how could they be improved? It 
shouldn’t be where it is (in a corridor close to a walkway) and if someone is in the padded 
cell I believe that there should be a permanent watchman there at all times. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Not flash you can 
hear them all the way out into the station especially if they are a drunk that’s going off. 
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21. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Receival and processing area detainee v police! 
 
22. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes but there are some detainees that no matter what 
you do you cannot make them happy or get through to them. 
 
23. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed 
differently? Yes as we previously discussed re it being a hindrance (see Q. 14) 
 
24. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Some might be useful, but we 
try to only use this lockup as a staging area before we take them to Perth Watch House. 
 
25. Is contraband easily hidden and if so where is it usually found? I don’t think it’s that easily 
hidden anywhere that I can think of. 
 
26. What are some of the other agencies that work with or assist in the lockup? None, if we 
need any one it’s on an as needs basis and we call them in e.g. PETS 
 
27. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Swan Districts Hospital or call SJA 
or if it’s minor like a cut etc. we can clean it up and band aid it ourselves. 
 
28. How does staff ensure that they allow detainees to maintain their dignity? They try to be 
professional when doing strip searches or if they are getting changed  
 
29. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees determine the way in which the lockup works? They 
may be a little more labour intensive, unhelpful, verbal or belligerent especially if you are 
trying to get on with your job or ask questions.  
 
30. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Only when I worked up north where you had 
Australian protesters at the detention centres, they all seem to be vegan and the detainees 
if Muslim also had issues with food. 
 
31. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender 
people? Explain your answer. Not really male and female are always an issue mostly in the 
reception area and in the cells due to the lack of cells we have there isn’t much distance 
between them, I haven’t had issues with transgendered people yet so I can’t say but my 
opinion would be that the policy is fairly clear in terms of searching but there may be issues 
if we had a male, female, juvenile and transgendered person in the lockup area all at the 
same time.  
 
32. Are the use of exercise yards beneficial or do they cause problems? Ours is non- compliant 
so we are not supposed to use it, but I know of them to be very useful in keeping or calming 
detainees down as it has a very different feel to the cells environment, you get some sense 
of openness due to being able to feel the breeze and hear the sounds from outside. 
 
33. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? No 
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34. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. No 
 
35. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. No 
not here, perhaps at the Perth Watch House, I seem to remember something but nothing 
significant. 
 
 
Interview 9 (03.12.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 24 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? EPLU and Court security 1 year total 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Sort of, you self-
manage it through friends and family and discussion. Further to this for other staff in 
general depression is becoming a major issue. Perhaps it was always this way it’s just now 
more acceptable to voice it openly, so I always liaise with health and welfare proactively on 
behalf of other staff this way they can keep face with the other staff and I will take the 
blame for calling them in which I am happy to do. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Yes, it depends what it’s for so most of the time we try to nip it in the 
bud and not let it fester into a problem, sometimes the grievance process isn’t independent 
enough. New age issues of social networking and cyber bullying in private life have a 
tendency to surface as animosities at work. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? It depends on the length of time at the location and 
environment, e.g. a GD’s officer going to Detectives will still be sympathetic to GD’s and 
how things are there but after say 6 months they won’t be thinking or associating 
themselves so much with their former role or peers or relationships. There are different 
relationships between GD’s of different sub-stations within the same district. I try to break 
this up at district level rather than individual station level. I find it more acceptable if there 
are differences between districts but not within the district. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this 
is the case? The conditions here can be pretty shitty but generally the morale is O.K. More 
staff and better equipment don’t necessarily mean better morale as most people would like 
to believe, I remember working at the old Nollamara Police Station years back and it was 
appalling but there was such great morale between the staff there due to the hardships. 
Morale is more about the people and the amount of support you are given by your peers 
and management. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? It has a bit, there is a lot of focus placed on 
custodial care. There are cameras and audio now as standard but the physical checks need 
to be made and entered into an electronic custody system which can be checked live 
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anywhere in the state. It is also very procedural since CIA 2006 can’t put suspects in holding 
they must go into a ‘room’ that doesn’t feel like a cell. 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? No most of it is on the job, it would be hard to do as the 
number of scenarios could never be duplicated. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. Not much – maybe cell extraction, but we do some local drills though 
(rarely though) there isn’t much time for it. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Not sure, as I 
think the working environment is not healthy, it could be but you would need rotations as 
the amount of abuse received would wear you down pretty quickly. Most police do not join 
the job to baby sit. It is a confined environment and I think the role should be shorter term 
than long-term. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? No its a hindrance, if there were no cameras you 
would need someone permanently in the lockup area and be walking up and down the 
corridors (which are too narrow) and doorways are also too narrow. The corridors are too 
long from the reception point. Not enough safe cells. Need pacifying tools such as 
televisions (EJ discusses that this is not a luxury as everyone has a TV and this was proposed 
in Masters Diss.) 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? No because I know what the answer will be, the money required to redo the 
lockup would never be spent. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. There must be better solutions but I still think you could never design a one 
fits all lockup. We have issues with needing to be able to observe thoroughly in conjunction 
with the detainees privacy especially with the toilet and females. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Long narrow passageways and doorways, its 
really designed for a compliant detainee, once there is a struggle or non-compliance there 
are difficulties due to these constraints. Doors should be a lot wider ideally if 3 people could 
fit through and the same with the corridors. 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No as they also have to do physical checks 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. It’s generally not too bad but it could be improved, from what I have seen its not 
that bad so they are probably O.K with it. 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? Our 
vans fit O.K but the prisons trucks do not. They need to be brought in one by one. It could 
be longer higher and wider. 
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18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? We 
don’t have one but it would be great to have one 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it should 
be closer to the reception point and the ceiling is too low (EJ site visit measured to be 
approx. 2400) 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Lighting is adequate 
but acoustics is not (screaming can be heard right into station). 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Still there which is just accepted, but 
more violent now probably due to drugs in their system 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Mainly detainee v staff and usually either at exit from van (so in Sally Port) or in 
the charge / reception area. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of 
the above 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Sometimes, but its more up to the individual 
personalities, they could be both experienced officers but one will click better with some 
detainees and others detainees will click with the other officer. Some officers may be 
calmer but less experienced. Perhaps too the auxiliary officers epaulettes being different 
(purple) is more assuring to a detainee also 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Shorter and wider corridors and doorways for a start. 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Some would be good, a 
combination of facilities for flexibility it would be more appropriate when we only have 2 
approved cells as soon as you get juveniles mixed with adults and male and female there 
will be issues. Also it would allow for placement of sex offenders and ordinary ‘mum and 
dad’ types (maybe a fatal crash related) who really don’t belong with other offenders (say 
burglars, recidivist offenders and violent types) 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? Toilets (the 
rim) and ‘S’ bend and on the person (body cavity) 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Nil – officers 
do most of the cleaning; unless it is a bio hazard then we get contractors in. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Armadale hospital or SJA 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? It depends 
on their behaviour and demeanour as to how much latitude they are given but the issue of 
toilet and female privacy is an issue which comes up. We try to place detainees with 
appropriate other detainees (try to be mindful) at the end of the day some dignity must be 
lost in order to decrease the risk of DIC which is far worse. 
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31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer Yes they are more labour intensive, need more monitoring, may 
need assessment at hospital for fit to hold from medical opinion but this can take time away 
from officers when it is already short it makes for difficult and complex decisions as to the 
best solution with minimal resources 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol effected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? They can be violent 
and non-compliant and just drop on you and the corridors are too long and narrow same 
with doors again too narrow, if they are very violent or a danger to themselves they may go 
into the padded cell but it is la long distance from the Sally Port and reception and very 
confined and the ceiling is too low. 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? No not as yet 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. Difficult to segregate at the moment but 
hopefully when two get 2 more safe cells that should be alleviated 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? I 
know that they can work well for pacifying but procedure these day doesn’t allow for it 
especially any discussions which might take place ‘off the record’ and the officer these day 
don’t have the time to sit there with them for 10 minutes either 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Not really when two get 2 
more safe cells any crowding should be alleviated 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Not enough experienced staff I have 10 staff with less than 4 years experience 
and only a couple of more senior officers 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
Only the ‘your rights in custody’  
 
 
Interview 10 (06.12.2010)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 26 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? <1 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes and dealt with by 
discussion with family, other police and sports etc.  
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Yes, there is a grievance process but the method is dependent upon the 
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type of complaint re what happens or how it is handled, it could be by discussion over the 
table or to the OIC and further to DO. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? There would have to be just like any other location. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this 
is the case? Pretty low, we are told that we are at capacity re staffing levels but where are 
they? 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? It has changed as we have become more 
concerned about DIC and custodial care but I think the attitude towards lockup duties may 
have a lot to do with the environment in which we have to work e.g. if it is meant to be or 
taken to be so important this is lost by virtue of the fact that officers have to contend with a 
variety of other distracting (although legitimate) functions, such as attend to the counter, 
answer phones and prepare associated paperwork, therefore as a direct consequence, the 
primary role cannot conceivably be custodial care. 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? It’s hard to say, I know there is training out there but I haven’t 
personally had the opportunity to do some of it most of the experience gained it is on the 
job 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. Most of it has been local updates on procedures as a result of a 
number of incidents which have occurred in the last number of months. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Not at station 
level, perhaps at the main watch houses. At station level we just need the HR to be able to 
provide an appropriate level of CC. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? More so related to lack of HR, we also need more 
monitoring, it’s a bit piecemeal with some areas being covered and others not. Some areas 
have doors which self-close and proximity card access which could be a problem for 
arrestees by non-station staff. The Sally port roller door cannot be opened from inside the 
Sally port or from the main office where the monitoring, staff and OIC is situated. It is 
operated by a button on the inside of the entry door from Sally port to receival area 
(conceivably an officer could be locked in the Sally port and his arrest in the receival area 
without a way of opening the door himself and only able to ask for assistance from 
someone in the office [provided it is attended and not on comfort break as an example]). 
No window on door from main office corridor into the cells area corridor. No area for 
officers to put firearms before entering the lockup. Sally port roller door no sufficiently high 
for a prisons truck to enter. Area for un-arming at entry from Sally port to lockup is 
inappropriate. The location of panic button in Sally port is inappropriate will be behind 
opening area for detainee to alight from vehicle. The vehicle in the Sally port creates a 
confining space should an altercation arise. No cameras in hallways of the cells area and at 
front of the padded cell. No room for conducting searches or strip searches, no separate 
male – female – juvenile areas. Protruding fixtures on walls within corridors of cells area 
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pose a risk of injury to officers and detainees. Doors not able to be strap bolted and thus 
able to be used as a weapon or in the case of the cell doors cause significant injury should 
the door be slammed onto hands or fingers of either officer or detainee in a struggle. 
Padded cell skin material too loose and not resilient enough having been patched on a 
number of occasions. Charge area is insufficiently sized for more than 1 and max 2 
offenders at a time. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes, it always comes down to funding, or until something happens, but then it’s 
too late isn’t it. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. See all points in Q.11 (EJ notes on site visit the corridor widths are good 1770 
wide) we also need more monitors for prisoners as when other sections e.g. detectives 
bring a prisoner in they expect that because we have monitors in the GD’s area we are the 
ones to be looking after them. There is nowhere for an officer to sit and be productive if 
they were to be positioned in the lockup permanently during the shift. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. See points in Q.11 and also the size of the 
receival area - unable to have appropriate personal space (EJ which should be more 
generous in receival custodial environments where questions about health, mental health, 
removal of property, photographing etc. take place). 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No doubt and its down to a low HR level needed to fulfil the legal procedures required. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I don’t think they are happy but there is some works due to happen  
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? See 
points in Q.11 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? We 
don’t have one but it would be great to have one but we would need to have the staff for it 
to be able to be used as one. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Location is 
O.K but the materials are not appropriate, the door swings freely and there are fixtures on 
the wall right outside the door and generally the non-compliant detainees are placed in 
there so these are inappropriately placed here. One is a SS box with hose fixture in case of 
excrement in padded cell to wash out into grate right at door threshold to padded cell. The 
other is an old monitor above it which could be hung onto and then be able to kick out from 
thus officers would have to pull the detainee away from it. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Lighting good 
acoustics are O.K (EJ all cells having compliant doors sound is better retarded and each cell 
having highlight windows to outside). 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Pretty much the same. 
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22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Mainly detainee v staff and usually either at exit from van (so in Sally Port) or in 
the charge / reception area. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of 
the above 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. That’s a judgement call and very subjective sometimes 
common sense is just as important as experience. The other thing is these days they don’t 
talk to arrestees enough and resolve things verbally its straight to some other form of 
compliance. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Not reduce the violence but minimise the risk to all involved. 
See Q.11 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? A mix would be O.K 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Meals from 
MOJ. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? SJA 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? The 
condition of the lockup is fresh and new and not like a dungeon, it’s well-lit (naturally) in a 
proposed search room the video might be separate recording to the main office or even be 
able to be stopped while audio continues. 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Only if they are extremely intoxicated as happened here where 
they required SJA attend (Sally port injury – drunk unsteady on feet and struck wall with 
head, while officers had to contend with inappropriate doorway from SP to receival area 
holding it open and other officer momentarily letting go to close rear of vehicle door). 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? The level of risk is 
increased further. 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? No not as yet but I have a prayer mat and a Koran 
here just in case, there is such a thing as institutional racism, where no provision is made 
where clearly there might be an issue, we would also need some flexibility in the meals we 
have as we only have meat pies and no vegetarian or halal type food. I might not be racist 
but as an organisation it can be due to the lack of provision of alternatives. 
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34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. It is difficult as there is no dedicate male and 
female or juvenile area and no search room with independent recording capability. 
Searches therefore must be carried out in the cells but they have cameras out to the main 
office and the pint room likewise. No high risk/low risk cells. 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? We 
don’t have an exercise yard. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? No 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Again, that’s a judgement call see Q.24 we were meant to have 4 auxiliary 
officers sent here in September but they have been taken up by Perth Watch House. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. 
Only the ‘your rights in custody’ stuck on the window of every cell looking in towards the 
detainee and in the receival area. 
 
 
Interview 11 (07.01.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 27 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? Nil  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes: I am heavily into 
sports, so I try to relax that way. Most is pressure from hierarchy as it is like running a 
business with targets and goals – each person’s target and outcomes relies on the 
performance of others under them. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Yes, but there aren’t many, if any - I try to look after the staff and care 
for them really well which might help. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Not sure 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this 
is the case? It’s not too bad we have pretty adequate staffing numbers here 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Probably has for the better? 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? None personally being ex forensics. Difficult to comment, I 
haven’t seen staff that don’t seem to be competent – most try really hard to do a good job. 
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9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. Not sure of any – there might be some on blackboard 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Perhaps at the 
watch house facility. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? In general more difficult depending on how well 
observation can take place. This one has been improved significantly to what it was when I 
first came here it was a disgrace. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes, significant monies spent on capital works to bring up to a standard which is 
also acceptable to DCS. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. Need a few more cells or options as no juvenile area and cameras have blind 
spot at female corridor area. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. See above.13. 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? Yes but if they are in a doc or obs cell an officer physically stays with them so not on 
these occasions. We have a good camera system beamed to SGTS office. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. Facilities are ok but they don’t like the shift (3 panel) 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? Yes and 
we double ours for training purposes – Taser and the like (see blue target outline on wall) 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? Yes it is 
in the station area so can keep eye on detainee at all times and conduct enquiries it is a 
dock not a safe holding cell. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Yes its 
effective and it has cctv. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Unsure but states 
that sound travels into station – (EJ observes: lighting is sufficient in new cells but not so 
much in corridors) 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Very common I have 2 staff on leave at 
the moment with injuries and it always seems linked to alcohol and drugs. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? - 
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23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? 
physically 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. No doubt, experienced communicator but no matter 
how experienced some people you cannot reach usually due to drugs or alcohol. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Minimised not avoided 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Good idea for option and a 
mix of facilities 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? Not aware of it 
happening 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS does a bit 
of liaising and provides clean mattresses and blankets. This lockup must stay approved by 
DCS as an emergency overflow facility for them. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Peel health campus via SJA 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? They are as 
helpful and considerate as they can be to keep detainees comfortable. 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. YES more non-compliant and difficult and loud and aggressive 
and uncooperative. 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? - 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? No but the demographics is changing a little in secret 
harbour somewhat with many African and New Zealander families moving in. 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. We just deal with situations according to 
policy and procedure. 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? We 
have 2 they are beneficial but they are non-compliant so if we ever allow someone some 
fresh air an officer must stay with them at all times. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Yes there is some 
overcrowding sometimes especially when a juvenile comes in as it affects how the rest of 
the facility is used- we have 1 male, 1 female, 1 padded, 1 holding call and 1 holding dock 
only – the rest are non-compliant. We do not have any trustees. 
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37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Yes we do but no Auxiliary officers only promise of them 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No. 
 
 
Interview 12 (14.01.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 30 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? 15-20 years 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? other. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Yes, but it only works to a point. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? No 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this 
is the case? High 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes likely 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? maybe just enough to a satisfactory job 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. Maybe a little at firearms re-qual but not specific 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? Makes it more difficult. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. Not sure exactly how it would be designed to achieve this but it could for sure 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Temporary pods and concrete walls 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No 
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16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. Situational 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? Pretty 
much. 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? Pretty 
much. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? situational 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Unsure  
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Getting worse. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Reception area 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Verbally  
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Possibly  
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Possibly  
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Yes good idea 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? None that I 
can think of at station level. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Local hospital of SJA 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Situational 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Yes 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Yes 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? No. 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. Possibly – not sure 
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35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? 
Beneficial. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Sometimes – situational 
solutions. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Generally. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Yes – situational at 
various locations more so at stations. 
 
 
Interview 13 (18.03.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 25years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? 6 months  
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? There is a lot to learn 
but no. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Yes, but there are differences now with Auxiliary and custody officers 
due to EBA and unions and this behind the scenes stuff can be niggling and an issue 
regarding who’s who and under what. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Different but same. Also there are issues which 
arose from custody officers being recruited by an external agency and Auxiliary being 
recruited by police – seems that custody officers in general bring more ‘issues’ with them, 
but it doesn’t mean there are not some good operators among them. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this 
is the case? I think it’s better since custody officers and Auxiliary took over, they feel and 
are resided to this being their job not as a punishment or a place to hide for 12 months to 
get out of country which attracted the wrong type of sworn staff. I have also implemented a 
social club and asked for reps from each team to form a committee with a focus on family 
and friends not booze parties or ‘police’ club. We look for consistency between shifts and 
the way they are run we don’t want particular issues or instigators causing problems due to 
their own issues so we have weekly supervisors meetings to discuss. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? More so now with the changeover of staff type 
they appear not to be so blaze about their job and take the job more seriously as if it’s 
important not just a transitional spot. 
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8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? They get a foundation that is all – enough to get them started 
then that’s why they have their probationary period where they learn on the job. They get 
more specialised training these days specific to custodial environments – close quarter and 
effective communications 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. Judicial services have a dedicated trainer and a 1.5 hour shift overlap 
where staff can do refresher training where they can refresh on say search procedures or 
empty hand techniques. Otherwise I also encourage them to either work, train or go tho the 
police gym in the time and make the most of it or become a part of the fit for life program; 
which offers free blood tests, cholesterol tests, health appraisals and can do up training 
programs for staff. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes and no it 
would be a harsh environment to be in for long periods of time so while the training 
required would be specialised and the facilities should be I’m not so sure about long-term 
secondments to a WH. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? Well this one doesn’t help but we have a 
prototype of a type of cell proposed for the new PWH so we are trialling it and tweaking it 
before committing to the final type. We do a lot of experimenting these days but it’s not so 
‘give it a go’ it’s well considered. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes, we work closely with land and buildings and we have a decent budget to 
make some changes – within reason. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. More open plan not so compartmented. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Some cells not compliant and ex yards not 
compliant require staff be there at all times. There will be no trustees in new WH all 
cleaning and soiling by contractors – consider calling contractors out at 3am due to 
someone soiling the cells or padded cell it will be a problem and the trustee mutually 
beneficial relationship works well. 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No they don’t but they usually forget the cameras are there and do some silly things 
which could be questionable if the footage was to ever get called up. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. For the time being it is what it is, staff more so don’t like the new shifts but it’s 
necessary sometimes to get a good gender balance and to break up little comfortable clicks 
which develop. Staff just don’t like change 
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17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? The 
location of the cell dock could be better located away from the firearm unloading area and 
Taser area and procedures must be adhered to lock the dock before unloading. 
  
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? You 
can’t see in to it very well its location could be better but not in the layout we have. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Easier access 
required not around the corner from the admissions area, either reposition or addition of 
another.  
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Light is a bit dim in 
the ex-yard but ok in the cells and the sound is always an issue even in the trial cell – the 
door seals are good but the ventilation grate is quite large and open to noise. The new 
facility will be air-conditioned and should hopefully be better on noise.  
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Reception area and sometimes it’s a 
detainee who’s had enough another detainee if they are constantly mouthing off. To some 
degree – with the detainees who actually listen – having custody officers helps as they say I 
am not police I am custody – I am only here to look after you. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee?  
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc?  
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. I think the more experienced officer may have more 
communication skills but it’s more the hesitation to get involved in things that 
inexperienced officers might perceive as potentially able to get them investigated due to 
levels of accountability and thus stand-offish. It’s also important to have 2:1 ratio officers to 
detainees. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Perhaps minimised by design and avoided by training 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Good – I think there may be 
some in the new PWH (referring to drop off cells [but these are not single person cells by 
definition]) 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found?  
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS G4S, 
Cultural diversity Unit, AVS – aboriginal visitors scheme, MHERL – mental health emergency 
response, Choice One – nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, DUMAR through ECU. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? On-call or duty Nurse or RPH 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Discussion 
had regarding the understanding of what dignity is and what is perceived as offering dignity 
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and the difficulty of dignity v operational safety in WH environments. And that there is no 
defined way of offering dignity just ones perceived understanding. How do you strip search 
someone with dignity – is this taught?  
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Yes they may require FFC clearance if very intoxicated and then 
require more obs they are usually louder and more obnoxious 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? - 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Somewhat we have prayer mats delivered here. 
African detainees seem not too worried about what the conditions are like in here I am 
guessing that they have seen much worse so this is nothing to them.  
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. Females are provided sanitary products (but 
bins for the same it is not so clear) 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They 
have their place with some benefits but officer must stay with them at all times as they are 
not compliant. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Not really we have 50 max 
overnighters and more capacity of considering ‘drop and goes’ if they are going to bail but if 
we get to our limit and we would not want more than 4 to a cell - we can take overflow to 
Fremantle (first port of call) or any district level lock-up. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Yes we do but no Auxiliary officers only promise of them 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Not exactly but what to 
expect and the procedure of what will be happening while in the lockup has been posted in 
the reception area facing the reception seating benches. 
 
Nurses are now on 7 days a week on nights 2000 – 0400 and Sunday day shift 1000 – 1800 
and 1800 – 0200 afternoon shifts (Sunday). And an on call set-up extended to metro lock-
ups. Nurses mean they can FFC can be signed with ease of not taking to emergency and 
wasting time 
 
Assigned a reserve officer (Auxiliary) to take administrative pressure off the shift sergeant – 
they do BAMR, admin duties relating to WH operation. SGT is equivalent to a Level 4 
Custody Officer [civil service] and a ‘band’ 3 Auxiliary Officer [police act] 
 
New PWH no parking for staff major issues for staff finishing work late and expected to take 
public transport. We are trialling electronic opening cell doors or electronic swipe ID when 
doing cell checks and electronic information boards over white boards. 
 
Any pre-lockup unit mustn’t make it less expedient to process detainees. 
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Interview 14 (25.03.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 15 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? Two years - at the moment my position is such that it acts as the 
hub of the lock-up, I am in charge of operations, I act as a filter, I audit, and authorise. 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Sometimes but it's 
got a little bit better since the reserve officers being implemented. Now as a sergeant I also 
feel that I can make a difference I feel that I can implement changes at this rank. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Is there are ways but the success of how it turns out can vary, and this 
is dependent on what level the grievance is made, for example; if the complaint is about the 
sergeant the investigating officer may know the person and therefore the investigation is 
compromised. The only issue is the police mentality is such that if you make a grievance you 
will always be known as someone complains and therefore no one will want to work with 
you will really trust you again for fear of complaining against them. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Your organisational relationships are different 
because the general frontline Copper thinks differently most of the people that work in the 
watch house now are not police officers and therefore have a different perspective on their 
work, location, relationships, and the importance they place upon their function. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is 
the case? Definitely better particularly now that auxiliary and custodial officers work within 
the lock-up, they see their duties as being significant and important as opposed to 
previously, when the watch house was staffed by police where their belief was that they 
were being punished, doing babysitting, or undertook duties there to get out of doing 
country service. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Attitudes towards custodial duties has changed 
in two ways; firstly as a result of the deaths in custody investigations police took the duty 
somewhat more seriously, and since the introduction of auxiliary officers and custodial 
officers to the lock-up, attitudes have changed significantly. We also have women in 
leadership programs it appears that some leaders do not agree with this and they just 
accept it because they have to do because the Commissioner has implemented it our ratio 
here is approximately 50-50 male to female. Otherwise the organisation is still quite male 
dominated. I know that among police some feel that I have been made up to a sergeant to 
make up for it requirements for females however I would much rather be regarded upon 
my merits as a police officer than as a female and it's difficult for other coppers to 
understand that. This doesn't appear to be such an issue within the lock-up now that it is 
employed with auxiliary officers and custodial officers. 
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8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? I didn't receive any formal training specific for the lock-up, 
rather, just the training received when one goes through the police Academy. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. Staff now receive one and a half hour training session is specific 
towards issues that arise for example if we have an issue where some contraband manages 
to get through our judicial training officer will conduct training specific for this. Otherwise, 
staff can go to the gym during this time, keep working or undertake any other specific 
training. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer the lock-up 
could be a specialist area, however there are issues psychological issues that are quite 
relevant to lock-up can be found quite stressful to some people and I think one of the main 
issues are, that until you work inside a lock-up or a watch house it would be almost 
impossible to appreciate what the working environment would actually be like. For this 
reason I think that police are better equipped to accept the working environment more so 
than auxiliary officers or custodial officers. However, custodial officers don't have an option 
they will only work in a lock-up, and this is the reason why from this point on there will be 
no further custodial officers employed they will all be auxiliary officers. Auxiliary officers are 
subject to tenure, whereas custodial officers are not and many auxiliary officers use their 
role as a stepping stone to becoming a sworn police officer. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? Well this particular lock-up certainly does not 
help perform function without you asking me the biggest problem that I can see at the 
moment is the reception area and also the location of the padded cell. There are many 
aspects obviously that will be much better in the new facility and it's a good thing that we're 
trialling a cell which is intended for use in the new facility, however, it could have been 
placed in a much better location perhaps one of the first cells not the last cell as that was 
the only one which had a Perspex door. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes and of lot of what I have mentioned is noted, however within reason it is 
looked into. It is much better as a sergeant and I much prefer being a sergeant since 
becoming a sergeant I feel that I have a lot more authority to effect change. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. Yes and I think that the problem is that it's a very old design and most of the 
lock-ups are designed around similar principles as the Perth Watch House. Hopefully the 
new facility will be much more functional for our needs I think it will be its open plan. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Yes the main thing that comes to mind is the 
layout and where the padded cell is located. I think the padded cell should be much closer 
to the reception area and the second padded cell should be somewhere in the middle not at 
the end we only use the second padded cell sometimes went very busy. 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No I don't think they do not what they do is sometimes forget that it's even their and 
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then sometimes do silly things that this credit is then should the tape CCTV footage be 
downloaded all that they do in the background and all that they say is also recorded and it 
might not always be appropriate or professional. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I think staff generally make do with what they have I think they enjoy the fact that 
technology can help them particularly in a new facility in we're trialling many new 
instruments of technology and they should make work much more efficient, however, with 
this the police Department always seems to introduce new formats of paperwork 
irrespective of new technology or associated with the new technology and so although 
technology makes life easier it tends to be inherently increased workload in its inception. 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how?  
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? 
Generally it's not too bad however this is the cell that should have been made the trial cell. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Definitely not 
see answers to previous questions 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? There are always 
issues with acoustics especially when family members come in and start screaming to each 
other from the male side to the female side. Acoustics are also a problem at the reception 
counter especially when there are many people in, you can overhear what people are saying 
especially medical related questions and this is the place where male and female people are 
sometimes in the same place at the same time. The lighting is generally okay in the rooms 
and the cells however not too good in exercise areas. 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? We have specific ratios of 2 to 1 whereas 
if he went regional sometimes you have 1 to 6 which is a problem but we won't go there, 
you cannot stop violence in the lock-up but you can minimise it I think being a good 
communicator definitely helps and there are some very good communicators and some 
very bad ones in the lock-up. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Most of the violence can happen in the reception area although it can also 
happen in cells and in the exercise yard space but here it's more detainee versus detainee. 
Reception areas and Sally Port areas is usually versus police or others involved in the 
incident such as another party. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc?  
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Good communicators tend to defuse the situation much 
more readily and sometimes I find that female officers can talk their way to compliance 
without having to resort to physical confrontation but not always, I find that a female 
officer such as myself, I am not as strong as the male, I cannot fight, and not even interested 
in that, so if it takes me longer in achieving what I want by talking, I don't care I will choose 
that every time. I feel that female sergeants and staff in general can be more patient and 
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more compassionate towards detainees. At the end of the day as long as we get compliance 
and the job gets done I don't care if I am disregarded as being just a female by detainees. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Perhaps it could be minimised through appropriate training 
and perhaps selecting the right candidates for the job in the first place. Design certainly has 
a place but I'm not so sure about that, that's probably something I'd leave up to you. 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? I think single person cells 
definitely be an advantage particularly for people with infectious diseases, you would want 
to make sure that if the cells were sized for one person that they would not feel 
claustrophobic, space again, I would leave that up to professionals like you. 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? The cells are 
checked when empty it is rare but sometimes you might find something in the cells once 
empty but more so you might find it in the kitchen after breakfast or G4S might find it when 
research in a detainee, if this is the case this might be the reason we would have specific 
training on searching. 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS G4S, 
Cultural diversity Unit, AVS – aboriginal visitors scheme, MHERL – mental health emergency 
response, Choice One – nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, DUMAR through ECU. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? In relation 
to this I am in the middle of formulating new policy for transgender people and gay and 
lesbian people to reflect contemporary life for example to ask who would you like to be 
searched by as before it was the male would search the male parts and a female would 
search the female parts but there is a disparity between the different policies and different 
statutes. The lock-up at your pin reviewed at the moment as for example there is a 
contradiction between the misuse of drugs and that fee by a and lock-up procedures. Other 
initiatives include buying temporary hairnets for those who wear turbans, and prayer mats 
for Muslims, these issues have not come up much but at least we will be prepared and it's 
the least I think that we could do. 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Generally yes so that the detainees are generally more 
compliant and quieter time drunken detainees came to the obnoxious and the loud. 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? The lockup design 
here seems to be based on a compliant and sober detainee 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not really 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. No it doesn't hopefully the new facility will 
deal with this much better it couldn't be any worse. 
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35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They 
can be beneficial but at the moment they are non-compliant, and we would need to have 
staff there all the time. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Generally not as we have 
overflow procedures in place where our excess detainees can be taken to district lock-ups. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Yes we have a mixture of auxiliary officers and custody or offices here, custody 
officers are dying breed has there will be no more custody officers from now on there will 
only be auxiliary offices who offer much more flexibility 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Not exactly. 
 
Health unit might be the person to talk about in relation to psychological screening. 
 
I think that each team in the lock-up do not operate the same way particularly as they have 
different sergeants, we have female sergeants as well as male and I think that they operate 
their shift slightly differently. I think female sergeants showed more concern for their staff 
and feel more comfortable in asking if staff is okay word as men do not seem as open. 
 
Auxiliary officers have an induction day before working in the lock-up this is where they 
might get some specialised communications training before working in the lock-up. You 
might want to ask the training officer what the difference is between specialised training for 
lock-up work and general training for police officers. You might also ask what the difference 
is between a general police recruitment psychological requirements and psychological 
requirements and testing for custodial staff or auxiliary staff. 
 
You can speak to health and welfare branch regarding the recruitment of custody officers 
and their associated psychological testing. 
 
 
Interview 15 (08.04.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 31 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? At the moment I'm a shift sergeant, and have been so to 3 1/2 
years before that I have worked in the old East Perth lock-up for six months in 1992 and in 
Halls Creek which had a large lock-up for two years. 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? I don’t get stressed 
often at work however, if I do is HR related - I am the only sworn police officer on my shift 
the rest of all public service type of personalities then mentality sometimes causes stress. 
Sworn police officers generally don't question as much as an sworn do an sworn tend to 
have the attitude of it's not my business I don't get paid to do that it's not my job 
description were as sworn police generally just getting there and do it. They have an 
opinion about everything that is broken or doesn't seem right to complain about it all the 
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time, police such as myself we generally just get on and do the job and when something is 
broken we just get it fixed. Police generally have a make it to mentality and generally have 
fewer issues whereas civilian generally have lots of personal reactions and fights. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? There are definitely more grievances these days civilians generally 
make mountains out of molehills I had an unfounded complaint against me as it was 
reported formally when ought not to be. It was an assault complaint against me by a male 
officer as I gave him a jovial punch to the arm. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? The organisational relationships are different 
particularly now with auxiliary officers but they generally come around eventually and take 
on the police culture this might be because most of them may have wanted to become 
coppers but missed out and maybe come or try out later they use auxiliary as a stepping 
stone towards becoming an sworn officer. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is 
the case? Morale in the lock-up is definitely dependent upon the shift supervisor, I know 
that other shifts have very low morale and some have very high morale, at the moment I 
feel that the morale my shift is generally quite good. The shifts that have low morale are 
generally the ones without much leadership and also tend to afflict those that do not have a 
police officer who is sworn in charge. Other issues related to this are that police officers 
that bring in arrests from the street always look for a sworn police officer to give them 
direction or advice they do not feel comfortable taking advice or direction from a level 4 
civilian. There are currently five shifts of which three are run by sworn sergeants and to buy 
level 4 civilian supervisors 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? Attitudes towards custodial care have definitely 
changed over the years particularly as the term duty of care has actually been defined used 
to be just an art covering exercise but now it has a name. People generally now more aware 
also of the significance of what the job is detainees are much more aware of their rights at 
all levels of custody is generally more transparent. 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? No, I didn't receive any formal training and I didn't receive 
much training at the academy either back then is more than induction thing not training. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. I don't know that staff receive any theory but they do receive re-
qualification training every 12 months – critical training such as life-support and hands-on 
physical training is much more specialised and reflective of the environment in which they 
will be working ie. enclosed spaces. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer the I think the 
lock-up could definitely be a specialist area as it requires online shift from goodies and 
baddies staff need to treat everybody with dignity treat them as they are relative. Not to 
judge them on their character when they first walk in the door when a drunk and 
humiliated etc. And you can't react to what they are like at that point you will retaliation 
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reaction must be something like I have a life on the outside that some people in here will 
never have and you must also have a high level of compassion than the copper out on the 
street. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? No definitely not, we find that this layout splits 
the staff up during busy times especially if upstairs and downstairs are used I would much 
rather have detainees inside the exercise yard on mattresses and devote one person to 
constantly watch over them than to have them upstairs in the cells with staff split among 
different levels. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes and of lot of what I have mentioned is noted, however within reason it is 
looked into. It is much better as a sergeant and I much prefer being a sergeant since 
becoming a sergeant I feel that I have a lot more authority to effect change. 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. The watch house could be more efficient however the efficiency is limited by 
the capacity and ability to process detainees. When the capacity is surpassed there are 
many idle hands waiting for the next person to be brought in. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. The worst thing and most annoying thing at the 
moment about the design that I can think of is that when ambulances come the stretch that 
is not fit into the cell because the corridors are too narrow and they cannot swing into the 
doorway the last time we had a death in custody it was very undignified that the person had 
to be dragged out of the cell on a mattress while the people were working on the person to 
get them out to the stretcher in the reception area. Having said that during the 
investigation three other detainees testified to how much effort the officers put in to trying 
to bring the person back and that they did everything they could. Another issue which is not 
design related but procedural relates to the amount of people these days being bought into 
the lock-up who require medication to things such as diabetes and epilepsy we need 
something similar to a dispensary. 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? I don't think staff rely on cameras too much but I do feel there are issues for example, 
when time is quiet staff sometimes sit around a common table and chat just to blow off 
some steam and sometimes they might be discussing things which are recorded and the 
other problem is they might be letting off steam in relation to a particular sergeant, now 
this sergeant has access to playing back what the discussion was about and using the 
technology as an instrument such as Big Brother which has happened. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. No I don't think they do and it's been made quite clear by the civilian staff. Small 
offices generally didn't say anything they just got on with the job. 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? The 
biggest problem with the Sally port is the width of the entry door to the reception area is 
too narrow you can only fit to people through at once and it should be wide enough in three 
so that you can have the offender Central to an officer on either side. 
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18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? The 
location is not too bad but the design of the cell is not so good. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it's in the 
wrong spot because you have two marched through the small corridor with the half height 
wall which you can also not fit three people wide through in order to get into the padded 
cell. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? The biggest problem I 
can see is that the lights cannot be dimmed and I think this is psychologically bad for 
detainees particularly in the cells I have heard many complaints about it being too bright. 
The problem with sound is that as an operational officer you want to be able to hear 
everything you want to hear a door slamming upstairs you want to hear a door slamming at 
the other end of the building so you know what's going on, but this is conflicting to 
detainees hearing and screaming and waking up detainees are trying to sleep. This causes 
anxiety problems within the lock-up which is unwanted. 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? There is not much violence between 
prisoners more so between prisoners and staff the biggest problem with had with the cell 
set up to mimic the cell in the new facility is that there was no provision for electronic 
opening at the site of the door; opening of the door it was electronically operated from the 
control centre. In this instance one detainees was kicking the shit of the other person in the 
cell and would not stop we had to open the door with a key and almost Taser the guy to get 
him to step away from the other guy. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Between the back of the van and the reception area and also in the strip search 
room which is a problem in itself because it has a door which can be closed we once had 
female officers being attacked behind a closed-door and we had to get the male officer to 
kick the door down the problem is for him to kick the door in people are struggling behind 
the door for people to try to get out they have to pull the door open.. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of 
the above  
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. I think it comes down more so to life experience than 
job experience and patients males usually take longer to learn patience skills. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? I think if the lock-up was split into two sections such as a high 
risk section and a general section for people on warrants of commitment or mum and dad 
types and limit their number of areas where large gatherings of detainees occur the worst is 
the eating room where once everyone is sat down and eating the door is closed and staff go 
downstairs if there is an issue staff have to run upstairs to unlock the door which takes time 
and is a risk to inter prisoner violence. At this time there could be as many as 20 prisoners 
locked in one room at one time with access to utensils. 
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26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Single person cells would be a 
great idea it would give you flexibility to isolate certain people without compromising space. 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? We don't 
usually find much contraband comes through the lock-up this is predominantly because 
people are bought in at very short notice generally off the street if they were planning to 
come through they were generally not produce contraband within the lock-up more than 
likely if they knew the light coming through the lock-up that would be intending to get the 
contraband through to prison so then they would find the knife they could stick up the ass. 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS G4S, 
Cultural diversity Unit, AVS – aboriginal visitors scheme, MHERL – mental health emergency 
response, Choice One – nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, DUMAR through ECU. 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? They look 
to treat people as if they were someone they knew, they don't make derogatory comments 
during strip searches, they have spoken to politely. Sanitary pads are offered for women 
however I will have to look into that SOP’s for disposal provisions. I think at the moment 
they tied into the latex glove and dispose of it but I'm not sure. 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. They are not really themselves at that time and can be quite 
different in the morning when I say can I please have a cup of tea in such important to treat 
them as if you would want to be treated you cannot judge them based on what they are like 
when they are bought in. 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? The design is not good 
for non-compliant detainees it relies on orderly behaviour 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? We have had issues with Muslims that have dietary 
issues and specific requirements and male Muslims will not take orders or comply with 
what female officers asked of them we also had a Muslim woman that refuse to leave the 
outside backdoor and she was given several warnings to do so, my biggest concern was 
what the hell do we do if we have to lock her up, as her gear I was dreading to tell her that 
she would not be allowed to wear, we asked the direction should this incident have 
happened however we were never given any. 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. If any transgendered people or sensitive 
groups come in they are generally placed in isolation on the female wing which is F04.. 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? 
Exercise yards are very beneficial however they have been deemed non-compliant and if I 
am to have anyone in there I must commit a person to watch over them at all times. They 
are beneficial in that at worst people can be stuck in a very small cell for a period of 48 
hours with no diversionary instruments such as television and radio or magazines, at least in 
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the exercise yards people could get some fresh air, and the sound is different it doesn't 
resonate and drive you mad. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Sometimes they are 
problems of overcrowding the most we can fit in at 23 males full-time but this means some 
must go upstairs which divides my staff and I would rather risk placing more in the exercise 
yard on mattresses. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. I believe that I have sufficient staff with 12, however for some sergeants they 
want about 15 and for some it's never enough. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No. 
 
I think strip searching should be more common-sense for example if you had a 50-year-old 
woman who was brought in on unpaid fines I would say she should not be strip-searched 
other sergeants such as civilians go by the book and strip-searched everybody. We need 
more autonomy on what happens I think most women will want to give or make a decision 
on who is strip-searched. 
 
The current Perth Watch House feels even more claustrophobic when it is empty and 
devoid of human life and not used for its purpose. 
The least handling and movement is best 
 
Auxiliary officers have an induction in which they are taken through the entire process from 
the moment they arrive in the Sally port to the charge counter to the cells where their job 
starts and finishes and what is entailed at every stage of the lodging process. 
 
Each team does not operate in the same way on one you might have some crusty old 
sergeant that sits in his office and does nothing who is just looking to retire another you 
might have a micromanager type who is very anal and nit-picky who goes by the book and 
makes people take annual leave days to attend the funeral. 
 
I think that our policy is sometimes very out-dated I think the aboriginal sensitivity thing has 
been done to death as their culture here in the metro area is rather diluted and is more 
pertinent to those in country areas for example up north. We have a changing population 
and require a change in policy and procedure. We need more in relation to Sudanese and 
other African peoples who now form a large component detainees bought through the lock-
up with obvious signs of physical torture from their homeland these people particularly 
males do not talk or open up and to have some assistance from some of their groups would 
be of great advantage. When people are drunk culture means nothing to them we don't ask 
about mixing only when it relates to male-female, after the last getting custody we were 
supposedly to have a smoking ceremony of the watch house-which didn't happen, and 
supposedly aboriginal people were not going to want to be in the cell where the death 
occurred this also hasn't happened. So the do-gooders and policy makers make it into a 
much bigger issue than what it is in comparison to other contemporary issues. 
 
The current watch house design rationale is based on old prison design it’s intimidating, 
demoralising and isolating. It is not conducive to observation there is little interaction 
without opening the cell doors and when somebody else is placed in a cell that person 
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already within its new thinking who is he? And what is he going to do to me? Isolation in 
lock-ups or watch houses should not happen either for the staff or the detainees staff also 
need to be able to gather some way without causing isolation – and it is not a healthy 
environment for the good guys to be constantly recorded and under surveillance. 
 
Officers are now trained in how to carry out strip searches but you ask if this is done has the 
procedure alone or whether the issue of affording dignity is of concern in this training – 
there is no dignity in strip searching and everyone that comes into the watch house is strip-
searched the procedure is explained and they are advised that it is non-invasive unless they 
are non-compliant where their clothing will be forcibly removed from them, otherwise it is 
non-invasive. 
 
 
Interview 16 (04.01.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been working at Land and Buildings? 25 years 
 
2. How is section structured and what type of staff do you have? We have a few Architects, 
accountants, IT personnel and people with experience in building maintenance and minor 
works. All other Consultants, engineers, QS’s etc. are external and sourced as part of the 
project architects role. 
 
3. What are the positives and negatives of working with architects on police projects? 
Architects are still very concerned with how the building looks and winning accolades and 
competitions, so there are some heated debates sometimes balancing up our budget, and 
our department being aware of some of the more ‘architectural details’ the architects 
generally specify in order to achieve a certain look relation to maintaining the budget and 
maximising functional space for our staff. 
 
4. Do you have in-house trades? No we use external trades 
 
5. How busy is the section? We are usually extremely busy, particularly due to the number of 
User-Groups, Project Control Groups, ‘Steering Committees’ (outside consultants i.e. 
superintendents, OIC’s, BMW, Director General, Dept. of Attorney General, finance, media, 
a variety of representatives for who the building will be built, native liaison and various 
other stakeholders involved). The process becomes very lengthy and arduous and therefore 
some big projects such as the new Perth Watch House planning commenced 5 years before 
any real commencement.  
 
6. What type of work does the section undertake and what are some of the main current 
issues? We are involved in large projects all the way down to small maintenance works both 
metro and regional – police stations and lock-ups and we are involved with the design or 
procurement of new Perth Watch house. At the moment we have been requested to 
provide surveillance to all stations with charge areas with CCTV at all points of the charge 
process. 
 
7. To what extent is staff in this office involved in the various stages of a project? Hands-on 
usually in the early stages only, we appoint a project leader or for large capital works a 
project manager who establishes an architect and all sub-consultants. We also do the lists 
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of recommendations Project Definition Plans ‘PDP’ for proposed works and currently trying 
to implement a refurbishment program to upgrade office and lock-ups in one go (this is on 
the current business management plan) 
 
8. Staff here also prepares Concept Plans, Business Case Studies and Project Definition Plans, 
some of these can be found in the Strategic Asset Management Framework: Govt. 
Publication  
 
9. How often is an architect involved? They are involved with almost all projects even the 
refurbishment works to convert existing cells into safe cells. 
 
10. How is the scheduling of a project determined i.e. Prioritised? We compile a 
recommendation list for works to PDP and this is re-visited as required.  
 
11. How or who decided on the capital works budget? We have a current Budget for 
maintenance and faults etc., and a Capital works budget for specific larger projects – it is 
under the capital works budget that we also do our office and custodial facility upgrades. 
Building and Land has some minor control but larger projects are always referred to the 
BMW (Building Management and Works). 
 
12. What are some of the policies in place for obtaining quotations or tendering? Tender 
evaluations are made by the BMW and the architect and must be approved by police as 
police hold the budget 
 
13. Who has the final say on project proposals or design brief and signs off on them? BMW for 
allocation of funds and also for design and the police as holder of those funds.  
 
14. We expect that the new Watch House will facilitate staff procedures and that they (lock-up 
procedures) won’t need to change to suit. 
 
15. We have a palette of available colours we can use as a dado wall colour scheme but I am 
not sure if we will be using a dado in the new PWH – which is based upon Brisbane’s Roma 
St Watch House. 
 
 
Interview 17 (12.04.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 15 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? 3 years. 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes  
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? yes to approach a direct supervisor  
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5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Yes – morale and most people don’t want to be 
there. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is 
the case? I'd say it would be about average and due to older staff having been in this job for 
a long time 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? A bit more professional about it these days so 
much scrutiny. 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? Mostly but most you have to learn on the job.  
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. No ongoing training really just requalification, most training sessions 
are rushed and you are normally overdue for re training. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. It could be but 
you wouldn’t want to be stuck there for your whole career it’s not why become a copper. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? I can only relate to East Perth where the padded 
cell was too far away and a person resisting would have to be taken some distance before 
being put in a cell. The corridors were also quite narrow making it hard to manoeuvre  
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? No  
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. Cells closer to reception area, wider corridors, sound proofing, sharp edging to 
door and window surrounds.  
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. I didn’t find anything good about working there 
(it was over 14 yrs. ago though)  
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No  
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I'm not sure I don't think so 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? Too 
small and have to reverse out – bad image to let people see you take out weapons. 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? It’s 
annoying for when you try to do your paper work 
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19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No they are 
not in a good spot too far away from reception 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Terrible sound 
quality too noisy  
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups?  
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Reception or at rear of van 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? 
Physically and verbally 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. I feel that mediocre staff performance is sometimes 
rewarded while hard workers are sometimes overlooked so it is not always so clear cut that 
experience is either better or worse just how well you promote yourself and who you know.  
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? See question 13. 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Good idea to have a few 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity?  
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Yes see Question 32 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? advantage of long-
term custody is they generally behave better and are no longer under any drug/alcohol 
influences and their mind set is different once they are aware of what’s happening, e.g. how 
long their sentence will be in short-term custody it is the opposite and its when people are 
at their worst (behaviour) so drugs and alcohol make them play up even more meaning that 
the design is more important. 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not really 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. No because of the sound quality they can yell 
to each other can arc each other up  
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35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They 
are beneficial 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Sometimes 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Generally O.K. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Not aware of any. 
 
 
Interview 18 (20.05.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 3 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? 3 years. 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes  
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? There are grievances in relation to what some people say or talk among 
staff we generally sort them out in a fairly straightforward way 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? It can be said that this is public doing a police job at 
the beginning there was definitely an, ‘us and them feel’ and a sense that police could direct 
us anywhere and asked us to do anything and when we don't agree with what they say they 
always call the authority card on us. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is 
the case? Losing a lot of staff lately and the prospect of losing more staff soon has lots to do 
with low morale also differences of opinions and issues to do with police not listening or 
using their authority when we don't agree with something contributes to it. A lot of custody 
officers are looking to convert to auxiliary officers and auxiliary are using their position as a 
stepping stone to policing. We don't wear stripes on a uniform so part of the problem and 
something that does affect everyone is that police always try to go over our heads to try to 
get the answers they want it's difficult for them to see the experience that we have just by 
the uniform that we have said are always looking around for someone with stripes like a 
sergeant when we don't agree with something they want and a sergeant walks past and 
doesn't disagree with what we said that's usually enough for the police to accept what we 
said is correct if they had not walked past they would asked to see a sergeant. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how?  
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? I didn't feel the conditions that we were trained in were 
relevant and some of the things that we were taught were over emphasised when in 
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hindsight we do very little relating to that training more training could have been given to 
other things, things that we do all the time. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. We are supposed to have ongoing training but there isnt much that 
goes on, some of us do after work training as I haven't seen much of our special dedicated 
trainer. Our role now has also hybrid to a degree meaning that we are taking on more 
responsibility than I think it was intended for us, police are using us in ways not only has 
custody officers but also similar to what the CSO might do at a station level. We sometimes 
get stupid training advice from the office things like tilt your head to the side when he 
speaks aboriginals or if aboriginal is not feeling well to ask them is your spirit seek to how it 
is relevant to aboriginals that live in the city most of them think you're an idiot of doing 
these kind of things we need more training for problems of today such as dealing with 
Africans. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. It sort of 
already heading that way since custody took over. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? No everything is so narrow and all over the place 
doesn’t seem to have a logical order about it, something should be in places where they are 
not, like the padded cells and we can't use certain things like the exercise yard. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? No not really because is only so much that can be done you would need to start 
over and when you make suggestions nothing really happens 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. I think there should be some logic to the way in which people are processed 
from the time they are bought in to the time they leave should be in some sort of order it 
would make more efficient. 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Just that it's all over the place and there is an 
enough room if there is a struggle to have enough offices around the detainees 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No not really 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I'm not sure I don't think that they think too much about it and I'm sure that they 
don't because they don't know what to compare it to 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? I guess 
they work okay but this one you have to drive in and reverse out it would be good if they 
could drive in and out in one direction but you can't do that with this current building 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? It's 
effective for observation but it's in a bad spot because when detainees see staff behind the 
counter they keep distracting them and they can't do their work officers then have to do 
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purposely look away or ignore them to get on with their work which is not the idea of 
observation 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No they are 
not in a good spot but they are effective 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? It's not very good you 
can hear people shouting all over the place and sometimes when you bring a group of 
people in they keep yelling to each other especially if there are males and females involved. 
The lighting seems to be okay but its all neon lighting it'd be nice if there were some 
sunshine. 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? The violence in the lock-up is very 
prevalent and it seems that you just can't get away from it. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? In the reception area that in this area it is not usually directed at us it could be to 
the PTA officer for example, for bringing a detainee in or underpaid train tickets connected 
to say an arrest warrant. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? 
Physically and verbally mainly 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Not really most of the people that come in are under 
the influence of drugs and alcohol not sober people and this makes a difference. 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? I don't think you could ever reduce the violence because 
alcohol and drug affected people are in different to measures that you might put in place by 
what you could do is reduce the likelihood of injuries to both detainees and staff if it was 
better laid out and if there was a bit more room to work with, there's a fine line between 
too much room which gives people too much momentum in a struggle and enough room to 
allow enough staff to get around a violent detainees to restrain them without injuries. 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? We should have a few or a 
couple but the biggest problem is we don't have anything at radio or anything else to keep 
them from being extremely bored especially for those that have been held over the 
weekend is literally nothing for them to do except sit there and think what can I complain 
about to get taken to the hospital just to get out of the cell 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No not really 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? The way I 
see it in the way try to get my staff to see it is that dignity is always there in the beginning 
and then part of it is up to the detainees to keep it as soon as they start to not comply 
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especially with things such as strip searches dignity begins to get lost. Every effort is made 
to allow detainees to keep his dignity we usually try to discuss all advise them of the 
consequences of not complying and that it would be much easier for all parties involved if 
the processes required are simply carried out as they are required to be carried out in any 
event. We treat everyone the same whether they're homeless or a businessman. 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Yes they are totally different so the detainees are not usually 
the violent ones generally never the violent and combatant types are usually always 
intoxicated or on some form of drugs. 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Yes this is precisely 
what determines whether it works or doesn't, so the detainees generally comply and a 
coherent and the layout that we have in this lock-up works very well when people are sober 
because we can let them know what is going on and they generally follow instructions. Drug 
and alcohol effected detainees are completely the opposite and with some they come in 
kicking and screaming and they are pretty much like that the whole time they are here. 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not really the majority of it use dietary we do have a 
pram out but I wish in regards to training we had more training to do with dealing with 
Africans rather than aboriginals at the moment the biggest issue we have is with Africans in 
the lock-up they will always fight you we have a lot of training in regulations aboriginals but 
most of it is irrelevant and only applies to perhaps say traditional aboriginals from the far 
north not the ones in the city and generally not the ones that we get in the lock-up here. 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. Your training goes straight out the door 
when you're dealing with transgendered people because there are so many different 
scenarios and options and different stages and one person's preference at a certain stage 
might be different to another's and this will always cause issues as procedure and policy is 
so black and white. 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? It 
sucks that we no longer have use of exercise yards, I don't think there was ever a hanging in 
an exercise yard in 50 years it's a shame because they're very valuable especially over long 
weekends or when people are held in a long queue of time. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? There is sometimes 
overcrowding but there are options like using some of the cells upstairs but officers must 
stay up there all the time but at a push you can put five people per cell as in five mattresses 
but there won't be much room to move, having said that I would rather have five per cell 
than further split the shift among different levels and lose staff permanently to those levels. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. There is enough staff now but I don't think there are at outstations, all the 
outstation staff was called back to the Perth Watch House as the loss of staff from here had 
left quite a hole. There certainly was quite a bit of staff turnover and were expecting quite a 
large turnover again soon. 
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38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No and there are no 
other forms of pacifying detainees no TV no radio no reading material. 
 
 
Interview 19 (20.05.2011)  
 
1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 3 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? To do half years and is at the police operations centre before that 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes, but I think I cope 
with it well I have I think self-control which comes from martial arts training that I do 
outside of work  
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? There are grievances but we try to deal with them in the same way it 
usually doesn't go very far in this sorted out relatively quickly sometimes there just 
misunderstanding 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? Every team is different some are very social some 
socialise at the police social clubs and some go to barbecues and then there are some inter 
– shift clicks like boys clubs. I sometimes have issues with the fact that I'm very young and 
the supervisor some of the older police don't want to listen to anything I say. The fact that I 
am a female this doesn't make it any easier 
 
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is 
the case? It's different on all shifts some people flow well and some don't. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? I think that there's more respect to sworn 
officers therefore morale might be higher in a lock-up when sworn officers work in there. 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? Not really could have done more video scenarios perhaps like 
where they stop the video and say okay what would you have done their we didn't have any 
practice in the lock-up itself, and also we had to rely on what the trainers were telling us the 
lock-up environment was going to be like perhaps they tried to make it seem like the worst-
case scenario, we were always waiting for the worst to happen, for someone to arc up as 
we knew it would happen we were just waiting to get it out the way, but it's not like they 
said it was going to be. What this did is we were always waiting for the worst to happen An 
interesting thing that has occurred since not long ago his police are not allowed to carry at 
Taser or OC in the lock-up but auxiliary and custody officers can. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. We hardly see the trainer I don't know what he supposed to do and 
the classes seem pointless some training seems irrelevant. 
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10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes I could see 
it happening it's kind of already happening but we are doing more work is similar to that of 
an auxiliary Officer. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? The design of this one is pathetic big issues are 
things like belts getting caught on parts of doors and things he have to step back to retrace 
your steps the corridors are way too narrow this lock-up is designed to someone that is 
compliant not someone that struggling and needs for officers to carry a limb each down 
narrow corridors all the way to the end. 
 
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes I have but I don't expect much can be done about things that are set in stone 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. Perhaps more space would be good 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. The size mostly 
 
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel 
about this? Yes and no sometimes the camera is used unfortunately surreptitiously by some 
staff, they can gesture with facial expressions to a detainees that is already agitated 
instigating a physical confrontation but the camera will only catch the confrontation not the 
subtle gestures that incited the fight. They feel that the camera in this case will keep them 
protected because it looks just like struggle. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I'm not sure probably not 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? The 
problem with the Sally port is the camera only faces the back of the van so camera 
placement is important. The firearm cabinet is too small and has been known that some 
officers have put their belt and weapons in the boot of the car, would be much better if it 
was bigger. Cameras are need to be well placed, the facilities need to be to be improved 
and the shape of the Sally port is one-way directional. 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? The 
observation cell location is okay but the problem is the detainees always provoke staff that 
sit at a desk and do their work there is always someone that has to be at his desk so when 
there are people in the observation cell this always happens because the one-way glass can 
be seen through. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it is too 
far away and the corridors to get there are too narrow 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? The sound quality is 
terrible that there is a lot of Crosstalk there can be a lot of antagonism overnight which 
sometimes leads to big problems and fights at breakfast time where all of the detainees are 
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in one eating dining room at the same time. I'm not sure what the rules are on eating in 
your cell this could be an option if there was an opening midway up the door I don't think it 
looks good to serve people underneath that all it was seem a bit animal like. 
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? There is too much of it and I don't know 
how you would stop it unless you could stop the problem of so much alcohol and drug use. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? At reception it usually involves the arresting officers and the detainees or 
sometimes detainees themselves. 
 
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? 
Physically and racially 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes sometimes that sometimes you never know because 
when a very violent person or someone who is known to be violent is bought in there are 
usually about six officers waiting for them to come in and then sometimes they are 
completely compliant an issue related to this is that sometimes officers are disappointed 
about this that was no action and it's like they're not violent they are a pussy 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently, and if so how? Yes designed differently and bigger wider circulation 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Sometimes they would be 
good 
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No I don't think 
so 
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse  
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? He learned 
tactical communications but you don't get taught specifically had to give dignity or maintain 
he have to be sensitive for example some people that have been sexually abused will have 
issues during strip searches they might be very self-conscious and it might be a very difficult 
thing to do and there has to be an understanding of this so I would give them plenty of time 
and even allowed them to turn around to take their clothes off and then get them to turn 
around or allow them to keep their hands over their private areas while getting undressed 
and then asking them to quickly remove. I'm not sure that everyone is so understanding 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Yes they generally do because they don't listen and I don't 
follow instruction and they generally don't comply 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Yes because they are 
non-compliant all of the issues relating to insufficient space come into play 
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33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? No not yet not really 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. I haven't personally come across this issue 
yet. 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? We 
can't use them unfortunately as we don't have enough human resources however they 
could be very useful. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Yes there are mainly on 
Sundays.. 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. Sometimes we don't have enough staff sometimes were down to as little as 
nine especially when people are out doing pick-ups and the like and I could say honestly I 
trust three people on my team the rest I would feel like they have to check up on all the 
time some have no clue some are just give the money. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No 
 
Notes from clarification questions sent via email 24 June 2011: 
“The first is regarding the number of people that can be held in the obs cell at one time is 
there a specific number or is it up to operational requirements or up to the supervisor?” 
No, there is no a specific number as to how people can be in the cell at any one time. It is up 
to operational requirements as well as the Supervisors on shift. It also depends on who is in 
the cell and their demeanour, charges, or other occurring incidents in Perth Watch House at 
that time. 
 
“Is H1 compliant - I don’t remember it being so, but I can’t remember . . . ” No, it is not 
because of the bars on the door. If a detainee is in H1 then there is to be an officer standing 
outside the cell door constantly monitoring the detainee. The same is for the Male and 
Female Exercise Yards. 
“Finally, is there a specific maximum length of time the holding dock cell can be used to 
hold a detainee (the one within the Sally Port just outside the entry door to the charge 
area)?” No, there is not a specific maximum length of time for the “fishbowl” holding cell. 
Obviously it depends on what is currently happening within the Reception area as well as 
the person in fishbowl’s demeanour. We do not hold detainees in the fishbowl any longer 
that what is required at that time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview 20 (20.05.2011)  
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1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 2 1/2 years 
 
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please 
indicate type) and where? 2 1/2 years and I've been associated with WA police in total to 12 
years as a camera operator 
 
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes, I talk about it to 
my partner but I don't go into much detail as it's too difficult to paint an entire picture. I 
usually wait till I get home to de-stress I don't feel that there is a way to really de-stress at 
work just cope with that. 
 
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think 
this method works? Most grievances are sorted out fairly well and fairly quickly where as I 
feel and I'm not sure about this but it seems that police tend to shift the problem from 
place to place. 
 
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as 
general duties or traffic and if so, how? There is a real us and them mentality from my point 
of view I think most police think that custody or auxiliary officers want to be police just 
couldn't make the grade, the truth is I never wanted to be a police officer, I didn't want to 
be an auxiliary officer and I still don't, and I won't unless I am forced to you might have 
heard that custody officers no longer exist per se we might be allowed to just stay and live 
out our days so to speak or we might be forced to convert to auxiliary or leave. 
 
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is 
the case? It's down to the particular shift but I feel that it's a very negative environment it's 
important to try to keep morale up sometimes issues with personalities and with different 
sergeants affect this. 
 
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated 
facilities has changed over time, and how? I am not sure I can answer that 
 
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a 
lockup facility/environment? We did our physical training at the corrective services 
Academy due to issues with limited space at Joondalup I felt confident with the training I 
had received in dealing with some detainees which might be very difficult. You can’t be 
trained for every circumstance and we only received an induction to the lock-up before 
starting here - we never set foot in the Perth watch House for training purposes. 
 
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? 
Explain your answer. We sometimes do mini training things such as shields, pattern, most of 
everything happens on the job. 
 
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes I think it 
should be. 
 
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties 
or does it make it more difficult and how? It hinders your work but then again much has 
changed over time in policing and within the life of this lock-up. 
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12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no 
why not? Yes and a reasonably good about some things I understand some things can't be 
changed and some things it would be too expensive to change but for the most part apart 
from a couple of occasions that I can think of they have been reasonably okay 
 
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain 
your answer. I think it could become safer and staff if there was more room to manoeuvre it 
would make it easier to have the right number of staff around the detainees was violent 
 
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps 
hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Probably the condition that it in and that a lot 
of it is non-compliant 
 
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about 
this? No I don't feel that we do there is a provision on the custody computer system to do 
remote cell checks or physical cell checks we generally always do physical cell checks even 
to the point that if were uncertain if someone is breeding we will get a second officer 
opened the cell On the shoulder just to make sure that is if we can't see their chest rising 
and falling clearly enough. I feel that probably outstations might rely on this type of check 
that is remote checks more often. 
 
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your 
answer. I think most do some wouldn't have a clue what to expect and that what they're in 
for before leaving the Academy 
 
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup’s, could they be made better, how? I'm not 
sure how you could make it better perhaps if the areas where officers disarm were separate 
to where they leave the vehicle that might be better the doorway from the Sally Port into 
the reception by the way could be improved. 
 
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? It's 
reasonably central and works reasonably well but the one-way glass doesn't work and 
detainees in that always distract staff behind the counter. 
 
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it is not 
ideal especially PC2 because if PC1 is being used PC2 is a long way away at the end of a 
number of narrow corridors. 
 
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup it's a bit off-putting 
because is no natural light or very little the only natural light that comes in is very dim as 
well this is from the exercise yard which we can't use anyway.  
 
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? It's deplorable and happens too often and 
unfortunately it's to be expected. 
 
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v 
detainee? Most of it happens in the reception area and there I say it that usually comes 
from aboriginal females. 
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23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Most of 
it is verbal some racial not so much physical, whereas males are more physical and verbal. 
 
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling 
the situation? Explain your answer. Yes in general 
 
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid 
out differently? Yes 
 
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Yes in an ideal world  
 
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No  
 
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? 
 
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse predominantly she's here 
six days a week from 8 PM to 4 AM and Sundays from 10 PM to 4 AM. 
 
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? We are 
very discretionary in the way we place different people for example elderly or sensitive 
groups. 
 
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are 
sober? Explain your answer. Yes so the detainees are much easier to handle and more 
compliant, alcohol affected but especially drug affected ones can be incoherent and want to 
fight everyone and anyone they come in contact with. 
 
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup 
facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? yes of course you 
should design the facility so that it caters for the worst possible drug and alcohol effected 
and then it will be appropriate for one else but if you design it just for compliant detainees 
then for all others it will not be appropriate. 
 
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? 
Does the lockup easily allow for this? We have prayer mats this is usually a make do 
scenario this hasn't been a major issue to date. 
 
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders 
and transgender people? Explain your answer. I haven’t come across this issue yet. 
 
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They 
are a great tool that we are not allowed to use we don't have it at our disposable if we do to 
waste of staff. 
 
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Yes there are mainly on 
Sundays, there are a couple of ways to deal with these and I would think in this order 
number one you put five people to cell, to you take the most compliant detainees to the 
non-compliant cells on the floor above with officers up there permanently, and three you 
have a full house any close the lock-up and then use outstations lock-ups that this hasn't 
happened yet. 
287 
 
 
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain 
your answer. I feel that we have sufficient experience but not enough staff. On Friday and 
Saturday nights we have two shifts one shift is a drop in go and the other starts at 9:00 PM. 
 
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No. 
 
 
Interview 21 (01.07.2008)  
1. How long have you been a police officer for? 30 years. 
2. How long have you worked in a Lock-up? For 8-10 years over career. 
3. What is the level of professionalism of staff in comparison to a traditional Lock-up set up? I 
think the level of professionalism has definitely improved, I think the surroundings, 
equipment and general setting raises the expectations of staff, in other words they have 
two raise the bar in a more professional environment. 
4. Are there any apparent shortcomings of the new generation design, related to the arresting 
officers doing their duties and how? Nothing that I can think of at the moment. 
5. What are the major benefits you can think of this new design brings? We have much better 
surveillance and because of this, it is much safer. We are able to see every inch of this Lock-
up and were able to control everything in it from one place. It has three levels of security 
from the outside in just to get in. 
6. Are there any major flaws? We haven't found any flaws yet. 
7. How could it be made better operationally? For the time being I would say the building is 
just fine to make it better operationally you would have to look at officer training and the 
training they received before they get here. 
8. What are your views on surveillance? In a Lock-up surveillance ensures everybody's safety 
so it is imperative. 
9. What’s special about your strip-searched rooms? They are light, private, and provide 
dignity. 
10. What’s special about your padded cells? They are a light cream in colour but nothing out of 
the ordinary. 
11. What size cells do you have? Our minimum cell size is 2.5x2.5 m minimum, and we have a 
3.0x3.0 m preferred cell size. 
12. What is your average ceiling height? It ranges from 2.7 m minimum to 3 m maximum. 
13. What can you tell me about the materials used? We have a lot of stainless steel, Poly Glass 
with metal frame, all corners are moulded, everything is counter sunk and we have 
moulded one-piece furniture in each cell that can be used for either bed or bench and this 
has intercom and panic buttons counter sunk into it. 
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14. What’s special about the layout and sightlines? We have excellent sightlines because of the 
circular layout the way I would describe it is like a series of cells around an open area in the 
middle and then she pictured it like an orange with a core and sells around it and then cut it 
into quarters each quarter would have an open centre which sells around it and we are in 
the middle. 
15. Is there anything in particular about the ambience that you find appealing in the new Lock-
up? There are no prison smells; we have good bio filters with 85% recycled air. 
16. How else is comfort maintained in the new Lock-up? The temperature is 23° constant. 
17. What can you tell me about the lighting? We have a combination of artificial and natural, 
there is lots of light in this new Lock-up it makes it feel much fresher and airy and definitely 
not as dreary as most other Lock-ups I have seen. 
18. What else can you tell me about the operation of your new Lock-up? it doesn't look like a 
watch house from the outside we have very good access to rail buffs and other transport. 
 
 
Interview 22 (03.02.2012)  
1. How long were you a police officer in Western Australia? 16 years. 
 
2. What is your opinion of having a live training platform? The biggest liability and issue with 
recruits in live training would be liability. The problem is, they need on-the-job experience 
and current training only provides a basic level of skill. In the mid-90s they had what was 
referred to as 500 plan this was a good tool that was implemented (P and I) as it weeded out 
those people who were considered not to be appropriate. P and I was a good tool to find 
any cracks psychologically. I definitely think there is merit in a restructured training program 
but you would need someone that has more than just a slight degree or more than just a 
policing background someone that has a well-rounded knowledge of many disciplines 
should be putting something together. 
 
3. What are some of the issues with current training? I think the problem is the training that is 
delivered now has become a bit too soft and a bit too ‘educational’ before we use to break 
them down (recruits) we wanted them to all hate the instructors as a team, then upon 
graduation bring them into the fold with the instructors. That was how we built a team, that 
was how we built camaraderie, and that is how we kept morale high. I think things have 
become a bit too individual now. The problem I had was voicing my opinion and standing up 
and saying certain things were not right it didn’t do much for my career. 
 
4. Where can improvements in training be made? Issues that I can think of at not to let 
desperation or pressures reduce the level required, I can remember a time where recruits 
had to pass at all costs, an approach to training where physical obstacles were reduced in 
height, size and weight to make it easier to pass. 
5. Could you make any comparison between the training within the W a police and any other 
police force you have been involved with? I have been involved with police in south-east 
Asia and they are not as heavy as they are made out to be but they have the respect and 
there is a sentiment that they are hard, and because they have this they do not need to be. 
Crime still happens but it’s pretty safe, murders still happen but it's usually because of 
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infighting between specific groups and not the greater society itself it exists in some sub-
cultures but if you didn’t know about these you would thing nothing ever happens at all. 
The only problem is here the government monitor everything phone, Internet, listening 
devices in outside public areas, SMS, and other forms of electronic data gathering such as 
toll booths, extensive network of cameras, many undercover plainclothes police on public 
transport. While this must seem over the top it is not knowing whether you are being 
listened to all watched that makes everyone behave especially in public, actually it’s a small 
price to pay to feel safe and for your family to feel safe. You just learn to deal with it (said in 
hush tone). 
 
 
